

**Getting to the Table: Non-State Actors' Contributions to Inter-state Negotiations –
Accessing the Columbia River Treaty Consultations**

Tomas Hatala

A Thesis in
The Department
Of
Political Science

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Art
(Political Science) at Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

December 2022

© Tomas Hatala, 2022

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the thesis

prepared By: Tomas Hatala

Entitled: Getting to the Table: Non-State Actors' Contributions to Inter-state
Negotiations – Accessing the Columbia River Treaty Consultations

and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (Political Science)

complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Signed by the final Examining Committee:

Mireille Paquet _____ Chair

Chair's name

Leander Schneider _____ Examiner

Examiner's name

_____ Examiner

Examiner's name

Elizabeth Bloodgood _____ Supervisor

Supervisor's name

Approved by Mireille Paquet _____

Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director

November 29, 2022

Pascale Sicotte _____

Dean of Faculty

ABSTRACT

Getting to the Table: Non-State Actors' Contributions to Inter-state Negotiations – Accessing the Columbia River Treaty Consultations

Tomas Hatala

States use public consultation processes for civic input in the hope of finding expertise, legitimization, and civic engagement for their policy. Non-state actors in turn see these consultations as a steppingstone for the inclusion of their preferences in inter-state negotiations, but the strategies they use to gain access differ.

This thesis fills two gaps in the academic literature by examining the consultation processes in Canada and the United States which prefaced the Columbia River Treaty renegotiations. First, the thesis analyzes how non-state actors are conceptualized and differentiated within the literature as well as synthesizing what strategies they use to gain access to consultations and policymaking. Second, the resulting framework of actors and strategies is applied to the Columbia River Treaty renegotiation consultations to see if such a taxonomy has value in understanding and anticipating how non-state actors enter into governance. Since river systems are at the juncture of strong tensions surrounding economic development, clean water, natural resources, environmental protection, and transportation they provide an ideal site for such an analysis.

I conduct interviews with 20 state and non-state actors who were part of the Columbia River Treaty consultations as well as examine documentary evidence to uncover the strategies they used to access the consultations. I find that while non-state actors often follow the strategies as

anticipated by the framework, they tend to stay within the confines of the state-led consultation processes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the help of both of my supervisors, Dr. Elizabeth Bloodgood and Dr. Leander Schneider, for helping me think through both the critical and the positive sides of political science... And for their kindness and support while doing so.

DEDICATION

To Miri and Didl! My favorite sekls.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

List of Tables	ix
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Literature Review	4
2.1 Consultation	4
2.2 Non-state actors in International Governance	8
2.3 River governance	10
2.4 Non-state actors	11
2.4.1 First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes	16
2.4.2 Subnational Government Organizations	19
2.4.3 Corporations	20
2.4.4 Business Associations	20
2.4.5 Professional Associations	21
2.4.6 NGOs	23
2.4.7 Public Advocacy Groups	25
2.4.8 Civil Society Organizations	26
2.4.9 Religious Groups	28
2.4.10 Citizen Representatives	29
2.4.11 Research Organizations/Think Tanks	29
2.5 Strategies	31
2.5.1 Lobbying	33
2.5.2 Networking	36
2.5.3 Expertise	38
2.5.4 Education	39
2.5.5 Legal	40
2.5.6 Framing	41
2.5.6 Political Mobilization	43
2.5.7 Issue linkage	45
Chapter 3: Research Design	47
3.1 Crafting Taxonomies/Typologies	47
3.2 Case Studies	49
3.2.1 The Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation	49
3.3 Method	50
3.3.1 Documentary Research	50
3.4 Interviews	52
3.4.1 Interviewees	52
3.4.2 No Response/Lack of Data	55
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework	58
4.2 Strategies: First Nations/Indigenous/Tribes	62
4.3 Strategies: Subnational Government Groups	65
4.4 Strategies: Corporations	67
4.5 Strategies: Business Associations	69

4.6 Strategies: Professional Associations.....	70
4.7 Strategies: NGOs.....	71
4.8 Strategies: Public Advocacy Groups.....	74
4.9 Strategies: Civil Society Organizations.....	77
4.10 Strategies: Religious Groups.....	78
4.11 Strategies: Citizen Representatives.....	79
4.12 Strategies: Research Organizations/Think Tanks.....	81
Chapter 5: Results.....	84
5.1 Actors Involved in the Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation Consultations.....	84
5.2 Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation Consultation Processes Overview.....	97
5.2.1 Canada.....	97
5.2.2 USA.....	111
5.2.3 Consultation Key Similarities/Differences.....	117
5.3 Results: Non-State Actors and their Strategies.....	118
5.3.1 First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes.....	118
5.3.2 Subnational Government Groups.....	124
5.3.3 Corporations.....	130
5.3.4 Business Associations.....	133
5.3.5 Professional Associations.....	135
5.3.6 NGOs.....	136
5.3.7 Public Advocacy Groups.....	143
5.3.8 Civil Society Organizations.....	146
5.3.9 Religious Groups.....	149
5.3.10 Citizen Representatives.....	150
5.3.11 Research Organizations, Think Tanks, Academics.....	153
Chapter 6: Analysis/Discussion.....	157
6.2 Strategies.....	159
6.2.1 Expected.....	159
6.2.2 Unexpected.....	163
6.3 Limitations of Research.....	167
Chapter 7: Conclusion.....	170
References.....	176
Appendix.....	212
A1 – Complete List of Documentary Sources used in Analysis.....	212

LIST OF TABLES**List of Tables**

Table 1: Distribution of Interviewed Actors Regarding the CRT Consultation	54
Table 2: List of Interviewees with Approved Designations	54
Table 3: Summary Table of Actors/Strategies Based on Literature Review	61
Table 4: Actors Involved in the Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation Consultations	86
Table 5: Summary Table of Actors/Strategies Based on Research Results.....	158

Chapter 1: Introduction

State consultations offer opportunities for non-state actors to participate in shaping state policy.

While there are other avenues through which non-state actors can attempt to influence the state, consultations offer a direct and cost-efficient venue through which the mandates and preferences of non-state actors can be heard by the state. Although being consulted in no way guarantees policy change or the integration of non-state actor preferences, it is potentially the first step toward such inclusion. This thesis unpacks the strategies non-state actors are able to use to access consultations within the context of the Columbia River Treaty renegotiation.

The increase in proliferation of NSAs throughout governance as well as their greater inclusion in state processes is well documented. Nevertheless, the diverse set of actors that are often grouped within academic literature under the “non-state actor” title often differ from each other radically and have different resources, capabilities, and mandates. The variety of the combinations of these factors condition and constrain non-state actors to utilize varied sets of strategies. While there has been an increase in nuanced accounts of how different types of non-state actors engage with the state as well as the strategies they use to do so, there are considerable challenges, such as along what parameters we categorize non-state actors. Thus, the problem of finding a logic along which the actors can be separated that also drives the strategies they are able to use is challenging. This project fits into this debate by offering a taxonomy of actors based on the existing literature and the strategies they use to access consultation processes within inter-state negotiations. To situate the project and test the proposed actor/strategy combinations derived from the literature, the taxonomy is then applied to the involvement of non-state actors in the Columbia River Treaty renegotiation consultations which have been occurring between the United States and Canada since 2011.

In addition to checking the taxonomy from the non-state actor point of view, the application of a hypothesized taxonomy and the examination of how the non-state actors operated within the context of the Columbia River Treaty allows for valuable insights into how states both enable and disable participation by the design of the consultations. Consultations tend to be offered by the state – for reasons such as legitimization of policy, information gathering, and consensus seeking – but the many forms they take constrain which tools are available to non-state actors to use in trying to access them. The context of the Columbia River Treaty is well-suited for this analysis as two extensive and well documented consultation processes took place which engaged with a multiplicity of non-state actors. Further, while many non-state actors do seek to participate in consultations, some disengage and abstain in a desire to pursue their mandate through means other than trying to influence the state. This in part depends on the nature and type of the consultation process and to what extent it is viewed by a non-state actor as a productive place for their efforts. As such, in addition to examining the strategies non-state actors use to gain access, the link between the consultation design and the engagement of actors offers a productive insight for this research.

Determining which factors are key to determining what strategies non-state actors use and which parameters of the organization impact their ability to engage in gaining access to policymaking requires an engagement with previous literature to create a conceptual framework. Academic literature often examines specific non-state actors and how they operate – such as civil society organizations or corporations – and looks for features that are inherent to the actor to create an understanding of what enables or disables that actor from accessing policymaking. This thesis seeks to supplement this mode and consider the literature in a meta-review to identify common features to organizations that speak to most categories, most of the time, and see if a clear

taxonomy of non-state actors emerges. Further, whether such a taxonomy is based on a particular logic of categorization will determine to what extent the specific actor categories can be tied to particular strategies. Such work also enables a reflection on what might be required in terms of research on non-state actors by future scholars. As such, the taxonomy is inductive in its construction from the academic literature, while its application to the case is deductive in testing how well such a framework works on the particular case of the Columbia River Treaty consultations.

The thesis unfolds as follows. Following this Introduction is the literature review, broken into a systematic overview of most commonly encountered non-state actors and a systematic overview of the most common strategies of accessing policymaking. The subsequent theoretical framework is the synthesis of these two sets of literature into categories which anticipate which actors are most likely to use which categories. The following results section outlines the consultation processes, the list of actors who were involved, and then the strategies these actors used. The analysis offers a summary of the expected and unexpected results from the Columbia River Treaty consultations and how well this case models the theoretical framework, and the conclusion offers future directions for research as well as reflections on how consultations, along other strategies, are a useful means for non-state actors to become involved in governance.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The first two parts of the literature review offer theoretical background on consultations themselves as well as the changing nature of international governance. This sets the stage for understanding how the non-state actors use strategies to access the consultation process.

The third part of the literature review considers river governance specifically to help set up the case of the Columbia River Treaty as a productive site of analysis for this inquiry.

The fourth part of the literature review offers two lists, generated inductively from the review of “non-state actor” literature. The first list outlines the actors that are often considered under the umbrella of “non-state actors” and includes First Nations/Indigenous/Native Tribes, even though the nomenclature of “non-state actors” does not apply to these state-like entities. The list outlines the key characteristics and definitions of the actors and how they have been understood in the literature up to this point. The second list outlines the strategies that have been used by actors to gain access to policy making. Both lists are generalizations in the sense that they highlight the most prominent interpretations of these categories and are there to generate the two axes of the taxonomy according to the existing literature. The theoretical framework ultimately combines these two lists to create a taxonomy of actors and the strategies they use.

2.1 Consultation

Consultation (in the context of policymaking) is most commonly framed as the link between democracy and participation in governance by the citizenry and a necessary step toward the telos of deliberative democracy where citizen engagement is of crucial essence (Dryzek 2002). This engagement then leads to the formation of a new democratic consciousness by acknowledging changing preferences (Rawls 1997). Public state consultations are the processes of providing “venues for claims making by individuals” (Laforest and Phillips 2007, 75) by governments as a

way of “improving policy outcomes” (Catt and Murphy 2003, 407) and “a way of involving (or sometimes, re-involving) citizens in the processes of governance” (Stewart 2009, 3). While the normative aspect is often put into question by pragmatic policymakers, the sense of obligation that states feel to consult those affected by policy changes is becoming more embedded in legislation, particularly in local governments in advanced democracies (Stewart 2009, 4–5). According to normative theory of citizen engagement and participatory democracy, the state might engage in consultations to obtain the benefits which can be gleaned from consultation, such as gathering information, accessing their constituencies, and legitimizing future policy decisions (Catt and Murphy 2003; Bishop and Davis 2002). Fung (2007) outlines that in a democratic system where often elections are the only method of participation consultations can be important avenues for citizen and policy-maker interactions and negotiation (2007, 672). Strategically, consultation can be used by states to fill in gaps in deliberative democracy, by creating pathways for the desires of citizens to translate up the different levels of governance where formal channels of communication are missing (citizens-representatives, representatives-Executive, Executive-outcomes) (Stewart 2009, 11). The benefits to policymakers are equally numerous – in particular when the results of the consultation are not binding (which they are often not), implying they create a pool of options that do not necessarily have to be adhered to or followed (Catt and Murphy 2003). Stewart notes that policymakers get better access to “information flows... diversity of views... early warning of problems... tapping into community of resources... political management” (Stewart 2009, 15).

However, citizen engagement, even with the intention of pursuing such a normative goal, often falls short of the promise with regards to the ability of citizens to meaningfully inform policy outcomes. Head (2007) outlines the promise of engagement is often strategically wielded by

states to lessen dissent. Further, Fraussen et al. (2020) note that the type of engagement approach will determine how varied the stakeholders which are brought to the table will be. “Open” approaches open the consultation to the public and everyone can participate, while “closed” approaches tend to target specific stakeholders (e.g. expert groups) privileged access, with “hybrid” groups being a mesh of the two (Fraussen, Albareda, and Braun 2020, 477). The former (open) are likely to be utilized to “to acquire input from a broad range of stakeholders as regards the issue at stake”, while closed approaches tend to invite only specific stakeholders who the state perceives are relevant to the issue (2020, 476–77). As such, in determining the inclusivity of the process the state limits the voices that can be heard.

Another manifestation of the challenges of implementing the ideal standard of consultation is the resurgence of “managerial” models of consultation (e.g. managing dissent/conflict) which can lead to less representation in democratic processes from local citizenry (Sawer 2002). In this model, consultation becomes a tool to acknowledge citizen positions/preferences while not necessarily following through with acting on the input – with the idea that being heard appeases the citizenry (Sawer 2002). Similarly, new forms of participation and consultation (e.g. citizen juries) can lead to pushing aside other, more traditional, forms of citizen engagement such as interest groups (Hendriks 2002). Consequently, consultation, though normatively desired by the state within the context of a participative democracy, can leave gaps in execution and does not guarantee an increase in participation and access for citizens and non-state actors to policymaking.

Tensions remain in the literature regarding the intentionality of the actors in consultation. As Head (2007, 447–48) notes, states, business, and community groups often follow self-interested pursuits in consultations in order maximize their capabilities and resources – a far cry from the

normative appeals of working together within a deliberative democracy, albeit within the theoretical framework of pluralism (Mouffe 2000). Non-state actors face barriers in trying to obtain access to consultations. The barriers preventing access can be logistical like the lack of resources to participate in diplomacy (A. M. Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998a, 16) or restrictive sites for diplomatic meetings, conceptually and physically (Hocking 2016, 233).

While the focus of this research is not to unpack the intentionality of the state, considering the design of the consultation process – which is often controlled by the state - as one element which can either facilitate or restrict the participation of non-state actors in the consultations is important.

Not all voices and ideas entering consultations are equally perceived by the state. Consultations create openings for different perspectives from multiple actors. Only a limited number of these perspectives can be adopted by policy-makers, especially if some of these perspectives are in opposition to each other. Consequently, consultations become a site of struggle where different meanings about the consultation (such as rivers) are invoked, disputed, and negotiated. These contested meanings ultimately shape the policymakers' perceptions of the topic will enable the actors propagating such frames access to the policymaking process. David Snow's and Robert Benford's theoretical work in the area (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1989; 1992; Benford and Snow 2000) applied to social movements and citizen mobilization (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Bennett and Segerberg 2013) highlights the concept of "frame alignment" as a key way non-state actors can inspire action by aligning other groups' (including states) perceptions of issues, causes, and activists to their own (Snow et al. 1986). Further, creating "resonance" (Snow and Benford 1989) between a non-state actor's mandate and the current issue being negotiated aligns the issue with an non-state actor's capabilities and thus might gain both popular

support for the actor's cause as well as gain them a seat at the table. Thus, within consultations the non-state actors strive to create "collective action frames" which link the reality of the issue with a narrative/persuasive intent (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). Consequently, being able to frame an issue in a particular way results in the creation of discursive power which the non-state actor can consequently leverage to gain access to, or have their ideas represented at, consultations.

2.2 Non-state actors in International Governance

Multiple research areas highlight the increasing diversity of both international and national governance. Research on polycentric governance (Koinova et al. 2021), where the state divests some of its decision making power to other actors has noted the proliferation of both actor types (states, NGOs, civic groups, interest groups, etc.) as well as venues (international organizations, transnational coalitions, regional and sub-national associations) (Bailliet 2012; Risse-Kappen 1995; Ayhan 2019). This diffusion of governance and decentralization of institutions (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Bäckstrand et al. 2017; Grincheva and Kelley 2019), as well as the rise of transnational linkages between them (Renckens 2019; van der Ven 2015; Vogel 1997), creates an environment where even inter-state negotiations, such as those of the Columbia River Treaty, are situated within a new international relations context, where non-state actors actively seek and strongly advocate for being included in such forums. In diplomacy, the non-state actors' voices are increasingly louder (Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte 2009, 553), especially in the context of the digital age (Choucri 2012, 22; Archetti 2012), where network and transnational dynamics amplify the non-state actors' calls for access and inclusion.

Within the realm of non-state actor advocacy specifically, research highlights the increasing presence of transnational networks of such actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 9), their attempts to

impact the domestic sphere (Risse-Kappen 1995; Henry and Sundstrom 2012) as well as international organizations (Tallberg et al. 2018a, 214). Resource-exchange theory, where states seek the free expertise and labor and legitimacy that non-state actors can provide while non-state actors seek access to policymaking, outlines the roles these non-state actors can play and the motivation for their inclusion in governance (Tallberg et al. 2018a; Steffek 2013). Hajer notes that once non-state actors mobilize an issue by “ignit[ing]” the citizenry, “public policy... creates a public domain” where a negotiation on both issues and the relationship between the state and its constituents becomes inescapable, with non-state actors often distilling these voices into interest issues (2003, 88). Thus, non-state actors’ strategies of gaining traction within governance can help fill in the democratic deficit by both amplifying and reflecting the voices of the public.

In addition to resource-exchange theory, the inclusion of non-state actors has been understood as an attempt to include the voices of non-state actors in governance and increasing their representation within policymaking. Bruhl (2010) outlines the initial understanding of NGOs as equivalents of civil society, particularly in academic perspectives, and the problematics of the missing critical perspectives on the roles of NGOs in the initial phases of research. Thus, NGOs were seen as offsetting limits to state governance (Bruhl and Rittberger 2001) as well as filling in the gaps between citizens and international relations (governance in general) (Florini, Nihon Kokusai Kōryū Sentā., and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2000; Nanz and Steffek 2004; Steffek and Nanz 2008, 4–5). In these contexts, NGOs act as bridges for citizens to reach policymakers by pooling preferences, and their increasing presence in both domestic and international politics was viewed positively (Bruhl 2010, 185–86). While such views came under

heavy criticism (Martens 2006), the ethos of non-state actors as stepping stones for distilling the civic voice has remained prevalent (Steffek and Nanz 2008, 6).

Representing a distillation of the public democratic voice, offering legitimacy for state policy, engaging in networks to mobilize aligned actors as well as offering legitimacy for states allows non-state actors to tap into structural, discursive, and network strategies to gain access to global governance within the context of inter-state negotiations. Thus, the increases in the presence of non-state actors within global governance (Bäckstrand et al. 2017; Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017), in part due to their diffusion throughout governance networks (Böhmelt, Koubi, and Bernauer 2014, 18; Hadden 2014; Hadden and Jasny 2019) and through a variety of venues (S. K. Sell and Prakash 2004; Grincheva 2019; Keck and Sikkink 1998), suggests they strive to become an embedded feature within international relations negotiations. However, non-state actors can also feel disillusionment with state-led government processes of policy-making (such as consultations) (Reddel and Woolcock 2004, 84) and can alternatively engage in transnational efforts to build governance which does not engage to the state directly (Hadden 2014; Hadden and Jasny 2019; Renckens 2019; Vogel 1997; Florini, Nihon Kokusai Kōryū Sentā., and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2000; Ronit 2016).

2.3 River governance

The examination of river systems, as a heavily structured context within complex and competing discursive frames, allows the researcher to examine how various actors choose strategies which are constrained not only by their capabilities but also the external structural factors such as the upstream/downstream nature of rivers. River systems are at the juncture of strong tensions surrounding economic development, clean water, natural resources, environmental protection, and transportation (M. Giordano et al. 2014). Negotiations surrounding rivers posit a particular

situation/problem structure through their nature as fundamentally defining upstream/downstream players (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, 895–96; Mitchell 2006; Zawahri, Dinar, and Nigatu 2016). In this situation, the upstream player has an embedded structural advantage as the actor who controls the water flow (e.g. by damming the river) and/or the quality of water (e.g. through pollution) – while the downstream actor is unable to overcome such a structural setting. At the same time freshwater operates in a highly-charged discursive framing of environmental protection/climate change (Mitchell and Carpenter 2019; Lesnikowski et al. 2021; Swain 2011; Beyene, Lettenmaier, and Kabat 2010; Milman et al. 2013). “Water”, framed as a natural resource (for energy, food, transportation) often conflicts with frames of “water” as an integral part of the landscape: a source of identity (for indigenous communities), a non-renewable resource that cannot potentially be recovered (due to pollution and climate change) and as an ecosystem of value beyond the anthropocentric use. For example, natural resource frames can be anticipated to empower actors such as hydropower groups, industry (fishing and agriculture) while “water” as an ecosystem most likely empowers groups such as environmental NGOs, indigenous actors, and civil society groups focused around sustainability (Christian and Wong 2017; Chen, MacLeod, and Neimanis 2013). These different meanings enable diverse groups to deploy potentially competing strategies to access consultations. How these strategies correspond to the available theories of non-state actor access to consultations creates a need to build a taxonomy which evaluates these links within the context of inter-state river negotiations.

2.4 Non-state actors

The term “non-state actors” (alternatively “nonstate”) is very broad and encompasses varying constellations of actors depending on the user (Taylor 1984; Milner and Moravcsik 2009).

However, non-state actors tend to be “organized actors” who are subject to a state’s (states’ in

the case of international organizations) “laws and rules” and are often seen as “interfaces between citizens, states and the global arena” (Koch 2016, 203). However, even these definitions are of limited applicability: for instance, First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes are often perceived as non-state actors by researchers (Figueira 2020) but they themselves often reject such definition, especially given their status as sovereign nations, both in name and practice (Hershey 2019; Haring et al. 2015; O’Sullivan 2021; Goff 2009; Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006). Further, the fact that Indigenous peoples represent “people” as opposed to “interests” often distinguishes them from other types of non-state actors (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006, 102). It is not surprising, Heffers et al. (2020) note, that “there seems to be no uniform definition of what constitutes a NSA nor an agreed upon methodology on how to identify or classify them”. Nevertheless, despite these definitional concerns, there are several aspects that unite non-state actors – such as the desire to have an impact on policy makers (Tallberg et al. 2018a) and their increasing relevance to global governance (Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017). As such, this section represents a synthesis of the major groupings of such actors and outlines their key characteristics to establish one of the axes of the taxonomy.

Attempts at creating such frameworks, or even lists of similarities among the organizations, face challenges that tend to lead to broader categories (Salamon and Anheier 1992b). Speaking to the general chaos in definitions of the “third sector”, Salamon and Anheier’s (1992a) definition that describes the “non-profit” sector for instance can only be extended to some non-state actors, ones who fit the institutionalized, private, self-governing, non-profit, voluntary aspects and hence cannot be extended to all non-state actors (Salamon and Anheier 1998, 186). However, the tenets of their “structural/operational definition” (Salamon and Anheier 1992a, 134) can be integrated

into considering both the structure of the organization as well as the orientation of their operations.

To create a systematic overview of non-state actors, various features will be considered that emerged as relevant logics along which different authors have conceptualized the divisions between the categories of non-state actors: organizational structure (funding sources, size, presence/composition of membership), mandate audience (audience public/private, domestic/international), mandate issues (specific, broad). While not all the actors fall clearly within the considered rubrics, these features of the organizations start to produce a rough taxonomy of the large and varied group of non-state actors.

Organizational features speak to the type and form of organization that the non-state actor operates in and can delineate both the capabilities an actor can leverage to access consultations as well as the limitations they experience in doing so. The most salient organizational features are the public/private composition of the actor, their relative size, their age, and their sources of funding. Stroup and Wong (2018) note the problematics of comparing across issue focus as a primary characteristic of similarity and encourage organizational structure to be considered at least as equally relevant (2018, 18). Whether an organization is targeting a specific private audience or the greater public good, profit or non-profit can also constrain their choices in executing strategies (Nicholson-Crotty 2009, 1044). Charnovitz (2016, 333) notes, speaking to international organizations, that depending on the funding sources as well as member composition, actors can be either public or private. Public actors tend to be sanctioned by states and created by them while private actors compose NGOs (as an umbrella category), but these divisions get quickly muddled (such as when advocacy groups get largely funded by the state). However, Salamon and Anheier (1992a) note that in contexts such as Germany, the legal

division of “public” vs. “private” ultimately has little impact on the organization: “the choice of a public or private legal form seems often a matter of political and other circumstance, rather than the strict application of civil law principle” (1992a, 146). This seems to create the need to go beyond the legal definition of public/private to see how these organizations manifest in their operations and structure. In the similar vein, Josselin and Wallace (2001) note how “private actors shade into public” (2001, 1) and thus this organizational aspect loses its classification potency. The sources of funding can also impact strategy use and effectiveness (Mosley 2011) as can membership (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008). The size and age of an actor can relate to their ability to advocate effectively for their causes (Mosley 2011; Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014).

The mandate a non-state actor follows is a set of guidelines that constrains their objectives and strategies. In turn, the orientation of an actor is significant as it speaks to the target audience for the actor and where they direct their efforts. In turn, the scope of what the actor tries to achieve will determine which issues are focused on and which issues are beyond the scope of the actor to engage in. The orientation of a non-state actor determines what frame it fits in, to borrow the language from Schoenefeld (2021). Such distinctions in orientation and mandate constitute the differences in the category in which an actor will be slotted and removes much of the analytical ambiguity that is not clarified by the actors’ organizational features. Thus, in addition to the organizational features above, the actor’s target audience, relationship to the state (J. L. Cohen and Arrato 1992), and sources of their legitimization/power (Arts, Noortmann, and Reinalda 2001)– their mandate – is another dimension of categorization.

The challenges of creating a taxonomy of non-state actors are in choosing one logic to create the categories. Based on such a logic, one can assign values to different members of the set which make them distinct from each other. However, given that no one logic exists within the academic

literature, but rather several different axes on which non-state actors can be differentiated, any attempt to generate distinct groupings of actors without imposing a logic on the selection process leads to a somewhat arbitrary list, rather than taxonomy which is logically consistent. In a more concrete application to the non-state literature at hand, two key logics are often employed by analysts to separate the varied actors into meaningful groupings. The first differentiation happens along organizational features, where variables such as size, membership, age, legal status, profitability, and funding structure determine categories. For instance, an organization that is not for profit, represents the interests of private businesses, and is registered as a 501(c)(3) category organization would most likely fit into a business association bracket. The second differentiation occurs on a functionalist logic – what the organization’s mandate is for its existence. Here, variation can occur on a private vs. public targeting, its relationship to democratic governance (offsetting a deficit), its scope of action (broad, narrow), and its domain of action (e.g. specific purview). An organization whose job is to advocate on behalf of a disenfranchised citizens who have no voice to access governance or policymakers might as such be categorized as a civil society organization.

However, it is clear that these categories are both used interchangeably and often mixed within the existing literature. A category such as an “NGO” is both organizational – it is defined by its legal status as a non-governmental organization, potentially either for profit or non-profit. The large variety of NGOs suggest there is little consistency in terms of age, size, membership, or even funding structure. However, the category of NGO is often also a stand-in for organizations which are perceived to offset democratic deficits, oppose the state and businesses, and pursue an ethos of advocacy for a particular issue or cause. Thus, when encountering research describing the behaviour of “NGOs” the reader is often unclear which of the variables of this kind of

organization are enabling or constraining its actions. Given the lack of definitional clarity, as well as the large variety within the descriptive variables (on both organizational and functionalist fronts of non-state actors), further confusion is engendered. Further complicating matters is that a category such as “NGO”, taken at its nominative definition (“*non-governmental* organization”), often subsumes other types of *non-state* actors (such as CSOs or PAGs).

2.4.1 First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes

First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes groups as a category all share similar traits of colonial displacement (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014), quasi-statehood (Haring et al. 2015), and shared challenges as a result of the Western systems of governance (Joseph 2018). The groups (either “Nations” in Canada or “Tribes” in the United States) are highly varied (Statistics Canada. 2018; Dunbar-Ortiz 2014) as are the policy issues on which First Nations and Indian Tribes engage with the state (United States Commission on Civil Rights 1981; Canada. Health Canada and Public Health Agency of Canada 2014). Thus, apart from the need to challenge dominant narratives in policymaking which are exclusive of Indigenous ways of being (Engle 2010) and working consistently to assert their rights of sovereignty and sovereign-decision making on their lands (Pitty and Smith 2011; Haring et al. 2015) there are few features in terms of organizational structure that are shared among the Tribes and Nations. Flanagan (2019) notes some shared similarities in terms of governance: First Nations tend to operate in Council formats, tend to appeal to treaties and rights, especially vis-à-vis the Indian Act (Joseph 2018), but in terms a cohesive set of policies sought, political agendas, or strategies deployed there is no one systematic effort among the Nations. Similar diversity of organizational features as well orientation is found within the US. Membership of First Nations/Indian Tribes varies depending on the regulations and rules within individual groups, but both in the Canadian and American

context a genetic tie to the Nation/Tribe is often a requirement (Xanthaki 2007) albeit identity-based claims are emerging (Sébastien Grammond 2009).

The first feature and challenge that tends to be shared among the highly diverse grouping of First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes is whether they constitute another group of non-state actors or have a special standing as sovereign actors who are arguably on equal footing with the states.

The challenges that result from this tension influence the ability of First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes to negotiate with states or impact policy on a nation-to-nation basis if they are perceived as sovereign. In comparison, as non-state actors, First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes can only seek to be included rather than having a right to autonomous self-determination as nations do (Pevar 2007). As an example, Indian Tribes within the USA have an “inherent right to self-government” (Hershey 2019, 55) but within the execution of this right challenges remain, especially over resources which are not wholly bound within the confines of the Tribes’ lands such as rivers (Cosens and Royster 2012). Thus, despite being “domestic dependent nations” (Hershey 2019, 55), what this means in governance and legal frameworks is often disputed. Such a tension is found within other Indigenous societies around the world from New Zealand to Canada to Hawai’i – with different domestic legal frameworks establishing what right to self-governance and nationhood these groups have (Haring et al. 2015, 15).

How this perception of sovereignty intersects with governance depends on the national context.

For example, due to the extensive case-law in the USA, American Indian Tribes¹ tend to have the autonomy to determine their own policy (Haring et al. 2015, 16). Further, they engage in

¹ The term “Indian” and/or “Tribes” is often used both by Indigenous/First Nations within the USA as well as by non-Indigenous/non-First Nations folks as a way to harken to legal recourse which embeds these terms into law (Hansen and Skopek 2011, 20-Footnote 1)

activities akin to nation-building which further enhance their sense of autonomy and sovereignty (Hansen and Skopek 2011, 9–10). However, the continual erosion of the norm of sovereignty with new case law in the 1950s in the USA suggests that, in practice, such recognition of nationhood may be only from the side of the Tribes (Hansen and Skopek 2011, 11). The recent successes of international norms such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) resolution, however, potentially opens up more space for international influence over domestic rights of Indigenous actors (Pitty and Smith 2011).

Indigenous actors vary greatly in the resources they have at their disposal: whether this is finances, access to information and knowledge generation, or embeddedness within networks (Statistics Canada. 2018; Canada. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 1997; Hansen and Skopek 2011; Haring et al. 2015). Thus, it is challenging to establish any explicit summaries of organizational features for the group as a whole.

Indigenous actors can create organized bodies composed of Indigenous members and funded from within the Indigenous communities (McCalman et al. 2010). Such Indigenous groups advocate to impact policy on a specific issue or on behalf of a specific group. The target of Indigenous advocacy though varies greatly and is context dependent and can only be generalized to reflect the needs of the Indigenous peoples in question. Their ability to impact policy depends on the extent to which the issue is covered under the Indigenous governance or it falls under the state's jurisdiction within which the Indigenous group is situated (McCalman et al. 2010, 160). Thus, unlike public advocacy groups, specifically indigenous ones are constrained in terms of their membership.

2.4.2 Subnational Government Organizations

Subnational government groups include organizations which, while not officially part of the central state, are operated by different levels of the state (Anzia 2019). These form a distinct category as they tended to be historically excluded from having access to inter-state negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2001), and as such need to be treated as analytically distinct from the central state. These come in a wide range of varieties: coalitions of cities (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; 2006; C40 2015), regional organizations (Fawn 2009), and interest-based organizations that have state-mandates but operate autonomously, such as crown corporations or governance councils (Bursens, Beyers, and Donas 2014) as well as elected subnational governments (states, provinces, municipalities), “deconcentrated districts or agencies of the central/federal/state government... special purpose entities... sub-municipal localities” (United Cities and Local Governments 2016, 13). One key element connecting these diverse organizations is that they tend to be subsidized partially by the state (through grants and subsidies) as well as self-generated funding through mechanisms such as taxation, property income, or local service charges (United Cities and Local Governments 2016, 11). As such, they can bring significant financial resources to bear as well as the extensive expertise built into their bureaucracies. While these actors can be interpreted as state actors (Josselin and Wallace 2001), within the context of inter-state negotiations they tend to be excluded from being part of the negotiating Entities² which most often include only federal level policymakers. As such, the researcher here perceives them to be another set of voices which have agendas and mandates that they wish to translate

² “Entities” is the term used within USA and Canada negotiations to represent the members of the national delegation who are authorized to negotiate on behalf of the state (U.S. Entity 2013; BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013a)

into the negotiation through the state and can do so through accessing the state in consultation processes.

2.4.3 Corporations

Corporations are actors which are incorporated businesses with a profit-maximization motive and come in a variety of organizational structures (or “firms” or “private business”) (Herbst and Prüfer 2016, 318). Globalization has brought about a rise of multinational corporations (S. K. Sell 2011) which transcend domestic state boundaries. Corporations have significant resources at their behest (Fuchs 2007) but are bound often by the will of their investors if they are public and by state regulation (Ronit 2016). Corporations actively seek to influence policy making at all levels of governance (S. K. Sell and Prakash 2004) and are often associated with pro-market and deregulatory motivations (Teichman 2001). Consequently, when attempting to influence policy the goals of corporations tend to be maximization of profits and the autonomy of the corporation as well as being able to influence policymakers to create favorable environments for fulfilling their mandates (Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte 2009).

2.4.4 Business Associations

Business associations are “private, formal, noncommercial organization[s] designed to promote the common business interests of its members” (Prüfer 2016, 305). There are many types of varied organizations that fit within such a category (Pyle 2005). They tend to serve both as sites of communication about industry needs as well as organizations where efficiency from collective action can be organized and pursued (Doner and Schneider 2000). Unlike corporations, business associations are not profit seeking and their membership comprises of different businesses and corporations, traditionally aligned within the same domain and are privately funded by their membership (Doner and Schneider 2000). As such, they tend to have large financial resources

available at their disposal. Membership, often composed of other organizations such as corporations, can be both voluntary or mandatory and show up in different sizes, within differing governance structures and have varied levels of hierarchy, and targeting both states as well as private actors (Nugent and Sukiassyan 2009, 426).

Nugent and Sukiassyan (2009) note that business associations can serve as an avenue to modify regulatory environments or help businesses overcome unfavorable taxation strategies, especially in the contexts of less stable and less institutionalized markets – especially when other methods (such as side-payments to officials) are not tenable (2009, 425). Further, they serve as forums of knowledge acquisition about the industry and its developments (Nugent and Sukiassyan 2009) as well as acting as internal monitors and arbitrators in cases where conflict within the industry may arise (Pyle 2005). As such, they have significant knowledge and expertise to bring to bear.

Business associations' roles can be distilled into several key brackets: rent-seeking (extracting value beyond the business input), value-creating (protecting property rights, reducing transaction costs), providing public goods (maintaining knowledge, enhanced infrastructure), coordinating social conflicts, and redistributing rent-seeking (Molnár 2020, 77–82). Consequently, despite most of these activities being centered about representing and advancing the goals of the businesses involved in the association, there are also social benefits and involvement beyond the economic sphere which can have an impact on the public, such as accountability to consumers which can serve as an avenue of influence for the public upon the business or corporation (Pyle 2005, 573).

2.4.5 Professional Associations

Professional associations tend to have a voluntary membership tied to a particular profession and consists of the intersecting “contexts of specific fields of knowledge and practices, clientele, and

values” surrounding the profession (Rusaw 1995, 217). Since membership is voluntary, professional associations engage with quite extensive socialization to engender commitment to both the organization itself and the profession (Gruen, Summers, and Acito 2000, 36; Rusaw 1995, 218). Their structure depends on their scope and can consist of internal hierarchical governance bodies such as councils and include processes such as elections to seed members into governing positions (Friedman and Phillips 2004, 194). They represent roughly a quarter of the workforce in advanced Western democracies and consequently have significant presence in the global workforce, albeit each state has their own associations (Friedman and Phillips 2004, 187).

Professional associations tend to share many of their qualities with business associations and focus on offering members benefits of reducing the costs of collective action as well as the informational role of providing up-to-date industry information (Larrain and Prüfer 2015, 468; Pyle 2005). As such, they have extensive expertise and knowledge to offer other actors. In terms of their orientation, unlike business associations, professional associations tend to be apolitical for the most part, albeit within highly unionized contexts can adopt a political role (Salamon and Anheier 1992a, 147). Distinguishing key features though separate business and professional associations. Professional associations create collective knowledges, ethical standards, social recognition of the profession (Markova et al. 2013, 492; Ki and Wang 2016, 200). In addition, unlike business associations, professional associations can offer certification for their members as part of both a sense of belonging but also of designating the profession and its members apart from others (Markova et al. 2013, 493).

Thus, “representing and promoting the profession” both within the public sphere as well as the policymaking circles is one of the key goals of a professional association (Dan 2000, 3).

Concerns specific to the profession which the association is representing (e.g. safety in medical

practice (Rowell 2003; British Medical Journal 1954)) can also serve as the primary concern for a professional association and be the sole reason for their existence. Professional associations tend to play an informational role by educating and socializing members into the profession, thus creating a set of collective expectations about what it means to be a part of the profession (Rusaw 1995, 215). In addition to representing the needs of the professionals, these associations can also serve and advocate for the public through improving professional standards and practices (Rowell 2003). However, Merton (1958, 50–51) notes that the public benefit and private interests of the professional association do not always coincide and consequently the public function is secondary to that of serving the “clientele” of the association.

2.4.6 NGOs

Lewis (2010) suggests that NGOs tend to broadly offer services and public advocacy while NGOs’ organizational features range from “large or small, formal or informal, bureaucratic or flexible” with “many [sic] externally-funded, while others depend on locally mobilized resources” (2010, 1059). They are eponymously non-profit (Charnovitz 1997, 187; Martens 2002, 278), but tend to be funded mostly by fees and service charges as well as state subsidies (to a non-controlling extent (Martens 2002, 280)), with a small component being private donations (Salamon and Anheier 1998, 219), alongside “publications, fund raising, and selling is used to pay for staff and activities to support their aims and goals more effectively” (Martens 2002, 279). While traditionally perceived as nonprofessional, this aspect of NGOs is changing, and “many NGOs today maintain a paid and permanent staff, and activists have certain abilities which are specifically needed for their work in the NGO” (Martens 2002, 279). NGOs tend to have “permanent members, offices, or financial income” and are “formal institutions with self-governing constitutional arrangements” (Martens 2002, 281). However, the problematics of

NGOs being a potential catch-all term for all entities that are not the state or state-managed removes much analytical potential from this category.

NGOs are distinct from governments and any organizations (international or domestic) that are connected to government and their mandates may have a “public interest orientation” who act as “advocates for a public good or the wellbeing of people and the environment” (Koch 2016, 202). Further, Schoenefeld (2021) argues that these organizations have a “governance” frame, suggesting their desire to explicitly affect policymaking, rather than fill democratic gaps such as CSOs (2021, 590). Domestic NGOs can form international branches or have international impact (hence transnational NGOs), or expand operations internationally or join NGOs from other states, becoming International NGOs (INGOs) (Arts, Noortmann, and Reinalda 2001, 12). The dominant orientation for NGOs seems to align with two key agendas: the goal of influencing governance and an explicit desire to affect policymaking, (Schoenefeld 2021, 590), as well as service provision (Helmut Klaus Anheier, Toepler, and List 2010, 1074). Further, NGOs seem to operate through networks more than hierarchies (Fukuyama 2016; Rhodes 2007) which translates to their strategy building.

However, it is challenging to concretely separate NGOs from other forms of interest-based organizations (Gotz 2016). The challenges of mapping civil society, and NGOs as one part of such efforts, highlights the variety of criteria one can employ to categorize what exactly an NGOs is and how it differs from public advocacy groups or civil society organizations and business associations, for example (Appel 2011; 2013; Lewis 2010, 1057–58; Martens 2002, 277; 2003, 2).

2.4.7 Public Advocacy Groups

While many nonprofit and non-state actors advocate, their individual characteristics (such as the target of their operations, or their organizational features, or their orientation) set them apart from public advocacy groups. Many public advocacy groups self-identify as interest groups and slippage from one category occurs to the other (Mosley 2011), but the “main goal and core activity [of public advocacy groups] is advocacy” (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014, 12). The theoretical distinction between the advocacy groups and interest groups is that interest groups lobby for “benefit of its members” rather than for something “they believe in” as do public advocacy groups (L. Young 2004, 5), although the latter (mandate fulfilment) can result in the former (benefits to members) (Mosley 2011, 436). Groups that advocate can be self-interested or represent a desire of the greater public through influencing government policy (Mosley 2011, 436) while not seeking to govern themselves (L. Young 2004, 5). One key element that further distinguishes public advocacy groups from other interest groups is that they do not actively deliver the services of the government (L. Young 2004, 7), but can offer service provision of their own volition (Mosley 2011, 436). Further, social movements can be included within the definition, although such definitional range mostly outlines the organizations and networks embedded within the movement itself (L. Young 2004, 7). Thus, public advocacy group’s primary mandate is to follow a particular issue and seek no formal inclusion in the governance of states while offering services to both its members and the public.

Depending on the context, public advocacy groups can be partially funded by governments (G. DeSantis and Mulé 2017, 3), such as in the Canadian context, albeit less so post-2006 (Laforest 2013). Whether state funding limits or enhances the ability of organizations to conduct advocacy work and fulfill their mandate is inconclusive within the literature and a matter of debate

(Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014, 18). They can include “charitable organizations” with a non-profit motive (Kirkby 2014), depending on their legal classification and whether they are allowed to engage in political activities or not (Helmut Klaus Anheier, Toepler, and List 2010, 1072–75). Organizationally, public advocacy groups operate across different levels of governance, from community (G. C. DeSantis 2013), to provincial (G. DeSantis 2010), to federal level (Kirkby 2014). The target of their operations tend to be policymakers (G. C. DeSantis 2013, 49) although the relationship can be adversarial depending on the political climate (Kirkby 2014), and they tend to engage with multiple other actors to leverage network effects (G. DeSantis 2010). Public advocacy groups tend to have an already greater level of professionalization and “have already achieved some success, as evidenced by having relatively large size, professional leadership, strong collaborative ties, use of e-mail, and high levels of government funding” – whereas those that do not possess these features are less likely to conduct advocacy to the same extent (Mosley 2010, 57; 2011). These patterns seem to be consistent across the literature, where size, age, professionalization, and institutionalization in terms of funding and alignment/interaction with the state results in greater advocacy capabilities (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014, 19).

2.4.8 Civil Society Organizations

Civil Society Organizations are organizational manifestations of civil society, which is a “state of democratic political culture”, manifested through citizen activity which is institutionalized so that it impacts governance (Badie, Berg-Schlosser, and Morlino 2011, 259). This normative ethos is translated into material advocacy (Ruzza 2011, 59) within organizations composed of both members who are citizens as well as professionals who help the organizations enact their mandates (Heylen, Willems, and Beyers 2020, 1226). Further challenging a simple definition, civil society organizations are often used as an umbrella term for any organization that

contributes to civil society – such as religious, business, or non-governmental organizations (Uphoff and Krishna 2004, 361; Appe 2011, 163–64; Helmut K. Anheier 2007, 8–9; Hinds 2019, 24). A negating definition that unites these organizations, however, is that they are not “involved in nefarious activities” (hence no terrorist, gang, or criminal groups for example) (Hinds 2019, 24).

CSOs have an orientation that tends to connote alignment with the state (J. L. Cohen and Arrato 1992) and is perceived as a way to “connect citizens with their governing institutions” (Schoenefeld 2021, 591; Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008, 1110). As well, since civil society organizations often engage in advocacy work, they tend to share many characteristics of public advocacy groups (Giannetto 2019, 166; Berkhout 2013) in their orientation/mandate. However, a key uniting factor is that they tend to be perceived as filling in the governance gaps through participatory/citizen based approaches rather than directly appealing to policymakers (Schoenefeld 2021, 592). They often have organizational membership (Heinrich 2005, 217), although the categorizations of CSOs based on this feature is not without its critics (Heinrich 2005). There is an explicitly “public” orientation toward most CSOs which tends to reflect them as a distillation of the civic society voice (Heinrich 2005, 218).

CSO structure tends to be non-profit, has a mandate and legal capabilities and is peaceful in the execution of their mandate (Steffek and Hahn 2010, 13:120; Hinds 2019, 23; Pallas and Uhlin 2014, 189). The overlap between CSOs and NGOs is partially of nomenclature: CSOs has become the preferred term for organizations that have termed themselves NGOs previously as well as including more broadly “trade unions, faith-based communities, and more loosely structured social movements” (Pallas and Uhlin 2014, 189). The resources and membership CSOs have at their disposal vary greatly from organization to organization.

However, the ethos of the civil society organization – to address “collective interests and concerns” – separates CSOs from other groupings, including the broader category of “non-state actors” in general (Hinds 2019, 25). Consequently, for the purposes of this research this category will include only formally defined organizations with clearly defined boundaries that is composed of citizen members for the purposes of fulfilling a particular collective mandate.

2.4.9 Religious Groups

Religious groups can be viewed as a special type of NGO – they are organized institutions that are non-governmental (excepting the statehood of the Vatican State) – of which some are non-profit while others are for-profit (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2014, 287). Further, the existence of NGOs explicitly based on a religious membership (of one religion) tend to proliferate and operate as public advocacy groups and civil society organizations (Tezel Mccarthy 2017).

Religious groups - significant in their size and scope, long established, many-membered institutions (Gill and Pfaff 2010, 58–59) – and are highly effective in maintaining an strong organizational presence as well as able to influence policy-makers. They tend to advocate to states on moral fronts as well as organizational interests, particularly when seeking exemptions or changes in cultural policy (Gill and Pfaff 2010, 59). Given that religious groups are often subsidized by states (J. Fox 2006), religious groups tend to enter the policy-cycle with a privileged status compared to many other non-state actors and have large resources at their behest. However, this is dependent on the state context where the legal status of religious organizations as well an official separation between the Church and State offer limitations on their access to policymakers. In states where pluralism of religion exists (no one predominant state-sanctioned religion), religious groups have to fight harder for both funding as well as constituents and tend to much more actively engage in advocacy work (Gill and Pfaff 2010, 73),

such as alongside social movements (Smith 1996; Chong 1991). However, given the strong control religious groups enact over their membership (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004, 412; Iannaccone 1990), which is also a key source of funding (Finnegan and McCarron 2000, 126–28), this connection to the state or other groups is not always necessary. Further, state support might not be desirable, as it tends to create fears in the public about the “credibility of their credence” due to their ties beyond the church, which lowers their legitimacy and authority (Gill 2019, 16).

2.4.10 Citizen Representatives

Citizen representatives are invested members of the public who engage with policymaking in order to pursue specific goals. They tend to express particular interests which can aggregate into social movements or work alone but often serve to distill and articulate the voices of the broader public (Laforest and Phillips 2007, 76). While there are notable exceptions of well-connected/public figures causing great change due to their ability to sway policymakers (whether through inside or outside influence) (Busby 2007) many citizens find avenues for input only through formal consultation processes (C. M. Farrell 2000). Alternative understandings of citizen representatives divide the concept into its constituents. “Citizens” can inherently be “representative” by their very existence within a society and are not required to pursue active public engagement to be considered representatives (Stephan 2004). Similarly, the status of citizenship is problematized as individuals within a society do not necessarily have to have legal citizenship to represent the interests of society (C. M. Farrell 2000, 32).

2.4.11 Research Organizations/Think Tanks

Think tanks are both “private and public organizations that provide advice to governments” that offer information/knowledge to policymakers directly or use expertise to influence policy

indirectly (Stone 2001; Coleman 1991). In addition, they also serve a network function to mobilize and engage actors connected to the issue the advice is on (Badie, Berg-Schlosser, and Morlino 2011, 2607).

Think tanks, rather than having any one particular organizational structure find themselves reflecting the non-state actors from which they arise: civil society think tanks are explicitly non-profit, while research university think tanks are beholden to the mandates of the institution, while others are carrying out research on behalf of the government (Gaćeša 2020, 138). Further, think tanks are better defined by their function (knowledge and research generation) rather than their organizational structure (Pautz 2011, 419–20). Overall, think tanks tend to be independent and non profit, albeit this depends on the global context, where sometimes thinktanks are “para-statal” and fulfill state research functions (Stone 2001, 114). Within this context, they can be either funded by public or private funds, such as private endowments, explicit grants from the state, or through the affiliated institutions within which they operate (Coleman 1991, 440; Pautz 2011, 421). They tend to be varied in organizational in size and structure but align in their orientation being toward informing policy and knowledge acquisition through research– with varying commitments toward particular policy agendas or stances (Stone 2001, 114). Coleman (1991) however argues that think tanks tend to have a strong ideological orientation. Think tanks tend to have limited membership and engender legitimacy and credibility from their credentials (Stone 2001, 114).

Think tanks are focused explicitly on influencing policy (Pautz 2011, 421) and their rise to prominence has been linked to the rise of pro-market economic policies of the late 1990s (Leeson, Ryan, and Williamson 2012, 62). However, they occupy a space in the intersection of knowledge production, politics, and economics (Medvetz 2008, 6; Singh, Sharma, and Jha 2014,

291) which leads to a dual mandate where the think tank is potentially beholden to both finding knowledge as it is to serving a political purpose (in opposition to public advocacy groups, for instance).

Often, think tanks tend to operate by influencing the frameworks of reference – the “ideas” of a particular discourse – rather than by necessarily influencing policy directly (Leeson, Ryan, and Williamson 2012, 62).

2.5 Strategies

This section outlines the most common strategies of access to policymaking employed by non-state actors in the literature. Emphasis is placed on the key differences between these categories to highlight them as strategies that differ both in their practical execution as well as what capabilities they require for their execution. Similarly to the challenges of generating a taxonomy of actors, however, the literature differentiates the strategies based on different axes: communicative capabilities versus resource capabilities as an example. However, the greater challenge is in trying to separate strategies, despite these often operating in conjunction and reinforcing each other.

Both the access to strategies employed by actors as well as the likelihood they will be wielded are contextually dependent and *not* inherently connected to any specific factors/capabilities within the actor. For example, though First Nations groups might have access to legal recourse based on land claims, they do not necessarily access such a strategy at all points – the presence of the actor does not invoke the strategy automatically. Legal land claims might be of use in certain contexts but of no use in others. Thus, the first challenge is in trying to delineate a *stable*

category for a strategy – the same “strategy” (e.g. legal appeals) might take completely different form based on the context. If a legal claim is made within a court of law, the actor might be anticipated to use legal precedent to make their claim. If however the legal claim is in question (it’s very “legality” is not assured) the actor might chose to mobilize legal discourse to connect a particular issue to the legal frame. As such, “strategies” are inherently shaped by the context.

Further, categories are often embedded within each other. For instance, the category itself of “legal mobilization” is constituted by a host of other “strategies” – the ability to frame issues in a particular way (to make an issue about “land” for instance), the political mobilization or outside lobbying on an issue (to make that frame resonate more strongly and therefore be able to harken to it in legal discourse) and the ability to get relevant policymakers to share that view (inside lobbying). To achieve these ends, expertise and education might be wielded to create a particular version of events which then enables legal land claims to be made and have salience.

Consequently, the strategies do not operate autonomously from other ways of managing and influencing a discourse surrounding an issue - all come to bear, some more effectively than others, in a highly malleable and contextualized way that changes from case to case, from instance to instance. Thus, when an actor deploys a strategy, it is not because it is inherently within their capability to do so and they believe it will be successful, but rather because in this particular constellation of forces, the actor has found it conducive to attempt to influence the issue into a particular frame using a host of other strategies. Again, context empowers and disempowers actors in making claims.

However, such an analytical perspective is neither present in the literature, which often treats individual categories (e.g. lobbying) as separate, distinct, and static, nor does it lend itself to the creation of a taxonomy. As such, an attempt to differentiate based on the primary set of resources

a strategy requires is employed here. Nevertheless, the recognition going forward that such resources change in their value and capacity when employed should suggest that this division of strategies is not universal to any time and place.

2.5.1 Lobbying

Lobbying is often conceptualized in terms of inside and outside lobbying. While this analytical distinction will be covered in this section, there are features which tie both categories together. One of the key understandings of lobbying is that it is the communication between an actor and the government where there is an attempt to affect the decision of the state (L. Young 2004, 88). Such interactions require access of their own (lobbyist to decision-maker) and consequently privilege people who already frequent such circles – established lobbyists, people with past connections with decision-makers and well-funded lobbyists who can get a foot in the door (L. Young 2004, 88). For the groups that lack such resources informal strategies of raising awareness to harness the attention of the decision-makers become an option, which falls under the category of outside lobbying (L. Young 2004, 90).

Direct, or inside lobbying of the US Congress for climate change for instance runs to the scale of 3-4 billion dollars, and outside lobbying, or indirect mobilization of aligned actors, reaches similar levels (Brulle 2018, 293). Financial contributions, allowed until 2004 in the Canadian context on the federal level, were one of the direct ways to gain access – and contributions still exist and are allowed on the provincial or municipal level (L. Young 2004, 89; Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006; Canada Revenue Agency 2003). Broader regulatory frameworks, such as the Canadian Lobbyists Registration Act further constrain and set boundaries on the opportunities for organization to lobby effectively (Pross 2006). Within the USA, political contributions and activities are dependent on the classification status of the organization (defined as charitable or

not, recognized as the 501(c)(3)/(4) category of non-state actors) which determines to what extent political contributions are possible and whether they are tax exempt (Internal Revenue Service 2022). As such, the definitional status of a 501(c)(3) vs. 501(c)(4) organization constrains what strategies are available for the actor (Nicholson-Crotty 2009, 1046). If contributing finances is not possible, offering social venues for the lobbying groups and the decision-makers to mingle through group-sponsored events creates such opportunities (L. Young 2004, 89). Political financial contributions are one key form of direct lobbying where funds are allocated to key policy makers in terms of electoral support with the anticipation that down the line favorable policies will be enacted (Colgan, Green, and Hale 2020, 5–6; Bloodgood 2011, 98–99; Sunstein 2007, 12). Since some non-state actors (e.g. corporations) are allowed to make political contributions while non-profit organizations are not (in theory – but in reality some funds can be used for political purposes in Canada (Canada Revenue Agency 2003)), the coalition building by non-profit organizations with corporations might in part allow access to this kind of direct lobbying. Consultations have also been shown to be particularly effective sites of lobbying efforts in accessing policymakers (Quitkat and Kotzian 2011).

Further, as Drutman (2015, 79–83) outlines in detail, direct lobbying “involve[s] contacting policymakers, monitoring congressional activities and hearings, and building political coalitions” as well as “testifying before Congress, media outreach, fundraising for favored politicians, and drafting legislation” (Brulle 2018, 292). Insider groups tend to receive recognition from the state as “legitimate spokespersons” for their cases, anticipate a productive “dialogue” and of offering only “well-researched, accurate and truthful cases to support their claims” (Lee and Abbot 2021, 29). Such privileged recognition and legitimacy are a strong indication of inside lobbyists’ ability to influence policymaking. This can happen beyond the domestic sphere, speaking to elements of

the boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998), where non-state actors leverage their networks to engage states to pressure each other to be more receptive to their networked NGOs. Further, actors “venue shop” for the best possible regulatory environment globally to suit their needs, and try to influence these international contexts rather than the domestic ones (Chalmers and Iacobov 2019; Pralle 2003).

Lobbying also engages on the discursive front (Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) rather than being a simple transaction of contributing money into state officials’ bank accounts and campaigns in exchange for access (Brulle 2018, 292). The communicative component of lobbying is about creating aligned understandings which can be tapped for capacity rather than an anticipation of preferred policy making through money-transfer. Depending on the target of the lobbying, actors strategically choose the “bedfellows” alongside which their lobbying can have greatest effect, even ones that potentially might seem counterintuitive due to the misalignment of intentions and mandates (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018, 974–77). Thus, pooling resources to gain better access to insiders who might be difficult to access is one such example of a target conditioning the “bedfellows” disparate actors might engage with in their lobbying activities (Weiler and Reißmann 2019). Consequently, lobbyists create a receptive audience to specific policy proposals as well as a particular narrative about a policy issue by generating shared expertise, knowledge, meanings, and ethics around an issue. This results in an alignment of the lobbyists’ and policymakers’ understandings of the issue. This type of lobbying falls under the “informational lobbying” category, where the deficit of usable information by the policymakers can be filled by non-state actors (Bennedson and Feldmann 2006) with the intention of communicating a particular frame the policymaker should adopt (Milbrath 1960; Austen-Smith 1993). In return for such information, theoretically, the policymaker grants the

non-state actor access to the policy process or selects their version of the information to be the one informing the policy at hand (Chalmers 2019, 65–66).

Indirect lobbying, or outside lobbying, consists of mobilization of grassroots organizations or public relations (Drutman 2015, 14). Outside lobbying manifests in numerous variations. Public diplomacy can be directed by states but corporations might play an active role in shaping the issue through media channels as well as digital fora (Ayhan 2019, 70–71; Archetti 2012, 183). More directed public outreach through media can be either conducted by writing op-ed pieces, providing information, or supplying particular framings that reflect the corporations' particular stance (Supran and Oreskes 2017; Stokes 2020, 225). Philanthropy and raising public awareness through initiatives also puts specific issues on the table as well as the desired framing of these issues (Tesler and Malone 2008; Bertrand et al. 2020). Cooperating with unlikely members, as mentioned above, can help spread the reach of these techniques throughout the network (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018). All these methods require significant input in terms of labor and potentially resources. The effectiveness of outside lobbying is challenging to evaluate. However, one strand of research suggests that even though outside lobbying might not change the audience's/stakeholder's policy preferences, it does set the agenda and determine which issues are salient and talked about (Bakaki and Bernauer 2017; Binderkrantz and Rasmussen 2015; Soroka 2007; Pralle 2009).

2.5.2 Networking

Network effects allow non-state actors more access to policymaking. Networks in general have been long theorized to create cumulative effects in aggregating resources and lowering costs (Castells 1996; Owen 2016, 304). Various typologies of networks exist – ones that create knowledge, ones that disseminate it, ones that are focused around a topic area, and ones, and ones

that limit participation and knowledge types (H. C. Clark 2001, 1) – but they all share the ethos of pooled information (and other knowledge resources). In translation to strategies, individual non-state actors often lack the capacity – such as resources, finances, knowledge, points of access – and can gain these capabilities through either state funding or aligning themselves with other non-state organizations (other NGOs, businesses, trade associations, unions, etc.) (Abbott and Snidal 2009, 77; Tallberg et al. 2018b, 219). While not always the case, there might be normative synergies within the network of non-state actors as both values and information can flow within the network in addition to finances and access (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 9). “Leverage politics” and “accountability politics” both speak to the ability of the networks to enlist and mobilize actors to help them achieve their goals (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16). Often, to extend their reach to issues that go beyond the borders of any one state (e.g. environment), non-state actors use domestic networks to get access to international fora (Roger and Dauvergne 2016), such as international organizations where they can leverage influence onto multiple states or other non-state actors (H. Farrell and Newman 2016, 724; Slaughter 1997, 184). One such mechanism is the Boomerang Effect, which speaks to the utilization of a transnational network to pressure an unresponsive state on a particular issue, using a network member to advocate in their more responsive national context (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 13; Peterson 1992). This method is particularly useful when a productive relationship already exists between the states which can be leveraged by the non-state actors. While there are limits to the willingness of states to engage with non-state actors, if one state has an extensive consultation mandate (e.g. Canada) while the other state has limited consultation desires (e.g. USA), the responsive state itself might feel the desire/pressure to try to influence the non-responsive state.

Throughout these policy networks that emerge across multiple levels of governance (both state and non-state) (True and Mintrom 2001; Andonova and Tuta 2014) non-state actors become embedded in social networks as well – personal ties that allow for ideas to translate through the different fora without the gatekeeping possibilities traditionally offered by the state (Kelley 2010, 292; Böhmelt, Koubi, and Bernauer 2014, 20). Such linkages are amplified by communication capabilities which increase the ability of non-state actors to mobilize these social and policy networks to be more responsive and receptive to their proposals (Kelley 2010, 292). Ultimately, even if the networks are not utilized strategically to wield influence or change policy, they can serve as learning opportunities for “mimicking” successful strategies of other non-state actors (Hadden and Jasny 2019). Thus, the networks within non-state actors operate offer a host of benefits and as such non-state actors tend to gravitate toward them.

2.5.3 Expertise

Actors can offer expertise – knowledge, information, skills - to gain access to policymakers who are in need of such resources. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 16) highlight the role of information politics as a way for non-state actors to demand access. Information politics revolves around providing knowledge and information to where it is needed most quickly – whether within the network or with regards to the policymaker. While information politics are best leveraged within a network, they are an avenue of enabling non-state actors to fulfill their mandates within the context of policymaking.

In addition to positioning themselves as watchdogs of state policy non-state actors can offer valuable expertise (skills, deployment of tools, strategies) and knowledge (information) in exchange for access. In particular, non-state actors tend to excel at information generation specific to their mandate, which reduces the challenges and costs of states to access the directly

relevant information on the topic at hand (Tallberg et al. 2018b, 216). Thus information offers states material to seed into policies as well as defend them later on (Böhmelt, Koubi, and Bernauer 2014, 24). While there is significant overlap with the indirect lobbying strategy of “informational lobbying” (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006), within this context, the expertise generated by non-state actors is for their own purposes and potentially of use to policymakers rather than being specifically designed for the policymaker.

2.5.4 Education

Non-state actor provision of education is on a significant upswing globally and involves both actors supplementing formal education systems as well as offering non-state and private educational opportunities beyond what’s available through the state (UNESCO 2021). Thus, states in situations where education services may be lacking can utilize non-state actors to supplement these gaps. Further, non-state actors can offer educational services indirectly through financing educational institutions (Steer et al. 2015). Education is differentiated from expertise by requiring an institutional setting where the expertise can be disseminated.

Educational services lead to raising awareness for specific topics, add salience to an issue, construct/frame issues in specific ways and increasing state accountability on the issue, which leads to the non-state actor managing the way the issue is perceived by the state as well as those being educated (Roberts 2018; DeStefano and Schuh Moore 2010). As an example, within conflict areas where the non-profit sector as well as loose networks of organizations step in to supplement formal state education (Davies and Talbot 2008) we see non-state actors collaborate to offer either curricula or specific training (e.g. navigating immigration/refugee services). Once such an educational role is established, the non-state actor “develops local political leverage” as well as becomes the hub of a network surrounding the educational issue at hand (e.g.

immigration) (Ruszczyk 2019, 3036; Zakharia, Menashy, and Shields 2022) and gains access to policymaking.

2.5.5 Legal

Non-state actors make claims to legal frameworks within various levels of court as well as utilize them in legal mobilization of the different fora within which they operate to contest access to both policymaker fora and specific issues. While the specifics of First Nations/Indigenous/Tribes appeals are outlined in their own separate section, supranational emerging norms such as the UN Declaration of Environment and Development (Principle 10) (M. S. Sell 2006, 187) or the call for inclusion of non-state actors in the UNFCCC (Bäckstrand et al. 2017, 561) create opportunities for non-state actors to argue for inclusion in policymaking. However, such legal norms and soft laws are challenging to harness in domestic contexts and legal frameworks and consequently are only an indirect norm, rather than a hard law, for gaining access.

Non-state actors can use legal documents, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to challenge either a specific iteration of the issue itself or appeal to the legal form for their own inclusion in the policymaking (L. Young 2004, 112). Such techniques are used widely by a large variety of non-state actors, from both interest and member based organizations (Hein 2000).

However, when such avenues are not available, mobilizing legal discourse can be an avenue for non-state actors to appeal to legal codes and norms. Non-state actors, due to the common constraints on their ability to participate in various legal fora, both domestically and internationally (given these can only be used by states (De Silva 2017) with the potential exception of the EU (Bouwen and Mccown 2007)) often engage in what has been termed “legal mobilization” on the national front (Vanhala and Kinghan 2018; Lee and Abbot 2021; Vanhala and Kinghan 2022; Derman 2019). Legal mobilization is “any type of process by which

individual or collective actors invoke legal norms, discourse or symbols to influence policy or behaviour”, and manifests in “providing expert legal advice; developing and coordinating legal research and strategy; providing financing or aid in finding sources of financing for use of the law; sponsoring or coordinating non-legal research that may support particular legal claims; providing publicity about legal issues and developments; and developing or participating in legal networks and facilitating the exchange of ideas” (Vanhala and Kinghan 2018, 5–6). Such indirect support for legal appeals – especially for groups who do not have access to legislative processes directly – can strengthen non-state actor’s ability to contribute resources and/or demand access to participate in state processes. In the first case, being a source of legal mobilization can offer valuable tools to bureaucrats and consequently become embedded within a state’s policy as well as influencing legal appeals done by the state (Staszak 2013). In the latter case, legal mobilization *for* access within sub-national levels of court (e.g. municipal, state/provincial levels) can eventually translate to national contexts and be a source of inclusion (USDA 1992; EPA 2016). However, the translation of legal mobilization into direct legal action is an incredible challenge due to a lack of resources (Epp 1998), opportunity structure (Vanhala and Kinghan 2018, 8), knowledge as well as very high initial entry costs and consequently is not a common strategy (Dias et al. 2021, 11; Bouwen and Mccown 2007, 438; Vanhala and Kinghan 2022).

2.5.6 Framing

One strategy non-state actors can utilize to increase their relevance to the policymakers’ agendas is by tapping into their ability to shape frames which then create access to consultation for those aligned with these frames. Non-state actors can align the public’s interests with their own, thereby garnering leverage to pressure policymakers through outside lobbying (Tallberg et al. 2018a, 219). Tracking well with Keck and Sikkink’s notion of “symbolic politics” (1998, 22) the

most direct manifestation of this discursive strategy is through the concept of framing. Symbolic politics allow for the interpretation of an event into a meaningful whole, with the non-state actors framing being the salient one within the public's eye – an interlocutor between the state and public (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16). Unlike the rationalist perspectives which posit non-state actors as seeking to maximize access and influence through strategic choices, the constructivist perspectives highlight the role of interaction between these actors, the norms around which they operate, and the context within which they are participating as constituting the particular context within which non-state actors strategies are constrained (Haas 2004; R. Price and Reus-Smit 1998). Risse-Kappen (2017) suggests that constructivist strategies can be viewed as crafting arguments to create “common knowledge”, a set of truths from which the non-state actor can offer legitimacy and authority to state actors (2017, 267). This process of framing, alignment and reconciliation of actors and their roles and attachments to issues, is well described under the umbrella of “communicative reconciliation” (Reus-Smit 2007, 157). The discursive strategies non-state actors use to tap into these communicative frames to posit the negotiations in a way to position non-state actors' as capable of aiding/resolving the issues at hand.

Running parallel to sociopolitical interpretations of framing, the organizational communication's research based on the work of Erving Goffman (1974) offers critical insights of how exactly frames are constructed and negotiated. Frames are viewed by these scholars as collectively generated meanings which can result in a reorientation of actors toward action (such as activists, or non-state networks) (Steinberg 1998; 1999; Cornelissen and Werner 2014). Often, this creates intense conflict between the different actors' attempts to frame an issue (van Hulst and Yanow 2016; Purdy 2012; Dewulf et al. 2009; Brummans et al. 2008), which in turn challenges hegemonic discourses and structures within which these frames are being constructed (Joachim

2003). Research from behavioral psychology highlights the great extent to which framing shapes both the positions of participants as well as the possible outcomes that are conceived for a particular conflict (or negotiation in this case) (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Consequently, the power to shape frames results in definitional power, which can be leveraged to access consultations.

Framing can serve to link a specific issue with the non-state actor's capabilities. As an example, if a non-state actor has capabilities to mobilize legal avenues (lawyers on staff, intimate knowledge of the legal system, networks within the juridical system), it is in their interest to frame the issue as a legal one (Scheingold 1974). Thus, framing not only invokes a specific perspective on an issue, but also the privileges the tools which are required to address it.

One distinction between framing as constructing an understanding of an issue (e.g. Snow's interpretation) and framing as portraying a particular image (e.g. Goffman's understanding) is exemplified in through the idea of framing of the actor as branding. Barakso (2010) outlines that in the construction of identity, advocacy organizations and other non-state actors create a distinct brand which they can sell to consumers in the non-state market (Bob 2010). Non-state actors carefully choose their particular set of strategies, media output, and self-representation to create a consistent brand and sell that both to their constituents and policymakers (Barakso 2010, 157). In turn, the policymaker may choose to utilize the particular brand a non-state actor brings to the table to advance their own image/brand.

2.5.6 Political Mobilization

Political mobilization enables non-state actors to support those actors who resonate with the non-state actor's position on an issue through using leverage garnered by creating or removing

political support. This can be done by offering political support to a party, mobilizing the public, and withdrawing support.

Political support by a non-state actor of a state actor (a party, candidate, or a specific policy at stake in the electoral agenda) is one avenue through which non-state actors can try to directly influence policy choices or the receptiveness to particular policy stances. This can take the form of supporting a specific party directly, supporting an issue stance, or to focus on a specific member of the party (Carty, Young, and Cross 2000). Once this political support is established, the state group itself can then be utilized to reach the public through their embedded political apparatus.

In addition, indirect political mobilization, such as advertising within the context of an electoral campaign, can be a powerful way for interest groups to influence a specific policy issue. Thus, utilizing the highly politicized period during elections to resonate both with voters and the officials seeking to be elected results in greater attention paid to the particular versions of an issue's portrayal/framing (Hiebert 1991). As such, the issue itself is more easily politicized and gains traction within the public sphere (Habermas 1991).

The other vein of political mobilization is in close relation to outside lobbying, where the intended effect of lobbying indirectly is to raise awareness and traction for an issue beyond the policymaker – with the hope that the policymaker ultimately bows to the pressure of the public voice. If political mobilization happens in alignment with a specific policymaker's position, the resources that non-state actors generate are mobilizing the public opinion and using this political support as leverage for the state, in exchange for access (2018b, 219).(2018b, 219). If the policymaker's stance is in opposition to the non-state actors, non-state actors withdraw their support or openly critique and publicize the state's actions as negative or non-compliant with the

states' initial promises (Strezhnev, Kelley, and Simmons 2021; Murdie and Urpelainen 2015; Spektor, Mignozzetti, and Fasolin 2021).

Alternatively, mobilizing popular support for a particular issue can take form of protests. Such tactics – which overlap with outside lobbying as they do tend to target specific policymakers or issues and consequently mobilize other members of the public for the cause (L. Young 2004, 115–16). However, as Onyx et al. (2010) note, such tactics can be dangerous as they potentially antagonize the policymaker and prevent future cooperation from taking place.

2.5.7 Issue linkage

Issue linkage refers to the “the players’ beliefs that cooperative behavior in one setting influences the prospects for cooperation in other settings characterized by different issues” (Lohmann 1997, 39). In inter-state bargaining the issues that are attached to the main bargaining point are often thought of as side payments which are demanded of the weaker position player within the bargain (Schneider 2011). Further, as part of weaker reciprocity (Keohane 1986), side payments of additional concessions during bargaining are often connected to the negotiation as an incentive or deterrent to a particular bargaining position (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, 892).

While the linkages tend to be more effective on issues that are credibly connected in some way (Tingley and Tomz 2014, 350), linkages can also inspire commitment to a particular bargaining resolution/outcome through positive or negative rewards (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, 899).

In the new age of multilevel and transnational governance, nonstate actors equally partake in issue linkages as part of their bid to include their own desired outcomes within specific negotiations or appeals to the state (H. Farrell and Newman 2018). The three avenues issues become entangled with others – linking issues to bargaining positions, expanding the scope of the issues that are linked through knowledge and expertise, and seizing opportunities as they

arise within policy – in fact allow non-state actor voices that do not have structural easy access to state to find a possible “in” to push through their mandates (H. Farrell and Newman 2018, 524, 544). Thus, issue linkage becomes a potentially powerful avenue for non-state actors to impact policy and punch above their weight.

Chapter 3: Research Design

The research design section outlines the analytical process undertaken in the thesis. It begins with an overview of the taxonomy crafting process and subsequently outlines the value of the Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation as a well-suited case to examine this particular taxonomy. I then briefly outline the method employed here and examine the two key sources of data: documentary research and interviews. In each of these sections I outline in detail how this data was collected, analyzed, and observed.

3.1 Crafting Taxonomies/Typologies

The act of creating categories, or a taxonomy, of both the actors and strategies involves questioning the lens through which such categories are formed. Bailey's (1994) framework for distinguishing typologies from taxonomies suggests that typologies are "conceptual" while taxonomies are "empirical", noting though these distinctions often blend in reality (Bailey 1994, 4–6). Since this project to some extent attempts to align conceptual categories emerging from past research with the realities of how well these groups fit within these categories (hence a taxonomy of the actual actors consulted), the result of this effort can result in a productive comparison. The taxonomy itself will have the non-state actors on one axis (e.g. Indigenous groups, NGOs, business lobby, etc.) while the other axis will have a list of the strategies employed (e.g. leveraging the network, offering legitimacy through expertise, framing of issue as relevant). The table will be then populated with the actors found in the consultation processes of the Columbia River Treaty. If there is "misalignment" between the anticipated typologies/strategies and the executed taxonomy, the question emerges of where such differences lie and why the initial theoretical expectations from the existing literature were incorrect and need re-evaluation.

Generating a taxonomy inductively from academic literature results in a list of actors that at best share broad definitional strokes and at worst are arbitrarily grouped together by the preferences of the authors. Consequently, given that this project attempted to create such a taxonomy, rather than impose one based on a particular set of logics, the resulting list is both highly suspect, vague, and does not imply any kind of specific ordering. Thus, this amalgamation is not *meaningful* in the sense that the categories of non-state actors can inform some kind of logic which would drive a particular action/set of strategies from a specific actor grouping. An alternative way of approaching such a taxonomy would be to generate a categorizing logic based on the anticipated expectations of strategy use. If strategies are anticipated to be based on availability of resources (e.g. resource exchange theory), then the actors should be separated into those with large medium, small amount of resources – where factors such as organizational type or mandate are simply not relevant to the theoretical framework. However, since such a link between strategies and actors was *not* theorized, and rather inductively deduced from the literature, the resulting taxonomy is more a reflection of the disciplinary chaos more than anything else.

Understanding resources as a broad spectrum of material, communicative and political capabilities, it is still not possible to outline any stable measure of the *amount* of resources an actor may “possess”. All of these subsets of resources vary in their relative usefulness depending on the context, and as such, cannot be pinned to an easily comparable, stable value. For example, material resources may be highly effective in a scenario where lobbying access must be purchased through campaign contributions but are relatively meaningless when an issue has sufficient public attention and the relevant non-state actors are consulted regardless of their financial resources. Communicative ability to frame an issue matters when there are multiple

options available to sway, but becomes meaningless when one frame has gained the dominant position and cannot be displaced. As such, the only differentiation might be made based on the transaction costs of accessing certain strategies in particular contexts – which might be tied to the capabilities of the actor. If Civil Society Organizations have easier access to the groundswell support, and in the context of a particular struggle being able to represent the voice of the public matters, the cost for the CSO in accessing such a resource is less than for a corporation that might be perceived (again, in that particular context) as distant from the public. Consequently, a stable category of resource capabilities (as well as costs) is not possible to be determined apriori of the context.

3.2 Case Studies

3.2.1 The Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation

This thesis combines the elements of a theoretical framework generated by literature and tests it with a specific case-study that speaks directly to the framework. The expiring Columbia River Treaty, an agreement governing the Columbia River between Canada and the United States, is in the process of being renegotiated for the first time since 1964 and both sides have decided to try to renegotiate a new one (Stern 2020). In this iteration of the negotiations, there is an attempt to be more inclusive of the affected stakeholders in the negotiations from both Canadian and US administrations, and consequently both sides have employed extensive consultation processes to include a plethora of non-state actors: from local community representatives, to indigenous groups, to engineering boards, the local hydro authorities, scholars and academics, environmental activists, as well as local citizens (Global Affairs Canada 2018; A. Cohen and Norman 2018; U.S. Department of State 2017; Province of British Columbia 2014).

These two cases of non-state actors attempting to access consultations offers an excellent site for the examination of this theoretical framework, which necessitates a large number of varied non-state actors (and many of the groups examined in the framework do indeed attempt to participate in the consultation processes) as well as a variety of strategies employed by these actors. The relative strong documentation found within this case, from both the USA and Canada sides of the border, enables for the triangulation of research results from the interviews to portray a more complete picture of how the actors behaved in trying to access the consultations.

3.3 Method

This research uses an analysis of documentary sources and interview data to populate the taxonomy created through an analysis of existing literature.

3.3.1 Documentary Research³

The documentary research allowed for the dual purpose of generating a list of non-state actors and becoming aware of the process of the Columbia River Treaty consultations as well as for the triangulation of data from the interviews. In addition, given the gaps mentioned below in obtaining interviews from some groups, the documentary data was of crucial importance to inform the researcher of the actions that non-state actors undertook in the consultation.

The researcher first examined the state narratives of the consultation process which helped inform the general structure of the process. These documents helped generate an initial set of non-state actors that had been consulted in the process. Secondly, these documents also allowed the researcher to get a sense of the process of consultation itself as well as the timelines.

Ultimately, the documentation from the state sources and the summaries of meetings, events, and

³ For a full list of documentary sources consulted, see Appendix 1 A.

consultation functions gave the researcher a broad sense of the different frames and strategies that were used by the actors.

Following the initial review of the process of the consultations as well as the overview of non-state actors, the researcher conducted a thorough search through the organizations' websites, editorials, academic sources and document and media repositories. The researcher used the snowball method to collate an ever-increasing list of non-state actors and documents.

Consequently, the Table 4 within the thesis is a result of both the sets of actors as well as the documentation where this information was found. The documentation included reports, news articles, academic studies, infographics, letters, presentations, handouts, among others.

One source of documents were the research interviews themselves (described below) where research interviewees suggested certain materials or documentation to pursue within the context of the research (e.g. a mission statement of an NGO or a letter that was signed by an actor). As such, these were included into the analysis and the resulting table of data sources. The resulting document set was not analyzed with a systematic research method (such as discourse analysis) but rather parsed for themes and instances of the actors' viewpoints and the strategies that they used. As such, they serve to triangulate other results (such as those of interviews) rather than serve as primary evidence themselves. The researcher kept the search for documentation until a point of saturation was reached and no new evidence was regularly discovered using conventional searches – instead relying on references from interviewees as noted above. The documentary set also informed the targeting of the questions for the semi-structured interviews. In case a document suggested the use of a particular strategy and this was not emerging naturally within the interview, the researcher would prompt to see to what extent such a strategy was utilized – thus triangulating the documentary evidence in return.

3.4 Interviews

The interviews were conducted with 20 individuals from various non-state (and several state) actors involved in the consultation processes on both sides of the border. Whereas the individual interviewees are identified within the following section as well as within the Results section (within their actor sub-group), the interviews in general served as a primary data source to inquire the actors about the strategies they leveraged within the research.

The resulting interviews were transcribed and analyzed within qualitative research software (nVivo) to look for key themes and instances where the interviewee spoke to the theoretical framework or the strategies that were used. In all cases, attempts at triangulation with documentary sources were made to verify statements and offset any biases emerging from interviews.

3.4.1 Interviewees

While the interviewees sometimes self-identified in a particular way (e.g. “member of CBRAC”), they often touched on multiple categories delineated in the theoretical framework. Several interviewees, or the organization they belonged to, could belong to different groupings, depending on the analytical preferences of the researcher. For example, American Whitewater – a non-profit organization that supports access to waterways and enhances recreational opportunities – can easily fit under the NGO, CSO, or PAG grouping. Further, quite a few interviewees had multiple roles which they fulfilled within the scope of the consultation process. Some were concerned citizens who also happened to be members of local government, while others were First Nations who happened to be part of Indigenous Advocacy Groups and NGOs simultaneously. Consequently, the categorization process is highly subjective and as a result,

challenges the very basis of the taxonomy: when outlining issues of access, which exact “non-state actor” is being represented by the interviewee is up for the interpretation of the analyst.

The interviewees were offered an option of to self-identify in the interviews, including the ability to attribute certain quotations to different levels of attribution. Some interviewees chose to refer to themselves by name and their connection to the treaty was clear. Others chose fairly vague descriptors that would not identify them openly, citing concerns about continuing to work within the community on future endeavours and not endangering the connections and networks they had built. A few selected to be completely anonymous. This desire to not be openly critical due to the fear of endangering existing personal and professional connections to the Columbia Treaty does not suggest a censoring effect. However, it is worthy to note that one aspect of the consultation process, particularly in Canada, engendered a strong personal and communal connection among the members (particularly of CBRAC) of the consultations which the participants did not want threatened. Consequently, one idea that can be drawn from this process is that personal connection is potentially a method of managing dissent – further explored in the Discussion/Analysis section.

Even the interviewees who were comfortable being identified by name will be left anonymous for the benefits of the thesis and to avoid creating an analytical divide for the reader by perceiving certain interviewees as more outspoken, less critical, or more accountable. By treating everyone anonymously and just referring to them by their self-designated rank the analyst and reader can interpret them as voices from the (types of) organization they represent and move away from analyzing their individual personal characteristics.

Table 1 in this section outlines the distribution of the interviewees (total of 20), while Table 2 highlights their rank/organizational affiliation and to which non-state actor type they speak to.

3.4.1.1 Table 1: Distribution of Interviewed Actors Regarding the CRT Consultation

	Canada	USA
State Representatives	2	
Research Organizations/Think Tanks	2	1
Civil Society Organizations		1
Business Associations		
Public Advocacy Groups		1
Religious Groups		
Citizen Representatives	6	
Professional Associations		
Corporations		
NGOs	1	1
Subnational Government Groups	4	1
Indigenous Advocacy Groups		
First Nations/ Indigenous/Tribes		

3.4.1.2 Table 2: List of Interviewees with Approved Designations

Interviewee A	Canada	Province of BC, CBRAC Steering Committee	State
Interviewee B	Canada	Province of BC, CBRAC Steering Committee	State
Interviewee C	USA	Academic	Research/ThinkTank
Interviewee D	Canada	Member of CBRAC	Citizen Representative
Interviewee E	Canada	Member of CBRAC	Citizen Representative
Interviewee F	Canada	Member of CBRAC	“Expert in the Field”
Interviewee G	USA	Member of an NGO	NGOs
Interviewee H	Canada	Member of CBRAC, Local Government Committee	Subnational groups
Interviewee I	Canada	Member of CBRAC	Citizen Representative
Interviewee J	Canada	Anonymous	Anonymous
Interviewee K	Canada	Member of CBRAC	Citizen Representative
Interviewee L	Canada	Member of CBRAC	Citizen Representative
Interviewee M	Canada	Member of CBRAC, Local Government Committee	Subnational groups
Interviewee N	Canada	Academic	Research/ThinkTank
Interviewee O	USA	General Counsel, Northwest Power and Conservation Council	Subnational Groups
Interviewee P	Canada	Local Government Committee	Subnational Groups

Interviewee R	USA	Coordinator, Ethics and Treaty Project	Public Advocacy Group
Interviewee S	Canada	Founder & Executive Director, Living Lakes Canada	NGOs
Interviewee T	Canada	Member of CBRAC, Citizen Representative	Citizen Representative
Interviewee U	USA	Member of American Whitewater	Public Advocacy Group

3.4.2 No Response/Lack of Data

Despite expending great time and effort (within the confines of the ethics approval which restricted the researcher to virtual contact due to the COVID-19 pandemic) in reaching out to multiple potential participants numerous times, there are obvious gaps in the types of actors that were consulted due to the researcher's inability to form contact with them. Given the great relevance some of these actors have on the public consultation process both in Canada and the USA, I choose to highlight several instances of the challenges I experienced during the interview process as they bear on the results of the research.

The corporations did not offer a response to repeated inquiries. The lack of response from BC Hydro, which was crucially embedded within the public consultation effort on the Canadian side as well as the Columbia River Treaty in general (Province of British Columbia 2014), was surprising as the corporation is very engaged both in the consultations and negotiations of the Treaty. Similarly on the USA side, the federal agencies and administrators of the dams also did not respond to research inquiries.

Despite attempting multiple times, the researcher was unable to obtain any interviews with First Nations or Indian Tribes members. While not unexpected due to the lack of prior engagement with these groups, it is a critical oversight that the researcher hopes to rectify for future research, as the First Nations' and Indian Tribes' status both in the consultations and the ongoing

negotiations is unique as sovereign states – and consequently adds another dimension to how the state interacts with non-federal agents. One important point of contact however speaks to the concerns that at least one First Nation had which was regarding the possibility of breaching of the confidentiality agreement they had signed with the Province of British Columbia and the Government of Canada (Province of British Columbia et al. 2019). Despite my assurances that my research did not inquire into the negotiations process, the First Nation’s representative noted that they do not want to risk breaching such an agreement.

One key observation that the distribution of interviewees suggests is the dearth of responses from the USA side comparative to the Canadian side. The Canadian public consultation reports provided by the state (Province of British Columbia 2016a) as well as the extensive and regularly updated Public Engagement section on the Columbia River Treaty website (Province of British Columbia 2016b) provided an excellent overview of the Treaty consultation process as well as the actors who were involved, both in the past and present. Consequently, lists such as the CBRAC Member list (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016; Province of British Columbia 2022d) were invaluable tools and allowed the researcher to reach out to numerous members (whose emails were public or by referral through the snowball technique). However, such lists were not available on an active site for the USA Treaty Review, and consequently the researcher only discovered them considerably late in the research process (after the interview phase was completed) by using an Internet Archive search. Despite the few interviewees from the USA side being willing to refer the researcher’s invitation for an interview along, the interview struggled to find willing participants. This lack of active website on the consultation process made examining the consultation process in the USA challenging and highlighted the

difference between the ongoing nature of the process within Canada (ongoing public engagement efforts) versus their “concluded” status within the USA.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

In order to develop a taxonomy of non state actors' strategies to gain access to participate in consultations around international negotiations in the environmental realm, the theoretical framework associates the actors and the strategies based on the above literature. Such a matrix links patterns observed in the literature, often based on linking capabilities/resources with strategy types. However, such a vague theoretical link, which is not shared across literature, does not create one clean set of causal links that can be aligned into a taxonomy. Hence, the taxonomy here is more a reflection of the analytical links embedded within the literature than a selection of any kind of causal logic between actor and strategy. Such a taxonomy is testable in the context of a new case, which can reaffirm or disprove the multiple causal logics linking/aligning the two axes of the taxonomy (actors and strategies). Thus, the framework meshes the information already available in the field regarding non-state actors that traditionally try to access state governance with the strategies they are most likely to use as well as the potential explanations for why such strategies are particularly effective for these groups.

The intersections of strategies/actors that were found in the literature are represented in Table 3 (below) and justified within the following sections. One of the key challenges of doing this kind of analytical work is to disaggregate the often used, but rarely precisely defined, terms such as “non-state actors” or “interest groups” which are often used as umbrella terms for various groupings of non-state actors. However, the authors who use these terms do not always fully outline which groups are involved in their arguments and which actors are actually analyzed within their research. Consequently, if the author offers only a broad category (e.g. “interest groups” or “non-state actors”) when describing strategies of access to state governance, I apply that strategy to all categories, or to the group that was the subject of the empirical test within the

author's case. Further, since many strategies are used by multiple sets of actors (e.g. networking is used by NGOs, civil society organizations, as well as corporations among others), the theoretical framework overview table (Table 3), as well as the description, suggests how specifically the strategy is used by a particular actor.

The taxonomy is ordered based on the capacities and capabilities of the actors. Given the privileged position of First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribe groups as nations, they are first on the list as their capabilities will differ significantly from those of the non-state actors. Since corporations tend to have the most capital and resources at their behest, and consequently the greatest choice in terms of strategies available, they lead the non-state actor list. Business and Professional Associations, often funded by private capital, also have large capacity and thus are close in nature to corporations with regards to resources. The NGOs follow the list as they form a very large grouping of influential players and tend to be aggregated in literature as “NGOs” – meaning that the strategies they employ apply to many non-state actors in general depending on how the author interprets “non-governmental organization” to begin with. Further, NGOs tend to represent a wide variety of actors and as such the strategies they use tend to encompass a wide gamut of all the strategies available to non-state actors. Further, the list continues in a more arbitrary fashion, but most of the key strategies available are covered under corporations and NGOs, with subtle nuances offered under the remaining groups.

The theoretical framework is most helpfully viewed in a matrix format. Table 3 offers information on two fronts. First, what combinations of actors and strategies have been observed in the literature (the box is shaded black or grey), which also highlights the gaps in our knowledge actors and the strategies they use. Second, the double shading system (black vs. grey) indicates the level of deployment of such strategies. Black indicates the strategy is used often and

commonplace and has been documented as such by multiple authors within multiple contexts while grey indicates that this strategy has only occasionally been observed by the literature.

While the interpretation here is highly subjective, such analysis adds an additional layer nuance to the level of deployment of a strategy by an actor.

4.2 Strategies: First Nations/Indigenous/Tribes

The strategies for access to policymaking for Indigenous actors often revolve around past successful case-law, especially surrounding land governance (A. Cohen and Norman 2018, 18; MacInnes 2017, 155–57; Macpherson 2020, 394; Weinstock 2003, 94–96; R. T. Price 2009). Past victories (Marcum 2022, 265) have enabled Indigenous people globally, and especially within the Western context, to slowly demand for greater inclusion in governance.

However, the full recognition of default inclusion, both in consultation processes and negotiation itself, is slow. Globally, the most recognizable form of the inclusion of Indigenous peoples within policymaking has been the implementation of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) resolution and its caveat to seek consent, offer redress, and leave autonomy to Indigenous determination (United Nations for Indigenous Peoples 2022). The challenges of implementation of this protocol however abound (Godden and Tehan 2016, 100) and the translation into national contexts is challenging – as is advocating the strength of the legal norms that uphold it. Since Canada and United States were two of four countries that did not initially ratify the UNDRIP resolution, questions remain about the commitment to these norms (Pevar 2007, 30).

Indigenous groups can also appeal to national norms where they are codified in law. The Duty to Consult in Canada, for instance, mandates that sovereign projects within the nation must consult First Nations, Metis, and Inuit if they infringe upon the First Nations' sovereignty (Canada 2012). This is both a legal and moral and political commitment from the Canadian government (Goff 2021, 6). However, it is clear that within the framework of individual consultation protocols (either province or Nation specific), the goal is to “facilitate engagement, promote relationship building, clarify roles and responsibilities between governments and Indigenous

communities” rather than seek a consensus or consent (Canada 2012). Thus, despite the duty to “consult... and where appropriate, the duty to accommodate their interests” there are problems in utilizing this norm effectively to gain access to policymaking. Being based on “honor of the Crown” rather than being codified in the constitution (Richardson 2017, 3) suggests the legal weakness when a recourse to it would be taken up within a court of law. The case-law that has built up around this law, in particular with regarding the implementation of the results of international negotiation, suggests it is invoked for practical rather than moral reasons (Schwartz 2017, 4). UNDRIP itself goes beyond the goals of consulting and seeking to accommodate to seeking “free, prior, and informed consent” (Schwartz 2017, 2; United Nations for Indigenous Peoples 2022) – but as an international norm is even more challenging to enact into practice (Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

Within contexts such as the United States, consultation is an implicit norm which has been built through issue areas where the Tribes have gained significant victories/traction vis-à-vis state or federal governance, such as fishing rights (EPA 2016; Charlton 2014; USDA 1992). Thus, their inclusion in consultation could be framed in terms of a norm rather than an explicit legal framework. Nevertheless, the implicit nature rather than explicit coding of such a norm suggests the challenges of activating it when it is not offered willingly by the state.

International law has been used effectively by Indigenous actors to access state policy-making, albeit issues of access and participation within international law making bodies is limited (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006, 101). Consequently, access to “soft law” (Bailliet 2012) international organizations which form normative legal standards, such as the Arctic Council, has been found to be significantly more effective than inter-state legal forums where issues of access persist (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006, 102–4). This can be viewed as a modified Boomerang

effect strategy (Pitty and Smith 2011, 122): Indigenous actors use soft law international bodies (such as the Arctic Council) which also have member-state representatives and are beholden to their national/domestic governments to influence policy on the domestic front. The privileged seat (distinguished from “other” non-state actors – noting that Indigenous peoples often perceive themselves as nations as outlined above) that is often found for Indigenous actors within the international fora such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is illustrative of the effectiveness of this strategy (Goff 2009, 3–4).

Indigenous peoples, like non-state actors, form alliances and coalitions to gather power and support for their causes, especially if there is significant issue linkage (Engle 2010). While such alignment among seemingly varied groups might challenge expectations, the perspectives that link these groups (e.g. environment) can create powerful alliances and synergies (Löwy 2014). Thus, networking among tribes is common, as is creating coalitions between the tribes for temporary alignment of resources to fight for a particular cause (Boehmke and Witmer 2011, 27). Within the context of specific issues, Indigenous actors form advocacy groups which network beyond the Indigenous group and engage with non-state actors, such as academics, to boost their ability to fulfill their mandates given the meager resources these groups often possess (McCalman et al. 2010, 160; 2006, 9). The groups also often support members by engaging with the courts as well as advocacy, thus creating case-law precedent for future policy-making (McCalman et al. 2010, 160), but often they do not engage with government policymaking as they try to fill the very gaps state services have created in the first place (Tsey et al. 2002; McCalman et al. 2005).

Indigenous peoples also spend funds directly to offer political contributions/inside lobbying, such as payments to state, as seen by the Indian coalitions within the gaming industry both

within California and the federal government (Boehmke and Witmer 2011, 27–28). These contributions take form of “initiative campaigns” to the tune of 80\$ million for 5 years, not an insignificant amount (Boehmke and Witmer 2011, 29). However, this is dependent on the wealth of the particular Nation/Tribe. Much of these initiatives had elements of outside lobbying, such as media campaigns and consulting work (Boehmke and Witmer 2011, 29), and only a portion was allocated to the direct support of political campaigning of officials (Cummins 2011, 43). Some of these outside lobbying included taking legislative members on tours of tribal reservations as well as writing letters of support or opposition to legislative committees (Cummins 2011, 42). Consequently, both types of lobbying are extensively used by Tribes within the USA as a means of influencing policy.

However, due to the disillusionment with the state and the impotency of the duty to consult norms/policies (as opposed to hard laws), many Indigenous groups shun the consultation processes as a whole (Ariss, Fraser, and Somani 2017). Thus, disengaging with the state in trying to find common solutions, Indigenous groups often turn to either outside lobbying and mobilization strategies (Ariss, Fraser, and Somani 2017) or alternatively to adversarial litigation (Rozen 2021, 7). Therefore, though a consultation process is offered by the state, it might not be engaged in by Indigenous actors.

4.3 Strategies: Subnational Government Groups

Given their already close ties to governance, subnational groups sometimes choose to lobby, especially by alignment with private interests, or if private interests are already operating within the policy context within the region, as a way to engage with “contagious” networks of mobilization (Van Hecke, Bursens, and Beyers 2016, 1434). By lobbying alongside private interests, subnational actors both indicate their willingness to form partnerships as well as

incentivize support from the political mobilization of other actors who are engaged in the issue, creating “bandwagons” (Halpin 2011, 225). Similarly, research on open consultations of sub-national authorities suggests that participation by the private sector is a key driver to sub-national participation, but the reason for this link remains hidden (Van Hecke, Bursens, and Beyers 2016; Quittkat 2011, 653). One potential interpretation is that sub-national actors are highly politicized and themselves targets of corporate lobbying (Bursens, Beyers, and Donas 2014, 379) and consequently they act as a conduit for these preferences up to the national level. Another point of contact between subnational groups and states are consultations themselves which have been shown to be utilized by both non-state and subnational actors to gain access to state policymakers (Quittkat and Kotzian 2011, 403–5). As such, because subnational actors are embedded within governance due to their very existence, the ties which they have already made can be leveraged for further political gains. Given the substantial financial resources subnational groups can bring to bear (either from subsidies or taxation) (United Cities and Local Governments 2016), financially intensive aspects of insider lobbying (such as political contributions) or outside lobbying (such as advertising campaigns) might be feasible, dependent on national regulations.

In this vein, subnational groups often build networks (Ștefuriuc 2009; Kaltofen and Acuto 2018; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Gordon and Johnson 2017), which can help align similar interests with enough weight to overcome federal or state-level inertia or counter-push. The set of examples from climate change research on the continuing perseverance of states/provinces (Chaloux, Paquin, and Séguin 2015; Chaloux, Séguin, and Simard 2022) as well as cities (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; 2006; C40 2015) to continue to pursue the goals of climate change suggests

that they have the ability to both pressure state policy-making (Chaloux, Séguin, and Simard 2022) as well as pursue their own agendas beyond the federal level (Hocking 2016).

4.4 Strategies: Corporations

While corporations take many forms and are highly varied in their approaches to accessing state governance, they tend to share the traits of having large economic as well as structural and instrumental power to shape the state and market policy (Fuchs 2007). They have large financial resources, extensive network ties, and often the support of additional actors such as business associations to leverage in their choice of strategies. This significant set of resources and capacity allows them to deploy techniques of access which other non-state actors often do not have at their disposal. Further, given the rise of transnational corporations (Ronit 2016, 77), the international corporation has an ability to push for policy change in many domestic state fronts. Due to the large number of resources and capacity corporations have at their behest, they tend to mobilize resource-intensive strategies such as inside lobbying to a greater extent than resource-poor organizations such as NGOs or civil society organizations (Lee and Abbot 2021, 28; Betzold 2013, 302). Nevertheless, alliances with these different non-state actors allows corporations to engage with them to harness their expertise in outside lobbying (Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker 2016). It is unlikely that corporations would engage in issue linkage alongside these actors due to the risks of being embroiled in non-relevant issues, and they tend to side on the side of caution in terms of outside lobbying and political mobilization, due to the risks involved in being perceived as political actors (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018; K. F. A. Fox and Calder 1985). Further, evidence from large-scale historical analyses suggests that corporate business lobbying is on the increase in quantity and scope of access and is particularly prevalent

during times of political instability such as economic crises (Aizenberg and Hanegraaff 2020), which are on the rise as well (Altman 2009).

In practice this abundance of resources is constrained by external factors beyond the control of the corporation. The strategies corporations undertake therefore are a mixed bag of inside and outside lobbying (Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte 2009), as the choices they make depends on the institutional context within which the corporations operate. Where there are fewer limitations to direct lobbying, such as the allowance of political contributions or easy access to policy maker through consultations, corporations will elect to pursue inside lobbying techniques over outside ones (Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker 2016). Corporations therefore employ “both sector-wide and product-specific lobbying” depending on the context (de Bièvre et al. 2016, 1). Within trade lobbying, for instance, a highly judicial environment leads to more product specific product lobbying, whereas to advocate for broader sector issues engenders a more communicative approach of lobbying (de Bièvre et al. 2016, 25–26). While these venues and factors differ from domain to domain (trade vs. environment, as an example), the institutional constraints do factor into the choices of corporations. Nevertheless, compared to other types of actors operating within the same institutional constraint, business advocacy is more effective in affecting policy, although the reasons for this are not agreed upon within the literature (Varone et al. 2021, 496–97). Some research claims institutional constraints (little regulation of lobbying activities) and particular configurations of actors privilege businesses (e.g. weak other non-state actors) or a cohesive front, while other literature suggests that this result holds no matter what the context, although the rationale why is yet to be uncovered⁴.

⁴ For a detailed overview see (Varone et al. 2021) p. 479-482

One additional avenue through which corporations actively lobby are business advocacy groups, such as industry associations or business groups (Ronit 2016). Such organizations tend to have both access to networks of actors to mobilize (such as CSOs) and influence elements such as normative perceptions of an issue (outside lobbying) (Ronit 2016, 76) as well as the capital resources to directly support policymakers through financial contributions (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006). Further, campaigns to portray corporations as benefactors of particular causes and issues to improve their overall image (K. F. A. Fox and Calder 1985). This kind of advocacy work can be farmed as “education” and operates about informing both the public and the state about what are some of the roles that the corporation can play (K. F. A. Fox and Calder 1985, 7). Further, through efforts such as philanthropy, corporations gain social cache through which it can leverage in turn on the issues that they want to sway (Bertrand et al. 2020; Tesler and Malone 2008).

4.5 Strategies: Business Associations

Business associations tend to be directly aligned with the corporations whose interests they represent, both in national and international fora (Ronit 2016, 81). In terms of strategies of access, having the corporate donations’ large resources at hand leads to them being able to leverage resource-intensive strategies such as direct lobbying, which offers the corporations another avenue and resource network to utilize. Business associations tend to prefer inside lobbying as do specialized business groups (Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker 2016, 578–79; Betzold 2013, 306). They tend to be overrepresented within lobbying due to their large resource pools and capabilities (Braun 2015, 137). Further, through “providing information or expressing opinions regarding matters of public policy” business associations gain access to policymakers which they can subsequently lobby (L. Young 2004, 91).

Business associations tend to lobby on more “broadly scoped issues” (Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2019, 857), especially in comparison to specific business organizations, but they do face challenges when trying to find a cohesive stance on policy issues which makes subsequent coordination often more challenging, despite the availability of resources (De Bruycker, Berkhout, and Hanegraaff 2019, 295). However, during elections, the business association can advocate for a particular specific policy issue (L. Young 2004, 108) or support a particular candidate (Carty, Young, and Cross 2000) through both direct political contributions (Hiebert 1991) as well as election advertising/publicity (Carty, Young, and Cross 2000). Business advocacy associations also offer significant expertise to policymakers, which in turn leads to policy-makers attaching more credibility to their voices in other strategies of influence such as lobbying (Varone et al. 2021, 496).

4.6 Strategies: Professional Associations

Professional associations, much like business associations, have the capacity to lobby extensively both directly with policymakers and externally to the public (Larrain and Prüfer 2015, 471–72; Doner and Schneider 2000). Externally, such lobbying can take form of supporting other organizations, raising public awareness, challenging decisions regarding the profession and proposing specific policy legislation (Dan 2000, 3).

Professional associations also offer policymakers expertise, often through the form of research and the analysis of data collected from their members (Rowell 2003). Given that one of the primary functions of a professional association is knowledge generation and standardization (Rusaw 1995, 217), as well as ethical standardization (Markova et al. 2013), these resources can be adopted by the state as pre-packaged standards (Mattli and Bütthe 2003; Abbott and Snidal 2009; Bartley 2010). This in turn allows the professional associations both access to the

policymakers as well as to framing issues in the way that reflects those of their profession. Often, professional associations engage in “education and research-oriented activities” to boost their ability to offer relevant expertise on any given policy issue (Carmin 1999, 103). Further, professional associations can litigate on behalf of their members, or offer legal support (Carmin 1999, 103).

4.7 Strategies: NGOs

Non-Governmental Organizations can advocate directly to policy makers or through networks. NGOs do not “necessarily represent the public interest or common interests” and consequently their agendas are aligned with their mandates rather than external values (Dalton 1994; Abbott and Snidal 2009, 61). Their strong normative stances tend to dictate the content that is being translated to policy makers (Martens 2002, 273; 2003; Schoenefeld 2021, 585; Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008; Vierucci and Bakker 2008, 1; Abbott and Snidal 2009, 68; Zengerling 2013b, 28).

In terms of lobbying, Environmental NGOs focus mostly on outside lobbying (Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker 2016, 579; Martens 2002, 273) due to the lack of resources as well as the prohibition against non-profit political contributions. Further, outside lobbying allows for the function of organizational self-preservation – through outside lobbying NGOs gain “public visibility of outside advocacy to signal to their membership their active engagement and to maintain member support” (Betzold 2013, 306). The NGO advocates for its own relevance and survival through highlighting its mandate as crucial to the policymaker as well as internal legitimacy of the organization among members, which can be quite disparate and loosely organized (Betzold 2013, 306). However, within a concentrated arenas, such as environmental efforts on specific issues, NGOs can focus entirely on insider lobbying (Lee and Abbot 2021,

34). Their appeal to states is manifold: NGOs can act as aids in state regulation (Raustiala 1997), influence corporate behavior and conduct as well as educate the public (Wapner 1996) – all potentially useful to state actors navigating a complex arena of powerful actors. An observed drift toward inside lobbying has been observed within environmental governance (Betzold 2013, 302). To put this balance into perspective, only 3 percent of all climate lobbying in terms of value is done by environmental groups (Brulle 2018, 301). However, NGOs are not beyond finding strategic partners, such as greenwashing corporations who might also find it temporarily useful to align their interests with NGOs (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018). Consequently, though the resources are small within the NGOs themselves, networking can potentially bring more affluent corporations to invest on their behalf, offering legitimacy in return. NGOs also engage in public mobilization through protests and media engagement (Hein 2000).

Networking is one of the key sources of access for NGOs. Aggregating influence and resources through mutual connections and already existing points of access (S. K. Sell and Prakash 2004; Zengerling 2013a, 22) allows NGOs to amplify both the reach of their offerings as well as utilize each other's capacity and resources. Fukuyama (2016) and Rhodes (2007) suggest the proclivity of NGOs to operate in networked rather than hierarchical structures (whether domestically or internationally) which suggests this mode of operation is embedded in the operational structure of the NGOs.

Since NGOs have extensive expertise within the field (Ruzza 2011, 50–51) and they also can help with the implementation of programs, they are often utilized by states for these purposes (Rosenbaum 2006, 46–47; Martens 2002, 273). One key site for NGO expertise is the provision of monitoring and watchdog functions (Raustiala 1997, 720; Prouteau 2002; Denoon et al. 2020; Yang 2005; Palmer 1992) which can help states engage in deeper cooperation with each other

(Pallas and Urpelainen 2012, 2). Further, expertise as knowledge in the field area can be useful to states and is often offered up by NGOs in exchange for access, or as a way to inform and frame the situation (Delisle et al. 2005). Part of this information provision is the added transparency and legitimacy state actors will enjoy if the information is sourced from an NGO that is supposedly independent of state control (Raustiala 1997, 725). Education is used by NGOs as a delivery mechanism for this expertise to non-state contexts and has consequently the ability to frame the specific discourse (Tezel McCarthy 2017, 1–2).

Further, NGOs can use judicial avenues of access to fight for inclusion within policymaking. Seen more prominently in the international fora such as the UNFCCC, under Article 7(6) of the Convention, NGOs can gain status as observers (Zengerling 2013a, 21–22). Legal mobilization by NGOs can create new avenues where inclusion of NGOs within policy circles is framed as a right. Further, NGOs can use the legal system explicitly by ensuring follow through with environmental regulation by using the court systems (M. Young 2010). Examples from the climate justice literature (Adams, United Nations, and United Nations 2011; Godden and Tehan 2016; Marcum 2022; Derman 2019; Almeida 2019; Grear 2014) exemplify the possibilities for NGOs to utilize framing to connect non-legal issues (e.g. climate change) with those that do have legal jurisdiction (e.g. “human rights” discourses) (Derman 2019, 352). Consequently, framing is used strategically here (Joachim 2003; Benford and Snow 2000) to connect potentially disparate issues so that they end up getting more traction within already pre-existing legal frameworks. While Bob’s (2010; 2002) examples of “rights” discourses sometimes getting traction while others do not suggests such legal mobilization attempts are not guaranteed to succeed and Grear’s (2014) work suggests they may even backfire by privileging pre-existing discourses which are non-inclusive, the potential upside of having legal recourse through already

established institutions is a powerful draw for NGOs to engage in legal mobilization. As Lee and Abbot (2021) note, such framing attempts can be done through the information provision (e.g. expertise) to mobilize legal discourses rather than through direct appeals for legal inclusion.

In addition to legal mobilization, NGOs engage in extensive naming and shaming as part of their informational advocacy (Bloodgood 2011, 96). Both the ability to have information that highlights the states' inability to follow through with its promises as well as the normative accountability of the states to their promises allows NGOs to step in as critics and observers and highlight such deficiencies (M. Young 2008). Examples abound in environmental NGOs (Murdie and Urpelainen 2015; Strezhnev, Kelley, and Simmons 2021; Spektor, Mignozzetti, and Fasolin 2021), especially given the new perceived role of NGOs as watchdogs within the climate change system (Falkner 2016).'

4.8 Strategies: Public Advocacy Groups

Public advocacy groups, in part due to their varied nature and composition as outlined above, use quite a range of strategies to try to access policymaking. Research consistently suggests that the greater the age, size, institutionalization, security of funding, and professionalization a group enjoys the more likely they can leverage a broader range of strategies – and be more successful in their deployment (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008, 581; Mosley 2010, 57; 2011, 435). In terms of size, “the larger the number of volunteers in the organization, the greater the organization’s political influence” (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008, 581; Mosley 2010, 57). If the funding is mostly sourced from the state, there is a likely hood of the group using “a wider variety of tactics overall and increased use of insider tactics in particular” (Mosley 2011, 435), but potentially results in a “lower level of advocacy and political activity” (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008, 581). In terms of organizational structure, large numbers of volunteers and more professionalized

leadership leads to greater and more successful policy activity (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008, 481). The capabilities of public advocacy groups to choose strategies also depend on their legal status – whether they are for profit or non-profit (Nicholson-Crotty 2009, 1044) - with non-profit having different limits for lobbying compared to profit oriented organizations (dependant on the national context).

In terms of strategies themselves, groups adopt many advocacy strategies: “legislative advocacy; administrative advocacy; grassroots advocacy; judicial (legal) advocacy; electoral advocacy; media advocacy; research and public education, coalition building; and direct actions” (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014, 20). Direct lobbying, attending consultations and speaking directly to policy makers is quite common for advocacy groups as is providing expertise and knowledge generation (L. Young 2004, 8). Inside lobbying is available to those with greater resources and capacity and pre-networked connections with policymakers, and has been found the most effective for advocacy groups (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008, 581) and the most preferred (Gormley and Cymrot 2006). Further, inside lobbying can take place as part of other processes such as meetings and collective planning (Berry and Arons 2003). Through this mechanism, organizations also glean what they can offer policymakers and consequently build this capacity into their group, to “insinuate themselves inside government” (Berry and Arons 2003, 104). Less resource intensive insider lobbying tactics (such as calling or writing letters to government officials) are available to less institutionalized/small/less well funded organizations (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008).

Outside lobbying strategies such as joining protests or acts of civil disobedience are also engaged in regularly (L. Young 2004, 8, 116; Mosley 2011), especially if the organization has limited resources to pursue direct lobbying or through hiring professional lobbyists (L. Young 2004, 90).

Political mobilization is an option, but is less preferred as it is deemed more risky and threatens the relationship with the state and other groups (Onyx et al. 2010; Donaldson 2007; 2008).

However, within the online realm, extensive new research suggests advocacy can take place without threatening other collaborative efforts (McNutt and Boland 1999; J. G. McNutt 2006; J. McNutt 2008).

Further, offering public support is quite common for public advocacy groups. They can do this through direct support during elections or through highlighting specific issues and either protesting or supporting the policymakers who support them (L. Young 2004, 106; Carty, Young, and Cross 2000), but this is constrained by their legal status (Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008, 581)

Legal recourses, such as appealing to a constitutional right or to be included within policymaking has been wielded strategically by public advocacy groups (Hein 2000; Porta and Tarrow 2004).

The inclusion of social movement concerns (such as feminism, for instance) and the legal challenges framed within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms within Canada, have allowed advocacy groups to overturn legislative rulings on issues (Hein 1997). However, these are viewed as adversarial at times and consequently not deployed as often as more collaborative strategies (Donaldson 2007; Onyx et al. 2010).

Networking is extensively utilized by groups to establish partnerships, particularly with the state, which maintains not only access to policymaking but also favorable view of the advocacy group itself (Onyx et al. 2010). Networking as a result creates “culture of fostering advocacy as well as enhancing collective sectoral power and the ability to achieve broader support in society” – thus tying public mobilization, framing, and networking together (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014, 20; Onyx et al. 2010; Hoefler 2000; 2001). Public advocacy groups often utilize

knowledge/information as a way to leverage particular frames – such as during the environmental movement convincing the public to be sympathetic toward the cause (an ecology frame as opposed to an economic one) (Harries-Jones 1991, 12).

4.9 Strategies: Civil Society Organizations

Civil society organizations employ many of the same tools as seen in public advocacy groups and NGOs. Given their large variability, they possess a diverse set of skills and information that is of use to the policymaker. For instance, CSOs can provide information and expertise (Ruzza 2011, 50) as well as skills in helping deliver and execute and implement public services (Rosenbaum 2006, 46–47). Through this, they participate in an exchange of access for services and information (Berkhout 2013; Giannetto 2019, 166). While civil society organizations were sometimes at odds with state intentions or operated independently of them (Pallas and Uhlin 2014, 187), they will pursue collaboration with the state if they believe their resources are better served through cooperating with the state directly than by resisting them altogether (Giannetto 2019, 168). Pallas and Uhlin (2014) argue that the extent and ability of CSOs collaboration with the state or IOs depends on structural and situational constraints, as well as the social capabilities (e.g. personal connections to policymakers) that determines how fruitful such interactions would be for the CSO (Pallas and Uhlin 2014, 186). Further, civil society organizations tend to engage with outside lobbying to reach the public, particularly through the media and act as a conduit of interests back and forth between the public and policy makers (Ruzza 2011, 51). Further, especially for marginalized communities, civil society organizations can offer an ideologically aligned conduit through which to venue shop for the most opportune space for the community to advocate its policy desires (Ruzza 2011, 53). Due to the source of their membership in civil society as well as their composition as aggregates of the public voice, CSOs tend to gravitate

toward strategies which engage and mobilize the public, such as outside lobbying and public mobilization.

Thus, much like public advocacy groups, civil society organizations tend to focus on direct ways of gathering attention to their cause/issue, such as protesting for social movements and political mobilization of the citizenry (Andrée et al. 2019). Alongside these efforts, framing becomes very important to direct public momentum on a particular issue and steer it to act on specific policymakers to achieve a desired outcome (Benford and Snow 2000; Della Porta and Diani 2006). Thus, political mobilization of collective action becomes one of the key ways civil society organizations strive to impact policymaking (Sampson et al. 2005).

Due to their often fragmented nature as well as limited resources, civil society organizations engage in extensive network building, particularly around shared issues (Andrée et al. 2019, 2). Such networks can emerge between actors who already share a mandate (e.g. food affordability) or bring together a diverse set of actors around that specific issue (Levkoe 2014; 2015). One of the delivery mechanisms for the messages of such a civil society network or a movement is their ability to offer educational services to fill in the gaps of state provision, such as helping undocumented immigrants pursue legal status (Ruszczuk 2019, 3023–24).

4.10 Strategies: Religious Groups

Given their basis as moral authorities, religious actors often represent normative ideas as the foundational structural block of their existence (Madeley and Hayes 2016, 64; Hall and Biersteker 2002, 7), and the translation of such ideas and “lexicon” into the discourse of state or international actors acts as a form of soft power (Nye 2008). Thus, part of religious movements involves the sharing and engagement of ideas within other normative international for a (Gill 2001, 131–34). Thus, framing issues as ethical enables religious actors to weigh in actively on

policy. Examples of religious groups such as Al-Qaeda, however, highlight how hard power (in terms of military intervention) can be used to carve out a space on the political agenda by necessitating a response (Madeley and Hayes 2016, 71–73), especially when state responses are complicated due to the networked nature of religious movements (Juergensmeyer 2002).

There is a dearth in the literature analyzing the influences of religious groups (as opposed to religious parties or individuals) in advocacy (Yamane and Oldmixon 2006, 438). Religious groups also have lobbied governments, though mostly through outside lobbying (L. Young 2004, 6–7), albeit inside lobbying has well documented at federal level within the USA (Hertzke 1988; Fowler and Hertzke 1995; Tracy Kuperus 2018, 36). The networking that emerges from loose coalitions with social movements can also harness the capabilities of other non-state actors who are embedded in these social movements (Chong 1991; Smith 1996).

Religious groups have gained links to policymaking through supplementing educational services, especially in areas riddled with humanitarian crises (Tezel Mccarthy 2017). Faith inspired humanitarian actions through vehicles such as education positions the religious organizations at the center of a policy void which in turn allows them to leverage their particular mandates/frames on both the learners and the population (Davies and Talbot 2008).

4.11 Strategies: Citizen Representatives

Due to both limited resources and capital, as well as specific interests and scope, citizen representatives tend to focus on very specific issues and lobbying on “narrowly scoped issues” (Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2019, 857). Further, unlike business associations, the collective action problem of creating a cohesive policy stance within coalitions is easier for citizen representatives as is the subsequent positioning as a cohesive front (De Bruycker, Berkhout, and Hanegraaff 2019, 295). Citizen representatives tend to be more focused on “salient” issues due to the already

mobilized media support (which in turn alleviates the need to spend precious resources outside lobbying) that can be harnessed as well as the public support the issue accrues as it progresses (Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2019, 858; Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker 2016). However, it should be noted that Hanegraaff and Berkhout (2019) as well as Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker (2016) are referring to citizen groups – rather than citizen representatives individually – in their research and as such their conclusions may not be directly translatable between the organization (e.g. “group”) and the individual (e.g. “representative”).

Given that they lack “formal authority” or a “mechanism of accountability” (Stephan 2004, 121), citizens can engage with policy makers through organizing into collective bodies – an iteration of networking and political mobilization - such as citizen groups (e.g. Parent Advisory Committees in schools) (C. M. Farrell 2000, 33). The relative lack of material, network, and informational resources leads citizens to band together into groups. However, the translation of individual advocacy into group advocacy leads to the need to resolve and align disjointed mandates, find resources, and attune strategies to reflect the new capabilities of the group. As Stephan (2004, 121) notes, an organization of such sort remains either only loosely tied (e.g. citizens participating in a protest together along informal networks) or transitions into a new type of organization (NGO, CSO, public advocacy group).

Personal agendas surrounding policy issues can have great effect, particularly from notable figures. Thus, such lobbying tends to be oriented around the personal desires of the figure as well as dependent on the type/extent of resources they are willing to commit to the cause. While such resources can be small and have relatively little impact (e.g. a citizen donating a pittance or writing a letter to their government representative) some can have great scope and traction and resources (e.g. Greta Thunberg (“Greta Thunberg” 2022) or the Gates Foundation (Bill &

Medlinda Gates Foundation 2022)). Thus, the extent these actors gain access depends on the extent of their philanthropy (Morena 2021) and the personal social cache/charisma of the citizen (Busby 2007). Political mobilization – such as joining protests, virtual and in-person (Spaiser and Stefan 2021), or converting fellow citizens to the cause (Snow and Benford 1989; Klandermans 1989) - is one of the strategies of citizen representative activism, particularly within the environmental realm (Wapner 1996; Bakardjieva 2009; Carter 2001).

4.12 Strategies: Research Organizations/Think Tanks

Research organizations tend to access policy making through offering expertise to policymakers as well as direct lobbying especially outside lobbying (Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker 2016, 587–90) which utilizes the strength of coalitions and network alignment (Van Hecke, Bursens, and Beyers 2016). They tend to eschew inside lobbying, preferring to make arguments through knowledge claims and arguments (Pautz 2011, 423). These networks can extend in transnational contexts and can take the form of open, associational, closed, or membership-based forms (Struyk 2002, 86). Such lobbying tends to have extensive reach throughout all levels of policymaking within the state (Dür and Mateo 2010, 109). Media is often used by think tanks in trying to shift the discourse into a particular ideological orientation, rather than a specific policy outcome (Lingard 2016, 16). Such moves can be powerful as the media perceive (more so than not) think tanks to be independent and unbiased sources of expertise and information without political agendas (McDonald 2014; Rich 2004). Further, as some think-tanks “attempt to influence policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than lobbying, and many think-tank directors draw the line at advocacy” think tanks enjoy a privileged stance both within inside and outside lobbying strategies (Stone 2001, 114–15).

However, it is the ability to offer credible, trustworthy information (Fraussen and Halpin 2017, 112) that suggests research organizations as sources of legitimacy to state actors and thus engenders them access (Böhmelt, Koubi, and Bernauer 2014, 19; van der Hel and Biermann 2017, 216). The research organizations offer expertise to states which might not have the capacity to autonomously gather the same knowledge and skills without great expenditure (van der Hel and Biermann 2017, 216). This expertise can be as simple as providing information (Tallberg et al. 2018b, 215) or the skills the state requires through offering technical assistance and capacity building (Kaltofen and Acuto 2018, 17). The credibility of the research organization/think tank offers backing for policy proposals (Rich 2004), or indeed they tend to be sources of policy proposals which can be easily adapted by policymakers (Stone 2001, 114). Coleman (1991) notes that think tanks can operate as “policy boutiques” which act as “publicity organizations to market ideas and research sympathetic to their general aims” and lobby policymakers with relevant information to support a particular stance (1991, 439). Further, research organizations can serve as “laboratories” where learning about policies can take place before they are put into the real world (Hale 2020, 89; Roger, Hale, and Andonova 2017).

One concrete way that research organizations and think tanks tend to leverage their power for access is through creating networks which share discursively aligned frames. The dominant way of identifying such networks comes from Haas (1992) who termed these groupings “epistemic communities”, coalitions which tend to share “causal beliefs, canons of validity, [and] principles” (Peterson 1992, 154). Not all coalitions which agree on policy are epistemic communities as the underlying assumptions about the knowledge and ethics which generate their policy stance might not be shared. However, in many cases, a shared set of knowledge (e.g. scientific consensus (van der Hel and Biermann 2017)) can create a stance that aligns on the

other fronts (ethical, political, social) and can advance forward as a cohesive and integrated set of assumptions about the issue at stake (Haas 1992). When such a coalition aggregates enough momentum it can demand access through embodying the de-facto understanding of the issue and consequently being the source of legitimate information and expertise surrounding the issue (Hajer 1993).

Though not allowed to offer political contributions, universities do engage in outside lobbying by sending representatives to seek funding, as an example (L. Young 2004, 7). Furthermore, think tanks network strategically – or rather they are actively linked into networks to exploit the areas of “uncertainty”, such as climate change, to create doubt around any particular issue (e.g. climate change ‘science’) (Plehwe 2020, 151–53). As Stone (2001) notes, think tanks enhance their access to policymaking by engaging in “strategic practices to develop advisory ties to government, industry or the public” (2001, 115).

Chapter 5: Results

The results of the research are divided into three sections. The first section outlines and lists the actors involved in the Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation consultations, which have been gathered from documentary as well as first-hand (interview) research. The second section outlines the two review processes (USA and Canadian) and offers a timeline of the process, mostly gathered from documentary research. The third section, based on interview and documentary research data, outlines the key themes that emerged from the interviews and data regarding the non-state actors and the strategies they tried to utilize to get access to the consultations.

5.1 Actors Involved in the Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation Consultations

The list of non-state (although including sub-state) actors presented here is a collation from the various documentary sources (cited in Column 3 of Table 4), found throughout the research process both in formal documents connected to the consultations as well as from these actors' own public output. Column 4 of Table 4 indicates to what capacity they were consulted by the state or attempted to influence the consultations of the Columbia River Treaty. Not all of these actors were necessarily consulted during the public engagement processes within the USA and Canada. However, given that they were either invested in or connected to the consultation of the treaty in some shape or form, they are included in the list.

This list shows the great extent and variety of the non-state actors who did or attempted to influence the policymaking process of the treaty. This suggests that non-state actors not only faced challenges of access due to the difficulty of reaching policymakers but also because of the

competition faced by trying to access limited time and space of the policymakers due to the competition from other non-state actors.

5.1.1 Table 4: Actors Involved in the Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation Consultations

Type of Actor	Examples from the CRT	Consultation Involvement	Key Document Source ⁵
First Nations/Native Tribes (Canada)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> First Nations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Observer status <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ktunaxa First Nation <input type="checkbox"/> Secwepemc First Nation <input type="checkbox"/> Syilx/Okanagan First Nation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ktunaxa/Secwepemc/Syilx/Okanagan Nations were directly consulted by the state – now have “observer” status during the negotiations <input type="checkbox"/> The 3 Nations have representation on CBRAC as the Indigenous Nation Representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Province’s summary of the consultation process (Province of British Columbia 2014) <input type="checkbox"/> CBRAC List (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016)
First Nations/Native Tribes (USA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Tribes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Upper Columbia United Tribes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Indians <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation <input type="checkbox"/> Kalispel Tribe of Indians <input type="checkbox"/> Kootenai Tribe of Idaho <input type="checkbox"/> Spokane Tribe of Indians <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia River Plateau Tribes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Nez Perce Tribe <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation of Oregon <input type="checkbox"/> Okanagan Nation Alliance <input type="checkbox"/> Upper Snake River Tribes <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Tribes that were consulted (15) during the consultation process by the U.S. Entity, and 4 tribes/groups of tribes were ultimately included in the Sovereign Review Team: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Cowlitz Indian Tribe <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation <input type="checkbox"/> Upper Columbia United Tribes <input type="checkbox"/> Upper Snake River Tribes Foundation <input type="checkbox"/> On the Sovereign Technical Team, 5 tribes/groups of tribes were represented: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Cowlitz Indian Tribe <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation <input type="checkbox"/> Upper Columbia United Tribes <input type="checkbox"/> Upper Snake River Tribes Foundation <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The list of 15 Tribes involved in the consultation process initially is not clearly delineated in any of the reviewed literature. It is possible the 15 tribes are considered as the individual members under the umbrella of their parent organizations (e.g. UCUT, USRT, CSKT, Cowlitz) <input type="checkbox"/> Member roster of the Sovereign Review Team (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013e) <input type="checkbox"/> Member roster of the Sovereign Technical Team Designees (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division, n.d.)

⁵ These organizations often published their own material regarding the Columbia River Treaty renegotiation, suggesting they were engaged with the consultation process. If they were included in the official process (documented as participating in one of the state venues) in addition, both sources are documented

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Cowlitz Indian Tribe <input type="checkbox"/> Burns Paiute Tribe <input type="checkbox"/> Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation <input type="checkbox"/> Kalispel Tribe of Indians <input type="checkbox"/> Kootenai Tribe of Idaho <input type="checkbox"/> Fort McDermitt Paiute Shoshone Tribe <input type="checkbox"/> Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation <input type="checkbox"/> Shoshone Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Indian Reservation <input type="checkbox"/> Spokane Tribe of Indians 		
Subnational Government Groups (Canada)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Province of BC <input type="checkbox"/> Local Governments' Committee <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments (AKBLG) <input type="checkbox"/> Sounding Board <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia Basin River Advisory Committee (CBRAC) <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent Engineering Board <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 2 Canadian Representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Province of BC was designated by the Federal state to manage the consultation process) <input type="checkbox"/> The Local Government Committee was established to advocate on the behalf of the communities within the Canadian context with regards to the Columbia River. The AKBLG is one of the representatives in this group <input type="checkbox"/> The Sounding Board was established by the Province of BC to act as a body to distill the feedback through the selection of a few key representatives invested in the Treaty/River <input type="checkbox"/> CBRAC was the next iteration of the Sounding Board <input type="checkbox"/> The Permanent Engineering Board is a legally created group of four members, 2 Canadian 2 American, who manage the Treaty and its operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The description of the role of CBRAC and Sounding Board is described in the Province's Public Consultation report (Province of British Columbia 2014) <input type="checkbox"/> The role of the Local Government Committee is described on their website (Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee 2022) <input type="checkbox"/> The role of the AKBLG is described on their website (Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments 2022) <input type="checkbox"/> The role of the Sounding Board is described on the Province's website (Province of British Columbia 2016c) <input type="checkbox"/> The role of CBRAC is described on the Province's website (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016)

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Permanent Engineering Board has its own websites regarding the management of the CRT (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2022b)
Subnational Government Groups (USA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Northwest Power & Conservation Council <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia Basin Fish & Wildlife Authority <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Army Corps (state representative) <input type="checkbox"/> Bonneville Power Authority (state representative) <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent Engineering Board <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 2 American Representatives <input type="checkbox"/> Various USA Federal Agencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Bureau of Indian Affairs <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service <input type="checkbox"/> National Park Service <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Geological Survey <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Bureau of Reclamation <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Environmental Protection Agency <input type="checkbox"/> National Marine Fisheries Service <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Forest Service <input type="checkbox"/> Representatives of the States along which the Columbia Flows <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> State of Idaho <input type="checkbox"/> State of Montana <input type="checkbox"/> State of Oregon <input type="checkbox"/> State of Washington <input type="checkbox"/> City of Bonners Ferry <input type="checkbox"/> Multnomah County Drainage District <input type="checkbox"/> Multnomah County Emergency Management <input type="checkbox"/> Port of Portland <input type="checkbox"/> Senator Cantwell's Office <input type="checkbox"/> Adams County <input type="checkbox"/> Pend Oreille County 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Northwest Power & Conservation Council was not directly involved in the consultations – they had a continuing exchange of information with the Columbia Basin Trust but did not participate actively within the consultation processes. Several of the members of the NWPCC however were part of the consultations as state representatives <input type="checkbox"/> The Columbia Basin Fish & Wildlife Authority collaborates with the NWPCC's Northwest Power Act mandate that fish and wildlife should get equal consideration to power generation (same law that designated the Northwest Power & Conservation Council's authority within the region) (Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority 2008). They were present at the "Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue" on August 3 2011 in Portland, where the goal was for the Sovereign Review Team to gain a sense of the ecosystem perspectives of the Basin citizens and organizations <input type="checkbox"/> The US Army Corps is one half of the U.S. Entity in charge of the Columbia River Treaty since its first iteration. They administer, in collaboration with the Bonneville Power Authority, the Treaty from the USA side of the border, and do so through the Permanent Engineering Board, which is composed of members of the US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Northwest Power & Conservation Council developed a large database of information regarding the CRT on their website (Northwest Power and Conservation Council n.d.), the lack and extent of their participation was described by Interviewee O, as well as (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013e) <input type="checkbox"/> The Columbia basin Fish & Wildlife Authority was located on the "Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue" Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c) <input type="checkbox"/> The US Army Corps (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2022a) has its own website dedicated to the CRT with resources <input type="checkbox"/> The Permanent Engineering Board has its own websites regarding the management of the CRT (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2022b) <input type="checkbox"/> The remaining Federal agencies and the State representatives were both on the Sovereign Treaty Review

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Yakima County <input type="checkbox"/> Public Generating Pool <input type="checkbox"/> Chelan County PUD <input type="checkbox"/> Public Power Council <input type="checkbox"/> Grant County PUD <input type="checkbox"/> Western Montana Electric Generating and Transmission Cooperative <input type="checkbox"/> Snohomish PUD <input type="checkbox"/> Grant County PUD 	<p>Army Corps and the BPA. Given they are the pivotal actor who has historically been managing the Treaty, they were in charge of the Consultation process alongside the BPA and were a key representative of the U.S. Entity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Bonneville Power Authority is a federal agency responsible for power management in the Northwest Region and administering the Columbia River Treaty through the Permanent Engineering Board. Alongside the US Army Corps, they have been collaborating on the Consultation process and the negotiations as part of the U.S. Entity <input type="checkbox"/> The US Army Corps and the Bonneville Power Authority as the U.S. Entity were in charge of the Treaty Review in the USA and consequently appear as co-authors on most documents regarding the review process <input type="checkbox"/> The Permanent Engineering Board is a legally created group of four members, 2 Canadian 2 American, who manage the Treaty and its operations <input type="checkbox"/> The remaining federal agencies and states were part of the Sovereign Review Team but have not shown up significantly in the literature otherwise regarding their involvement <input type="checkbox"/> The city of Bonners Ferry, the Multnomah County representatives and the Port of Portland (a regional government) were present at the “Flood Control Representatives Dialogue” in August 3 2011, a discussion designed to discuss the 	<p>Team Roster and the Treaty Technical Lead Team Roster (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013e; n.d.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The city of Bonners Ferry, the Multnomah County representatives and the Port of Portland (a regional government) were located on the “Flood Control Representatives Dialogue” Summary of Dialogue document which includes the key highlights of the discussion (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011d) <input type="checkbox"/> Senator Cantwell’s Office, Adams County, Pend Oreille County, and Yakima County were located on the “Stakeholder Listening Session” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h) <input type="checkbox"/> The electric power representatives were found on the Summary of Dialogue report titled the “Electric Power Representatives Dialogue” published as part of the Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011b)
---	---	--

		<p>implications of flooding control vis-à-vis the CRT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Senator Cantwell’s Office, Adams County, Pend Oreille County, and Yakima County were present at the “Stakeholder Listening Session” in Spokane on September 27 2011 focused on generating alternatives for the CRT □ Non-profit (PUDs) are guided by regulation pertaining to public utilities. They were part of the “Electric Power Representatives Dialogue” on June 9 2011 Spokane Washington led by the Sovereign Review Team. They discussed concerns regarding electric power generation vis-à-vis the Columbia and the CRT. Grant County PUD was additionally present at the “Stakeholder Listening Session” in Spokane on September 27 2011. 	
<p>Corporations (Canada)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ BC Hydro □ Fortis BC □ Columbia Power Corporation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ BC Hydro, alongside the Province of BC, was the key manager of the CRT (and part of the Canadian Entity) until the Treaty Review, and then one of the members of the Sounding Board as well as the subsequent CBRAC. BC Hydro was present alongside the Province in managing the consultations, supplying information, and offering expertise on the rivers such as modelling □ Fortis BC, as the manager of several dams on the Columbia River, was present at several of the consultation meetings and has a place on the CBRAC as an Organizational Representative □ Columbia Power Corporation is one of the stakeholders managing dams within the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ BC Hydro appears both in the Public Consultation Report (Province of British Columbia 2014) as well as on numerous publications, especially ones of technical nature (BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013b; 2013c; 2013a; Matthews 2016) □ Fortis BC appears on the CBRAC Member List (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016). Its presence during consultations was only discovered during the Interview phase (mentioned by interviewee L) and has not been confirmed in other literature

		Basin and has a place on the CBRAC as an Organizational Representative	<input type="checkbox"/> The Columbia Power Corporation appears on the CBRAC Member List (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016)
Corporations (USA)	<input type="checkbox"/> Idaho Power Company <input type="checkbox"/> PNGC Power <input type="checkbox"/> Berg & McLaughlin <input type="checkbox"/> Avista <input type="checkbox"/> Lincoln County Electric	<input type="checkbox"/> The large group of electric power representatives (Power Council, Power Company and corporations) are a combination of electric power providers within the region. They are for profit (e.g. PNGC Power, Idaho Power Company), and structured as corporations. They were part of the “Electric Power Representatives Dialogue” in June 9 2011 Spokane Washington led by the Sovereign Review Team. They discussed concerns regarding electric power generation vis-à-vis the Columbia and the CRT. Grant County PUD was additionally present at the “Stakeholder Listening Session” in Spokane on September 27 2011. <input type="checkbox"/> Avista, Berg & McLaughlin, and Lincoln County Electric were present at the “Stakeholder Listening Session” in Spokane on September 27 2011 focused on generating alternatives for the CRT	<input type="checkbox"/> The electric power representatives were found on the Summary of Dialogue report titled the “Electric Power Representatives Dialogue” published as part of the Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011b) <input type="checkbox"/> Avista, Berg & McLaughlin, and Lincoln County Electric were located on the “Stakeholder Listening Session” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h)
Business Associations (Canada)	<input type="checkbox"/> Columbia Basin Trust <input type="checkbox"/> Valemount and Area Recreation Development Association <input type="checkbox"/> Pacific North West Economic Region (PNWER) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Montana, Washington, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Yukon and Northwest Territories 	<input type="checkbox"/> The Columbia Basin Trust has been instrumental in both recuperating the costs for the historical losses on behalf of the Basin citizens as well as offering education materials both on the river basin as well as the CRT. It was part of CBRAC as an Organizational Representative	<input type="checkbox"/> The Columbia Basin Trust can be found on the CBRAC Member list (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016) as well as speaks to its own history in a recent publication in the form of a book (Columbia Basin Trust 2020). Further, the Columbia Basin Trust has a strong presence of educational videos, particularly on the Vimeo

			video platform (Columbia Basin Trust 2022)
Business Associations (USA)	<input type="checkbox"/> Pacific North West Economic Region (PNWER) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Montana, Washington, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Yukon and Northwest Territories <input type="checkbox"/> Washington State Association of Counties	<input type="checkbox"/> The Washington State Association of Counties was present at the “Stakeholder Listening Session” in Spokane on September 27 2011 focused on generating alternatives for the CRT	<input type="checkbox"/> The Washington State Association of Counties was located on the “Stakeholder Listening Session” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h)
Professional Associations (Canada)			
Professional Associations (USA)	<input type="checkbox"/> Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association <input type="checkbox"/> Pacific Northwest Utility Coordinating Committee	<input type="checkbox"/> The Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association was present at the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” on August 3 2011 in Portland, where the goal was for the Sovereign Review Team to gain a sense of the ecosystem perspectives of the Basin citizens and organizations. The Association also co-signed a letter to the Chief Negotiator within the USA, Jill Smail, in support of including fish and wildlife (and general ecosystem function) within the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/> The Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association was located on the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c), as well as a co-signor on the letter to Jill Smail by the NGO Caucus (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2018)
NGOs – Environmental (Canada)	<input type="checkbox"/> Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Provincial <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> BC Nature <input type="checkbox"/> Sierra Club BC o Regional <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Wildsight – Kootenays <input type="checkbox"/> Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative (Y2Y) o Local <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Friends of Kootenay Lake Stewardship Society 		

	<input type="checkbox"/> Wildsight – Revelstoke <input type="checkbox"/> Canadian Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission		
NGOs – Environmental (USA)	<input type="checkbox"/> United States NGO Treaty Caucus (NGOs components) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o American Rivers o Pacific Rivers Council o Earth Ministry (also Religious Group) o Save our wild Salmon Coalition o Sierra Club o WaterWatch of Oregon <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (Indigenous NGO) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Nez Perce Tribe o Umatilla Tribe o Warm Springs Tribe o Yakama Tribe 	<input type="checkbox"/> American Rivers was present at was present at the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” on August 3 2011 in Portland, where the goal was for the Sovereign Review Team to gain a sense of the ecosystem perspectives of the Basin citizens and organizations. American Rivers also co-signed a letter to the Chief Negotiator within the USA, Jill Smail, in support of including fish and wildlife (and general ecosystem function) within the Treaty as well as the NGO Letter to the Canadian Negotiating Teams and the NGO Letter to Secretary Antony Blinken	<input type="checkbox"/> American Rivers was located on the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c), as well as a co-signor on the letter by the NGO Caucus to Jill Smail (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2018), Canadian Negotiating Teams (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2021a), and Secretary Antony Blinken (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2021b)
Public Advocacy Groups (Canada)			
Public Advocacy Groups (USA)	<input type="checkbox"/> Columbia Land Trust <input type="checkbox"/> Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs <input type="checkbox"/> Idaho Rivers United <input type="checkbox"/> Lower Columbia Estuary Partnership <input type="checkbox"/> Northwest Energy Coalition <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia Basin GWMA – City of Quincy	<input type="checkbox"/> The Columbia Basin GWMA for the City of Quincy was present at the “Stakeholder Listening Session” in Spokane on September 27 2011 focused on generating alternatives for the CRT	<input type="checkbox"/> The Columbia Basin GWMA was located on the “Stakeholder Listening Session” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h)
Civil Society Organizations (Canada)			
Civil Society Organizations (USA)	<input type="checkbox"/> Willamette Partnership <input type="checkbox"/> Aqua Permanente <input type="checkbox"/> Citizens for a Clean Columbia	<input type="checkbox"/> The Willamette Partnership present at the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” on August 3 2011 in Portland, where the goal	<input type="checkbox"/> The Willamette Partnership was located on the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” Summary

	<input type="checkbox"/> United States NGO Treaty Caucus (CSOs components) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o League of Women Voters (Idaho, Oregon, Washington) 	was for the Sovereign Review Team to gain a sense of the ecosystem perspectives of the Basin citizens and organizations	of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c)
Religious Groups (Canada)			
Religious Groups (USA)	<input type="checkbox"/> Ethics and Treaty Project <input type="checkbox"/> Faith and Environment Network <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Archdiocese of Seattle – Roman Catholic o Archdiocese of Portland – Roman Catholic o Nat’l Indigenous Anglican Bishop – Anglican Church of Canada o Bishop of Nelson – Roman Catholic o Diocese of Spokane – Roman Catholic o Diocese of Yakima – Roman Catholic o Cong. Ahavath Beth Israel – Boise, Idaho o Episcopal Bishop of Olympia o Tenth Bishop of Oregon – Episcopal Church o Episcopal Diocese of Eastern Oregon o Episcopal Diocese of Spokane o Eastern Washington-Idaho Synod – Evangelical Lutheran Church o Southwestern Washington Synod – Evangelical Lutheran Church <input type="checkbox"/> Oregon Synod – Evangelical Lutheran Church		
Citizen Representatives (Canada)	<input type="checkbox"/> CBRAC Members as of August 2022 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Kymme Paul - Baynes Lake o Jayme Jones - Castlegar o Victor Jmaeff - Castlegar o Stephen Gray - Kimberly 	<input type="checkbox"/> The CBRAC member list was updated in August 2022 and represents citizen representatives chosen and approved to act on the Columbia Basin Regional Advisory	The list of the CBRAC citizen representatives was found on the publicly available list on the Province of British Columbia website for the

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Grant Sapruff - Genelle o Brian Gustafson - Golden o Randy Priest - Golden o Heath Slee - Grasmere o Ross Lake - Kaslo o Janet Spicer - Nakusp o Cedra Eichenauer - Nakusp o Dwain Boyer - Nelson o Greg Utzig - Nelson o Caitlin Hinton - Revelstoke o Rana Nelson - Revelstoke o Daniel Bouillon - Trail o Korie Marshall - Valemount 	<p>Committee. Their community location identifiers are attached</p>	<p>Columbia River Treaty (Province of British Columbia 2022d)</p>
<p>Citizen Representatives (USA)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Responders to the Spring 2013 Open House Comments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o C. G. Sweeney o W. Thomas Soeldner o Mayor Gloria Wilson o Richard Beck o Pat Price o Commissioner Leann Rea, Morrow County o Tony Petrusa o Ray Ellis, Lincoln Electric Cooperative o Joe Noland, City of Cheney o Chad Jensen, Inland Power o Norm Semanko, IWUA o Wanda Keefer, Port of Clarkston o Jack Corbett o Katy Brooks, Port of Vancouver o Nathan Sandvig o Larry Bush o Vern Ruskin 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The list of the responders to the 2013 Open House highlights the individual contributions of citizens. However, often these individuals were writing on behalf of their organizations. As such, they are allotted here, and their organizations are also represented in other parts of this table as necessary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The list of the responders to the 2013 Open House was found on the Wayback Machine version of the Public Comment Opportunities site for the Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review in the USA (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017)
<p>Research Organizations/</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance <input type="checkbox"/> Individual Researchers 		

<p>Think Tanks (Canada)</p>			
<p>Research Organizations/ Think Tanks (USA)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Center for Environmental Law and Policy <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia Institute for Water Policy <input type="checkbox"/> Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Oregon State University <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Aaron Wolf <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia River Roundtable <input type="checkbox"/> Individual Researchers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Aaron Wolf, as a representative from Oregon State University is a member of the Universities Consortium on Columbia River governance and has published extensively on the topic of the CRT, the Columbia River (among others), and has attended numerous symposia and conferences within the region <input type="checkbox"/> The Center for Environmental Law and Policy was present at the “Stakeholder Listening Session” in Spokane on September 27 2011 focused on generating alternatives for the CRT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Aaron Wolf was located on the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c), as well as academic publications (Cosens et al. 2018; McCracken and Wolf 2019; Lucia De Stefano et al. 2010; Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano 2003; M. Giordano et al. 2014; M. A. Giordano and Wolf 2002; Lucia De Stefano et al. 2012; L. De Stefano et al. 2017) <input type="checkbox"/> The Center for Environmental Law and Policy was located on the “Stakeholder Listening Session” Summary of Dialogue document (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h)

5.2 Columbia River Treaty Renegotiation Consultation Processes Overview

The two consultation processes between the Canadian and the American sides shared similar aspects, such as methods of engagement, but also differed in some structural features. Both Canada and the USA had formal review processes, managed by the Province/U.S. Entity (respectively) where they created two bodies the Province/U.S. Entity interacted with during the Treaty Review processes: the Sounding Board (Canada) and the Sovereign Review Team (USA). In addition to the interactions through these two bodies, the state actors engaged with a variety of other consultative activities (e.g. town halls, stakeholder meetings, community groups, conferences). This brief overview is designed to give a top-level overview regarding the two processes and set the stage for situating the results in the following section. Where necessary, the overview introduces key actors so that in the Results section they can be referred to in brief.

5.2.1 Canada

The Canadian consultation occurred in two stages. The first stage consisted of a formal review from 2011-2013 and was conducted by the Province of British Columbia on behalf of the Federal government (Province of British Columbia 2014). This stage included the creation of the Sounding Board (Province of British Columbia 2016c), which was a collection of concerned citizens, representatives from organizations, local government members, the Province as well as BC Hydro as the key administrators of the treaty. At the end of this stage, the Province was able to issue both a summary of findings (Province of British Columbia 2014) as well as its Decision (to the Federal government), a document describing if and how to proceed with the renegotiation (Province of British Columbia 2012i). In the second iteration, the consultation process continued through the transformation of the Sounding Board into the Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee (CBRAC) as the official body the Province of British Columbia to continue

consulting with various stakeholders (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016; Province of British Columbia 2014; 2021). CBRAC consisted of official representatives from the local governments within the basin (many of whom were also members of the Local Governments Committee (Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee 2022), First Nations from the Ktunaxa First Nation, Secwepemc First Nation, and the Syilx/Okanagan First Nation, organizational representatives from the Columbia Basin Trust, Fortis BC, Columbia Power Corporation and BC Hydro, and Citizen Representatives from the various affected communities (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016; Province of British Columbia 2021). The activities of CBRAC are ongoing throughout the negotiations phase and still operate in a consultative capacity. Alongside CBRAC, other consultation processes undertaken by the province took place: one on one conversations with the First Nations, public town hall meetings, and the public/media presence of the BC Province Columbia River Treaty consultation website/social media, which served as a portal for public outreach (Province of British Columbia 2014). These are outlined in greater detail in the following sections. An outline/bullet format is used to increase clarity in terms of the timeline and activities of the consultation process.

5.2.1.1 Chronology

- Fall 2011 – BC Province Ministry of Energy and Mines establishes the Columbia River Treaty Review Team
 - Key focus of the Treaty Review Team was to determine whether “British Columbia should recommend that Canada exercise its right to terminate the Treaty” or enter negotiations to renew the treaty in 2024 (Province of British Columbia 2014, 2)

- 2011-2013 - Treaty Review Team, Local Governments' Committee, Columbia Basin Trust (CBT) and Sounding Board Group (local citizens and engaged non-state actors) participated in consultation events throughout the Basin (e.g. town halls) resulted in key themes (Province of British Columbia 2014, 4):
- May-June 2012 – Phase 1 - Community Consultation Workshops
 - Treaty Review Team holds Basin-local meetings for seven community sessions, with over 360 people attending (Province of British Columbia 2014, 6)
 - Participants offered materials to provide further feedback by mail back to Treaty Review Team
 - Agenda, speakers, flow managed by CBT/Treaty Review Team
 - Generated a list of themes that mattered to local citizens: “balancing land use needs, managing water (water levels, quantity and quality)... understanding and adaptin to climate change, with the key frames being “recreation and transportation; water levels (including flood control and erosion); First Nations and cultural heritage; environment and climate change (including impact on sustainability and ecosystem function, wildlife and vegetation, fish and aquatic resources); economic opportunities and costs (including Columbia River Treaty provisions and distribution of benefits); and engagement and collaboration in water management and the Treaty review process” (Province of British Columbia 2014, 6–7)
- November 2012 – Phase 2 – Community Consultation Workshops
 - Another round of community consultations within the Basin communities including a LiveStream of one of the workshops

- Similar structure to previous round of consultations, though included “small group discussions on key issues identified by Basin residents that could potentially be related to the Treaty” (Province of British Columbia 2014, 7–8)
- March 2013 – Phase 3 – Golden Civic Center/Nelson Further Discussions on Treaty
 - Community specific concerns emerge (e.g. Kinbasket reservoir in Golden, fisheries impact in Nelson)
- March 22 2013 – Columbia River Treaty Review Technical Conference
 - Presentations by BC Hydro and individual focus on different reservoirs + presentation of US concerns (from USA representatives) (Province of British Columbia 2014, 10–11)
- March 22 2013 – (parallel to conference) Columbia River Treaty Review Workshop for Basin Environment Leaders
 - Supported by the Province, tangential workshop on hydrology specifics to the basin regarding the environment
- June 15 2013 – Fauquier – Community Workshop
 - “Workshop topics and guest speakers and agenda were chosen by consensus” (Province of British Columbia 2014, 9)
 - Similar concerns to first rounds of consultation, with site-specific concerns (e.g. local reservoirs) being raised
- November 2013 – Phase 4 – “Closing the Loop”
 - LiveStream option in addition to physical meetings

- Reflections on the Columbia River Treaty Review draft of the BC Recommendation and Principles as well as other material generated in response to the previous rounds of consultation
- In state representative Interviewee A’s words, this was the time to check “did we get it right?” (Interviewee A)
- Filling in the gaps in what was desired – some issues were identified to be domestic (non-Treaty related)
- The Public wanted a strong negotiation presence from the BC Team in the future (Province of British Columbia 2014, 13–14)
- 2013 => Current - Start of “focused consultation” – Sounding Board => CBRAC (Province of British Columbia 2014, 12)
 - The Sounding Board was: “a geographically balanced group of Columbia Basin residents with knowledge and/or experience with dam/reservoir planning and operations. They provided a Basin-wide perspective on Treaty related issues including key areas of interest identified by Basin residents during the Columbia River Treaty Review process.” (Province of British Columbia 2016c).
 - Many of the individuals from the Sounding Board ended up joining the Columbia Basin River Advisory Committee

5.2.1.2 Consultation Design

Several key themes emerge regarding the design of the consultations on the Canadian side. First, the stated intention of the design of the consultations was to be an iterative process of “learning by doing” that was built on “trust” (Interviewee A) and to avoid a “top down” (Interviewee A) approach. Some elements within the consultations indicate the state’s follow through with these

intentions. The province's continual offering of the handout "How do you want to be consulted?" (Province of British Columbia 2012h; 2013d; 2013j) as well as the self-addressed envelopes and forms to provide feedback (Province of British Columbia 2014) allowed for feedback both on how the province should conduct the consultation (Such as the "Consultation Suggestions" section in (Province of British Columbia 2012j, 5)) as well as what issues are specifically important to consider. The offering of multiple avenues of engagement (described below) through various types of meetings (which included a LiveStream digital attendance option was intended to allow actors from different communities to pitch in without travelling great distances (Province of British Columbia 2014, 7–8). The continual reporting of how the consultation activities are going through documentation was intended to create a sense of accountability (Such as the "summary" documents available after each meeting and posted to the CRT Website (Province of British Columbia 2012j; 2012f)). The two representatives interviewed from the Canadian side were from the British Columbia Steering Committee – the Executive Director of the negotiations, Interviewee A (CAN-state) and Interviewee B (CAN-state) offered great insight into the execution and intentions of the BC Treaty Review process (from 2011 to 2014) as well as the continuation of the public engagement and consultation process after the initial Treaty Recommendation was offered. Since Interviewee A was initially present within the process as well as the director of the Treaty Review phase of the renegotiations (Province of British Columbia 2014) she can speak clearly to how the consultation effort developed from the BC side of the negotiations. Interviewee B, given her role as the Chair of the CBRAC and the lead on public consultations, as well as the hub of the CBRAC group, was able to describe accurately both the ongoing effort of the public engagement efforts from the BC Province as well as the initial Review.

This variety of consultation strategies was in part designed to fulfill the Province's self-described mandate. The mandate presented to Interviewee A by the Canadian federal government was to "get it right this time" (Interviewee A), referring to the previous round of meager consultations and negotiations that took place during the initial formation of the treaty in 1964 (A. Cohen and Norman 2018). This mandate has resulted in the intention to provide "deep" consultation and going beyond the fulfillment of an obligation phase (Interviewee B). In particular with the First Nations, where the "priority was to discharge our legal duty to consult" (Interviewee A) the state framed their engagement as going beyond a simple duty to consult and their intention to instigate a more meaningful type of consultation. This ethos was described as "aspirational" by one of the interviewees, who suggested they felt the state was open to idealist as well as pragmatic input (Interviewee D).

Consultation Functions

The consultation was intended to fulfill several major functions by the state. Primary of this was Education and Information provision as well as Information gathering. In terms of education, Interviewee B's self-described mandate was to find out "what mechanisms we would use to keep the public informed and when appropriate seek input from them on aspects of [sic] the modernization process". This was verified by Interviewee F who offered succinctly that "the majority of the CBRAC meetings have been information" with "a lot of presentations to bring everybody up to speed" (Interviewee F). The numerous technical studies (BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013b; 2013c; Province of British Columbia 2012c; 2012b; Jost and Weber 2013; Thomson et al. 2018) and handouts (Province of British Columbia 2012l) during community meetings as well as the technical conference (Province of British Columbia 2012a) suggest the education of the citizens regarding the Treaty was indeed a major concern.

In terms of information gathering, consultations were often framed as gathering of both knowledge and opinions regarding either the Columbia River, the Treaty, or the variety of topics that surrounded this nexus, such as salmon or ecosystem impacts. Interviewee E notes that “the province has done a good job over the years of extending the invitation to share knowledge” but noted that the Columbia Basin Trust’s role has been significant in that regard and the province has somewhat taken over this mandate (Interviewee E). In particular during the Treaty Review, the numerous calls for involvement (such as open question periods during the Community Sessions (Province of British Columbia 2014)) and feedback forms provided during the meetings (Province of British Columbia 2013d; 2013j) were the avenues the state offered as a way to gather information about the concerns of the public and organizations. In addition, the receipt of several technical studies (Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative 2018; BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013b), participation at symposia by state representatives, and solicitation of research regarding the Columbia Basin (Province of British Columbia 2013h; Spencer, Simms, and Brances 2018) all provided the state with additional sources of information (BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013b).

Ways of Engaging

The state used a variety of avenues to reach citizens and organizations, both during the Treaty Review and the subsequent consultation process occurring until this time. Community meetings (Province of British Columbia 2012d; 2012e; 2013b; 2013a; 2013c), town halls, mail-in feedback and forms (Province of British Columbia 2013d; 2013j), conferences (Province of British Columbia 2012a) and one-on-one consultations (with the First Nations) (Province of British Columbia 2014; Ktunaxa Nation et al. 2019; Province of British Columbia 2012k, 2; Ktunaxa Nation et al. 2019) were offered. This information was also available on a continually

updated site (Province of British Columbia 2016b), as well as social media (Province of British Columbia 2022b; 2022a; 2022c). The sessions were hosted in part by the Province, with the Federal government appearing occasionally, and employed professional facilitators (Interviewee D).

The meetings were “really well facilitated” where “there's lots of opportunities for engagement and small group discussions and report back and all the, you know, facilitation 101 two thumbs up kind of thing is usually what happens” (Interviewee E). In terms of agenda setting, numerous interviewees highlighted that the agenda for CBRAC meetings was mostly set by the state, but Interviewee E notes that “I feel like it’s [agenda] very open and transparent that if there’s something that I wanted there’s always an open door” (Interviewee E) – but this was not necessarily felt by all the interviewees. Interviewee D suggested the agenda was set explicitly by “three or four people that, that organize these meetings” who “set up an agenda to, to have a fairly broad discussion” (Interviewee D). These discussions occurred on a rotating basis throughout the basin communities (Province of British Columbia 2014), which resonated well with the members of these communities (e.g. Interviewee H).

[Actors Commissioned by the State](#)

Throughout the Treaty Review process, the Province solicited feedback from the broad population through community session meetings happening in the Columbia Basin region (Province of British Columbia 2012d; 2012e; 2013b; 2013a; 2013c), as well as through the social media avenues (Twitter and Facebook) (Province of British Columbia 2022b; 2022a). At this point, the Province also engaged with the First Nations on an ongoing basis (Interviewee A, B) (Province of British Columbia 2014; Ktunaxa Nation et al. 2019; Province of British Columbia 2012k, 2), but there is no documentary evidence to triangulate these claims. Once the formal

Treaty was concluded, the formation of the Sounding Board (Province of British Columbia 2016c) as a distillation of the citizen/organizational voice into a meeting body created the next set of actors that were to engage with the state. Ultimately, the Sounding Board (after 2 meetings) was transitioned into the more structured Columbia Basin Regional Advisory, with more balanced representation from organizational, local government, citizen, and First Nations representatives (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016). Participation in the 2nd stage of consultations (after the Canadian Decision was issued to the USA in 2012) also opened up avenues for public meetings and online (Province of British Columbia 2016b).

Sounding Board

The Sounding Board was an organization formed by the Province to distill the voices from the Basin into a body which could provide feedback onto ongoing consultation processes. The mandate for the Sounding Board was explicitly to: “to gather input from Basin residents knowledgeable about dam/reservoir planning and operations and recognized experts in identified Treaty Review - related areas of interest” (Province of British Columbia 2013f), where members were selected for their ability to speak to the intricacies of the region (e.g. local government members) as well as for their issue expertise (e.g. fisherman shops) and topical expertise (e.g. environmental researchers) (Province of British Columbia 2013f; 2013e).

While representing a variety of interests and non-state actors, much like CBRAC (below), the Sounding Board is not a non-state actor, in the sense that it was chosen by state members and was by invitation only:

“Prospective Sounding Board membership suggestion will be obtained from Columbia Basin Trust, Columbia River Treaty Local Governments Committee, First Nations, the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Gas, and other sources. Final selection will be made by the Columbia River Treaty Review team” (Province of British Columbia 2013f, 2)

While the Sounding Board was short-lived, as it transitioned into the CBRAC body described below, it represented a shift toward a more “closed” form of consultation (Stewart 2009), where the state selected a group of representatives who were used to provide further feedback.

Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee - CBRAC

The Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee is not a non-state actor in the same vein as the Sounding Board – it was managed and commissioned by the Province as part of the Treaty Review process and a continued desire of the Province to keep engaging with the public (Province of British Columbia 2021). From the Terms of Reference, it is clear the selection process was managed by the EMLI (Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Low Carbon Innovation) and the LGC (Local Governments Committee), with an attempt to have a regionally representative coverage (e.g. 2 representatives from each community) (Province of British Columbia 2021, 3). Thus, much as the Sounding Board, it is a state-organized and managed body which is composed of non-state actors. The fact that the substate Local Governments Committee (as subnational actors but also chosen in part by state actors) had some input into member selection, adds a bit more challenge to classifying CBRAC as a purely Province-selected body. However, Interviewee M suggests that the selection processes of the Canadian consultations group CBRAC were tightly controlled as the people there were “handpicked by the Province of British Columbia and BC Hydro” (Interviewee M) which implies significant control over the process and the final member list.

CBRAC was created to continue the consultation process as the Province and the Government of Canada approached negotiations from 2014-2018. It operates to this day (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016). The main purpose was to distill and have “a Basin-wide perspective on Treaty related issues including key areas of interest identified by Basin residents

during the Columbia River Treaty Review process” (Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee 2016). The group is composed of five key groups: the Steering Committee, First Nations representatives (two per nation), Local Government Representatives (two per regional district, one for the Municipality of Valemount), Organization Representatives, and Citizen Representatives. They were selected “to ensure equitable representation of geographical and other interests within the region covered by the CBRAC... based on clearly defined criteria” (Province of British Columbia 2021, 3).

Most of the interviewees from the Canadian side the researcher interviewed were CBRAC members.

CBRAC – Steering Committee

The Steering Committee includes the two state representatives from the Province of British Columbia, the Chair, Vice-Chair, and Executive Director of the Local Governments Committee, and two BC Hydro Representatives. This is the section of CBRAC which sets the agenda for most CBRAC activities (Interviewee F). Interviewees A and B are part of the Steering Committee.

CBRAC – Indigenous Nations Representatives

The Indigenous Nations represented on CBRAC are those who a) have lands or are affected by the River within the watershed and b) now also have Observer status within the Columbia River Treaty negotiations, but this was only the case after 2019 agreement with the Federal Government and the Province of British Columbia (Ktunaxa Nation et al. 2019; Global Affairs Canada 2019). The three Nations were consulted on one-on-one basis initially (Province of British Columbia 2013b). These include Ktunaxa, Okanagan, and Shuswap groups.

CBRAC – Local Government Representatives/Committee

The Local Government Committee (LGC) was initially mobilized by the Columbia Basin Trust in 2011 (merging the Village of Valemount and the Association of Kootenay Boundary Local Governments) and includes 10 members (Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee 2022; Local Governments Committee 2012). The Committee was designed to engage the local governments with the Columbia River Treaty and was integrated as a key actor into the Treaty Review Process. Many of the members of the Local Government Representatives (LGR) on CBRAC are also members of the CRT LGC but not all. The LGC operates autonomously, albeit with funding from the Province and the Columbia Basin Trust. The CBRAC Local Government Representatives do not explicitly align policy agendas with the LGC. Interviewees H, M, P are from these two groups. The CBRAC-LGRs are replaced if the positions are vacated by the previous holder.

CBRAC – Citizen Representatives

The CBRAC Citizen Representatives are volunteer positions that were filled by advertisement by the CBRAC Steering Committee. These positions are regionally representative (with one or two representatives per municipality/region) and occupy roughly 18 or so spaces on CBRAC (Province of British Columbia 2021; 2022d). The gamut of expertise and backgrounding regarding the CRT within the Citizen Representatives ranges from invested citizens to experts in hydrology and citizens who have already worked within the watershed and/or on hydro issues. The Citizen Representatives are replaced on CBRAC if the positions are vacated by the previous holder.

The most represented group within the interviews were citizen representatives, who were also members of CBRAC (Canada). The positive response of this large contingent of citizens

suggests their willingness to participate in the consultation process from the local communities – as well as in my research – due to their commitment to the Columbia River Treaty, their local communities, and personal connection to the river. I interviewed 6 of these citizen representatives, all from the Canadian side and all members of CBRAC. They ranged in being part of the process since CBRAC inception to recent replacements for open vacancies (as some citizens retired from their roles on CBRAC). Since CBRAC tended to create one or two positions for representatives per community, the interviewees were all local to the Basin and were embedded within the communities as citizens. Further, the six interviewees varied greatly in their level of expertise regarding the topic of the CRT – both in technical information surrounding the treaty as well as the history of the region as well as hydro issues in general. This variety resulted in very different perspectives on the consultation process as well as the expectations of what the consultation process could/should be. Interviewee D, in particular, had extensive background in hydrology research. The citizen representatives approached the consultations from different angles, but the uniting factor was their passion for the region as well as the future of the river. Consequently, from their own admissions, they were not representative of the citizens of the region who were often affected but ill-informed regarding the CRT and its impacts.

CBRAC – Organizational Representatives

There are four Organizational Representatives on CBRAC for each of the relevant organizations within the Basin. The Columbia Basin Trust, the Columbia Power Corporation, the Government of Canada, and Fortis BC all have a representative (Province of British Columbia 2022d). The researcher was unable to obtain any interviews with these representatives.

5.2.2 USA

The consultation process within the USA bore striking similarities to the one within Canada. The US Government first undertook an extensive Treaty Review process from 2011-2013, which involved rounds of community/stakeholder meetings, town halls, and technical studies undertaken (Stern 2020). The US Government mandated the U.S. Entity – composed of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Northwestern Division Engineer (Army Corps) – with carrying out the consultation as well as negotiations on behalf of the US government. During the latter part of this process, the State formed the Sovereign Review Team – made up of state, Tribal, and subnational representatives – to focus on specific issues and continue the consultation process in the latter part of the Treaty Review. The Treaty Review engaged with various stakeholders – mostly power corporations/Public Utility Districts (PUDs) (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011a; 2011f; 2011g; 2011i; 2012e; 2012f), municipalities, counties, and other subnational actors (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2012b), as well as environmental activists and researchers (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c). Further, a sub-consultation on the Recommendation (the document the Treaty Review forwarded to the U.S. State as its set of recommendations for the negotiations) took place in 2013 to solicit feedback on the draft version of the Recommendation by inviting letters and comments from the general public and stakeholders (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013a; 2013f; October 2-16; July 16-July23; 2013g). The Treaty Review offered summaries of feedback and events and updated their website (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2022), albeit this site is

no longer active in 2022. The Treaty Review ultimately issued a Recommendation (akin to the BC Province's Decision) to the US Federal State on how to proceed with the negotiations (U.S. Entity 2013).

5.2.2.1 Chronology

- March 2011 – Presentation by the Sovereign Review Team of the upcoming Stakeholder Sessions (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h)
- March 2011-November 2012 – Stakeholder Sessions conducted with Various Stakeholders (business, counties, municipalities, environmentalists) (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2012f; 2011a; 2011f; 2011g; 2012e)
- March-August 2011 – Dialogues with: Electric Power Representatives (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011b), Ecosystem Representatives (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c), Flood Control Representatives (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011d)
- August 13 2011 – Water Quality Working Group Workshop (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011e)
- February 2012 – Panel Session with County Commissioners (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2012b)
- 2012 – Summaries of Technical Studies conducted (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2012a; 2012d)

- June-December 2013 – In September, U.S. Entity issues Draft Regional Recommendation (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013a; Stern 2020, 6) and a call for Feedback on the Recommendation (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013g) as well as offers an Informational Webinar on the Draft of the Regional Recommendation (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013f) and Public Roundtable Discussions (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division October 2-16; 2013g)
- December 2013 – Final recommendation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) delivered to US State Department (U.S. Entity 2013)

5.2.2.2 Consultation Design

Since the researcher was unable to speak to any state representatives from the USA, it is only possible to speak to the consultation design based on the documentary evidence. The design was primarily a combination of technical studies in 3 stages (physical, modeling on ecosystem, and scenario analysis) as well as “stakeholder outreach so as to provide for additional input from other interests in developing a recommendation” (Stern 2020, 6). The multiple opportunities for participation for Stakeholder Sessions (engaging non-state actors who felt affected by the treaty) offered in multiple venues (e.g. Portland, Eugene, Spokane) (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011a; 2011f; 2011g; 2011i; 2012e; 2012f), as well as the different foci for the Representative Dialogues (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c; 2011d; 2011b)

(specific stakeholder meetings with power, ecosystem groups and municipalities), suggests an engagement with multiple non-state actors from multiple categories. The reporting back to the public about the results of such consultation (e.g. such as with the results of the stakeholder sessions or dialogues or feedback from the public) (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011a; 2011f; 2011g; 2011i; 2012e; 2012f; Sovereign Review Team, n.d.; Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013c; 2013b) offered some sense of accountability, as did the publication of the open letters to the Treaty Review (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017). The open letter invitation sessions (to rework the Draft Regional Recommendation) (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013g; 2013f; July 16-July23) created more back-and-forth engagement between the public and the Treaty Review (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017).

However, Interviewee G noted with concern the nature of the Treaty Review did not allow for a meaningful exchange of ideas:

“The US federal government wanted to do their own [consultation], like they wanted to do their own stuff in secret... they didn’t want an open collaborative process with multiple stakeholders... looking at everything together” (Interviewee G).

Interviewee C was also critical of the process, having experience on both sides of the border, noting that one of the key structural challenges of the USA consultation process was “ad hoc” and that there is “no equivalent to what’s happening on the BC side set up” where there was “a very formal process” (Interviewee C). Whereas the documentary evidence is suggesting a highly structured formal process in the Treaty Review, it is possible that Interviewee C and G are

referring to the time after the initial Treaty Reviews were finished. Perhaps critically for these two participants, since the official 2011-2013 Treaty Review, and especially in comparison to Canada's continuing consultation processes, there has been very limited conversation between the U.S. Entity and the stakeholders.

Consultation Functions

The two primary functions that the consultation during the Treaty Review phase seems to have fulfilled is gathering information from the varied stakeholders and informing the stakeholders on the CRT. In this fashion, the two primary functions of the Canadian consultation process are reflected. The explicitly named Stakeholder Sessions (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011a; 2011f; 2011g; 2011i; 2012e; 2012f) and Representative Dialogues (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c; 2011d; 2011b) as well as the Draft Regional Recommendation revision period to find consensus on the final outcome of the Recommendation (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013g; 2013f; July 16-July23) served as gathering points of information from the various invested groups and individuals.

Information provision *to* the public was not as extensively featured as on the Canadian side. While technical studies were a large part of informing the Sovereign Treaty Team (Stern 2020; Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2012c), these were not conducted or offered to the public to the same extent as on the Canadian side. Consequently, education and information provision did not feature as heavily in the case of the USA.

Ways of Engaging

Similarly to the Canadian side, the American Treaty Review offered multiple means of engagements. Dialogue sessions with focused groups (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c; 2011d; 2011b; 2011f; 2011g; 2011i), broader public outreach sessions (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013d) invitations to send in letters by the public (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017), as well as virtual information sessions (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013f; July 16-July23) were present. However, compared to the Canadian side, there were fewer town hall/community sessions available (which were open to the public rather than specific and invested stakeholders), and there seems to have been no social media presence. Town halls however have become a common feature during the negotiation phase (U.S. Department of State 2018b; 2018c; 2019a; 2019a; 2019b; 2018d; 2018a), and are used to the public on the progress of the negotiations.

Actors Commissioned by the State

The actors involved in the consultation fall under several key groups. The Sovereign Review Team was a collection of state representatives, Indian Tribes, and the two members of the U.S. Entity, the Bonneville Power Administration and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013e; Stern 2020, 6). This organization is described below briefly.

Sovereign Review Team

The Sovereign Review Team was composed of “4 Northwest states, 15 tribal governments, and 11 federal agencies” (Stern 2020, 6), albeit the 15 Tribal governments were distilled into 5

representatives working on behalf of the 15 overall tribes: Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, Upper Columbia United Tribes, Upper Snake River Tribes Foundation, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013e). Much like Sounding Board/CBRAC, this group was a quasi-state actor – composed of representatives whose allegiance was to their own constituencies (e.g. the States or Tribes they represented) but chosen and mandated by the U.S. Entity (Stern 2020). One difference between Sounding Board/CBRAC and the Sovereign Review Team was the lack of an inclusion of both subnational (municipal/county) representatives as well as citizen representatives (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013e).

5.2.3 Consultation Key Similarities/Differences

There are several key marked differences between the USA and the Canada version of the process which will be expanded upon later but briefly mentioned here. Within the USA, the consultation process finished at the end of the Treaty Review in 2013, and stakeholders have been engaged with either minimally or not at all (Interviewee G) (Stern 2020). Secondly, the Sovereign Review Team does not include regional representation, nor citizen representatives, unlike the Sounding Board/CBRAC bodies in Canada, nor did engage or update the public through a social media presence (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2013e). Thirdly, the design of the consultations was not as flexible as that of the Canadian side, with no input being sought on how to conduct the consultations. Fourthly, there is a disparity with the availability of data on the consultations currently available to the public. The key website (“<https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov>”) for the consultation process, including all the material about the consultations themselves, is non-

operational (no clear reason why), and could only be accessed through the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine (Internet Archive 2022). The new site is now located on the US Department of State website dedicated to the Columbia River Treaty renegotiation, which contains fairly minimal information and only dates to the start of the negotiations, from 2017 onwards (U.S. Department of State 2017). However, Stern (2020) has compiled a summary report which serves as a key document narrating the development of the consultations.

5.3 Results: Non-State Actors and their Strategies

The following sections follow the same structure as the theoretical framework and outline the strategies different actors used to access the consultation processes. The list follows the order of the Literature Review and discusses each individual actor for parallelism. A summary table (Table 5) of techniques/strategies observed (e.g. vis-à-vis the taxonomy above) is offered at the end of the section.

5.3.1 First Nations/Indigenous/Indian Tribes

Since the researcher was unable to obtain any interviews with representatives from either the First Nations or Indian Tribes, documentary evidence and references from other interviewees inform this section.

The First Nations/Indian Tribes were referred separately from other non-state actors in both within Canada and the USA, in the accounts of the Province of BC as well as the U.S.

Entity/Department of State (Province of British Columbia 2014; Stern 2020). This suggests that as sovereign nations they have a privileged status to access consultation processes. This bears out within the interviews as well. Interviewee U noted that from the mix of all the non-state actors “they [Indian Tribes] have a higher standing in the process than we do” (Interviewee U).

Similarly, Interviewee S alluded to the fact that “it’s very much First Nations who have the

authority to be there” adding “as they should” (Interviewee S). Further, this distinction is highlighted in that both the First Nations (Interviewee A) (Province of British Columbia 2014; 2013g, 3) and the Indian Tribes had one-on-one consultations with the state (Stern 2020), whereas the rest of the non-state actors were acknowledged together (Interviewee G).

This separate treatment seems to have conditioned the behavior of the First Nations in how they related to the other non-state actors. Within the Canadian context, the division in legal terms resulted in a partial separation between the First Nations and non-state actors. Interviewee D clarified that the “First Nations were acting somewhat individually” and would “tend to sit together, strategize together, go away, and come back with a position” (Interviewee D).

Interviewee F notes that “if we were going to engage them or try to influence them, I don’t think that would be very well received because they’re looking out for themselves” (Interviewee F).

However, in some instances the First Nations did cross the divide and engage the other non-state actors strategically.

However, the First Nations/Indian Tribes on both sides of the border – and indeed collectively through bodies such as the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (US) (CRITFC) and Columbia River Intertribal Fisheries Commission Canada (CRIFCC) (Baltutis and Moore 2019, 9; Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 2022; Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission 2022) – used networking to create a unified stance among the Nations/Tribes to advocate to their respective states (Canada and USA). This networking in turn led to the creation of a cohesive set of frames that the Indigenous groups advocated for as a whole. The two key frames were that of ecosystem function and salmon restoration (Interviewee P) (Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 2022; Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission 2022), which were acknowledged both in the USA and Canada Treaty

Reviews by the state (Stern 2020; Province of British Columbia 2014). Invoking this frame in part by supplying critical studies commissioned by the CCRIFC (Interviewee F) and disseminating them within the consultation fora such as the Technical Conference in BC in 2013 (Province of British Columbia 2013h, 15) as well as their own conferences in 2012, 2014, and 2016 on the “Future of Our Salmon” (Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 2012) , pushed strongly against the two dominant previous frames which the Treaty covered, mainly power generation and flood control (Province of British Columbia 2012g). Thus, one of the key functions that is of consideration of being added to the Treaty, spearheaded by the First Nations and Indian Tribes, is salmon restoration/ecosystem function, suggesting the original framing is no longer feasible in the new Treaty (Columbia Basin Tribes 2010). These two frames (salmon restoration/ecosystem function) were also explicitly linked throughout the various symposia and reports created by the First Nations/Indian Tribes (Province of British Columbia 2013h, 15; Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 2012). Thus, issue linkage enhanced the resonance of each individual frame.

This frame generated much traction with the other non-state actors, who repeatedly asked for ecosystem function and salmon restoration to be included within the next iteration of the Treaty (Province of British Columbia 2013g; 2012k; Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c). In describing this alignment of frames, Interviewee N suggests that it is “very in vogue right now for environmental groups to tally align themselves with First Nations... because among other things, First Nations have incredible political momentum and they also have constitutional firepower, legal firepower that environment groups can only dream about” (Interviewee N). Other interviewees felt differently (e.g. Interviewee P), but the documentary evidence suggests such alignment of frames did indeed

exist, but there is no evidence of the intention of the First Nations or Indian Tribes to create such a link through active networking with the other non-state actors (Province of British Columbia 2013g; 2012k; Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c)). Given the legal and physical separation between the Nations/Tribes and the other non-state actors noted above, it seems the Nations/Tribes did not necessarily instigate such frame resonance, but the effect of reinforcing ecosystem function/salmon restoration must have been mutually reinforcing of advocating for this frame.

Networking was a key strategy used by First Nations/Indian Tribes to coalesce into a more cohesive position. In a few interviews, oblique comments to the First Nations in Canada finding synergy throughout the Columbia River Treaty process which might have been challenging before (as they were litigating against each other) became a sign that unanimous understanding of the issues was not present pre-consultation. As Interviewee F noted, the meetings of the First Nations are “decided by consensus... there has to be agreement, but I think they [the First Nations] recognize the strength in working together” (Interviewee F). Indeed, the Framework Agreement between the Nations and the Province and Canada (Ktunaxa Nation et al. 2019) offers the Nations individual one-on-one consultations/negotiation ability, but they have not utilized this function yet, suggesting staying networked is a powerful tool to present a unified front. On the USA side of the border, networking seems to be inherent to the Tribal approach. Since they obtained only 5 representatives for 15 tribes on the Sovereign Review Team, the 15 Tribes coalesced into 5 key groups who each elected a representative to submit to the Team: Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, Upper Columbia United Tribes, Upper Snake River Tribes Foundation, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North

Pacific Division 2013e). The ability to work under umbrella organizations to find common ground suggests networking allows for enhanced representation of Indian Tribe voices overall within the consultations.

The First Nations and Indian Tribes also engage in networking for informational purposes and productive exchange to generate expertise and information which can be used to gain access to particular frames and justify them. For example, when actualizing the environmental/salmon/ecosystem frame, First Nations and Indian Tribes have formed an organization called CRITFC (Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission) which is an “international first nations organization looking at Fisheries” (Interviewee F). The links between CRITFC and UCUT (Upper Columbia United Tribes within the USA) and the Canadian Columbia River Intertribal Fisheries Commission suggests networks also facilitate the gathering of information (Interviewee N). Their presence at the various academic Symposia and Conferences speaks to this collaboration (Spencer, Simms, and Brances 2018; Province of British Columbia 2013h).

The First Nations/Indian Tribes leveraged the legal landscape to advocate for inclusion in the consultations. One of the key ideas to emerge from the interviewees was the capacity increases for both the First Nations and Indian Tribes to harness new and emerging norms of consultation and inclusion in governance for Indigenous peoples. Interviewee A highlighted to the extent that both Canada’s Duty to Consult (Canada 2012) and the recently adopted UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People (Brideau 2019) played into the design of the consultations and increasing the presence of the First Nations both within the consultations as well as ultimately the negotiations (as observer status). This strengthening of the implementation of the 1982 Constitution act (Section 35), which requires the consultation of First Nations for newly

negotiated treaties (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 2021; Brideau 2019; 2019) is due to recent legal precedent created by victories of Aboriginal groups within Canada in the early 2000s (Government of Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2011). Similar appeals to legal norms were on the rise for the Indian Tribes within the USA, Interviewee C suggests that:

“Since the 1960s, there's just been the huge rise in the demand of public voice in decision-making and that's in both the US and Canada and beyond, you know, just a lot more call for transparency. And so you have that coinciding with on, on the US side of the border, you had huge capacity building by Tribes, census series lawsuits that were decided in their favor on fishing rights, within treaty fishing rights, within the, and starting in the, in the sixties and had led to the development of really sophisticated fisheries and policy agents who kind of have their finger in everything that's going on in the, and that's going to affect the efficacy of their, their treaty fishing rounds. So much more capacity on probably the primary voice that even in 1964 was saying, Hey, what about the fish? But had no, no real power at that. Huge increase in power there.” (Interviewee C)

This increase in capacity within the USA is also founded on legislative victories and skillful wielding of official federal Acts, such as the Scenic Area Act (section 17(a)(1)) to designate parts of the Columbia Basin as sovereign territory of the Indian Tribes (USDA 1992). While consultation in neither case means equal and fair consideration (Government of Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2011; EPA 2016) as does UNDRIP (United Nations for Indigenous Peoples 2022), the legal precedents and their increasingly legally supported mobilization seems to create avenues of inclusion for First Nations/Indian Tribes. The long-term effects of the developments with the Duty to Consult law in Canada as well as the impacts of UNDRIP on the ability of the First Nations to wield these legal norms to leverage their access to state consultations are as yet unclear. Interviewee N is quick to note the limitations of the Duty to Consult soft law, as it created “constant, never-ending litigation as to what it means to continue and what meaningful consultation really is” (Interviewee N). Thus, while UNDRIP might have the potential for the guaranteed inclusion of Indigenous voices within

the final outcomes of policy in the future, the Duty to Consult served as a way for the First Nations to get into the consultations (Interviewee A).

Thus, First Nations and Indian Tribes used strong legal precedent as well as the Duty to Consult to leverage access to the consultations and policymakers. This correlates well with the anticipated strategy use in the theoretical framework. Once there, using a particular frame which has historically been excluded from the Treaty (A. Cohen and Norman 2018) they were able to find traction to a strong and united front, which has been enhanced by Inter-Tribe and Inter-Nation and cross-border networking. Part of the appeal to the explicitly linked salmon/ecosystem frame was the provision of expert information that the groups offered within the consultation process.

5.3.2 Subnational Government Groups

The researcher managed to interview four members (Interviewees H, J, M, P) of the Local Governments' Committee within the Columbia Basin (Canada). This organization brings together individuals who are elected officials and representatives of the municipalities and districts around the basin (Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee 2022; Local Governments Committee 2012). No interviewees from the USA side were responsive in terms of local municipalities. However, Interviewee O is General Counsel for the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, a unique sub-national, cross-state organization created with the sole mandate of managing the power needs of the Northwest region of the United States (Northwest Power and Conservation Council n.d.). Since many members of the Local Governments Committee are also members of CBRAC, the cross-over creates unique opportunities for those members to access the Canadian consultation process. This mixture creates an analytical challenge: while the Local Governments Committee is a non-state actor (and represents

communities which are not beholden to the Province of BC or the Canadian Federal Government), the representatives from this committee who are on CBRAC are within a state-managed consultation body. Thus, while it is the local communities that the LGC members represent, the interaction with the state could have potentially conditioned/constrained the issues that emerged during the consultations. However, unlike the citizen representatives, the LGC was the one who selected its representatives to CBRAC so the state was not involved within the selection mechanism (Province of British Columbia 2021).

One key strategy for accessing the consultations for the local governments was to be in control of the money for an organization. The Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments (AKBLG) for instance was able to garner a seat at the Local Governments' Committee because they "manage the money" that despite "hav[ing] no legislative power" they "have the power because [they] manage the money" (Interviewee P). This correlates well with the theory presented in the taxonomy, where the significant financial resources from membership (such as the municipalities, regions, electoral areas covered by the AKBLG (Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments 2018)) allow for access to policymakers (such as in this case having a seat among the CBRAC-Local Government Representatives).

For Local Governments Representatives within Canada geography created challenges to networking as well as frame alignment. The physical distances present within the Basin, similar to the (CBRAC) Citizen Representatives, made it difficult for members to attend meetings at times or coordinate on projects, as they are "not in the loop" (Interviewee H). Speaking to the CBRAC-Local Governments' Committee's ability to concentrate on specific issue points and work on them together, Interviewee M notes that "I'm lucky, really luck you see any of these people in person, like once a year or something" (Interviewee M). Thus, despite a desire to

“band[sic] together with other communities” on issues as voiced by many members of the LGC (Interviewee H), the constraints of geography limited their ability to network and communicate effectively across the large distances of the Basin.

The varied concerns of each community prevented the formation of a cohesive frame among the subnational government groups. Communities on reservoirs where the water levels did not change much (Interviewee P) did not share the concerns of those where there was great fluctuation in the water levels (Interviewee H). While some reservoirs had dangerous “dead-heads” (flooded dead trees that would randomly burst to the surface of the water), other reservoirs did not share this concern. Some areas had access to the payments for the water generation from the Columbia Basin Trust due to their community being within the catchment area of dam (Columbia Basin Trust 2020), while others were left scrambling for financial resources since their communities did not ‘host’ a dam (such as the misallocations of the Payment-In-Lieu-of-Taxes system, both in the USA and Canada (BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013b; Hoover, n.d.)). Consequently, the issues and problems that mattered the most to individual committees were dependent on geography and challenged the ability of the LGCs to coalesce into one united front. The LGC did manage to find a unified set of interests as presented in their recommendation to the Province of BC, but both the original 2013 version as well as the updated 2021 version shows a wide range of disparate concerns, many of which are at odds with each other (Local Governments’ Committee 2013; 2021). Thus, unlike the First Nations who found synergies in aligning their interests and bringing them to the table as one monolithic proposal, the local governments remained divided.

This division of interests resulted in limited coordination among the different local governments. Interviewee P noted the frame division between the different communities (in this case the

municipalities in the Basin represented by the CBRAC-Local Governments Committee): “some of them [LGC members] are missing the big picture. They get so invested in their own little community and then their own kind of silo. They’re not seeing the big picture” (Interviewee P). The concern, according to Interviewee P, was supposed to be on US-vs-Canada interests, rather than local community vs. local community. As such, this going “down rabbit holes” of local issues lead to an inability for the LGC to sway the bigger issues such as fighting for a greater share of the profits BC Hydro garners from the Columbia River dams (Interviewee P, M). Similar division occurred in the framing of interests between the Local Governments Committee and the First Nations. Interviewee F in turn categorized “social and economic recreation” for the Local Governments and a much broader remit for the First Nations: “all those interests involved as well [social and economic]” but also “there’s a cultural loss of territory and, and food items, all kinds of impacts... as well as economic concerns” (Interviewee F).

Consequently, alignment of ideas, goals and strategies occurred often along personal alliances and attachments rather than a key frame: “a lot of that [which topics are raised] I think just has to do with who I have personal relationships with” (Interviewee M). As such, the direction of the relationships seemed more local government-to-state rather than local government-to-government. For instance, Interviewee P notes that “I think as far as feeling welcomed by Kathy [Eichenberger, Executive Director of the Public Engagement process in BC] she showed up on one of our regional district board meetings one day talking about a situation related and she sent me a text in the middle of it and [sic] I texted her back like it’s, it’s so open and it’s lovely” (Interviewee M).

Within the USA, there was a large contingent of municipalities and counties that were consulted during the Stakeholder Sessions conducted by the state (Bonneville Power Administration and

US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c; 2011d; 2011b; 2011f; 2011g; 2011i; 2012b). These subnational entities were able to send representatives to these meetings, but it is difficult to ascertain why they were so well represented. The breadth of framing concerns – from flooding to water levels for port activities to fisheries along the river – which emerged from the organizations’ letters to the Treaty Review process in Spring 2013 (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017) suggests that they all advocate on behalf of the issues specific to their communities rather than one dominant frame. Neither was present explicit coordination or networking among these actors, as they seem to arrive at the negotiations from their own needs’ perspective rather than as a collective group (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2012b).

The only actor interviewed from the USA subnational group was Interviewee O who was general counsel for the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NWPPCC) and speaks to the challenges of being involved in the consultation process. This key organization (mandated by the USA federal government to manages the power entities and development of power options within the northwest region, through a legal mandate (Hydropower Reform Coalition 2022), but was unable to participate meaningfully within the consultations as they were excluded from the Sovereign Review Team (Interviewee O). Interviewee O noted carefully that the NWPPCC had some access by coincidence as some of the members of the NWPPCC were also State Representatives which gained a seat on the Sovereign Review Team in that capacity (3 of them), but that they were not participating there as official representatives of the Northwest Power and Conservation Council who has a double mandate of power maintenance as well as other functions (Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority 2008; Northwest Power and

Conservation Council n.d.; Hydropower Reform Coalition 2022). Given their strategic positioning as the power administrator of the whole Columbia Basin within the USA, Interviewee O noted that they tried to affect the consultations in other ways. The primary was by networking with the Columbia Basin Trust and in combination offering educational materials to inform the public and stakeholders on the CRT (Interviewee O). The Columbia Basin Trust was very involved in the education aspects surrounding the Treaty and its impacts within the Basin (Columbia Basin Trust 2020; 2022). Merging their efforts with academic practitioners and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council into the “The Columbia River Basin: Learning From Our Past to Shape Our Future” 2014 conference (Northwest Power and Conservation Council and Columbia Basin Trust 2014) as well as their annual Symposia and Transboundary Conferences (hosted by the Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance) (Northwest Power and Conservation Council and Columbia Basin Trust 2019; Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust 2012) generated a lot of traction and brought many stakeholders together (Interviewee C). While this process was not an officially sanctioned educational program by either the Canadian or the USA Governments, it did create a momentum of engagement and networking among the key members who would later become part of the consultation processes (Interviewee O). These events were attended by State representatives and thus potentially contributed to the shaping of the ideas regarding the treaty – as well as creating network opportunities. The “Bibliography of the Columbia River Basin” (a repository of documents on the Columbia River) is another educational set of resources from the Council (Northwest Power and Conservation Council 2022). Thus, education was used strategically to network actors

together to create fora for meaningful engagement and generation of ideas as well as useful networks of engagement.

One strategy that was employed by some subnational actors was of lobbying by sending in letters to the U.S. Entity (Port of Vancouver 2013; Douglas County 2013; City of Portland 2013; Chelan County 2013), which expressed the various views of the stakeholders. These letters were in response to an invitation but given that they were offered publicly on the USA Treaty Review website (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017) rather than to a specific policymaker they constituted outside lobbying.

The two members of the U.S. Entity – Bonneville Power Authority (BPA) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as directly mandated and responding to the USA Government can be considered as state actors. Whereas the U.S. Army Corps is a federal entity, and consequently not subnational, the BPA's purpose is to solely administer power mandates for the region on behalf of the US Government (U.S. Entity 2013). In this sense, it is equivalent to the Crown Corporation of BC Hydro in Canada, which was also treated as a state actor for these very same reasons. However, unlike BC Hydro (which is treated as a Corporation below), the BPA is a public entity and does not generate profit. Thus, given that these two entities had privileged access and are directly already embedded in the management of the Treaty since 1964 as part of the US Entities, they cannot be considered non-state actors.

5.3.3 Corporations

BC Hydro was the key corporation involved on the Canadian side, as the electricity provider who managed most of the dams within the region as well as is responsible for electricity provision within British Columbia (BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013a). BC Hydro appears to have had immediate access to policymaking and the consultation on the BC side by being part of the

CBRAC Steering Committee (Province of British Columbia 2021), and present alongside the Province of BC in almost all consultations efforts within the province (Interviewee A). BC Hydro had great ability to shape the framing – power and flood control, the two key mandates of the original treaty (Province of British Columbia 2012g) - by being the key information and expertise provider within the consultations. Historically, having managed the Treaty and dams along the river alongside the BPA and USACE (Permanent Engineering Board et al. 1964) BC Hydro has had both many years of experience as well as the technical expertise to speak to issues such as water levels, flood control, power generation, and modelling for alternate scenarios. Indeed, because of this large capacity (technically and resource wise) BC Hydro was the source of most technical information within the consultation processes (BC Hydro and Power Authority 2013b; 2013c; Matthews 2016; Jost and Weber 2013). Multiple interviewees (C, M, F) spoke to BC Hydro being a key source of presentations, handouts, modelling results, and general information about proposed scenarios within the consultation meetings. Thus, expertise and information generation were some of the key strategies of BC Hydro's access to the consultation processes and policymaking surrounding the CRT in general.

The other Canadian corporations: namely Fortis BC and Columbia Power Corporation were present at some of the consultation meetings (Interviewee L) but not in significant roles. Given that they both manage some of the dams within the Canadian system, they were included automatically within the Organizational Representatives of CBRAC (Province of British Columbia 2022d). Fortis BC and Columbia Power Corporation appear in the November 2012 Community Consultations report (Province of British Columbia 2012k, 9) as the stakeholders which were asked for more money from the public (as compensation for the damages from the dams which Fortis BC, Columbia Power Corporation and BC Hydro operate), as well as the

discussions surrounding the Arrow Lake Reservoir (operated by Fortis, owned jointly by Columbia Power Corporation and the Columbia Basin Trust) (Province of British Columbia 2013i, 6), but it is mostly absent from other documentary sources. Consequently, it seems that corporations on the BC side have access to consultations by their ownership of the dams in question and in the case of BC Hydro by their ability to generate and provide expertise and technical information.

On the USA side of the border, power companies, public utility districts, and power distributors (For a complete list refer to the corporate actors within the USA, refer to Table 4 above) were present at the Stakeholder Sessions within the USA Treaty Review (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2012f; 2011a; 2011f; 2011g; 2012e) and in particular the Electric Power Representatives Dialogue Session (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011b). Within this session, there was synchronicity in the dominant frame (of maintaining water levels in particular to maintain water generation) and the desire to avoid uncertainty vis-à-vis the future of the Treaty (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011b, 2–5). Part of this dominant framing was information sharing regarding the different power providers – who generates how much electricity and how many dependent on what amounts of water, etc. However, individual frames entered into the discussion: the Western Montana Electric Generating and Transmission Cooperative for instance highlighted the extent to which the fish and wildlife programs were important to integrate into the Treaty in the future, in addition to power generation (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011b, 3). As such, while the dominant frame was of stability

in water provision (as well as security for the future of the companies), other frames were introduced but not negotiated within the discussion.

There were very few non-power generating private entities (e.g. Berg&McLoughlin – a real-estate and business law firm) present at the consultation phase but beyond their attendance at stakeholder sessions (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h) their particular views were not included.

Similarly to the subnational groups in the USA, corporations submitted letters providing a response to the U.S. Entity Draft recommendation (Ellis and Lincoln Electric 2013; Jensen and Inland Power 2013; Keefer and Port of Clarkston 2013; Brooks and Port of Vancouver 2013; Port of Pdx Marine 2013; Western Montana G&T 2013; Seattle City Light 2013; Public Power Council 2013; Power Group 2013; PNGC Power 2013; Northwest Requirements Utilities 2013; Multnomah County Drainage District 2013; Clark Public Utilities 2013) which were made public on the USA Treaty Review website (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017), which had the effect of outside lobbying.

5.3.4 Business Associations

Several business and trade associations were part of the CRT consultation efforts, but information regarding remains challenging to find. The transboundary Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) association represents the economic interests for both Canadian provinces as well as American states (Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) 2022) used information gathering and networking to access consultations. Though only appearing formally within a one Stakeholder Sessions within the USA Treaty Review (where details were not available about its contributions) (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011g), the PNWER hosted a conference in July 2011

(Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust 2012; Pacific NorthWest Economic Region Wednesday August 18) which brought together both state and non-state actors. The hosting of this discussion allowed not only for the gaining access to state policymakers and networking, but also to invite people who could be conducive to emphasizing the PNWER's dominant frame of economic prosperity. The economic significance of the treaty for both Canadian and USA actors allowed the PNWER to harness this frame to attract key attention to its concerns and bring in actors which influence the policymaking to a great extent (Pacific NorthWest Economic Region Wednesday August 18): namely Senator Bill Hansell (Oregon State Legislature), The Honourable Katrine Conroy (Minister of Forests, Lands, Natural Resource Operations & Rural Development, Government of BC), and Sylvain Fabi (Consul General – Consulate General of Canada-Denver, head of Canadian Negotiations).

On the Canadian side, the Columbia Basin Trust is a complex entity which co-owns some of the dams within the Canadian portion of the Basin, administers the funds on behalf of the Basin residents that are siphoned off from the BC Hydro endowment (as a result of the treaty) and coordinates projects to benefit the Basin Residents (Columbia Basin Trust 2020). It emerged within many of the Interviewees' comments about the educational and information aspects of the Treaty, as a key provider of both educational and heritage information regarding the Basin and the injustices of the past Treaty (Columbia Basin Trust 2022), the Columbia Basin Trust had an influential role due to both its historical positioning as well as the dissemination of educational/informational materials. It offered extensive education and awareness information through its Vimeo channel (Columbia Basin Trust 2022) as well as funded and co-hosted (alongside the Northwest Power Conservation Council and the Universities Consortium on

Columbia Basin Governance) several symposia and conferences (Northwest Power and Conservation Council and Columbia Basin Trust 2019; 2014; Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust 2012) on the CRT. Just as for the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, the Trust as such had access to networking opportunities. The large financial resources of the Trust, consequently, enabled it to create fora for information sharing which in turn gained access to policymaking.

While several other business associations were mentioned by either interviewees or within the literature (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011f),² Valemount and Area Recreation Development Association (Interviewee L), no further information was available on these actors.

5.3.5 Professional Associations

While no professional associations were found to have tried to access the consultation process from Canada, on the American side the Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association (NSIA) was present both as a stakeholder at the “Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue” (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c), as well as a co-signor on the letter to Jill Smail by the NGO Caucus (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2018). Therefore, the organization used elements of indirect lobbying to appeal to policymakers. Within the official consultation process, the representative for the NSIA raised continually a frame to offset the “missing [sic] third leg” of ecosystem function (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011c, 2) This frame seemed to resonate between two actors in particular – Liz Hamilton (NSIA) and Tom Iverson (Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority) (Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority 2008), where concerns about

fish stock, despite their different endpoint (sportfishing vs. ecosystem preservation) resulted in issue linkage to support a particular frame. Consequently, the advocacy for sport-fishing and commercial-fishing was possibly strengthened by the alliances created by linking disparate purposes under the same umbrella issue (fish preservation).

Professional associations were also involved in sending in letters to the U.S. Entity in response to the solicited feedback on the US Draft Recommendation (Pacific Northwest Waterways Association 2013; The Columbia-Snake River Irrigators Association 2013), and ultimately ended up being posted on the USA Treaty Review website, effectively indirectly lobbying (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017).

5.3.6 NGOs

The researcher was able to interview two well-placed members of NGOs, one on both sides of the border. Interviewee G is embedded within the network of environmental NGOs within the Basin on the USA side both professionally and as a volunteer and has significant experience and knowledge regarding the environmental NGO landscape surrounding the treaty. Interviewee G is not a technical expert but is aware of the issues within the basin, and the researcher was referred to speak to the interviewee numerous times. Interviewee S was not directly involved in the consultation process but represents the Living Lakes Canada NGO which works within the Columbia Basin on the Canadian side. The researcher was referred to speak to Interviewee S for their expertise as well as a perspective of an NGO whose mandate is relevant to the Columbia River (Treaty) but was not involved in the consultations. This potentially reveals an avenue of inquiry into why this NGO was not a part of the consultation process given its expertise and mandate and what barriers it encountered to participation.

The NGOs that were connected to the consultation in both Canada and the USA used a variety of strategies to access policymakers. Within Canada, the key NGO involved was the Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative (UCBEC) which is an umbrella organization for several other NGOs within Canada: BC Nature (provincial level), Sierra Club BC (provincial level), Wilsight – Kootenays (regional level), Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative Y2Y (regional level), Friends of Kootenay Lake Stewardship Society (local level), and Wildsight – Revelstoke (local level) (Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative 2022b). The umbrella nature of the organization speaks to the increases in capacity due to the networking of the different subsidiary NGOs, each of which has a different set of capabilities. Further, UCBEC was present in many avenues as a source of expertise and information – such as commissioning studies and modeling (Interviewee F) and presenting this to the public (Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative 2022a; 2018). A cohesive frame of ecosystem function was in part achieved by the production materials which all referenced the interactions between the river, salmon, and ecosystem (Interviewee F).

This frame alignment is visible on the USA side of the border, where the USA NGO Treaty Caucus (Save Our Wild Salmon 2022c) and the River Roundtable (One River Ethics Matter 2022a; Center for Environmental Law & Policy 2022) were two collections of non-state actors which were supportive of involving the ecosystem function within the Treaty (Interviewee G). Though some members of these two organizations fit better under Public Advocacy Groups and Civil Society Organizations, the core groups (American Rivers (American Rivers 2022), Pacific Rivers Council (Pacific Rivers n.d.), Earth Ministry (also Religious Group)(Earth Ministry 2022), Save our wild Salmon Coalition (Save Our Wild Salmon 2022a; 2022e), Sierra Club (Sierra Club 2022), WaterWatch of Oregon (Waterwatch of Oregon 2022) (Save Our Wild

Salmon 2022c)) all espoused ecosystem function, thus creating a strong frame through networking. Issue linkage – particularly of the mutually reinforcing salmon restoration (for Save Our Wild Salmon) and ecosystem (for the rest of the NGOs) seemed to create synergies between the two stances (Save Our Wild Salmon 2022c). However, geography also plays an important role in determining the concerns and frames which are the most relevant for the river itself. Since the river flows from Canada to the US different needs apply to each section of the river. Further, each section of the river is further governed under different political contexts:

“In terms of what do people agree on and what are people not agree on? Well... it comes down pretty [much] to geography. So [sic] there’s the upper basin and there’s the lower basin and [sic] there’s the different political contexts and with the, with the Columbia River Treaty” (Interviewee G).

Consequently, ability to find solutions, especially for groups like Interviewee G’s Columbia River Roundtable, is challenging as they all encounter different political jurisdictions and processes that are split along the border. As such, the ability to find cohesive frames around which to coalesce is made more difficult, as is the ability to launch legal challenges.

Educational activities and informational provision also played a big role in the strategies of the NGOs, especially within the USA. The media libraries available by the Save Our Wild Salmon (Save Our Wild Salmon 2022b), as well as the Center for Environmental Law & Policy (CELP)⁶. Publications by the Save our Wild Salmon NGO in particular serve to both educate and create public awareness for the crisis of the salmon within the region (Save Our Wild Salmon 2022d) and are thus a strong way of indirect lobbying. The NGO Wildsight on the Canadian side has created a curriculum for Basin students in secondary school which is integrated into the regular

⁶ Within this thesis, the CELP is categorized as a think tank, but with NGO tendencies, and officially part of the US NGO Treaty Caucus, and thus resonates with this section. CELP’s media and document libraries are no longer active, and the researcher is using archived versions of them (Center for Environmental Law & Policy 2022). The libraries are now hosted by the One River Ethics Matter group/conferences and is hosted on their website (One River Ethics Matter 2022b; 2022c)

Grade 9 curriculum (Wildsight 2022) where students learn and explore the watershed. This program was created by the Columbia Basin Trust but is lauded by the Province of British Columbia as one of their key missions (child education) (Interviewee A). Thus, education and information provision seem to be a way to frame the discussion and define some of the frames which are discussed by the other stakeholders.

This attempt to generate valuable information for the sake of the mandate of the organization but also as a steppingstone to policymaker access was clearly expressed by Interviewee S. They were somewhat critical of the attempt to influence governance directly but found this unwieldy: it's "not a bad thing, but we just don't have time to talk and talk and talk" (Interviewee S). Instead, Interviewee S felt that despite being "so slow" NGOs and other organizations could "get to governance through data" (Interviewee S). What Interviewee S's NGO could offer was good data, and in exchange they can influence policy, rather than policymakers – by offering high quality, pre-packaged data that can easily inform policy. Interviewee S felt this application had its advantages as it cut out the politics of the policymaker:

"I tried the other route [referring to communicative, lobbying strategies] and it's so unweild[y], complicated, political. I just thought forget it. We'll just, you know, it will go under the radar and collect data and then we can [sic] help local governments at least make some decisions based on the data that they've been given, you know?" (Interviewee S)

Information was one of the key barriers for raising political support for the causes of many of the non-state actors' mandates. The complexity of the issue and the lack of knowledge and awareness of the public was repeated by interviewees on both sides of the border – which makes efforts like outside lobbying even more challenging (Interviewee G). The NGOs do not seem to have the same capacity as the State to conduct such ongoing educational activities (such as within CBRAC, for instance).

The NGOs within the USA engaged in outside lobbying. The U.S. NGO Treaty Caucus sent three targeted letters, representing 18 members of the Caucus (many of them NGOs) to Canada (praising them for their ongoing consultation efforts), to Jill Smail (the chief negotiator) and senator Antony Blinken, exhorting them for greater inclusion of the ecosystem function and salmon restoration into the future treaty (as the negotiations commenced) (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2021a; 2018; 2021b). These letters were published and widely disseminated as well as sent in person to the addressees. However, as Interviewee G notes, they are not convinced the letter had any effect on the USA side of the negotiations – that it was acknowledge by the head negotiator Jill Smail but had no further effect (Interviewee G). The Provincial government of BC however publicized the accolades received from the USA as a demonstration of their successful consultation efforts (Province of British Columbia 2016a, July 6 2021 Entry).

However, the lobbying efforts were not without problems. Interviewee S noted the limitations NGOs within Canada can leverage in their attempt execute inside lobbying:

“Because we’re a charity we have 10% [sic] lobby limit. We did hire lobbyists to speak to the federal government about the Columbia basin in general... and those lobbyists were registered in [sic] Ottawa and they gave us audience to senior folks at EC [Environment Canada], but really we didn’t, there, there wasn’t tons of traction there, you know? ... and it’s always hard cuz we’re busy doing the work so we don’t have a lot of time to do politicking” (Interviewee S)

Thus, both regulatory constraint on lobbying activities for non-profits in Canada as well as financial availability (highlighted below) as well as time limitations create barriers for NGOs to utilize methods of inside lobbying as an effective tool to access policymakers.

Speaking to the USA NGOs, Interviewee G suggests “we have decent relationships with some significant people... done meetings” with “senator’s office and house of representative’s offices” and “sent things to the governors” and “the state department” but that it’s not resulting in change (Interviewee G). The challenges to this mode of lobbying were in part to finding the right

“people” or translating the salience of the issue to make it “enough of a priority for the congressional offices” (Interviewee G).

These efforts however do speak to the networking element NGOs seem to engage with continually to advance their mandates. Interviewee R and Interviewee G, both working in the USA highlight the intertwined nature of the Public Advocacy Groups, NGOs and CSOs. The presence of the same actors within the Columbia River Roundtable (Center for Environmental Law & Policy 2022; One River Ethics Matter 2022a), the US Treaty Conservation Caucus (and the many NGOs that compose them) as well as the Ethics and Treaty Project (a network of advocacy groups, citizen representatives, NGOs, and CSOs offering annual conferences on the intersection of ethics, ecosystems, and the Columbia River and its Treaty (One River Ethics Matter 2022d)) suggests that frame alignment (Interviewee R’s focus on ethical and ecosystem functions of the river) creates bridges which create networks. The large variety of non-state actors who co-signed the 3 “NGO Letter[s] to the Negotiating Teams” mentioned above suggests that at least in the USA, networking is a strategy designed to aggregate a collective voice. Therefore, networking occurs between organizations of disparate mandates, structure, and composition to advocate for access and influence with policymakers.

Additional finances enabled greater ability to execute mandates and participate in consultations. The challenges of finding funding are “a very tedious and competitive process where you have a bunch of NGOs scrapping each other over the drags of money to get work done for civil society, which isn’t acknowledged or honored” (Interviewee S). Interviewee F suggested the funding provided by the Province of BC was helpful in subsidizing UCBEAC (Interviewee F). Thus, there are limitations to how much information can be provided (as outlined above one of the key ways NGOs can get a foot in the door) if there are no funds. Consequently, several of the participants

(Interviewee F, S, P) noted that the funding from the Province of British Columbia to execute mandates and support research and information gathering during the consultations was key in their ability to participate in the process meaningfully. Interviewee S noted that while this did not condition the outcomes of their research, it did influence the alignment of their research agenda to fit in with the Province's. Nevertheless, it seems the funding provision by the consultation provided is crucial to being able to participate meaningfully in information provision for the province.

Interviewee S notes that unlike in the past, upon receiving a significant grant from the Province of BC, it allowed them “to move and get some real things done really quickly... we're actually then able to hire the hydrologists and the geomorphologists and the experts who then help us implement the program and [sic] get things moving” (Interviewee S). Interviewee S however felt some conditionality attached to this financial support: “The other thing is [the] province sees us as an extension of us helping them to meet their mandates. So all of our programs are aligned with provincial and federal goals and needs because why would we be doing something completely separate?” (Interviewee S). However, Interviewee S also implied there was a natural synergy to this alignment as their work would ideally complement the provincial/federal work in hydrology. Interviewee G, speaking to the NGOs within the USA, experienced similar constraints of lack of finances:

“It's hard to fundraise for it [Columbia River Treaty as an issue]... there's lots of NGOs that are interested in the Treaty, but it tends to be toward the bottom of people's priority lists. And so the way that NGOs end up working on it is a little bit, kind of, under-resourced and sporadic and a bit chaotic” (Interviewee G)

Financial constraints limited the ability of non-state actors to both execute their mandates as well as deploy strategies to the best of their abilities. As Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler (1998b) highlight, lack of resources of particularly non-corporate actors can make it challenging for non-

state actors to participate in diplomatic/consultative processes. This was certainly the case for the NGOs both on the USA and Canadian side, where the lack of resources was *perceived* as a challenge in balancing the money needed to execute foundational activities (such as research) alongside the costs of consultations (Interviewee G, S).

5.3.7 Public Advocacy Groups

Interviewee U is a member of a USA non-profit organization American Whitewater which could be categorized both as a CSO or an NGO, but best fits under the Public Advocacy Group category. Given that its primary purpose is to protect and restore freshwater watercourses and promote access to waterways for recreational purposes through advocacy (American Whitewater 2022a) the category of “public advocacy group” is quite accurate in representing Interviewee U’s affiliation. Interviewee U is well versed in the technicality of hydrology and while only obliquely connected to the CRT consultation process, they were able to speak to the organization’s prior engagement with the CRT and the individual rivers that contribute to the Columbia (American Whitewater 2022b).

Several of the other organizations could easily fall under the Public Advocacy Group headline – as many of them focused more on the purposes of their advocacy than their membership, as outlined in the theoretical framework. These organizations included, on the USA side, Columbia Land Trust, Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, Idaho Rivers United, Lower Columbia Estuary Partnership, Northwest Energy Coalition, Columbia Basin Ground Water Management Area – City of Quincy (a cross-municipal body created to advocate for nitrate reduction in soil) (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h; Washington Water Science Center 2004). Since each of these organizations has a very different mandate that they advocate for there is no dominant frame that can unite these actors.

However, each of these organizations does advocate for a very particular framing. Idaho Rivers for instance, as noted in their letter to the US Entity in Spring 2013, advocates for the protection of rivers for the purposes of fish (Idaho Rivers 2013). The Northwest Energy Coalition, on the other hand, advocates for adequate water levels to support hydropower development to avoid the use of carbon-based energy sources (Northwest Energy Coalition 2022). The GWMA advocates for the reduction of nitrate levels in the soil within the area (Washington Water Science Center 2004). Since the evidence is paltry for these organizations – most of them being only present at a Stakeholder meeting (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2011h) with no specific interests attributed to them – it is challenging to ascribe any specific strategies for access. The one member (Idaho Rivers United) who did write the opinion letter which was published by the Treaty Review within the USA shows outside lobbying is one possible strategy. However, no other examples of direct or indirect lobbying seem to be present – Interviewee U noted that their organization does talk to the media, but not in connection to the CRT. One challenge facing inside lobbying is geographical. Access to policymakers – who tend to sit in the metropolises of Eugene, Portland, and Seattle – highlight the geographical limitations of some strategies for access (Interviewee U).

However, issue linkage, or the alignment of interests through linking of several disparate issues, was outlined as a powerful strategy of pooling efforts to access consultations and change dominant frames. Since the remit for Interviewee U was to promote recreational use of the river, they described in detail how their mandate of recreation (kayaking) can be strategically joined to the other issues at hand, such as flood management:

“They’d dump water, lower the pool to have more flood storage capacity. So they dump water and, maybe they do it on a weekday when everyone’s there... working at the dam... and someone’s like... what if we could have water released on the weekends and then we could have a recreational industry around this” (Interviewee U)

While Interviewee U was careful to note this is not always successful as it does not match the federal agency mandate, the attempt to link issues and different frames together is a feasible strategy, which resulted in the ability of American Whitewater to leverage access to the local negotiations surrounding water and power allotment of dams.

One key strategy that emerged from the conversation with Interviewee U was that of utilizing legal precedent to gain access to processes such as watercourse negotiations – particularly in the USA. The federally licensed power projects (such as several of the dams on the Columbia River administered by the Bonneville Power Authority and the U.S. Army Corps Engineers) operate under the Federal Power Act (Hydropower Reform Coalition 2022) which embeds an “equal consideration” clause which mandates the “federal energy regulatory commission [sic] to give equal consideration to power and non-power values at federally licensed facilities” and consequently “which has to give equal consideration to recreation among other” (Interviewee U). However, the use of this act for non-state actors to access water governance is often framed as mobilization because it does not end up in courts. Thus, the threat of both potential legal action as well as the desire to control the narrative and avoid unexpected repercussions later makes the use of this act a valuable tool when non-state actors try to gain access to federal licensing of dams. However, given that “the statement of the statute is equal consideration, not equal treatment”, Interviewee U noted the room within the clause for malleable interpretation from the hydro utilities as well as law makers. In this sense, “consideration” seems closer to consultation as information gather than consultation as consensus building. However, since American Whitewater did not participate directly in the CRT consultations (as it is only focused on specific projects on the tributaries to the Columbia), and the strategies outlined above speak to only

domestic efforts to influence consultations/negotiations on tributaries of the Columbia River, it is not clear how such a strategy would translate to the CRT consultations in an international setting.

On the Canadian side, none of the participating organizations were categorized as public advocacy groups.

5.3.8 Civil Society Organizations

Interviewee R is a coordinator for the Ethics and Treaty Project, a unique organization which puts on annual One River, Ethics Matter conferences (One River Ethics Matter 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021; 2022d) where faith-based communities (as well as various loosely-affiliated NGOs and CSOs and PAGs) gather to discuss and advocate for the environmental well-being of the Columbia River. This organization, and Interviewee R as a spokesperson for the organization, are categorized as a CSO due to the conflation of a specific mandate (environmentalism) with a specific demographic (religious communities) – but not fully allocated to either. Since the Ethics and Treaty Project is a loose combination of involved members supported by other organizations (Sierra Club, Center for Environmental Law & Policy, Columbia Institute for Water Policy) rather than a designated non-profit (One River Ethics Matter 2022d), it does not fit under the NGO category.

None of the Canadian organizations were categorized as CSOs, but on the USA side several were identified: Willamette Partnership, Aqua Permanente, Citizens for a Clean Columbia, League of Women Voters (Idaho, Oregon, Washington). These all share the combined features of a CSO of a specific membership (e.g. women voters or those living in the Willamette watershed) with a specific mandate (e.g. advocating for ecosystem function within the Columbia River).

Within the USA context, inside lobbying seems to be only possible if there is physical proximity to the locations of governance such as Northwest Washington or Oregon. As an example, the NGO Caucus “home offices are in like Portland and Seattle” so “getting people to the offices speaking to their [sic] staff in most cases is [sic] much easier” (Interviewee R). CSOs attempt to lobby policymakers indirectly: writing letters, “contacting government leaders”, but also other non-state actors: “we normally go to religious leaders and Tribal leaders, US Tribal leaders, and indigenous sovereigns in Canada” (Interviewee R). This speaks to elements of networking as well, linking non-state, indigenous, and other actors together. However, this ability to speak directly to policymakers is dependent on geography – and access to the places where “representatives and senators” operate such as Northwest Washington, Oregon (Interviewee R). As such, much like for the Public Advocacy Groups, reaching policymakers remains limited. Further, communiques such as the letters the indirect effect of publicizing particular standpoints within the public domain – such as signing the NGO Letter to Jill Smail (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2018; 2021b; 2021a), or sending in public letters (League of Women - Idaho 2013; League of Women - Oregon 2013) to the Treaty Review which are eventually published on the Treaty Review website. Such kinds of interventions are less costly and resource intensive.

However, networking and frame alignment is one of the key strategies observed by some of the CSOs on the USA side of the border. The annual One River Ethics Matter conferences bring together voices from numerous (and highly diverse group of) non-state actors⁷. These actors tend to share two frames regarding the river: salmon restoration and ecosystem consideration for the

⁷ The extensive list of participants can be found on the individual conference sites, but they tend to include eNGOs, academic representatives, Indian Tribes/First Nations representatives, religious leaders: (One River Ethics Matter 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021; 2022d). These various non-state actors (not counting the Indian Tribes/First Nations) are often grouped under the River Roundtable (One River Ethics Matter 2022a; Center for Environmental Law & Policy 2022) as well as the NGO Treaty Conservation Caucus (Save Our Wild Salmon 2022e)

river (One River Ethics Matter 2022e; 2022a). Thus, in addition to discussing a dominant frame of salmon/ecosystem maintenance, these actors engage in opportunities to network and form connections. These prove fruitful in future advocacy work, as the highly disparate actors can undertake advocacy efforts like the public letter to the USA head negotiator and senator in charge of the Treaty (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2018; 2021b). Further, these conferences offer ways to create and leverage knowledge that is later leveraged to gain access to the consultation process. Information generation and sharing is one of the key ways that non-state actors interact with policymakers as well as each other within the Basin. Interviewee R notes that “the [Columbia River] Roundtable... has been involved in most... is sharing information... across the border” and describes the Roundtable as “an information sheets effort so that people in the US [sic] know what’s happening in Canada and vice-versa... and we can, we can share that information and we can talk about strategies together” (Interviewee R). Beyond this, Interviewee F noted that technical water modelling results from these initiatives for instance were juxtaposed to the BC Hydro modelling within Canada, which demanded the inclusion of ecosystem function within the BC Hydro modelling – thus shifting the dominant frame of only hydro power and flood control.

The lack of CSO actors from the Canadian side was surprising, as similar concerns to those south of the border apply to the north of the border as well. The lower density of players in the area could speak to the lack of overall representation on the Canadian side, but a more compelling interpretation is to suggest that the lack of formalized networks (such as the Roundtable or the NGO Caucus) through which CSOs could join into the conversation, unlike in the USA, led to an inability of individual CSOs to find avenues of access. The nature of the CSOs as explicitly

operating within a network in the USA suggests this might be a necessary strategy in order to participate in the consultations.

5.3.9 Religious Groups

Only religious groups from the USA were found to have attempted to influence the consultation process regarding the CRT. This occurred in two primary ways. Firstly, they are regular participants within the One River Ethics Matter conferences run by the Ethics & Treaty Project (One River Ethics Matter 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021; 2022d). Given the project is attempting to merge environmental and faith concerns (One River Ethics Matter 2022e), it is a natural site for the religious groups to try to impact policymaking – by increasing their presence through networking. The clearest example of such networking is the alliance of faith communities in the USA and the Indian Tribes (as well as some groups composed of Indian Tribes, such as the CCRIFC), who co-wrote and publicly signed and disseminated a letter to President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper in support of a “moral framework for decision-making for the river and the human communities that depend on the river” (Faith Communities USA, First Nations, and Indian Tribes 2014). This letter, given the challenging history of reconciliation between Indigenous groups and faith communities given the residential schools in both Canada and the US, creates a combination of strange “bedfellows” (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018), who nevertheless combined their efforts to push for a particular frame regarding the CRT – in this case one of morality and justice (Faith Communities USA, First Nations, and Indian Tribes 2014). This coordination and issue linkage is in line with the theoretical framework which anticipates that religious groups will appeal on normative grounds, or at least normatively grounded frames. Thus, issuing a statement and making it public

highlights elements of networking as well as outside lobbying to achieve a particular frame for the Treaty.

5.3.10 Citizen Representatives

The most represented group within the interviews were citizen representatives who were also members of CBRAC (Canada) as Citizen Representatives. This creates a challenge of analysis in considering their views as both individual citizens, who are speaking through a state mandated and selected body (Province of British Columbia 2021). The overrepresentation (relative to the number of other interviewees) suggests a potential bias toward a CBRAC-specific understanding of the Treaty, as all the interviewees have been part of the long education and consultation process managed by the Province of British Columbia. Therefore, it is challenging to ascertain to what extent these voices are representative of other citizens, especially ones who were not selected to be part of CBRAC.

The positive response of this large contingent of citizens suggests their willingness to participate in the consultation process from the local communities – as well as in my research – due to their commitment to the Columbia River Treaty, their local communities, and personal connection to the river. I interviewed 6 of these citizen representatives, all from the Canadian side and all members of CBRAC. They ranged in being part of the process since CBRAC inception to recent replacement for open vacancies (as some citizens retired from their roles on CBRAC). Since CBRAC tended to create one or two positions for representatives per community, the interviewees were all local to the basin and were embedded within the communities as citizens. Further, the six interviewees varied greatly in their level of expertise regarding the topic of the CRT – both in technical information surrounding the treaty as well as the history of the region as well as hydro issues in general. This variety resulted in very different perspectives on the

consultation process as well as the expectations of what the consultation process could/should be. Interviewee D in particular had extensive background in hydrology research. The citizen representatives approached the consultations from different angles, but the uniting factor was their passion for the region as well as the future of the river. Consequently, from their own admissions, they were not representative of the citizens of the region who were often affected but ill-informed regarding the CRT and its impacts.

Within the USA, the only sense of citizen voices was present from the list of letters found on the Treaty Review website under the Public Comments Opportunities section (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017). These letters were solicited for the Spring 2013 Open House as part of the official Treaty Review. The 17 individual letters listed all expressed highly differing viewpoints and there was very little cohesion among them (Sweeney 2013; Soeldner 2013; Wilson 2013; Beck 2013; P. Price 2013; Rea 2013; Petrusha 2013; Ellis and Lincoln Electric 2013; Noland and City of Cheney 2013; Jensen and Inland Power 2013; Semanko and IWUA 2013; Keefer and Port of Clarkston 2013; Corbett 2013; Brooks and Port of Vancouver 2013; Sandvig 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; Bush 2013; Ruskin 2013).

A few key citizen voices were not included officially within the consultations but have made their presence felt by writing editorials and participating in conferences and symposia. For example, Eileen Delehanty Pearkes is a key figure within the basin but is not affiliated to any particular organization. She wrote a book on the Columbia River (Pearkes 2016), wrote numerous editorials on the subject (Pearkes and Rowlands 2020; One River Ethics Matter 2022c), and presented at multiple conferences (Pearkes 2015; One River Ethics Matter 2014). Thus, the extensive use of outside lobbying – as well as sharing information and networking –

seems to be possible for actors who are not explicitly connected to any specific organization. This can potentially result in being included in some of the activities where policymakers are present and soliciting feedback, such as the conferences (Pearkes 2015; One River Ethics Matter 2014) outlined above. Through the conduit of gaining traction and access and invitations to speak at CRT related events, and through this gaining access to policymakers, individual citizens can engage with the consultation process.

For the CBRAC representatives, their input was mediated by the state within the formal meetings and structure of CBRAC, where they had continual access to policymakers. This relationship was based mostly on trust, which was felt by many of the interviewees (e.g. Interviewee E). When prompted whether they felt whether they felt their views would be considered within the consultation, Interviewee E said “I trust them they’re doing the right things they need to do. They’ve asked the right question[s]” since “we’ve [CBRAC] helped them over the past years figure out the questions that we need to be asking” (Interviewee E). This speaks to elements of framing and agenda setting by the citizen representatives within CBRAC. Many asked for ecosystem function and recreation/economic concerns to be considered as part of the Treaty (E, I, K, L, T). Nevertheless, this ability to frame issues was perceived as limited by some of the citizen representatives who did not feel they could actually influence the dominant framings of the treaty (power generation and flood control). This self-awareness of the limitations of challenging the dominant frame of the Treaty (power generation and flood control) emerged several times, particularly by interviewees who were technically well-versed in hydrology or had previous contact/worked with BC Hydro. Interviewee D posited this succinctly when mentioning their [CBRAC citizen members’] “expectations have to be managed”. Nevertheless, this did not disengage the citizens from participating and engaging the policymakers in attempts to have their

voices heard, such as Interviewee M who kept bringing up the same issue at every meeting, despite explicit discouragement on the topic.

Consequently, feeling frustrated with the assurances that their consultation contributions would be implemented, Interviewee D spoke to the fear of being “used” by the Province to legitimize their ultimate negotiation position and limit their exposure to criticism.

In terms of networking, there were limited opportunities both due to geographical limitations as well as group dynamics. The needs and desires of these individual communities were too disparate to join together in a particular concentrated effort (Interviewee D). There might be temporary alliances on specific issues – “if one person [sic] had a community interest, another community member, somewhere down the river might say, yes, that’s, that’s our interest too” but would not end up “sitting together or strategizing together so much” (Interviewee D). Thus, strategic alignment was only temporarily present and ad hoc at best.

5.3.11 Research Organizations, Think Tanks, Academics

The two academics interviewed were involved in the consultations, one from the USA and the other from Canada. They were both ultimately consulted by the Canadian state as part of their expertise, and their research was utilized by the Canadian side to frame discussions (to protect the privacy of the Interviewees this documentary evidence is not cited). For Interviewee C, prior work within the basin created a context for engaging with the review and in particular creating fora for discussion about the futures of the basin. Within these fora, such as the symposia and conferences offered by the Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance (Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust 2012; Northwest Power and Conservation Council and Columbia Basin Trust 2014; 2019), non-state actors invested in the region had an opportunity to

engage and debate questions and ideas relative to the process. Interviewee N is deeply embedded within research on the Columbia River as well and is a member of the Universities Consortium, but additionally has conducted research on behalf of the actors within the region, both state and non-state. Consequently, these academics supplied knowledge, expertise, as well as coordinating meeting opportunities to engage with other actors invested in the basin.

Interviewee F, who preferred to be referred to as an “expert in the field” crossed categorical boundaries in terms of where they fit in. They had expertise with hydrology research and had worked with many of the actors involved in the province, including BC Hydro, the First Nations, as well as the NGOs – in roles as both a consultant and an invested citizen. They were also a member of CBRAC. The challenges to categorization of this individual highlight the abstract and somewhat arbitrary nature of the categories imposed on non-state actors as well as the categories themselves.

The international (Canada/USA) Consortium has leveraged a set of strategies to gain access to policymakers as well as directly within the consultations themselves (Interviewee C, F). Through their symposia and conferences, they created opportunities for networking, and indeed this allowed direct access to policymakers. Past relationship building was a source of access for some non-state actors. Interviewees C and N, as academics, found access to the consultations through their past research and the connections they have encountered along the way. These opportunities in turn allowed them to have an input on new projects regarding the Columbia River Treaty, in particular for Interviewee N. Further, Interviewee N notes that links across the US/Canada border between Tribes/First Nations/NGOs and other groups “helped build bridges” (Interviewee N). Similarly, Interviewee F noted that “there’s a lot of things that are based on personal contact and myself, and another person... we have close personal relationships with the BC government

representative” which in turn led to them “having no problem” with “translating views from the environmental community into the process” (Interviewee F). Thus, being “in a position to know people who are... involved in high levels” and having access to them through personal ties facilitates the translation of particular frames (e.g. environment) into the policy process.

Further, the conferences and symposia offered avenues for the dissemination and sharing of research – such as the publications that were published by the University Consortium in relation to the CRT (Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance et al. 2015). The research generated by the various researchers was present in discussions further on in the process⁸, and helped inform and frame the discussion within both state and non-state discourses. The presence of Universities as institutions in the various conferences/symposia as well as hosting several of these events (Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust 2012; Northwest Power and Conservation Council and Columbia Basin Trust 2014; 2019; One River Ethics Matter 2014) exemplifies the same patterns of accessing policymaking on the topic – bringing people together (networking) and advocating for particular stances (framing) as well as sharing valuable information (expertise/knowledge provision). In particular the information gathering is consistent with the theoretical framework and anticipated.

The University Consortium issued a letter of feedback to the US Treaty Review Process as part of their 2013 Spring Open House (Universities Consortium 2013), which suggests elements of outside lobbying, as these letters were later publicized (Bonneville Power Administration and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 2017). Direct lobbying was mostly possible

⁸ To protect the identity of the Interviewees, these works are not cited, but they are academic articles alongside reports on various topics relating to the Columbia River and its Treaty

due to the close proximity through bodies such as CBRAC: “we have direct access to the lead BC negotiator and the federal negotiator, there is really no barrier” (Interviewee F).

In terms of framing, however, the academics and researchers had great challenges in finding one dominant frame which they could align themselves behind. As Interviewee N notes that “what a lot of people aren’t prepared to concede is that the interests of First Nations and the interests of environmental groups are not necessarily coterminous” but that due to the “constitutional firepower, legal firepower” and “incredible political momentum” that First Nations have it is “in vogue right now for environmental groups to totally align themselves with First Nations” (Interviewee N).

Chapter 6: Analysis/Discussion

The analysis section synthesizes how well the theoretical framework corresponded to the data from the Columbia River Treaty case. While some results were consistent with the framework, others were not anticipated by the literature, and as such this synthesis is presented in an Expected/Unexpected dichotomy.

In the remaining sections, challenges to the project of creating a taxonomy and categorization more broadly, as well as the limitations of the research, are explored.

6.1 Table 5: Summary Table of Actors/Strategies Based on Research Results

	Lobbying	Networking	Expertise	Education	Legal	Framing	Political Mobilization	Issue Linkage
First Nations/ Indigenous/Tribes		EXP RES	EXP RES			EXP RES	EXP RES	
Subnational Government Groups				EXP RES			EXP RES	
Corporations			EXP RES			EXP RES		
Business Associations		EXP RES		EXP RES				
Professional Associations	EXP RES		EXP RES	EXP RES	EXP RES	EXP RES		
NGOs				EXP RES	EXP RES		EXP RES	
Public Advocacy Groups							EXP RES	EXP RES
Civil Society Organizations							EXP RES	
Religious Groups				EXP RES				
Citizen Representatives	EXP RES						EXP RES	
Research Organizations/Think Tanks		EXP RES		EXP RES				

Legend:

Orange Border	Not consistent with theoretical framework
EXP/RES	EXP = “expected” according to theoretical framework RES = “result” according to the data from the research No writing = consistent with the theoretical framework
Change in shading (within one cell)	First shading = theoretical anticipation Second shading = indicated by the results of study

6.2 Strategies

While there was some consistency in mapping the case to the taxonomy of the research framework, there were many actor/strategy combinations that were present in either greater or lesser amounts than anticipated. Though the complementary accounts from the interviews and documentaries offered insight into how many categories participated in the consultation process on both sides of the border, some gaps remain. As such, the theoretical expectations cannot be verified as a whole and neither can the USA and Canadian contexts be put into a strict comparison (Lijphart 1975). However, patterns emerged that reflect elements of the framework, while others are unexpected, and hence this section of the analysis offers insights along these lines.

6.2.1 Expected

The taxonomy suggested at the end of the theoretical framework anticipated many of the strategies non-state actors deployed when trying to access the consultations on both the Canadian and the USA side of the border. This section describes the most striking consistencies with the theoretical framework without being exhaustive.

Within the Canadian context, the First Nations, as observed indirectly through the narratives of other interviewees and documentary evidence, strategically used both the Duty to Consult as well as the newly adopted UNDRIP to leverage for access to the consultations and ultimately the negotiations. The state representative noted initially that they were initially simply “discharging” the obligation to consult but have now gone “beyond that” (Interviewee A). Especially given the research on indigenous leveraging of land rights, both within river contexts and without (Cosens and Royster 2012; Cosens et al. 2018; Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance et al. 2015; Popet 2011; Blumm and Pennock 2021; Richardson 2017), the strategy of legal

mobilization seems to have been effective for the First Nations. Thus, particularly for Indigenous actors who have utilized new laws and soft norms of consultation and now “free and informed consent” (United Nations for Indigenous Peoples 2022) suggests a savvy operator (Interviewee N) who can gain access to consultation processes.

Given the large number but limited resources of the USA NGOs, networking was one of the key strategies deployed by the actors to aggregate into a greater voice that would be significant enough to be consulted. The effectiveness of this strategy remained in question (Interviewee G), but the significant number of coalitions and networks as well as aggregate NGO organizations that emerged is telling of how these organizations strategize to pool their resources. The NGO Caucus, the River Roundtable, the UCBEC collaborative, the CRTIFC coalition as well as the Treaty and Ethics project all brought actors together of slightly differing mandates and created collective materials. While the NGO caucus and River Roundtable (whose members overlapped in some cases) were only part of some of the technical conferences that were part of the consultations, both UCBEC and CRTIFC were involved in, and contributed material to, the consultations themselves. Consequently, the networking function not only created links (in some cases cross-border) and points of access to policymakers but also allowed for information sharing and the provision of expertise from the various actors embedded within these networks. The NGOs from the Canadian side were not as connected as the ones on the American side, which could explain why some of them were disconnected so clearly from the process (Interviewee S).

Outside lobbying was deployed by both NGOs as well as Public Advocacy Groups and Civil Society Organizations. This mode of operating is quite consistent with these groups utilizing more labour intensive but less costly means of mobilizing the public and raising the awareness

for their mandates. The co-writing of letters by the NGOs within the USA as well as Canada – to shame the USA as well as praise Canada in comparison for their consultation efforts – serves as one such good example (U.S. Columbia NGOs 2021b; 2018; 2021a). The symposia/conferences that were generated by both NGOs, CSOs, and PAGs as well as Researchers and Think Tanks created significant public awareness of the issue and were some of the first instances of networking opportunities for the key stakeholders as well as information sharing. Consequently, outside lobbying has its place within the arsenal of non-state actors.

Issue linkage took form through the alignment of disparate frames. For instance, maintaining higher water levels was beneficial both for salmon restoration as well as recreation purposes (Interviewee U), and such linkages were invoked strategically by various groups of actors within the greater networks mentioned above. However, in the example offered by Interviewee U, the opportunistic nature of such a strategy becomes clear, and as such, is highly dependent on the participants to recognize and jump on such opportunities. The most explicit use of issue linkage was by the First Nations/Indian Tribes where salmon restoration and ecosystem preservation were linked together into one inter-related issue. Thus, not only did this evoke a particular frame (described below) but also became inextricably linked in future discussions.

The frames that were invoked by the non-state actors who were not power providers aligned in that they wanted the Treaty to consider factors beyond power/flood control. Thus, the issues that Indigenous and NGO/CSO/PAG/citizen actors wanted to define the consultations tended to revolve around ecosystem function and salmon restoration. For subnational actors (cities and municipalities in particular) within Canada, water levels for recreation purposes became a dominant frame. The corporations and power generating actors on the other hand kept advocating for continuing maintaining adequate water levels to operate their dams at high

efficiencies. Subnational actors within the USA, were concerned about flood control, which already was embedded as one of the major functions within the treaty. In many cases, these frames overlapped but also contrasted with each other – higher water levels are beneficial for power generation and salmon reintroduction, but not for flood control. Steady water levels are great for ecosystem function and recreation, but not for power generation. There were instances of frame alignment within some actor groups (in particular the Indigenous Actors [ecosystem function], power providers [high water levels]) but this was less common than individual concerns for individual groups/communities.

In terms of capabilities, it is clear that structurally embedded actors – Indigenous actors (legal claims), subnational actors (connected to governance or mandated to take care of the river), and corporations (as managers of the dams) – had privileged access to the consultation processes. In terms of technical capabilities, actors like BC Hydro had guaranteed access as they were both the managers of the dams, the electric systems, and the only ones with modelling capabilities (until groups like the CRTFIC developed their own modelling techniques). Similarly, the Local Governments Committee was guaranteed a seat at the CBRAC consultation body due to the local communities being fully embedded within the Basin – noting, however, that they had no final say in the outcomes (Interviewee N). These results were consistent with the theoretical framework.

Lobbying – especially outside lobbying - was present among almost all actors. The anticipation from the literature review is that there are limited means of access to policymakers as well as limited resources to engage in direct lobbying for non-corporate groups. However, the NGOs both in USA and Canada had personal linkages, spent financial resources, and lobbied policymakers directly, and indirectly through means such as communiques and letters in almost

every instance. While the ability to execute these strategies was limited by geography as well as resources (e.g. being able to travel to a particular site across the large distances of the Basin), the belief that influencing people in key positions was key to achieving policy was consistent among the groups. While some groups (NGOs) were not convinced by the effectiveness of lobbying of either kind, this did not dissuade them from utilizing it as a strategy. The outside lobbying elements – sending in letters or writing media articles, were consistent with the theory, and spanned the gamut of non-state actors..

6.2.2 Unexpected

Certain networks that emerged were unique because of their traditional disparate policy stances and histories. The theoretical framework anticipates collaboration along not only specific actor groups but frames as well (e.g. environmental NGOs). In particular, the links between the Faith Communities and First Nations/Indian Tribes emerged as unexpected, given the presence of historical tensions regarding residential schools both within the USA and Canada and brought to the forefront of public attention by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's work in Canada in the 2010s. These strange "bedfellows" (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018) however were able to coalesce around the strong frame of environmentalism. Similarly, the unique Treaty and Ethics Project, which coordinates religious groups around environmental consciousness, created a strong focal center around which actors from both sets of groups could coalesce. Thus, the networks that emerged within the consultations were not only based on aligned mandates (e.g. NGOs), but on the frame invoked surrounding both the topic (the Columbia River) and what was absent in the Treaty (ecosystem/environmental function/equity/justice).

There was a considerable tension between competing frames and networks. Especially in the Canadian context, where the dominant frame of power generation and flood control had been

dominant since the previous treaties' inception, many of the non-state actors and the First Nations advocated for the consideration of ecosystem function and salmon restoration (among other demands, such as for historical redress and recreation consideration). However, the aligning of the frame did not create an aligned network in this case or cumulate the effect/power to access of the NGOs/CSOs/PAGs to the consultations. This was emphasized by the willingness of the state to engage with the First Nations on a one-on-one basis within Canada and their inclusion on the Sovereign Review Team within the USA. Further, the privileged access that the First Nations seemed to enjoy throughout the process was felt by some interviewees to speak to their disadvantaged access – despite agreeing that the increased access warranted, the perception of a tiered system was noted by some interviewees. Thus, frame alignment does not create immediate synergies or enable everyone positing that frame to garner equal access to the consultations. Further, the distinct notion of state-to-state (Canada-to-First Nations) consultation and ultimately negotiations could have potentially created a greater divide between the state and non-state actors – simply the First Nations managed to position themselves on the “state” side of the divide.

As the theoretical framework describes, legal mobilization requires resources as well as expertise to mobilize, which many actors might not have at their disposal. However, the use of legal mobilization in several instances by non-First Nations actors (such as Interviewee U within the USA) highlights how legal provisions can be leveraged and utilized to demand access, even though they are not actively disputed in the courts. The specific use of the Federal Power Act's mandate to give equal consideration to both power and non-power use, for example, was an instance where the law itself creates a norm and does not have to be contested actively in court. As such, this “soft” version of the law (Bailliet 2012) conditioned the willingness of the state to

consider other frames (beyond “power”) to engage with the non-state actors’ preferred framing (in this case recreation/ecosystem use). While this linking of frames through legal norms does not apply directly to the CRT negotiations, it was leveraged to affect the Columbia tributaries as well as dams. This example only appeared within the domestic USA where complex legal structures and levels of governance between states enable for more nuanced appeals to law than within Canada. As Interviewee N noted, exempting rights to consultation and equal consideration (for First Nations), in the Canadian context only the federal and provincial governments have any kind of legal recourse with regards to influencing international treaties (and non-state actors such as municipalities have no recourse). Nevertheless, the effective exploitation of such a legal act in the USA suggests that CSOs and PAGs are savvy operators who utilize law when possible to access consultations regarding the CRT.

One anticipated barrier to the leveraging of strategies was the lack of information available both to groups and citizen representatives on the highly complex, and technical, aspects of the River and its operations as well as the CRT. The technical aspects which were mostly controlled and presented by the state actors (e.g. BC Hydro modelling in Canada, BPA and USACE within the USA) shaped and controlled the perceptions of what is possible and what is not. While all the non-state actors (especially the NGOs and academics) had their own expertise and information, the sourcing of most of the information by the Canadian and USA governments from the power providers (BC Hydro) and power administrators (BPA and USACE) resulted in this information not being as relevant or necessary as it might have been without the ‘official’ sources. A case in point is the lack of access for the Living Lakes NGO, which despite having extensive modelling capabilities, was not utilized for its data in exchange for access. The issue of expertise utilization might have been compounded by the preference to receiving expertise from those actors who

were already embedded within the official consultation bodies (such as CBRAC) – such as BC Hydro. However, this point is potentially muted by the links that some of the members had to research collectives (e.g. UCBECC or CRITFC) as well the opportunities to request information on subjects that the members of CBRAC did not have access to personally. How these external sources of expertise were selected at the CBRAC meetings remains unclear. Several interviewees suggested that as the CBRAC consultations went on, the state reached out to greater numbers and variety of sources from beyond their own traditional ones (e.g. BC Hydro), and that was in response to groups of actors (First Nations in particular), demanding such inclusion (Interviewee F). Therefore, the usefulness of the information and expertise that non-state actors could leverage increased over time, but not due to the initial/original lack of such information from the state side. Thus, despite the breadth of information available among the non-state actors, the privilege state actors had as sources of authoritative expertise limited the usefulness of non-state actor information/expertise as a source of leverage in exchange for access.

Further, unlike anticipated by the theoretical framework, political mobilization was almost non-existent within the strategies of the non-state actors. The NGOs in particular found it challenging to mobilize people who were not directly connected to the issue in some way. As such, trying to garner the public's support, which would lead to them having a stronger ability to indirectly lobby, network, and offer support for particular policies in exchange for access, was limited. As such, the ability to *create* alternative fora to the state offered ones to impact the CRT process (e.g. influence the ultimate negotiations but not through the state-created consultation process), was challenging.

This observation highlights the most surprising result from the research, which is that in both the Canadian and the USA case, the state led consultations were the main avenue of engagement

with non-state actors. While the thesis asks how non-state actors gain access to consultations (in general), throughout the case of the Columbia River Treaty, it was almost synonymous with asking how did non-state actors gain access to *these specific state-led consultations*. It is not challenging to envision an instance where, had the consultation process been completely inadequate, the non-state actors would have deployed strategies to still access the policymakers and the negotiations... a sort of unsolicited consultation. However, in this case, the state on both sides of the border seemed intent on capturing as much of the strategies of the non-state actors within the design of the consultations, thus discouraging external efforts to bypass the consultation process (and potentially destabilize the ability of the state to control it).

This line of inquiry is potentially beyond the scope of this thesis, which was to unpack what strategies non-state actors use to access consultations that were already in place. However, the funneling of most consultation related activities – roundtable meetings, conferences, symposia, discussions – into a state-led process (whether financially supported or integrated into formal bodies like the Sovereign Review Team and/or the Sounding Board/CBRAC) begs the question of why an actor chose to pursue such consultations in the first place. Potential responses might be that the actors found this the quickest and easiest way to access the policymakers involved, or that they genuinely felt this was a conduit to translate their wishes to the policymakers. But the interesting observation remains that even those who were cynical of the ability of the consultations to act as a conduit for their preferences still participated within the process.

6.3 Limitations of Research

One of the great limitations of this research was the inability to speak to Indigenous actors. The researcher recognizes the complex and conflictual relationship researchers have created in trying to gain access to Indigenous knowledge and perspectives (Weinstock 2003; Gellman 2021), and

consequently also recognizes the need to modify his research frameworks and approaches to be both suitable and useful to both First Nations and Indian Tribes if he wishes to include these voices in the future. Oblique references from participants in consultation processes were helpful in gaining a sense of the strategies First Nations and Indian Tribes deployed in the consultation process to gain access, as were some of the documentary sources that the Indigenous groups have published. Nevertheless, to have no Indigenous actors voice their perspective as key actors in both the consultations and the negotiations leaves significant gaps in understanding the public engagement process surrounding the Columbia River Treaty. The researcher plans to build relationships with these groups over the next few years to create a sense of mutual trust.

The lack of interviews speaking to some groups, as well as parity between USA and Canadian participants, leaves the author unable to reflect on many of the different groups which were involved in the Columbia River Treaty, except from documentary evidence. Given the significant involvement of religious groups from the USA side of the River, as well as numerous NGOs that were involved on both sides of the river, leaves a gap in the analysis. More important, the key players involved in managing the Treaty for the past 60 years and heavily involved in the consultation process – namely the Bonneville Power Administration, BC Hydro, and U.S. Army Corps – are all not present to account how they view the consultation process. Similarly, the lack of a response from the U.S. Department of State leaves the researcher unable to compare the design of their consultation process to that of Canada. Further efforts will be made to create and build connections with these groups.

Lastly, the greatest issue facing the thesis is the limited account of those who eschewed the consultation process altogether – who were those who did *not* participate in the consultation process, despite trying to? While the account above speaks to several actors using alternate fora

(other than the state offered consultation processes) to influence policymakers, those that have failed to do so and left no documentary evidence of such failures were not considered in this research. As such, this research experiences a gap in representing those voices. It is the hope of the researcher to create networks which facilitate the discovery of such voices.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The primary question this research attempted to answer was how non-state actors utilize strategies to access policymaking through consultations. To this end, the literature pointed to links between organizational features (mandates, orientation, structure) and capabilities to engage in consultation. Resource intensive strategies such as lobbying were more likely to be used by resource-rich non-state actors, such as corporations or bigger NGOs. Similar frames around issues (such as environmental concerns) tended to bring groups with similar mandates into networks which mutually reinforced each other. Groups with expertise and knowledge, such as civil society groups and public advocacy groups, were able to leverage these for access to policymakers. Thus, the literature resulted in a matrix of actors and the likely strategies they would leverage in trying to access consultations. While not encompassing all the actors or all the possible strategies – and questioning the very nature of categorizations itself – the resulting matrix created a framework which needed to be checked.

In turn, the Columbia River Treaty consultation process was an excellent case with which to check this analytical framework. The consultations happened recently, were well documented, and most importantly brought many non-state actors together to attempt to influence the policymakers in the eventual outcome. The troublesome history of the first Columbia River Treaty – with its primary focus on the two main goals of power generation and flood control at the expense of many other values and needs such as fishing, ecosystem preservation, and recreation within the region – created an optimum engaged set of actors who are trying to revise the new Treaty into something more representative of the many needs of the people within the basin. In turn, the two states (Canada and the USA) created two extensive consultation processes,

in many cases emulating the best practices of consultation. Thus, the setting created an additional opening for the non-state actors to participate in the consultations.

Using documentary evidence and primary research interviews with 20 state and non-state actors, the researcher was able to create an account of the ways the non-state actors attempted to gain access to the consultations – if they did so at all. The resulting matrix corresponds greatly to the anticipated theoretical framework and was not unexpected, in the sense that many actors did indeed employ the categories they were expected to use. The corporations not only lobbied but had great capability to send representatives to state-run meetings. The NGOs, for the most part resource poor, banded into greater networks and shared information and expertise among them which they eventually presented to the policymakers. Academics had abundant information and expertise which they were able to leverage for access through both state consultation processes as well as non-state events (such as conferences) where non-state actors created even more diverse networks.

Mismatches with the framework occurred along several strategies in particular. Expertise and education offered in exchange for access was even more present than anticipated, which reinforces the validity of the resource exchange model of political access. Even though the information/expertise might not have resulted in gaining access to the consultations in all cases, in the latter consultations especially within Canada, the state invited those with the information/experience to the table explicitly (such as UCBEC). Further, networking was even more crucial than anticipated, which suggests that despite this strategy being already applicable to most of the non-state actors, it is even more salient than previously thought. The ability of actors to frame issues effectively was also much more present than anticipated – it seems controlling the discourse allows actors who speak to that discourse (in particular First

Nations/Indian Tribes) a seat at the table as they are the ones who can lay claims to this frame through elements like rights and norms.

However, the most surprising feature was the underutilization of political mobilization as a strategy among all the non-state actors, despite them engaging in significant outside lobbying (which can touch on elements of popular mobilization through invoking the public will). The interpretation this researcher finds most compelling is that the state on both sides of the border conducted consultations that (seemingly) allowed non-state actors to participate – as long as they operated within the confines of the state consultation process. In other words, it seems as though the trade of access for lack of political mobilization was struck, with the reward for non-state actors being a direct link to the consultations.

The challenges in this thesis in terms of categorization were numerous. The first was in deciding how actors – who are part of state-mandated consultation bodies such as CBRAC/Sovereign Review Team/Sounding board – fit into the scheme of the consultations. While it is the case that they have autonomy *within* the consultations once begun, they are always at the behest (and potential disbanding) of the state... their access is not guaranteed. Further, the control with which these actors (such as citizen representatives) are elected to these bodies remains under the control of the state. Thus, the main crux of this problem is how much autonomy, once they gained access to the consultations by joining such a body, do these actors have, and to what extent are their voices, “their” own?

The second challenge of categorization that emerged was the lack of distinction between different strategies that were witnessed within the case, and raised the question whether categorization and strategies can ever be clear cut. Lobbying, though resource intensive, was used by many groups, although the great variety of strategies seen (from direct contact to

policymakers, to private letters, to public letters, to media op-eds, etc.) suggests that within this large brackets variations exist that must be distilled into more finely tuned categories (such as inside and outside lobbying, and more precisely defined). Further, the distinction between framing and issue linkage remain problematic – when a dominant frame subsumes two frames (e.g. environmentalism subsuming salmon restoration and ecosystem function), is this the same as issue linkage? Lastly, the complex category of “expertise” needs finer precision: information dissemination (which does not require the actor presence) is not the same as skills (which involves the actor directly), which can have significant effects on actor access to consultations.

Nevertheless, the framework offers an excellent starting point, needing numerous cases to flesh out both axes as well as the gradations and anticipated combinations of actors/strategies, as well to point out the gaps in existing literature. Inadequate information exists on legal/legal mobilization by non-state actors as well as on issue-linkage within non-state actors, as highlighted by the largely empty columns in Table 3/5. Some actor categories also need fleshing out: religious groups, citizen representatives, and associations (business/professional) all need more analysis and theorization to posit how they utilize and engage with state actors in consultations. The researcher’s challenges in finding relevant literature on these actors is in part indicative of this dearth. Further, dividing actors into specific groups – what distinguishes a CSO from an NGO from an advocacy group? – creates challenges in terms of the variables that are used for comparison between non-state actors. Organizational features such as funding sources, membership, and size certainly matter, but so do orientation/mandate features such as what is the purpose of the organization and what the target audience is of their actions.

A greater challenge though exists in separating the analytical units of the actors within the framework. The framework lacks clear causal links between actors and strategies and is mostly

deductive: an actor has been observed utilizing these strategies, probably because of certain factors – however, whether these are necessary, sufficient, or necessary and sufficient causes is usually not delineated. Such patterns might give us a sense of the correlation between different variables, but in order to operationalize them in future research, more cases and instances – as well as the underlying theoretical assumptions about the causal mechanisms – have to be explored. However, even if the causal links are not formalized, clarity in how external factors (such as the context) can influence variables and their relationships, would lead to greater predictive capabilities. Thus, in attempting to understand some aspects of both strategic behavior as well as non-state actors' varied use of these strategies, there is a necessity to try to ascribe a rationale for actors' use of strategies. For instance, if financial constraints are a common feature of environmental NGO organizations, or challenges of access to policymakers are a feature of the unnetworked citizen representatives, then we can anticipate that these groups will not have access to inside lobbying techniques. However, a strong aligned mandate between two actors can result in networks despite such constraints). These two interpretations are based on different aspects of organizations that can influence each other in various, and yet untheorized, combinations. Thus, the researcher suggests such categorization quandaries can be resolved through focusing on different aspects of the organizations. One set of parameters could consider the organizational features (size, age, membership, funding) while others could consider their orientation (mandate, target audience, issue scope) while others yet could consider their behavior (by strategies used such as information generation or explicit networking). Combining these different sets of parameters results in the challenges this researcher has faced in this thesis, where organizational features mesh somewhat with orientation and behavior... and the resulting challenge of trying to attribute the strategies these actors used to the different parameters of these

actors. Did the NGOs network because of their individual limited capacity/size/resources? Or did they network because they use information to access policymaking and collectively they can cumulate more information? Such questions are challenging to answer on the basis of a mixed framework.

Ultimately, this research is a call to keep examining consultations as sites of a struggle for power. Here, at the behest of the state, non-state actors get a foot in the door – they must struggle to widen it and get into the room through various strategies described in this research. None of the documentary evidence nor the interview responses suggested a lack of a desire to participate in the consultation process – the open-door policy seems to be a too-strong invitation to participate. However, ultimately, the consultation was still controlled heavily by the state in both cases and whether the voices heard in the consultations matter – or which ones matter more – remains to be seen. The call for linking consultation outcomes with policy outcomes becomes clear and particularly so within the negotiations. Thus, it is the hope of this researcher to keep examining how the voices heard in this research shape the final version of the Columbia River Treaty when the negotiations conclude.

References

- Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2009. "Chapter 2: The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State." In *The Politics of Global Regulation*, edited by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, 44–88. Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830732.44>.
- Adams, Barbara, United Nations, and United Nations. 2011. *Climate Justice for a Changing Planet: A Primer for Policy Makers and Ngos*. https://catalogue.solent.ac.uk/openurl/44SSU_INST/44SSU_INST:VU1?u.ignore_date_coverage=true&rft.mms_id=9997111458304796.
- Aizenberg, Ellis, and Marcel Hanegraaff. 2020. "Is Politics under Increasing Corporate Sway? A Longitudinal Study on the Drivers of Corporate Access." *West European Politics* 43 (1): 181–202. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1603849>.
- Almeida, Paul. 2019. "Climate Justice and Sustained Transnational Mobilization." *Globalizations* 16 (7): 973–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2019.1651518>.
- Almog-Bar, Michal, and Hillel Schmid. 2014. "Advocacy Activities of Nonprofit Human Service Organizations: A Critical Review." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 43 (1): 11–35. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764013483212>.
- Altman, Roger C. 2009. "Globalization in Retreat: Further Geopolitical Consequences of the Financial Crisis." *Foreign Affairs*, June, 2–7.
- American Rivers. 2022. "About American Rivers." American Rivers. 2022. <https://www.americanrivers.org/about-us/>.
- American Whitewater. 2022a. "American Whitewater." 2022. <https://www.americanwhitewater.org/>.
- . 2022b. "American Whitewater: Stewardship Success." 2022. <https://www.americanwhitewater.org/content/Wiki/stewardship:success>.
- Andonova, Liliana B., and Ioana A. Tuta. 2014. "Transnational Networks and Paths to EU Environmental Compliance: Evidence from New Member States: Transnational Networks and Paths to EU Environmental Compliance." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 52 (4): 775–93. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12126>.
- Andrée, Peter, Jill K. Clark, Charles Z. Levkoe, and Kristen Lowitt, eds. 2019. *Civil Society and Social Movements in Food System Governance*. 1st ed. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429503597>.
- Anheier, Helmut K. 2007. "Reflections on the Concept and Measurement of Global Civil Society." *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 18 (1): 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-007-9031-y>.
- Anheier, Helmut Klaus, Stefan Toepler, and Regina A. List, eds. 2010. *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*. Springer Reference. New York: Springer.
- Anzia, Sarah F. 2019. "Looking for Influence in All the Wrong Places: How Studying Subnational Policy Can Revive Research on Interest Groups." *The Journal of Politics* 81 (1): 343–51. <https://doi.org/10.1086/700726>.
- Appel, Susan. 2011. "Civil Society Mappings by Government: A Comparison of Ecuadorian and Colombian Cases." *Journal of Civil Society* 7 (2): 157–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2011.573668>.
- . 2013. "Deconstructing Civil Society 'Maps': The Case of Ecuador." *Administrative Theory & Praxis* 35 (1): 63–80. <https://doi.org/10.2753/ATP1084-1806350105>.

- Archetti, Cristina. 2012. "The Impact of New Media on Diplomatic Practice: An Evolutionary Model of Change." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7 (2): 181–206. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187119112X625538>.
- Ariss, Rachel, Clara MacCallum Fraser, and Diba Nazneen Somani. 2017. "Crown Policies on the Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Towards Reconciliation?," 55.
- Arts, Bas, Math Noortmann, and Bob Reinalda. 2001. *Non-State Actors in International Relations*. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments. 2022. "Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments (AKBLG) - About Us." 2022. https://akblg.ca/about_us.html.
- Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments, AKBLG. 2018. "AKBLG Constitution and Bylaws: Version 8.1."
- Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (3): 799. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111575>.
- Ayhan, Kadir Jun. 2019. "The Boundaries of Public Diplomacy and Nonstate Actors: A Taxonomy of Perspectives." *International Studies Perspectives* 20 (1): 63–83. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/eky010>.
- Bäckstrand, Karin, and Jonathan W. Kuyper. 2017. "The Democratic Legitimacy of Orchestration: The UNFCCC, Non-State Actors, and Transnational Climate Governance." *Environmental Politics* 26 (4): 764–88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1323579>.
- Bäckstrand, Karin, Jonathan W. Kuyper, Björn-Ola Linnér, and Eva Lövbrand. 2017. "Non-State Actors in Global Climate Governance: From Copenhagen to Paris and Beyond." *Environmental Politics* 26 (4): 561–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485>.
- Badie, B, D Berg-Schlosser, and L Morlino, eds. 2011. *International Encyclopedia of Political Science Bertrand Badie*. Sage.
- Bailey, Kenneth D. 1994. *Typologies and Taxonomies: An Introduction to Classification Techniques*. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences 07–102. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.
- Bailliet, Cecilia M., ed. 2012. *Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes: From the Margins*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139134989>.
- Bakaki, Zorzeta, and Thomas Bernauer. 2017. "Do Global Climate Summits Influence Public Awareness and Policy Preferences Concerning Climate Change?" *Environmental Politics* 26 (1): 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2016.1244964>.
- Bakardjieva, Maria. 2009. "Subactivism: Lifeworld and Politics in the Age of the Internet" 25 (2): 91–104.
- Baltutis, William Jesse, and Michele-Lee Moore. 2019. "Degrees of Change toward Polycentric Transboundary Water Governance: Exploring the Columbia River and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project." *Ecology and Society* 24 (2): art6. <https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10852-240206>.
- Barakso, Maryann. 2010. "Brand Identity and the Tactical Repertoires of Advocacy Organizations." In *Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action*, edited by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty, 155–76. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Bartley, Tim. 2010. "Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The Limits of Forest and Labor Standards Certification in Indonesia." *Business and Politics* 12 (3): 1–34. <https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1321>.
- BC Hydro and Power Authority. 2013a. "Canadian Entity's Preliminary View of Columbia River Treaty Post-2024 Called Upon Procedures." Vancouver, BC: BC Hydro.
- . 2013b. "Columbia River Treaty Review Technical Studies." British Columbia: BC Hydro.
- BC Hydro and Power Authority, Glen. 2013c. "Columbia River Treaty Technical Studies: Addendum Report." British Columbia: BC Hydro.
- Beck, Richard. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Richard Beck," 2013.
- Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (1): 611–39. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611>.
- Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann. 2006. "Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions." *Journal of Public Economics* 90 (4–5): 631–56. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.003>.
- Bennett, W. Lance, and Alexandra Segerberg. 2013. *The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198752>.
- Berkhout, Joost. 2013. "Why Interest Organizations Do What They Do: Assessing the Explanatory Potential of 'Exchange' Approaches." *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 2 (2): 227–50. <https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2013.6>.
- Bernstein, Steven, and Benjamin Cashore. 2007. "Can Non-State Global Governance Be Legitimate? An Analytical Framework." *Regulation & Governance* 1 (4): 347–71. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00021.x>.
- Berry, Jeffrey M. 1948-, and David F. Arons. 2003. *A Voice for Nonprofits*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy041/2003012547.html>.
- Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, and Francesco Trebbi. 2020. "Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence." *American Economic Review* 110 (7): 2065–2102. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180615>.
- Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. 2004. "Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2): 471–93. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00310.x>.
- Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. 2006. "Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change." *Global Governance*, June, 141–59.
- Betsill, Michele M., and Elisabeth Corell. 2001. "NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis." *Global Environmental Politics* 1 (4): 65–85.
- Betzold, Carola. 2013. "Business Insiders and Environmental Outsiders? Advocacy Strategies in International Climate Change Negotiations." *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 2 (3): 302–22. <https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2013.9>.
- Beyene, Tazebe, Dennis P. Lettenmaier, and Pavel Kabat. 2010. "Hydrologic Impacts of Climate Change on the Nile River Basin: Implications of the 2007 IPCC Scenarios." *Climatic Change* 100 (3–4): 433–61. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9693-0>.
- Beyers, Jan, and Iskander De Bruycker. 2018. "Lobbying Makes (Strange) Bedfellows: Explaining the Formation and Composition of Lobbying Coalitions in EU Legislative Politics." *Political Studies* 66 (4): 959–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717728408>.

- Beyers, Jan, Rainer Eising, and William Maloney. 2008. "Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know?" *West European Politics* 31 (6): 1103–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802370443>.
- Bièvre, Dirk de, Arlo Poletti, Marcel Hanegraaff, and Jan Beyers. 2016. "International Institutions and Interest Mobilization: The WTO and Lobbying in EU and US Trade Policy." *Journal of World Trade* 50 (2): 1–29.
- Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 2022. "Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation." Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 2022. <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/>.
- Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, and Anne Rasmussen. 2015. "Comparing the Domestic and the EU Lobbying Context: Perceived Agenda-Setting Influence in the Multi-Level System of the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 22 (4): 552–69. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008553>.
- Bishop, Patrick, and Glyn Davis. 2002. "Mapping Public Participation in Policy Choices." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 61 (1): 14–29. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.00255>.
- Bloodgood, Elizabeth A. 2011. "The Interest Group Analogy: International Non-Governmental Advocacy Organisations in International Politics." *Review of International Studies* 37 (1): 93–120. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001051>.
- Blumm, Michael C., and Lizzy Pennock. 2021. "Tribal Consultation: Toward Meaningful Collaboration with the Federal Government." *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3841809>.
- Bob, Clifford. 2002. "Merchants of Morality." *Foreign Policy*, no. 129: 36–45. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3183388>.
- . 2010. "The Market for Human Rights." In *Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action*, edited by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty, 133–54. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Boehmke, Frederick J., and Richard Witmer. 2011. "Tribal Political Expenditures in California and Washington DC." In *The New Politics of Indian Gaming*, edited by Tracy A. Skopek and Kenneth N. Hansen, 25–37. Nevada: University of Nevada Press.
- Böhmelt, Tobias, Vally Koubi, and Thomas Bernauer. 2014. "Civil Society Participation in Global Governance: Insights from Climate Politics: Civil Society Participation in Global Governance." *European Journal of Political Research* 53 (1): 18–36. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12016>.
- Bonneville Power Administration, and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division. 2011a. "Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Discussions; Stakeholder Listening Session." Portland. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011b. "Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Electric Power Representatives Dialogue." Spokane. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011c. "Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue." Portland. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.

- . 2011d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Flood Control Representatives Dialogue.” Portland.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011e. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review Water Quality Workshop.”
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011f. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Stakeholder Listening Session.” Spokane.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011g. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Stakeholder Listening Session.” Portland.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011h. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Overview of Preliminary Phase 2 Alternatives (Stakeholder Listening Sessions: Spokane, Portland, Boise, September-October 2011).” Washington WA, October.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011i. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Stakeholder Listening Session.” Boise.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012a. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Other Studies.” 2012.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170227050515/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/OtherStudies.aspx>.
- . 2012b. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Panel Session with County Commissioners.” Spokane.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012c. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Recent Study Results.” Washington WA. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Modeling Results: Iteration One (Stakeholder Listening Sessions June-July 2012).” Washington WA, July.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012e. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Discussion: Stakeholder Listening Sessions.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012f. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Discussion: Stakeholder Seminar.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.

- . 2013a. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review: Draft Regional Recommendation.” 2013. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226164754/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/DraftRegionalRecommendation.aspx>.
- . 2013b. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review: Stakeholder Responses to U.S. Entity Solicitation Response Summary: March 5, 2013.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226223132/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/CRTComments.aspx>.
- . 2013c. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Iteration #2 Alternatives & Components: General Summary of Results.” Washington WA, April 10. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Recreation Outreach Session.” Washington WA, May. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013e. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Sovereign Review Team Roster,” May, 3.
- . 2013f. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Agenda: Informational Webinar - Working Draft of a Regional Recommendation.” Portland. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013g. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Please Join the U.S. Entity Public: Roundtable Discussions: Draft Regional Recommendation on the Future of the Treaty (October 2013 Public Discussions).” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2017. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review: Public Comment Opportunities.” February 26, 2017. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226223132/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/CRTComments.aspx>.
- . 2022. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review Main Site.” 2022. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170201224917/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Default.aspx>.
- . October 2-16. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Draft Regional Recommendation Discussion Roundtable.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Lead Sovereign Technical Team Roster.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . July 16-July 23. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Learn and Discuss: Working Draft Recommendation Informational Webinars.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- Bouwen, Pieter, and Margaret Mccown. 2007. “Lobbying versus Litigation: Political and Legal Strategies of Interest Representation in the European Union.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 14 (3): 422–43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760701243798>.

- Braun, Caelesta. 2015. "Lobbying as a Leveraged Act: On Resource Dependencies and Lobby Presence." In *The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities*, edited by David Lowery, Darren Halpin, and Virginia Gray, 137–56. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137514318>.
- Brideau, Isabelle. 2019. "The Duty to Consult Indigenous Peoples." 2019-17-E. Library of Parliament.
- British Medical Journal. 1954. "Public Health and Tropical Medicine: Professional Societies." *British Medical Journal*, August, 530–31.
- Brooks, Katy and Port of Vancouver. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Katy Brooks Port of Vancouver," 2013.
- Bruhl, Tanja. 2010. "Representing the People? NGOs in International Negotiations." In *Evaluating Transnational NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation*, edited by Jens Steffek and Kristina Hahn, 13:181–99. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14742837.2013.844060>.
- Bruhl, Tanja, and Volker Rittberger. 2001. "From International to Global Governance: Actors, Collective Decision-Making, and the United Nations in the World of the Twenty-First Century." In *Global Governance and the United Nations System*, edited by Volker Rittberger, 1–47. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Brulle, Robert J. 2018. "The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying Spending on Climate Change in the USA, 2000 to 2016." *Climatic Change* 149 (3–4): 289–303. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2241-z>.
- Brummans, Boris H. J. M., Linda L. Putnam, Barbara Gray, Ralph Hanke, Roy J. Lewicki, and Carolyn Wiethoff. 2008. "Making Sense of Intractable Multiparty Conflict: A Study of Framing in Four Environmental Disputes." *Communication Monographs* 75 (1): 25–51. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03637750801952735>.
- Bursens, Peter, Jan Beyers, and Tom Donas. 2014. "Domestic European Union Coordination and Interest Group Mobilization in Three Member States: Looking Beyond the Formal Mechanisms." *Regional & Federal Studies* 24 (3): 363–81. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2014.911739>.
- Busby, Joshua William. 2007. "Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2): 247–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00451.x>.
- Bush, Larry. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Larry Bush," 2013.
- C40, ARUP, UCL. 2015. "Potential for Climate Action: Cities Are Just Getting Started." London: C40, ARUP, UCL.
- Canada, Government of Canada; Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs. 2012. "Government of Canada and the Duty to Consult." Administrative page. March 15, 2012. <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1331832510888/1609421255810>.
- Canada. Health Canada and Public Health Agency of Canada. 2014. *First Nations & Inuit Mental Health and Addictions : Cluster Evaluation 2005/06-2009/10 : Final Report*. 1 online resource (xiv, 58 pages) vols. [Ottawa, Ontario]: Health Canada. <https://www.deslibris.ca/ID/242698>.
- Canada. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 1997. *First Nations in Canada*. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.

- Canada Revenue Agency. 2003. "Political Activities." Service description. September 15, 2003. <https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/charities-giving/charities/policies-guidance/policy-statement-022-political-activities.html>.
- Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission. 2022. "Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission - Home." CCRIFC Online. 2022. <http://ccrifc.org/>.
- Carmin, Joann. 1999. "Voluntary Associations, Professional Organisations and the Environmental Movement in the United States." *Environmental Politics* 8 (1): 101–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644019908414440>.
- Carter, Neil. 2001. *The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Carty, R. Kenneth., Lisa. Young, and William P. (William Paul) Cross 1962-. 2000. *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics*. Vancouver: UBC Press. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/vic/>.
- Castells, Manuel. 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society, Volume I of The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. Oxford: Blackwell. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1252090>.
- Catt, Helena, and Michael Murphy. 2003. "What Voice for the People? Categorising Methods of Public Consultation." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 407–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1036114032000133967>.
- Center for Environmental Law & Policy. 2022. "Columbia River Roundtable." 2022. <https://celp.org/columbia-river-roundtable/>.
- Chalmers, Adam. 2019. "Informational Lobbying in the EU: Mechanisms of Probity, Dissembling, and Transparency." In *Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, Dynamics and Trends*, edited by Doris Dialer and Margarethe Richter, 65–80. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9>.
- Chalmers, Adam, and Adela Alexandra Iacobov. 2019. "The Stakes of Global Venue Shopping: Examining Bank Lobbying in the Basel Committee and the European Union." *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 8 (3): 433–59. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-019-00059-8>.
- Chaloux, Annie, Stéphane Paquin, and Hugo Séguin. 2015. "Canada's Multiple Voices Diplomacy in Climate Change Negotiations: A Focus on Québec." *International Negotiation* 20 (2): 291–318. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341311>.
- Chaloux, Annie, Hugo Séguin, and Philippe Simard. 2022. "'All in' Climate Regime: Federated States as Autonomous Participants to the Paris Agreement the Cases of Québec and California." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, February, 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2021.2002702>.
- Charlton, Guy. 2014. "The Law of Native American Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Outside of Reservation Boundaries in the United States and Canada." *Canada-United States Law Journal* 39: 103.
- Charnovitz, Steve. 1997. "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance." *Michigan Journal of International Law* 18 (2): 183–86.
- . 2016. "Accountability of Public and Private International Organizations." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, edited by Bob Reinalda, 333–46. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Chelan County. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Chelan Co Columbia River Treaty Review," 2013.
- Chen, Cecilia, Janine MacLeod, and Astrida Neimanis, eds. 2013. *Thinking with Water*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

- Chong, Dennis. 1991. *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Choucri, Nazli. 2012. *Cyberpolitics in International Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Christian, Dorothy 1950-, and Rita 1968- Wong. 2017. *Downstream : Reimagining Water*. Environmental Humanities Series. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- City of Portland. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - City of Portland Letter on CRT Process," 2013.
- Clark, Ann Marie, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler. 1998a. "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women." *World Politics* 51 (1): 1–35. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007772>.
- . 1998b. "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women." *World Politics* 51 (1): 1–35. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007772>.
- Clark, Howard C. 2001. "Formal Knowledge Networks: A Study of Canadian Experiences." International Institute for Sustainable Development. Canada Commons. <https://canadacommons.ca/artifacts/616149/formal-knowledge-networks/>.
- Clark Public Utilities. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Clark Public Utilities Response to Entity Request," 2013.
- Cohen, Alice, and Emma S. Norman. 2018. "Renegotiating the Columbia River Treaty: Transboundary Governance and Indigenous Rights." *Global Environmental Politics* 18 (4): 4–24. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00477.
- Cohen, J.L., and A Arrato. 1992. *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Coleman, David A. 1991. "Policy Research - Who Needs It?" *Governance* 4 (4): 420–50. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1991.tb00022.x>.
- Colgan, Jeff D., Jessica F. Green, and Thomas N. Hale. 2020. "Asset Revaluation and the Existential Politics of Climate Change." *International Organization*, December, 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000296>.
- Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority. 2008. "Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority Recommendations for Ammendments to the Northwest Power and Conservation Council 2000 Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program."
- Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee. 2016. "Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee." December 12, 2016. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/columbia-basin-regional-advisory-committee/>.
- Columbia Basin Tribes. 2010. "Columbia Basin Tribes: Common Views on the Future of the Columbia River Treaty."
- Columbia Basin Trust. 2020. *Columbia Basin Trust: A Story of People, Power and a Region United*. Canada: Helmock Printers.
- . 2022. "Columbia Basin Trust - Vimeo." Vimeo. 2022. <https://vimeo.com/columbiabasintrust>.
- Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission. 2022. "Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission - About Us." CRITFC. 2022. <https://critfc.org/about-us/>.
- Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, CRITFC. 2012. "Future of Our Salmon Conference: 2012, 2014, 2016." *CRITFC* (blog). 2016 2012. <https://critfc.org/future-of-our-salmon-conference-a-success/>.

- Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee, CRT LGC. 2022. "CRT LGC | Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee." CRTLGC. 2022. <https://www.crtlgc.ca/the-committee>.
- Corbett, Jack. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Jack Corbett," 2013.
- Cornelissen, Joep P., and Mirjam D. Werner. 2014. "Putting Framing in Perspective: A Review of Framing and Frame Analysis across the Management and Organizational Literature." *Academy of Management Annals* 8 (1): 181–235. <https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2014.875669>.
- Cosens, Barbara 1955-, and Judith V. Royster. 2012. *The Future of Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights : The Winters Centennial*. 1 online resource (372 pages) vols. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10554407>.
- Cosens, Barbara, Matthew McKinney, Richard Paisley, and Aaron T. Wolf. 2018. "Reconciliation of Development and Ecosystems: The Ecology of Governance in the International Columbia River Basin." *Regional Environmental Change* 18 (6): 1679–92. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1355-1>.
- Cummins, Jeff. 2011. "Lobbying Strategies and Campaign Contributions: The Impact on Indian Gaming in California." In *The New Politics of Indian Gaming*, edited by Tracy A. Skopek and Kenneth N. Hansen, 38–56. Nevada: University of Nevada Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1994. *The Green Rainbow : Environmental Groups in Western Europe*. New Haven: Yale University Press. http://digitool.hbz-nrw.de:1801/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=745031&custom_att_2=simple_viewer.
- Dan, Kathryn. 2000. "Lobbying and Public Campaigns for Professional Archival Associations." International Council on Archives.
- Davies, Lynn, and Christopher Talbot. 2008. "Learning in Conflict and Postconflict Contexts." *Comparative Education Review* 52 (4): 509–18. <https://doi.org/10.1086/591295>.
- De Bruycker, Iskander, Joost Berkhout, and Marcel Hanegraaff. 2019. "The Paradox of Collective Action: Linking Interest Aggregation and Interest Articulation in EU Legislative Lobbying." *Governance* 32 (2): 295–312. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12373>.
- De Silva, Nicole. 2017. "Intermediary Complexity in Regulatory Governance: The International Criminal Court's Use of NGOs in Regulating International Crimes." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 670 (1): 170–88. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716217696085>.
- De Stefano, L., Jacob D. Petersen-Perlman, Eric A. Sproles, Jim Eynard, and Aaron T. Wolf. 2017. "Assessment of Transboundary River Basins for Potential Hydro-Political Tensions." *Global Environmental Change* 45 (July): 35–46. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.04.008>.
- De Stefano, Lucia, James Duncan, Shlomi Dinar, Kerstin Stahl, Kenneth M Strzeppek, and Aaron T Wolf. 2012. "Climate Change and the Institutional Resilience of International River Basins." *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (1): 193–209. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311427416>.
- De Stefano, Lucia, Paris Edwards, Lynette de Silva, and Aaron T. Wolf. 2010. "Tracking Cooperation and Conflict in International Basins: Historic and Recent Trends." *Water Policy* 12 (6): 871–84. <https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2010.137>.
- Delisle, H el ene, Janet Hatcher Roberts, Michelle Munro, Lori Jones, and Theresa W Gyorkos. 2005. "The Role of NGOs in Global Health Research for Development." *Health Research Policy and Systems* 3 (1): 3. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4505-3-3>.

- Della Porta, Donatella, and Mario Diani. 2006. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Denoon, Riley T. P., Richard K. Paisley, Marguerite de Chaisemartin, and Taylor W. Henshaw. 2020. "Engaging Non-State Actors in the Negotiation and Implementation of International Watercourse Agreements: Experiences and Lessons Learned from Canada." *Water International* 45 (4): 311–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2020.1734757>.
- Derman, Brandon. 2019. "Revisiting Limits to Legal Mobilization for Global Climate Justice: Complexity, Territoriality, and Responsibility." *Oñati Socio-Legal Series* 9 (3): 333–60. <https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1062>.
- DeSantis, Gloria. 2010. "Voices from the Margins: Policy Advocacy and Marginalized Communities." *Canadian Journal of Nonprofit and Social Economy Research* 1 (1). <https://doi.org/10.22230/cjnsr.2010v1n1a24>.
- DeSantis, Gloria C. 2013. "Policy Advocacy Experiences of Saskatchewan Nonprofit Organizations: Caught between Rocks and Hard Places with Multiple Constituents?: Policy Advocacy of Nonprofits." *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien* 57 (4): 457–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0064.2013.12043.x>.
- DeSantis, Gloria, and Nick J. Mulé. 2017. "Advocacy: A Contested yet Enduring Concept in the Canadian Landscape." In *Shifting Terrain : Nonprofit Policy Advocacy in Canada*, edited by Nick J. Mulé, Gloria DeSantis, and Peter Elson, 3–32. Ottawa, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press. <https://canadacommons.ca/artifacts/1877449/the-shifting-terrain/>.
- DeStefano, Joseph, and Audrey-marie Schuh Moore. 2010. "The Roles of Non-State Providers in Ten Complementary Education Programmes." *Development in Practice* 20 (4–5): 511–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614521003763061>.
- Dewulf, Art, Barbara Gray, Linda Putnam, Roy Lewicki, Noelle Aarts, Rene Bouwen, and Cees van Woerkum. 2009. "Disentangling Approaches to Framing in Conflict and Negotiation Research: A Meta-Paradigmatic Perspective." *Human Relations* 62 (2): 155–93. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726708100356>.
- Dias, Vitor M., Pedro Paulo de Miranda Araújo Soares, Eduardo S. Brondizio, and Sandra Helena Ribeiro Cruz. 2021. "Grassroots Mobilization in Brazil's Urban Amazon: Global Investments, Persistent Floods, and Local Resistance across Political and Legal Arenas." *World Development* 146 (October): 105572. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105572>.
- Donaldson, Linda Plitt. 2007. "Advocacy by Nonprofit Human Service Agencies: Organizational Factors as Correlates to Advocacy Behavior." *Journal of Community Practice* 15 (3): 139–58. https://doi.org/10.1300/J125v15n03_08.
- . 2008. "Developing a Progressive Advocacy Program Within a Human Services Agency." *Administration in Social Work* 32 (2): 25–48. https://doi.org/10.1300/J147v32n02_03.
- Doner, Richard F., and Ben Ross Schneider. 2000. "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others." *Business and Politics* 2 (3): 261–88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713991579>.
- Douglas County. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Douglas County Response Letter to US Entity Coordinators Regarding Columbia River Treaty," 2013.
- Drutman, L. 2015. *The Business of America Is Lobbying*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Dryzek, John S. 2002. *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/019925043X.001.0001>.
- Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne 1938-. 2014. *An Indigenous Peoples' History of the United States*. ReVisioning American History. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Dür, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. 2010. "Irish Associations and Lobbying on EU Legislation: Resources, Access Points, and Strategies." *Irish Political Studies* 25 (1): 107–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07907180903432150>.
- Earth Ministry. 2022. "Mission, Vision, and Values – Earth Ministry." 2022. <https://earthministry.org/about/>.
- Ellis, Ray and Lincoln Electric. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Ray Ellis, Lincoln Electric Cooperative," 2013.
- Engle, Karen. 2010. *Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- EPA. 2016. "EPA Policy on Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribes: Guidance for Discussing Tribal Treaty Rights." https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-02/documents/tribal_treaty_rights_guidance_for_discussing_tribal_treaty_rights.pdf.
- Epp, Charles R. 1998. *The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/uchi052/98014170.html>.
- Faith Communities USA, First Nations, and Indian Tribes. 2014. "First Nations and Tribes and Faith Communities Letter to President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Harper: Declaration on Ethics & Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty," September 23, 2014.
- Falkner, Robert. 2016. "The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics." *International Affairs* 92 (5): 1107–25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12708>.
- Farrell, Catherine M. 2000. "Citizen Participation in Governance." *Public Money and Management* 20 (1): 31–37. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9302.00199>.
- Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. 2016. "The New Interdependence Approach: Theoretical Development and Empirical Demonstration." *Review of International Political Economy* 23 (5): 713–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1247009>.
- Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2018. "Linkage Politics and Complex Governance in Transatlantic Surveillance." *World Politics* 70 (4): 515–54. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887118000114>.
- Fawn, Rick. 2009. "'Regions' and Their Study: Wherefrom, What for and Whereto?" *Review of International Studies* 35 (S1): 5–34. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210509008419>.
- Figueira, Carla. 2020. "Indigenous Peoples as Non-State Diplomatic Actors in the Public/Cultural Diplomacy of Taiwan: A Case Study of Dispossessions: Performative Encounter(s) of Taiwanese Indigenous Contemporary Art." *International Journal of Taiwan Studies* 3 (1): 62–92. <https://doi.org/10.1163/24688800-00301006>.
- Finnegan, Richard B., and Edward McCarron. 2000. *Ireland: Historical Echoes, Contemporary Politics*. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429499623>.
- Florini, Ann., Nihon Kokusai Kōryū Sentā., and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2000. *The Third Force : The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange ;
- Fowler, Robert Booth, and Allen Hertzke. 1995. *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Fox, Jonathan. 2006. "World Separation of Religion and State Into the 21st Century." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (5): 537–69. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005276310>.
- Fox, Karen F.A., and Bobby J. Calder. 1985. "The Right Kind of Business Advocacy." *Business Horizons* 28 (1): 7–11. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0007-6813\(85\)90031-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0007-6813(85)90031-X).
- Fraussen, Bert, Adrià Albareda, and Caelesta Braun. 2020. "Conceptualizing Consultation Approaches: Identifying Combinations of Consultation Tools and Analyzing Their Implications for Stakeholder Diversity." *Policy Sciences* 53 (3): 473–93. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-020-09382-3>.
- Fraussen, Bert, and Darren Halpin. 2017. "Think Tanks and Strategic Policy-Making: The Contribution of Think Tanks to Policy Advisory Systems." *Policy Sciences* 50 (1): 105–24. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-016-9246-0>.
- Friedman, Andrew, and Mary Phillips. 2004. "Balancing Strategy and Accountability: A Model for the Governance of Professional Associations." *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 15 (2): 187–204. <https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.61>.
- Fuchs, Doris. 2007. *Understanding Business Power in Global Governance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2016. "Governance: What Do We Know, and How Do We Know It?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (1): 89–105. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042214-044240>.
- Fung, Archon. 2007. "Democratic Theory and Political Science: A Pragmatic Method of Constructive Engagement." *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 443–58. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540707030X>.
- Gaćeša, Radmila. 2020. "Think tank." *Bankarstvo* 49 (2): 131–42. <https://doi.org/10.5937/bankarstvo2002131G>.
- Gellman, Mneasha. 2021. "Collaborative Methodology with Indigenous Communities: A Framework for Addressing Power Inequalities." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 54 (3): 535–38. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096521000299>.
- Giannetto, Leila. 2019. "Lobbying EU Agencies from Within: Advocacy Groups in Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights." In *Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, Dynamics and Trends*, edited by Doris Dialer and Margarethe Richter, 165–84. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98800-9>.
- Gill, Anthony. 2001. "Religion and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 117–38. <https://doi.org/10.1094-2939/01/0623-0117>.
- . 2019. "DRAFT: The Comparative Endurance and Efficiency of Religion: A Public Choice Perspective."
- Gill, Anthony, and Erik Lundsgaarde. 2004. "State Welfare Spending and Religiosity: A Cross-National Analysis." *Rationality and Society* 16 (4): 399–436. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463104046694>.
- Gill, Anthony, and Steven Pfaff. 2010. "Acting in Good Faith: An Economic Approach to Religious Organizations as Advocacy Groups." In *Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action*, edited by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty, 58–90. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Giordano, Mark, Alena Drieschova, James A. Duncan, Yoshiko Sayama, Lucia De Stefano, and Aaron T. Wolf. 2014. "A Review of the Evolution and State of Transboundary

- Freshwater Treaties.” *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 14 (3): 245–64. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-013-9211-8>.
- Giordano, Meredith A, and Aaron T Wolf. 2002. “Incorporating Equity into International Water Agreements.” *Social Justice Research*, 18.
- Global Affairs Canada. 2018. “Canada and United States Launch Negotiations to Renew Columbia River Treaty.” News releases. Government of Canada: Global Affairs Canada. May 22, 2018. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/05/canada-and-united-states-launch-negotiations-to-renew-columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- Global Affairs Canada, Global Affairs. 2019. “Federal Government Announces Columbia River Basin Indigenous Nations to Participate as Observers in Columbia River Treaty Negotiations.” News releases. April 26, 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/04/federal-government-announces-columbia-river-basin-indigenous-nations-to-participate-as-observers-in-columbia-river-treaty-negotiations.html>.
- Godden, Lee, and Maureen Tehan. 2016. “REDD+: Climate Justice and Indigenous and Local Community Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption.” *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law* 34 (1): 95–108. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2016.1121620>.
- Goff, Patricia M. 2009. “Indigenous Peoples at WIPO: Intellectual Property, The Politics of Recognition, and Identity-Based Claims-Making.” In *APSA*. Toronto.
- . 2021. “Bringing Indigenous Goals and Concerns into the Progressive Trade Agenda.” *Interventions Économiques*, no. 65 (January). <https://doi.org/10.4000/interventionseconomiques.12777>.
- Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis : An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Harper Colophon Books ; CN 372. New York: Harper & Row.
- Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2014. *International Relations*. Tenth edition, 2013-2014 update. Boston: Pearson.
- Gordon, David J., and Craig A. Johnson. 2017. “The Orchestration of Global Urban Climate Governance: Conducting Power in the Post-Paris Climate Regime.” *Environmental Politics* 26 (4): 694–714. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1320829>.
- Gormley, William T., and Helen Cymrot. 2006. “The Strategic Choices of Child Advocacy Groups.” *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 35 (1): 102–22. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764005282484>.
- Gotz, Norbert. 2016. “Civil Society and NGO: Far from Unproblematic Concepts.” In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, edited by Bob Reinalda, 185–96. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Government of Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. 2011. “Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult.” Ottawa: Minister of Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada.
- Grear, Anna. 2014. “Towards ‘Climate Justice’? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Future Law and Policy.” *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment* 5 (Special Issue): 103–33.
- “Greta Thunberg.” 2022. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Greta-Thunberg>.
- Grincheva, Natalia. 2019. “Cultural Diplomacy of a Different Kind.” In *Global Trends in Museum Diplomacy: Post-Guggenheim Developments*, 14–32. London: Routledge.

- Grincheva, Natalia, and Robert Kelley. 2019. "Introduction: Non-State Diplomacy from Non-Western Perspectives." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 14 (3): 199–208. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-14401072>.
- Gruen, Thomas W., John O. Summers, and Frank Acito. 2000. "Relationship Marketing Activities, Commitment, and Membership Behaviors in Professional Associations." *Journal of Marketing* 64 (3): 34–49. <https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.64.3.34.18030>.
- Haas, Peter. 1992. "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." *International Organization* 46 (1): 1–35. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001442>.
- . 2004. "When Does Power Listen to Truth? A Constructivist Approach to the Policy Process." *Journal of European Public Policy* 11 (4): 569–92. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176042000248034>.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. 1st MIT Press pbk. ed. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. <http://library.ccsu.edu/help/spcoll/oconnell/Structural%20Transformation%20of%20the%20Public%20Sphere.pdf>.
- Hadden, Jennifer. 2014. "Explaining Variation in Transnational Climate Change Activism: The Role of Inter-Movement Spillover." *Global Environmental Politics* 14 (2): 7–25. https://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00225.
- Hadden, Jennifer, and Lorien Jasny. 2019. "The Power of Peers: How Transnational Advocacy Networks Shape NGO Strategies on Climate Change." *British Journal of Political Science* 49 (2): 637–59. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000582>.
- Hajer, Maarten. 1993. "Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain." In *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester, 43–76. Duke University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822381815-003>.
- . 2003. "A Frame in the Fields: Policymaking and the Reinvention of Politics." In *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*, edited by Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, 88–110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hale, Thomas. 2020. "Catalytic Cooperation." *Global Environmental Politics* 20 (4): 73–98.
- Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds. 2002. *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491238>.
- Halpin, Darren. 2011. "Explaining Policy Bandwagons: Organized Interest Mobilization and Cascades of Attention." *Governance* 24 (2): 205–30. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01522.x>.
- Hanegraaff, Marcel, and Joost Berkhout. 2019. "More Business as Usual? Explaining Business Bias across Issues and Institutions in the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 26 (6): 843–62. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1492006>.
- Hanegraaff, Marcel, Jan Beyers, and Iskander De Bruycker. 2016. "Balancing inside and Outside Lobbying: The Political Strategies of Lobbyists at Global Diplomatic Conferences." *European Journal of Political Research* 55 (3): 568–88. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12145>.

- Hansen, Kenneth N., and Tracy A. Skopek. 2011. "Introduction: The Rise of the First Nations in State Politics." In *The New Politics of Indian Gaming*, edited by Tracy A. Skopek and Kenneth N. Hansen, 1–24. Nevada: University of Nevada Press.
- Haring, Rodney C., Māui Hudson, Louisa Erickson, Maile Taulii, and Bonnie Freeman. 2015. "First Nations, Maori, American Indians, and Native Hawaiians as Sovereigns: EAP with Indigenous Nations Within Nations." *Journal of Workplace Behavioral Health* 30 (1–2): 14–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15555240.2015.998969>.
- Harries-Jones, Peter. 1991. *Making Knowledge Count : Advocacy and Social Science*. McGill-Queen's University Press. <https://canadacommons.ca/artifacts/1866674/making-knowledge-count/>.
- Head, Brian W. 2007. "Community Engagement: Participation on Whose Terms?" *Australian Journal of Political Science* 42 (3): 441–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361140701513570>.
- Heffes, Ezequiel, Marcos D. Kotlik, and Manuel J. Ventura. 2020. "Introduction: The Functions and Interactions of Non-State Actors in the Realm of International Humanitarian Law." In *International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice*, edited by Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos D. Kotlik, and Manuel J. Ventura, 1–17. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-339-9_1.
- Hein, Gregory. 1997. "Feminists and Environmentalists in Canada (1910-1995)." Toronto: University of Toronto.
- . 2000. *Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy*. Choices / IRPP Courts and Legislatures Series ; v.6, No. 2 (March 2000). Quebec: IRPP.
- Heinrich, Volkhart F. 2005. "Studying Civil Society across the World: Exploring the Thorny Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement." *Journal of Civil Society* 1 (3): 211–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448680500484749>.
- Hel, Sandra van der, and Frank Biermann. 2017. "The Authority of Science in Sustainability Governance: A Structured Comparison of Six Science Institutions Engaged with the Sustainable Development Goals." *Environmental Science & Policy* 77 (November): 211–20. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.008>.
- Hendriks, Carolyn. 2002. "Institutions of Deliberative Democratic Processes and Interest Groups: Roles, Tensions and Incentives." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 61 (1): 64–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.00259>.
- Henry, Laura A., and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2012. "Russia's Climate Policy: International Bargaining and Domestic Modernisation." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64 (7): 1297–1322. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.701388>.
- Herbst, Patrick, and Jens Prüfer. 2016. "A Theory of Organizational Choice: Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives." *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 87 (3): 315–43. <https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12130>.
- Hershey, Tina Batra. 2019. "Collaborating with Sovereign Tribal Nations to Legally Prepare for Public Health Emergencies." *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* 47 (S2): 55–58. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1073110519857318>.
- Hertzke, Allen. 1988. *Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Politics*. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.
- Heylen, Frederik, Evelien Willems, and Jan Beyers. 2020. "Do Professionals Take Over? Professionalisation and Membership Influence in Civil Society Organisations."

- VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 31 (6): 1226–38. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-020-00214-9>.
- Hiebert, Janet. 1991. “Interest Groups and Canadian Federal Elections.” In *Interest Groups and Elections in Canada*, edited by F. Leslie. Seidle, 3–76. Research Studies, 1188-2743 ; v. 2. Toronto: Dundurn Press. <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1202/92218914-b.html>.
- Hinds, Kristina. 2019. *Civil Society Organisations, Governance and the Caribbean Community*. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04396-4>.
- Hocking, Brian. 2016. “Non-State Actors and the Transformation of Diplomacy.” In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, edited by Bob Reinalda, 225–36. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Hoefler, Richard. 2000. “Making a Difference: Human Service Interest Group Influence on Social Welfare Program Regulations.” *Journal of Sociology* 27 (3): 21–38.
- . 2001. “Highly Effective Human Services Interest Groups: Seven Key Practices.” *Journal of Community Practice* 9 (2): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1300/J125v09n02_01.
- Hoover, Katie. n.d. “PILT (Payments in Lieu of Taxes): Somewhat Simplified,” 27.
- Hulst, Merlijn van, and Dvora Yanow. 2016. “From Policy ‘Frames’ to ‘Framing’: Theorizing a More Dynamic, Political Approach.” *The American Review of Public Administration* 46 (1): 92–112. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074014533142>.
- Hydropower Reform Coalition. 2022. “Federal Power Act (FPA).” 2022. <https://hydroreform.org/resource/federal-power-act-fpa/>.
- Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1990. “Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29 (3): 297. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1386460>.
- Idaho Rivers. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Idaho Rivers,” 2013.
- Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. 2021. “INAN - Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 - Background - Jan 28, 2021.” May 13, 2021. <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/committees/inan-jan-28-2021/inan-section-35-constitution-act-1982-background-jan-28-2021.html>.
- Internal Revenue Service. 2022. “Exemption Requirements - 501(c)(3) Organizations.” 2022. <https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-501c3-organizations>.
- Internet Archive. 2022. “Wayback Machine.” 2022. <https://web.archive.org/>.
- Jensen, Chad and Inland Power. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Chad Jensen, Inland Power,” 2013.
- Joachim, Jutta. 2003. “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2): 247–74. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.4702005>.
- Joseph, Robert P. C. 1963-. 2018. *21 Things You May Not Know about the Indian Act*. Vancouver, British Columbia: Page Two Books.
- Josselin, Daphne, and William Wallace. 2001. “Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework.” In *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, edited by Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 1–20. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403900906>.
- Jost, Georg, and Frank Weber. 2013. “Potential Impacts of Climate Change on BC Hydro’s Water Resources.” BC Hydro.

- https://www.bchydro.com/content/dam/hydro/medialib/internet/documents/about/climate_change_report_2012.pdf.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2002. "The Global Dimensions of Religious Terrorism." In *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*, edited by Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, 131–57. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491238>.
- Kaltofen, Carolin, and Michele Acuto. 2018. "Rebalancing the Encounter between Science Diplomacy and International Relations Theory." *Global Policy* 9 (November): 15–22. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12620>.
- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders*. Cornell University Press. <http://www.jstor.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh13f>.
- Keefer, Wanda and Port of Clarkston. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Wanda Keefer, Port of Clarkston," 2013.
- Kelley, John Robert. 2010. "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21 (2): 286–305. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2010.482474>.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1986. "Reciprocity in International Relations." *International Organization* 40 (1): 1–27.
- Ki, Eyun-Jung, and Yuan Wang. 2016. "Membership Benefits Matter: Exploring the Factors Influencing Members' Behavioral Intentions in Professional Associations." *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 27 (2): 199–217. <https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.21230>.
- Kirkby, Gareth. 2014. "An Uncharitable Chill: A Critical Exploration of How Changes in Federal Policy and Political Climate Are Affecting Advocacy-Oriented Charities." MA Thesis, Victoria, BC: Royal Roads University.
- Klandermans, Bert. 1989. "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus." In *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney G. Tarrow, 173–96. International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich, Conn. u.a: JAI.
- Koch, Martin. 2016. "Non-State and State Actors in Global Governance." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, edited by Bob Reinalda, 197–208. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Koinova, Maria, Maryam Zarnegar Deloffre, Frank Gadinger, Zeynep Sahin Mencutek, Jan Aart Scholte, and Jens Steffek. 2021. "It's Ordered Chaos: What Really Makes Polycentrism Work." *International Studies Review*, October, viab030. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab030>.
- Koivurova, Timo, and Leena Heinämäki. 2006. "The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic." *Polar Record* 42 (2): 101–9. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247406005080>.
- Ktunaxa Nation, Secwepemc Nation, Syilx Nation, Department of Foreign Affairs Government of Canada Trade and Development, Ministry of Children and Family Development British Columbia, and British Columbia, Ministry Responsible for the Columbia River Treaty. 2019. "Canada - British Columbia - Columbia Basin Indigenous Nations Columbia River Treaty Negotiations Framework Agreement."
- Laforest, Rachel. 2013. "Shifting Scales of Governance and Civil Society Participation in Canada and the European Union: Shifting Scales of Governance and Civil Society Participation." *Canadian Public Administration* 56 (2): 235–51. <https://doi.org/10.1111/capa.12016>.

- Laforest, Rachel, and Susan Phillips. 2007. "Citizen Engagement: Rewiring the Policy Process." In *Critical Policy Studies*, edited by Michael Orsini and Miriam Smith, 67–90. Vancouver, CA: UBC Press.
- Larrain, Maria, and Jens Prüfer. 2015. "Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions." *Journal of Legal Analysis* 7 (2): 467–516. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/lav009>.
- League of Women - Idaho. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - League of Women Voters-Idaho," 2013.
- League of Women - Oregon. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - League of Women Voters-Oregon," 2013.
- Lee, Maria, and Carolyn Abbot. 2021. *Environmental Groups and Legal Expertise: Shaping the Brexit Process*. London: UCL Press. <https://doi.org/10.14324/111.9781787358584>.
- Leeson, Peter T., Matt E. Ryan, and Claudia R. Williamson. 2012. "Think Tanks." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 40 (1): 62–77. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2011.07.004>.
- Lesnikowski, Alexandra, Robbert Biesbroek, James D. Ford, and Lea Berrang-Ford. 2021. "Policy Implementation Styles and Local Governments: The Case of Climate Change Adaptation." *Environmental Politics* 30 (5): 753–90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2020.1814045>.
- Levkoe, Charles Z. 2014. "The Food Movement in Canada: A Social Movement Network Perspective." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 41 (3): 385–403. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.910766>.
- . 2015. "Strategies for Forging and Sustaining Social Movement Networks: A Case Study of Provincial Food Networking Organizations in Canada." *Geoforum* 58 (January): 174–83. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.11.013>.
- Lewis, David. 2010. "Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History." In *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, edited by Helmut Klaus Anheier, Stefan Toepler, and Regina A. List, 1056–62. Springer Reference. New York: Springer.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1975. "II. The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research." *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (2): 158–77. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001041407500800203>.
- Lingard, Bob. 2016. "Think Tanks, 'Policy Experts' and 'Ideas for' Education Policy Making in Australia." *The Australian Educational Researcher* 43 (1): 15–33. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13384-015-0193-0>.
- Local Governments Committee. 2012. "Columbia River Treaty: Local Governments Collaborate on Community Engagement and Education." <https://akblg.ca/src/documents/Columbia%20River%20Treaty/Local%20Governments%20Form%20Columbia%20River%20Treaty%20Committee%20Jan2012.pdf>.
- Local Governments' Committee. 2013. "Columbia River Treaty: Recommendations - December 2013." Local Governments' Committee.
- . 2021. "Columbia River Treaty: Local Governments' Committee Recommendations Update - January 2021."
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1997. "New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1): 38–67.
- Löwy, Michael. 2014. "Ecosocial Struggles of Indigenous Peoples." *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 25 (2): 14–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2014.897414>.

- MacInnes, Angus. 2017. "Free, Prior and Informed Consent: How to Rectify the Devastating Consequences of Harmful Mining for Indigenous Peoples'." *Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation* 15: 152–60.
- Macpherson, Elizabeth. 2020. "Indigenous Water Rights in Comparative Law." *Transnational Environmental Law* 9 (3): 393–402. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102520000291>.
- Madeley, John, and Jeffrey Hayes. 2016. "Transnational Religious Actors." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, edited by Bob Reinalda, 63–74. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Marcum, Connor. 2022. "The Ends and The Means: Indigenous Sovereignty, Climate-Related Legal Actions, and Frameworks of Justice." *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 29 (1): 261–78.
- Markova, Gergana, Robert C. Ford, Duncan R. Dickson, and Thomas M. Bohn. 2013. "Professional Associations and Members' Benefits: What's in It for Me?: Professional Associations and Members' Benefits." *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 23 (4): 491–510. <https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.21076>.
- Martens, Kerstin. 2002. "Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations," 15.
- . 2003. "Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law." *Journal of Global Legal Studies* 10 (2): 1–24.
- . 2006. "NGOs in the United Nations System: Evaluating Theoretical Approaches." *Journal of International Development* 18 (5): 691–700. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1303>.
- Matthews, Heather. 2016. "BC Hydro - Kootenay System Overview." British Columbia, March.
- Mattli, Walter, and Tim Büthe. 2003. "Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?" *World Politics* 56 (1): 1–42. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0006>.
- McCalman, Janya, Komla Tsey, Mark Wenitong, Darryl Ahkee, Anthony Jia, David Ambrum, and Andrew Wilson. 2006. "'Doing Good Things for Men': Ma'Ddaimba-Balas Indigenous Men's Group Evaluation Report - 2004-2005." Cairns: James Cook University.
- McCalman, Janya, Komla Tsey, Mark Wenitong, David Patterson, Bradley Baird, Dennis Warta, and Andrew Wilson. 2005. "'No More Bandaid Solution': Yaba Bimbie Indigenous Men's Support Groups Evaluation Report - January 2004- June 2005." Cairns: James Cook University.
- McCalman, Janya, Komla Tsey, Mark Wenitong, Andrew Wilson, Alexandra McEwan, Yvonne Cadet James, and Mary Whiteside. 2010. "Indigenous Men's Support Groups and Social and Emotional Wellbeing: A Meta-Synthesis of the Evidence." *Australian Journal of Primary Health* 16 (2): 159. <https://doi.org/10.1071/PY09032>.
- McCracken, Melissa, and Aaron T. Wolf. 2019. "Updating the Register of International River Basins of the World." *International Journal of Water Resources Development* 35 (5): 732–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2019.1572497>.
- McDonald, Lauren. 2014. "Think Tanks and the Media: How the Conservative Movement Gained Entry Into the Education Policy Arena." *Educational Policy* 28 (6): 845–80. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904813492372>.
- McNutt, John. 2008. "Advocacy Organizations and the Organizational Digital Divide" 7 (2): 16.
- McNutt, John G. 2006. "Building Evidence-Based Advocacy in Cyberspace: A Social Work Imperative for the New Millennium." *Journal of Evidence-Based Social Work* 3 (3–4): 91–102. https://doi.org/10.1300/J394v03n03_07.

- McNutt, John G., and Katherine Mary Boland. 1999. "Electronic Advocacy by Nonprofit Organizations in Social Welfare Policy." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 28 (4): 432–51. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764099284004>.
- Medvetz, Tom. 2008. "Think Tanks as an Emergent Field." *The Social Science Research Council*, 1–10.
- Merton, Robert K. 1958. "The Functions of the Professional Association." *The American Journal of Nursing* 58 (1): 50–54.
- Milbrath, Lester W. 1960. "Lobbying as a Communication Process." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 24 (1): 32. <https://doi.org/10.1086/266928>.
- Milman, Anita, Lisa Bunclark, Declan Conway, and William Neil Adger. 2013. "Assessment of Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change in Transboundary River Basins." *Climatic Change* 121 (4): 755–70. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0917-y>.
- Milner, Helen V., and Andrew Moravcsik, eds. 2009. *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830787>.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. 2006. "Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements." *Global Environmental Politics* 6 (3): 72–89. <https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2006.6.3.72>.
- Mitchell, Ronald B., and Charli Carpenter. 2019. "Norms for the Earth: Changing the Climate on 'Climate Change.'" *Journal of Global Security Studies* 4 (4): 413–29. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz006>.
- Mitchell, Ronald B., and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. "Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange." *International Organization* 55 (4): 891–917. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193637>.
- Molnár, Gábor Tamás. 2020. "What Do Business Associations Do?" *Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 11 (1): 73–101. <https://doi.org/10.14267/CJSSP.2020.1.3>.
- Morena, Edouard. 2021. "The Climate Brokers: Philanthropy and the Shaping of a 'US-Compatible' International Climate Regime." *International Politics* 58 (4): 541–62. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00249-1>.
- Mosley, Jennifer E. 2011. "Institutionalization, Privatization, and Political Opportunity: What Tactical Choices Reveal About the Policy Advocacy of Human Service Nonprofits." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 40 (3): 435–57. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764009346335>.
- Mosley, Jennifer E. 2010. "Organizational Resources and Environmental Incentives: Understanding the Policy Advocacy Involvement of Human Service Nonprofits." *Social Service Review* 84 (1): 57–76. <https://doi.org/10.1086/652681>.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism." *Reihe Politikwissenschaft* 72: 30.
- Multnomah County Drainage District, MCDD. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - MCDD," 2013.
- Murdie, Amanda, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2015. "Why Pick on Us? Environmental INGOs and State Shaming as a Strategic Substitute." *Political Studies* 63 (2): 353–72. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12101>.
- Nanz, Patrizia, and Jens Steffek. 2004. "Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere." *Government and Opposition* 39 (2): 314–35. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00125.x>.

- Nicholson-Crotty, Jill. 2009. "The Stages and Strategies of Advocacy Among Nonprofit Reproductive Health Providers." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 38 (6): 1044–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764009332467>.
- Noland, Joe and City of Cheney. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Joe Noland, City of Cheney," 2013.
- Northwest Energy Coalition. 2022. "NW Energy Coalition – for a Clean and Affordable Energy Future." 2022. <https://nwenergy.org/>.
- Northwest Power and Conservation Council. 2022. "Bibliography of the Columbia River Basin." 2022. <https://www.nwcouncil.org/reports/columbia-river-history/bibliography/>.
- . n.d. "Northwest Power and Conservation Council - About." Accessed July 23, 2022. <https://www.nwcouncil.org/about/>.
- Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust. 2014. "The Columbia River Basin: Learning From Our Past to Shape Our Future: 2014 Conference Summary." ———. 2019. "The 6th International Columbia River Transboundary Conference | Columbia River Treaty." February 14, 2019. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/event/the-6th-international-columbia-river-transboundary-conference/>.
- Northwest Requirements Utilities, NRU. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - NRU Comments on CRT Review," 2013.
- Nugent, Jeffrey B., and Grigor. Sukiassyan. 2009. "Alternative Strategies for Firms in Oppressive and Corrupt States: Informality or Formality via Business Associations?" *Contemporary Economic Policy* 27 (4): 423–39. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00171.x>.
- Nye, Joseph S. 2008. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (1): 94–109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699>.
- One River Ethics Matter. 2014. "2014 Spokane – One River, Ethics Matter." 2014. <https://riverethics.org/2014-spokane/>.
- . 2015. "2015 Portland – One River, Ethics Matter." 2015. <https://riverethics.org/2015-portland/>.
- . 2016. "2016 Ethics Boise – One River, Ethics Matter." 2016. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-boise/>.
- . 2017. "2017 Ethics Revelstoke – One River, Ethics Matter." 2017. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-revelstoke/>.
- . 2018. "2018 Ethics Montana – One River, Ethics Matter." 2018. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-montana/>.
- . 2019. "2019 Castlegar – One River, Ethics Matter." 2019. <https://riverethics.org/2019-castlegar/>.
- . 2020. "2020 Ethics Estuary – One River, Ethics Matter." 2020. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-estuary/>.
- . 2021. "2021 Ethics Okanagan – One River, Ethics Matter." 2021. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-okanagan/>.
- . 2022a. "About Roundtable – One River, Ethics Matter." 2022. <https://riverethics.org/about-roundtable/>.
- . 2022b. "Document Library – Columbia River Treaty – One River, Ethics Matter." 2022. <https://riverethics.org/document-library-columbia-river-treaty/>.

- . 2022c. “Media Library – Columbia River Treaty – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/media-library-columbia-river-treaty/>.
- . 2022d. “One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/>.
- . 2022e. “Project History – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/project-history/>.
- Onyx, Jenny, Lisa Armitage, Bronwen Dalton, Rose Melville, John Casey, and Robin Banks. 2010. “Advocacy with Gloves on: The ‘Manners’ of Strategy Used by Some Third Sector Organizations Undertaking Advocacy in NSW and Queensland.” *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 21 (1): 41–61. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9106-z>.
- Ordeix-Rigo, Enric, and João Duarte. 2009. “From Public Diplomacy to Corporate Diplomacy: Increasing Corporation’s Legitimacy and Influence.” *American Behavioral Scientist* 53 (4): 549–64. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764209347630>.
- O’Sullivan, Dominic. 2021. *Sharing the Sovereign: Indigenous Peoples, Recognition, Treaties and the State*. Singapore: Springer Singapore. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4172-2>.
- Owen, Taylor. 2016. “The Networked State and the End of 20th Century Diplomacy.” *Global Affairs* 2 (3): 301–7. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1239375>.
- Pacific NorthWest Economic Region. Wednesday August 18. “Water Infrastructure and Policy.” Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER). 2022. “Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) - About Us.” PNWER. 2022. <https://www.pnwer.org/about-us.html>.
- Pacific Northwest Waterways Association, PNWA. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - PNWA Comment on Columbia River Treaty Preparations,” 2013.
- Pacific Rivers. n.d. “Pacific Rivers - Columbia River Treaty.” Pacific Rivers. Accessed July 24, 2022. <https://www.pacificrivers.org/columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- Pallas, Christopher L., and Anders Uhlin. 2014. “Civil Society Influence on International Organizations: Theorizing the State Channel.” *Journal of Civil Society* 10 (2): 184–203. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2014.921102>.
- Pallas, Christopher L., and Johannes Urpelainen. 2012. “NGO Monitoring and the Legitimacy of International Cooperation: A Strategic Analysis.” *The Review of International Organizations* 7 (1): 1–32. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9125-6>.
- Palmer, Geoffrey. 1992. “New Ways to Make International Environmental Law.” *American Journal of International Law* 86 (2): 259–83. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2203234>.
- Pautz, Hartwig. 2011. “Revisiting the Think-Tank Phenomenon.” *Public Policy and Administration* 26 (4): 419–35. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076710378328>.
- Pearkes, Eileen Delehanty. 2015. “Keynote Address – The Columbia River Treaty: Is It Sustainable? | UBCO World Water Day.” March 19, 2015. <https://worldwaterday.ok.ubc.ca/ubco/eileendelehantypearkes/>.
- . 2016. *A River Captured: The Columbia River Treaty and Catastrophic Change: Pearkes, Eileen Delehanty*. Victoria, BC: Rocky Mountain Books. <https://www.amazon.ca/River-Captured-Columbia-Treaty-Catastrophic/dp/1771601787>.
- Pearkes, Eileen Delehanty, and Graeme Lee Rowlands. 2020. “Eileen Delehanty Pearkes and Graeme Lee Rowlands: River Treaty Still Crucial to Columbia’s Health | The Spokesman-Review.” *The Spokesman-Review*, April 3, 2020. <https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2020/apr/03/eileen-delehanty-pearkes-and-graeme-lee-rowlands-r/>.

- Permanent Engineering Board, Bonneville Power Administration, US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division, and BC Hydro and Power Authority. 1964. "PEB - Annual Report to the Governments of the US and Canada." Permanent Engineering Board.
- Peterson, M. J. 1992. "Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling." *International Organization* 46 (1): 147–86. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001478>.
- Petrusha, Tony. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Tony Petrusha," 2013.
- Pevar, Stephen L. 2007. *The Rights of Indians and Tribes : The Authoritative ACLU Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights*. 3rd ed. An American Civil Liberties Union Handbook. New York: New York University Press.
- Pitty, Roderic, and Shannara Smith. 2011. "The Indigenous Challenge to Westphalian Sovereignty." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 46 (1): 121–39. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2010.546336>.
- Plehwe, Dieter. 2020. "Think Tank Networks and the Knowledge-Interest Nexus The Case of Climate Change." In *Climate Change Denial and Public Relations: Strategic Communication and Interest Groups in Climate Inaction*, edited by Jordi Xifra i Triadú and Núria Almiron, 140–56. Routledge New Directions in Public Relations and Communication Research. London ; New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
- PNGC Power, PNGC. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - PNGC Power Response to US Entity Request for Input," 2013.
- Popet, Anne. 2011. "Indigenous-Law Land Rights: Constitutional Imperatives and Proprietaryparadoxes." *Acta Juridica* 2011: 28.
- Port of Pdx Marine. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Port of Pdx Marine," 2013.
- Port of Vancouver. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Port of Vancouver," 2013.
- Porta, Donatella Della, and Sidney Tarrow. 2004. "Transnational Processes and Social Activism: An Introduction." In *Transnational Processes and Social Activism*, 1–17. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Power Group. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Power Group Response," 2013.
- Pralle, Sarah B. 2003. "Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy." *Journal of Public Policy* 23 (3): 233–60. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X03003118>.
- . 2009. "Agenda-Setting and Climate Change." *Environmental Politics* 18 (5): 781–99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010903157115>.
- Price, Pat. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Pat Price," 2013.
- Price, Richard, and Christian Reus-Smit. 1998. "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism." *European Journal of International Relations* 4 (3): 259–94.
- Price, Richard T. 2009. "The British Columbia Treaty Process: An Evolving Institution." *Native Studies Review* 18 (1): 30.
- Pross, A. Paul. 2006. "The Lobbyists Registration Act: Its Application and Effectiveness." In *Restoring Accountability - Research Studies: Volume 2 - The Public Service and Transparency*, edited by John Gomery, 163–231. Ottawa, Ontario: Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities.

- Prouteau, Lionel. 2002. "National and Supranational Government - NGO Relations: Anti-Discrimination Policy Formation in the European Union" 22 (1): 31–37.
- Province of British Columbia. 2012a. "Columbia River Treaty Review Technical Conference | Columbia River Treaty." 2012.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/columbia-river-treaty-review-technical-conference/>.
- . 2012b. "Kinbasket Reservoir Dam: Feasibility Overview." Province of British Columbia.
https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/CRT_KinbasketReservoir_ver01.pdf.
- . 2012c. "Libby VARQ Flood Control Impacts on Kootenay River Dikes: Summary." Province of British Columbia.
https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/CRT_Factsheet_LibbyFlood_v02.pdf.
- . 2012d. "May and June 2012 Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty." 2012.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/may-and-june-2012-community-sessions/>.
- . 2012e. "November 2012 Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty." 2012.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/november-2012-community-sessions/>.
- . 2012f. "Phase 1 Community Consultation Summary Spring 2012: Appendix 1: Notes from Community Sessions." Province of British Columbia.
https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Community-session-summary_Appendix-1-notes_Oct-30.pdf.
- . 2012g. "Session Handout (2012): Columbia River Treaty Review Overview." <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/crt-review.pdf>.
- . 2012h. "Session Handout (2012): How Do You Want to Be Consulted?" <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/how-do-you-want-to-be-consulted.pdf>.
- . 2012i. "Columbia River Treaty Review - B.C. Decision." British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2012j. "Summary of Interests and Values Shared by Columbia Basin Residents." Province of British Columbia.
https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Community-session-summary_final_Oct-30.pdf.
- . 2012k. "Summary Report (November 2012): November 2012 Community Consultations." Province of British Columbia.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Treaty-Review-November-2012-Public-Consultation-Summary-Report1.pdf>.
- . 2012l. "Session Handout (November 2012): Table of Scenarios and Benefits and Impacts." <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/BCH-handout-scenarios-Nov-2012.pdf>.
- . 2013a. "June 2013 Fauquier Community Session | Columbia River Treaty." 2013.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/june-2013-fauquier-community-session/>.

- . 2013b. “March 2013 Golden and Nelson Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty.” 2013. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/march-2013-golden-and-nelson-community-sessions/>.
- . 2013c. “November 2013 Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty.” 2013. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/november-2013-community-sessions/>.
- . 2013d. “Panel Discussion Feedback Form (2013).” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Panel-Feedback-Form-2.pdf>.
- . 2013e. “Sounding Board - Member List.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2013/04/Sounding-Board-List-May-21-public.pdf>.
- . 2013f. “Sounding Board - Terms of Reference.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2013/04/Sounding-Board-TOR-April-2.pdf>.
- . 2013g. “Summary Report (March 2013): Community Consultations: Golden and Nelson.” Province of British Columbia. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Golden-and-Nelson-Community-Consultations-Summary-Report-March-2013-rev1.pdf>.
- . 2013h. “Summary Report (2013 - Castlegar): Technical Conference.” Castlegar, BC: Province of British Columbia. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Summary-Report-CRT-Review-Technical-Conference-March-22-2013.pdf>.
- . 2013i. “Summary Report (2013 - Fauquier): Fauquier Community Workshop.” Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013j. “Community Feedback Form - November 2013.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Nov-Community-Feedback-Form.pdf>.
- . 2014. “Columbia River Treaty Review: Public Consultation Report.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/Columbia-River-Treaty-Review-Public-Consultation-Report- March-2014-1.pdf>.
- . 2016a. “Columbia River Treaty News.” Columbia River Treaty. September 6, 2016. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/>.
- . 2016b. “Public Engagement.” September 6, 2016. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/engagement-process/>.
- . 2016c. “Sounding Board Meetings.” December 12, 2016. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/sounding-board-meetings/>.
- . 2021. “CBRAC - Terms of Reference.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2021/05/CBRAC-Terms-of-Reference-and-Code-of-Conduct-UPDATED-May-18-2021.pdf>.
- . 2022a. “Columbia River Treaty | Facebook.” 2022. <https://www.facebook.com/ColumbiaRiverTreaty>.
- . 2022b. “CR Treaty Review (@CRTreaty) / Twitter.” Twitter. 2022. <https://twitter.com/CRTreaty>.
- . 2022c. “ProvinceofBC Youtube Channel - Columbia River Treaty Playlist.” Video Channel. ProvinceofBC Youtube Channel. 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLbER4Sxdn0R786RyWJohqgAEgYD7yF12X>.

- . 2022d. “CBRAC - Member List.”
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2022/08/CBRAC-Member-List.pdf>.
- Province of British Columbia, Government of Canada, Ktunaxa Nation, Secwepemc Nation, and Syilx Nation. 2019. “CRT Negotiation Framework Agreement: Confidentiality Agreement.” Victoria, BC: Province of British Columbia.
- Prüfer, Jens. 2016. “Business Associations and Private Ordering.” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 32 (2): 306–58. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewv017>.
- Public Power Council. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Public Power Council,” 2013.
- Purdy, Jill M. 2012. “A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance Processes.” *Public Administration Review* 72 (3): 409–17. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02525.x>.
- Pyle, William. 2005. “Contractual Disputes and the Channels for Interfirm Communication.” *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 21 (2): 547–75.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewi014>.
- Quittkat, Christine. 2011. “The European Commission’s Online Consultations: A Success Story?” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 49 (3): 653–74.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02147.x>.
- Quittkat, Christine, and Peter Kotzian. 2011. “Lobbying via Consultation — Territorial and Functional Interests in the Commission’s Consultation Regime.” *Journal of European Integration* 33 (4): 401–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2011.582280>.
- Raustiala, Kal. 1997. “States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions.” *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (4): 719–40. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.00064>.
- Rawls, John. 1997. “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” *The University of Chicago Law Review* 64 (3): 765–807. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315193496-12>.
- Rea, Leann. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Commissioner Leann Rea, Morrow County,” 2013.
- Reddel, Tim, and Geoff Woolcock. 2004. “From Consultation to Participatory Governance? A Critical Review of Citizen Engagement Strategies in Queensland.” *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 63 (3): 75–87. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2004.00392.x>.
- Renckens, Stefan. 2019. “The Instrumental Power of Transnational Private Governance: Interest Representation and Lobbying by Private Rule-makers.” *Governance* 2019 (October): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12451>.
- Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007. “International Crises of Legitimacy.” *International Politics* 44 (2–3): 157–74. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800182>.
- Rhodes, R.A.W. 2007. “Understanding Governance: Ten Years On.” *Organization Studies* 28 (8): 1243–64. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840607076586>.
- Rich, Andrew. 2004. *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise*. Cambridge, UNITED KINGDOM: Cambridge University Press.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/concordia-ebooks/detail.action?docID=259887>.
- Richardson, Katya Lena. 2017. “Finding a Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples During the Negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs),” 19.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in : Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*. Cambridge Studies in International

- Relations ; 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam022/95000866.html>.
- . 2017. *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations: Ideas Do Not Float Freely*. 0 ed. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315623665>.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 66. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Roberts, Jennifer. 2018. “Realising the Right to Education with Non-State Actor Involvement: Is the British Council Guided by a Human Rights-Based Approach to Education?” European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation, Vienna: University of Vienna.
- Roger, Charles, and Peter Dauvergne. 2016. “The Rise of Transnational Governance as a Field of Study.” *International Studies Review* 18 (3): 415–37. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw001>.
- Roger, Charles, Thomas Hale, and Liliana Andonova. 2017. “The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance.” *International Interactions* 43 (1): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2017.1252248>.
- Ronit, Karsten. 2016. “Transnational Corporations and the Regulation of Business at the Global Level.” In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, edited by Bob Reinalda, 75–87. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Rosenbaum, Allan. 2006. “Cooperative Service Delivery: The Dynamics of Public Sector-Private Sector-Civil Society Collaboration.” *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 72 (1): 43–56. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852306061615>.
- Rowell, Patricia. 2003. “The Professional Nursing Association’s Role in Patient Safety.” *Online Journal of Issues in Nursing* 8 (3, Manuscript 3).
- Rozen, Omri. 2021. “Status Quo Sorrows: The Failures of Energy Project Consultations and Reconciliatory Paths Forward.” *Western Journal of Legal Studies* 12 (1). <https://doi.org/10.5206/uwojls.v12i1.13620>.
- Rusaw, A. Carol. 1995. “Learning by Association: Professional Associations as Learning Agents.” *Human Resource Development Quarterly* 6 (2): 215–26. <https://doi.org/10.1002/hrdq.3920060209>.
- Ruskin, Vern. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Vern Ruskin,” 2013.
- Ruszczuk, Stephen P. 2019. “Non-State Actors in the Regularisation of Undocumented Youths: The Role of the ‘Education without Borders Network’ in Paris.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45 (15): 3023–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1495068>.
- Ruzza, Carlo. 2011. “Organized Civil Society and Political Representation in the EU Arena.” In *Civil Society and International Governance: The Role of Non-State Actors in Global and Regional Regulatory Frameworks*, edited by David Armstrong, Valeria Bello, Julie Gilson, and Debora Spini, 49–69. Europe in the World. Oxo;, New York: Routledge/GARNET.
- Salamon, Lester M., and Helmut K. Anheier. 1992a. “In Search of the Non-Profit Sector. I: The Question of Definitions.” *Voluntas* 3 (2): 125–51. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01397770>.
- . 1992b. “In Search of the Non-Profit Sector II: The Problem of Classification.” *Voluntas* 3 (3): 267–309. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01397460>.
- Salamon, Lester M, and Helmut K Anheier. 1998. “Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally.” *International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 9 (3): 213–48.

- Sampson, Robert J., Doug McAdam, Heather MacIndoe, and Simón Weffer-Elizondo. 2005. "Civil Society Reconsidered: The Durable Nature and Community Structure of Collective Civic Action." *American Journal of Sociology* 111 (3): 673–714. <https://doi.org/10.1086/497351>.
- Sandvig, Nathan. 2013a. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Nathan Sandvig-1," 2013.
- . 2013b. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Nathan Sandvig-2," 2013.
- . 2013c. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Nathan Sandvig-3," 2013.
- Save Our Wild Salmon. 2022a. "Save Our Wild Salmon - About Save Our Wild Salmon." 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/about/about-us.html>.
- . 2022b. "Save Our Wild Salmon - Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty." 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/projects/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- . 2022c. "Save Our Wild Salmon - Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty - About." 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/projects/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty/about-modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- . 2022d. "Save Our Wild Salmon - News - News and Media." 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/news-and-media/news/>.
- . 2022e. "Save Our Wild Salmon - Save Our Wild Salmon Coalition." 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/about/save-our-wild-salmon-coalition.html>.
- Sawyer, Marian. 2002. "Governing for the Mainstream: Implications for Community Representation." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 61 (1): 39–49. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.00257>.
- Scheingold, Stuart A. 1974. *The Politics of Rights : Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Schmid, Hillel, Michal Bar, and Ronit Nirel. 2008. "Advocacy Activities in Nonprofit Human Service Organizations: Implications for Policy." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 37 (4): 581–602. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764007312666>.
- Schneider, Christina J. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations1: Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2): 331–55. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00651.x>.
- Schoenefeld, Jonas J. 2021. "Interest Groups, NGOs or Civil Society Organisations? The Framing of Non-State Actors in the EU." *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 32 (3): 585–96. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-020-00283-w>.
- Schwartz, Risa. 2017. "Toward a Trade and Indigenous Peoples' Chapter in a Modernized NAFTA," no. 144: 32.
- Seattle City Light. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Seattle City Light," 2013.
- Sébastien Grammond. 2009. *Identity Captured by Law : Membership in Canada's Indigenous Peoples and Linguistic Minorities*. McGill-Queen's University Press. <https://canadacommons.ca/artifacts/1872156/identity-captured-by-law/>.
- Sell, Mariana Suzuki. 2006. "International Water Law in the La Plata Basin: Regional Application of Principles and Procedural Rules of General International Water Law."

- Verfassung in Recht Und Übersee* 39 (2): 176–91. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2006-2-176>.
- Sell, Susan K. 2011. “Multinational Corporations (MNCs).” In *International Encyclopedia of Political Science* Bertrand Badie, edited by B Badie, D Berg-Schlosser, and L Morlino, 1641–43. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Sell, Susan K., and Aseem Prakash. 2004. “Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (1): 143–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00295.x>.
- Semanko, Norm and IWUA. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Norm Semanko, IWUA,” 2013.
- Sierra Club. 2022. “Sierra Club Home Page: Explore, Enjoy and Protect the Planet.” Sierra Club. 2022. <https://www.sierraclub.org>.
- Singh, Rahul, N.N. Sharma, and Uday Jha. 2014. “Think Tanks, Research Influence and Public Policy in India.” *Vision: The Journal of Business Perspective* 18 (4): 289–97. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0972262914552173>.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1997. “The Real New World Order.” *Foreign Affairs* 76 (5): 183–97.
- Smith, Christian, ed. 1996. *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*. New York: Routledge.
- Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1989. “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.” In *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney G. Tarrow, 197–217. International Social Movement Research 1. Greenwich, Conn. u.a: JAI.
- . 1992. “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.” In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, 133–55. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” *American Sociological Review* 51 (4): 464–81. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581>.
- Soeldner, W. Thomas. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - W. Thomas Soeldner,” 2013.
- Soroka, Stuart N. 2007. “Agenda-Setting and Issue Definition.” In *Critical Policy Studies*, edited by Michael Orsini and Miriam Smith, 185–210. Vancouver, CA: UBC Press.
- Sovereign Review Team. n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Columbia River Treaty Review: Summary Analysis of Revised Iteration #1: Ecosystem-Based Function.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- Spaiser, Viktoria, and Cristina Stefan. 2021. “Responsibility to Safeguard (R2S): A New Norm Against Climate Atrocities Emerging From Global Climate Protests?” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581404>.
- Spektor, Matias, Umberto Mignozzetti, and Guilherme N. Fasolin. 2021. “Nationalist Backlash Against Foreign Climate Shaming.” *Global Environmental Politics*, December, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00644.
- Spencer, Megan, Rosie Simms, and Oliver M. Brances. 2018. “Columbia River Treaty Symposium Edited Proceedings.” In , 35. Victoria, BC: POLIS Project on Ecological Governance.

- Staszak, Sarah. 2013. "Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State." *Law & Social Inquiry* 38 (01): 222–45. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12012>.
- Statistics Canada. 2018. *First Nations People, Métis and Inuit in Canada : Diverse and Growing Populations*. 1 online resource (13 pages) : color charts, color illustrations vols. [Ottawa]: Statistics Canada. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/weekly_acquisitions_list-ef/2018/18-12/publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/statcan/89-659-x/89-659-x2018001-eng.pdf.
- Steer, Liesbet, Julia Gillard, Emily Gustafsson-Wright, and Michael Latham. 2015. "Non-State Actors in Education in Developing Countries." Washington, D.C: Center for Universal Education at Brookings.
- Steffek, Jens. 2013. "Explaining Cooperation between IGOs and NGOs – Push Factors, Pull Factors, and the Policy Cycle." *Review of International Studies* 39 (4): 993–1013. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000393>.
- Steffek, Jens, and Kristina Hahn. 2010. *Evaluating Transnational NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation*. Vol. 13. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14742837.2013.844060>.
- Steffek, Jens, and Patrizia Nanz. 2008. "Chapter 1 – Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation in Global and European Governance." In *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance: A Cure for Its Democratic Deficit?*, edited by Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling, and Patrizia Nanz, 1–30. Camden: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Ştefuriuc, Irina. 2009. "Introduction: Government Coalitions in Multi-Level Settings— Institutional Determinants and Party Strategy." *Regional & Federal Studies* 19 (1): 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13597560802692199>.
- Steinberg, Marc W. 1998. "Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn." *Theory and Society* 27: 845–72.
- Steinberg, Marc W. 1999. "The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners." *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (3): 736–80. <https://doi.org/10.1086/210359>.
- Stephan, Mark. 2004. "Citizens as Representatives: Bridging the Democratic Theory Divides." *Politics & Policy* 32 (1): 118–35. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00178.x>.
- Stern, Charles V. 2020. "Columbia River Treaty Review." CRS Report R43287-Version 23. Congressional Research Service.
- Stewart, Jenny. 2009. *The Dilemmas of Engagement: The Role of Consultation in Governance*. Canberra: ANU E Press.
- Stokes, Leah Cardamore. 2020. *Short Circuiting Policy : Interest Groups and the Battle over Clean Energy and Climate Policy in the American States*. Oxford, UNITED STATES: Oxford University Press USA - OSO. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/concordia-ebooks/detail.action?docID=6129339>.
- Stone, Diane. 2001. "The 'Policy Research' Knowledge Elite and Global Policy Processes." In *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, edited by Daphné Josselin and William Wallace. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403900906>.
- Strezhnev, Anton, Judith G. Kelley, and Beth A. Simmons. 2021. "Testing for Negative Spillovers: Is Promoting Human Rights Really Part of the 'Problem'?" *International Organization* 75 (1): 71–102. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000661>.
- Stroup, Sarah S. (Sarah Snip), 1978-, and Wendy H. 1980- Wong. 2018. *The Authority Trap : Strategic Choices of International NGOs*. 1 online resource : illustrations (black and

- white) vols. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702143.001.0001>.
- Struyk, Raymond. 2002. "Transnational Think-tank Networks: Purpose Membership and Cohesion." *Global Networks* 2 (1): 83–90.
- Sunstein, Cass R. 2007. "Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols." *Harvard Environmental Law Review* 31 (1): 1–66.
- Supran, Geoffrey, and Naomi Oreskes. 2017. "Assessing ExxonMobil's Climate Change Communications (1977–2014)." *Environmental Research Letters* 12 (8): 084019.
<https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f>.
- Swain, Ashok. 2011. "Challenges for Water Sharing in the Nile Basin: Changing Geo-Politics and Changing Climate." *Hydrological Sciences Journal* 56 (4): 687–702.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02626667.2011.577037>.
- Sweeney, CG. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - C G Sweeney," 2013.
- Tallberg, Jonas, Lisa M. Dellmuth, Hans Agné, and Andreas Duit. 2018a. "NGO Influence in International Organizations: Information, Access and Exchange." *British Journal of Political Science* 48 (1): 213–38. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341500037X>.
- . 2018b. "NGO Influence in International Organizations: Information, Access and Exchange." *British Journal of Political Science* 48 (1): 213–38.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341500037X>.
- Taylor, Phillip. 1984. *Nonstate Actors in International Politics: From Transregional to Substate Organizations*. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Teichman, Judith. 2001. *The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Tesler, Laura E., and Ruth E. Malone. 2008. "Corporate Philanthropy, Lobbying, and Public Health Policy." *American Journal of Public Health* 98 (12): 2123–33.
<https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.128231>.
- Tezel Mccarthy, Aslihan. 2017. "Non-State Actors and Education as a Humanitarian Response: Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Education for Syrian Refugees in Turkey." *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 2 (1): 13. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-017-0028-x>.
- The Columbia-Snake River Irrigators Association, CSRIA. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - CSRIA," 2013.
- Thomson, Alan, Greg Utzig, Bill Green, and Nicole Kapell. 2018. "Arrow Lakes Reservoir Mid-Elevation Scenarios: Scoping Evaluation." Nelson, BC; Cranbrook, BC: Mountain Station Consultants Inc.; Kutenai Nature Investigations Ltd.; Canadian Columbia River Inter-tribal Fisheries Commission; Ktunaxa Nation Council.
- Tingley, Dustin, and Michael Tomz. 2014. "Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change." *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (3): 344–68.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013509571>.
- Tom Flanagan. 2019. *First Nations? Second Thoughts : Third Edition*. Ottawa, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press. <https://canadacommons.ca/artifacts/1879156/first-nations-second-thoughts/>.
- Tracy Kuperus. 2018. "Democratization, Religious Actors, and Political Influence: A Comparison of Christian Councils in Ghana and South Africa." *Africa Today* 64 (3): 29.
<https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.64.3.02>.

- True, Jacqui, and Michael Mintrom. 2001. "Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (1): 27–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00181>.
- Tsey, Komla, David Patterson, Mary Whiteside, Leslie Baird, and Bradley Baird. 2002. "Indigenous Men Taking Their Rightful Place in Society? A Preliminary Analysis of a Participatory Action Research Process with Yarrabah Men's Health Group." *Australian Journal of Rural Health* 10 (6): 278–84. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1440-1584.2002.00491.x>.
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." *Science* 211 (4481): 453–58.
- UNESCO, Sustainable Development Goals. 2021. "Global Education Monitoring Report: Non-State Actors in Education: Who Chooses? Who Loses? 2021/2022." Global Education Monitoring Report. Paris: UNESCO.
- United Cities and Local Governments, OECD. 2016. "Subnational Governments Around the World: Structure and Finance - A First Contribution to the Global Observatory on Local Finances."
- United Nations for Indigenous Peoples. 2022. "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." United Nations. 2022. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html>.
- United States Commission on Civil Rights. 1981. "Indian Tribes: A Continuing Quest for Survival: A Report." Washington, D.C.: The Commission.
- Universities Consortium. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Universities Consortium," 2013.
- Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust. 2012. "Annual Symposia on Columbia River Governance | Columbia River Treaty: 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014." July 19, 2012. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2012/07/19/%e2%80%a424th-annual-symposium-on-columbia-river-governance/>.
- Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance, Richard K. Paisley, Matthew McKinney, and Molly Smith Stenovec. 2015. "A Sacred Responsibility: Governing the Use of Water and Related Resources in the International Columbia Basin Through the Prism of Tribes and First Nations."
- Uphoff, Norman, and Anirudh Krishna. 2004. "Civil Society and Public Sector Institutions: More than a Zero-sum Relationship." *Public Administration and Development* 24: 357–72.
- Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative. 2018. "Improving Ecosystem Function in the Canadian (Upper) Columbia Basin." Ecosystem Function Discussion Paper. British Columbia: Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative.
- Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative, UCBECC. 2022a. "UCBECC - The Future of the Columbia River Basin Hangs in the Balance."
- . 2022b. "Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative - UCBECC." 2022. <https://www.kootenayresilience.org/columbia-river-treaty>.
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division. 2022a. "US Army Corps - Columbia River Treaty." 2022. <https://www.nwd.usace.army.mil/CRWM/Columbia-River-Treaty/>.

- . 2022b. “US Army Corps - Permanent Engineering Board.” 2022. <https://www.nwd.usace.army.mil/CRWM/PEB/>.
- U.S. Columbia NGOs. 2021a. “NGO Letter to Canadian Negotiating Teams,” June 30, 2021.
- . 2021b. “NGO Letter to Secretary Antony Blinken,” June 30, 2021.
- . Appeal. 2018. “NGO Letter to Jill Smail - Chief Negotiator Columbia River Treaty,” August 31, 2018.
- U.S. Department of State. 2018a. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). July 18, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson. 2017. “Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). December 7, 2017. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2018b. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 1.” *United States Department of State* (blog). April 10, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime-3/>.
- . 2018c. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 2.” *United States Department of State* (blog). July 18, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2018d. “Chief Negotiator Jill Smail’s Remarks at the Second Columbia River Treaty Town Hall.” *United States Department of State* (blog). September 6, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/chief-negotiator-jill-smails-remarks-at-the-second-columbia-river-treaty-town-hall/>.
- . 2019a. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 3.” *United States Department of State* (blog). February 27, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime-2/>.
- . 2019b. “Town Hall to Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 5.” *United States Department of State* (blog). November 22, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime-4/>.
- U.S. Entity. 2013. “U.S. Entity Regional Recommendation for the Future of the Columbia River Treaty after 2024.” U.S. Government.
- USDA, Forestry Service. 1992. “Indian Tribal Treaty Rights and Consultation.” In *Management Plan for the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area*, IV-25-IV-31. https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5212938.pdf.
- Van Hecke, Matti, Peter Bursens, and Jan Beyers. 2016. “You LI Never Lobby Alone Explaining the Participation of Sub-national Authorities in the European Commission’s Open Consultations.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (6): 1433–48.
- Vanhala, Lisa, and Jacqueline Kinghan. 2022. “The ‘Madness’ of Accessing Justice: Legal Mobilisation, Welfare Benefits and Empowerment.” *Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law* 44 (1): 22–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2028407>.
- Vanhala, Lisa, and Jacqui Kinghan. 2018. “Literature Review on the Use and Impact of Litigation.” Public Law Project. London: Lankelly Chase.

- Varone, Frédéric, Steven Eichenberger, Roy Gava, Charlotte Jourdain, and André Mach. 2021. "Business Groups and Advocacy Success: Insights from a Multi-Venue Approach." *Acta Politica* 56 (3): 477–99. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-020-00162-8>.
- Ven, Hamish van der. 2015. "Correlates of Rigorous and Credible Transnational Governance: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis of Best Practice Compliance in Eco-Labeling: Best Practice in Eco-Labeling." *Regulation & Governance* 9 (3): 276–93. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12092>.
- Vierucci, Luisa, and Christine Bakker. 2008. "Introduction: A Normative or Pragmatic Definition of NGOs? [2008] ELECD 144; in Dupuy, Pierre-Marie; Vierucci, Luisa (Eds), " " (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008)." In *NGOs in International Law*, edited by Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Luisa Vierucci. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. <http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ELECD/2008/144.html>.
- Vogel, David. 1997. "Trading up and Governing across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection." *Journal of European Public Policy* 4 (4): 556–71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/135017697344064>.
- Wapner, Paul Kevin. 1996. *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*. SUNY Series in International Environmental Policy and Theory. Albany: State University of New York Press. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=007223273&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
- Washington Water Science Center, U.S. Geological Survey. 2004. "Columbia Basin GWMA." January 6, 2004. <https://www.usgs.gov/centers/washington-water-science-center/science/columbia-basin-gwma>.
- Waterwatch of Oregon. 2022. "Waterwatch of Oregon." WaterWatch. 2022. <https://waterwatch.org/>.
- Weiler, Florian, and Jonas Reißmann. 2019. "Interest Group Coalitions: How the Intensity of Cooperation Affects the Choice of Lobbying Strategies." *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 8 (1): 91–119. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-019-00047-y>.
- Weinstock, Joseph A. 2003. *Participating in Development: Approaches to Indigenous Knowledge*. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. <http://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.1663/0013-0001%282003%29057%5B0162%3ABR%5D2.0.CO%3B2>.
- Western Montana G&T. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Western Montana G&T," 2013.
- Wildsight. 2022. "Know Your Watershed." Wildsight. 2022. <https://wildsight.ca/programs/knowyourwatershed/>.
- Wilson, Gloria. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Mayor Gloria Wilson," 2013.
- Xanthaki, Alexandra. 2007. *Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards : Self-Determination, Culture and Land*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge, UK ; Cambridge University Press. <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0803/2007310262-t.html>.
- Yamane, David, and Elizabeth A. Oldmixon. 2006. "Religion in the Legislative Arena: Affiliation, Salience, Advocacy, and Public Policymaking." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31 (3): 433–60. <https://doi.org/10.3162/036298006X201878>.

- Yang, Guobin. 2005. "Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China." *China Quarterly* 2005 (181): 46–66.
- Yoffe, Shim, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano. 2003. "Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of Basins at Risk." *Journal of the American Water Resources Association* 39 (5): 1109–26. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-1688.2003.tb03696.x>.
- Young, Lisa. 2004. *Advocacy Groups*. UBC Press.
<https://canadacommons.ca/artifacts/1867380/advocacy-groups/>.
- Young, McGee. 2008. "From Conservation to Environment: The Sierra Club and the Organizational Politics of Change." *Studies in American Political Development* 22 (2): 183–203. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X08000060>.
- . 2010. "The Price of Advocacy: Mobilization and Maintenance in Advocacy Organizations." In *Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action*, edited by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty, 31–57. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zakharia, Zeena, Francine Menashy, and Robin Shields. 2022. "Policy Networks in Refugee Education." *International Journal of Educational Research* 114 (102003): 1–14.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijer.2022.102003>.
- Zawahri, Neda A., Ariel Dinar, and Getachew Nigatu. 2016. "Governing International Freshwater Resources: An Analysis of Treaty Design." *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 16 (2): 307–31.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-014-9259-0>.
- Zengerling, Cathrin. 2013a. "NGOs, Environmental Problems, International Law, and Politics." In *Greening International Jurisprudence*, 17–42. Environmental NGOs before International Courts, Tribunals, and Compliance Committees. Brill.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv29sftzr.8>.
- . 2013b. "Introduction." In *Greening International Jurisprudence*, 1–16. Environmental NGOs before International Courts, Tribunals, and Compliance Committees. Brill.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv29sftzr.7>.

Appendix

A1 – Complete List of Documentary Sources used in Analysis

- Affairs, Ministry of Municipal. n.d. “BC Hydro Payments-in-Lieu-of-Taxes for Regional Districts - Province of British Columbia.” Province of British Columbia. Accessed August 29, 2022. <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/local-governments/finance/requisition-taxation/grants-in-lieu-of-taxes/bc-hydro-payments-in-lieu-of-taxes-for-regional-districts>.
- American Rivers. 2022. “About American Rivers.” American Rivers. 2022. <https://www.americanrivers.org/about-us/>.
- American Whitewater. 2022. “American Whitewater.” 2022. <https://www.americanwhitewater.org/>.
- Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments. 2022. “Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments (AKBLG) - About Us.” 2022. https://akblg.ca/about_us.html.
- Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments, AKBLG. 2018. “AKBLG Constitution and Bylaws: Version 8.1.”
- Baker County. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Baker County - Columbia River Treaty Review,” 2013.
- Baltutis, William Jesse, and Michele-Lee Moore. 2019. “Degrees of Change toward Polycentric Transboundary Water Governance: Exploring the Columbia River and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.” *Ecology and Society* 24 (2): art6. <https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10852-240206>.
- . 2020. “Whose Border? Contested Geographies and Columbia River Treaty Modernization.” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 35 (4): 581–601. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2019.1666730>.
- BC Hydro and Power Authority. 2013a. “Canadian Entity’s Preliminary View of Columbia River Treaty Post-2024 Called Upon Procedures.” Vancouver, BC: BC Hydro.
- . 2013b. “Columbia River Treaty Review Technical Studies.” British Columbia: BC Hydro.
- BC Hydro and Power Authority, Glen. 2013c. “Columbia River Treaty Technical Studies: Addendum Report.” British Columbia: BC Hydro.
- Beck, Richard. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Richard Beck,” 2013.
- Bonneville Power Administration. 2019. “Administrator’s Record of Decision 2019 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho and Bonneville Power Administration.”
- Bonneville Power Administration, and US Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division. 2011a. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Overview of Preliminary Phase 2 Alternatives (Stakeholder Listening Sessions).” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011b. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Discussions; Stakeholder Listening Session.” Portland. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.

- . 2011c. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Electric Power Representatives Dialogue.” Spokane.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Ecosystem Representatives Dialogue.” Portland.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011e. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Flood Control Representatives Dialogue.” Portland.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011f. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review Water Quality Workshop.”
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011g. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Stakeholder Listening Session.” Spokane.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011h. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Stakeholder Listening Session.” Portland.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011i. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Overview of Preliminary Phase 2 Alternatives (Stakeholder Listening Sessions: Spokane, Portland, Boise, September-October 2011).” Washington WA, October.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011j. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Dialogue: Stakeholder Listening Session.” Boise.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2011k. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Sovereign Technical Team Water Quality Working Group.” Portland.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012a. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Other Studies.” 2012.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170227050515/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/OtherStudies.aspx>.
- . 2012b. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Columbia River Treaty History and Treaty Review.” Washington WA.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012c. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Stakeholder Listening Sessions Autumn 2011 Comments and Responses - January 2012.”

- <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Panel Session with County Commissioners.” Spokane.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012e. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Recent Study Results.” Washington WA. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012f. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Modeling Results: Iteration One (Stakeholder Listening Sessions June-July 2012).” Washington WA, July.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012g. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Discussion: Stakeholder Listening Sessions.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2012h. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Summary: Discussion: Stakeholder Seminar.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013a. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review: Draft Regional Recommendation.” 2013. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226164754/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/DraftRegionalRecommendation.aspx>.
- . 2013b. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Preliminary Iteration #2 Alternatives and Components.”
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013c. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review: Stakeholder Responses to U.S. Entity Solicitation Response Summary: March 5, 2013.”
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226223132/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/CRTComments.aspx>.
- . 2013d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Iteration #2 Alternatives & Components: General Summary of Results.” Washington WA, April 10.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013e. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Introducing the Columbia River Treaty and Its Review (2013 Spring Open Houses).” Washington WA, May.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013f. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Recreation Outreach Session.” Washington WA, May.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013g. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: What Does the Columbia River Treaty Mean for the Following Regions Today? (2013 Spring Open Houses).” Washington WA, May.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.

- 2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx.
- . 2013h. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Sovereign Review Team Roster,” May, 3.
- . 2013i. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Agenda: Informational Webinar - Working Draft of a Regional Recommendation.” Portland.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2013j. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Please Join the U.S. Entity Public: Roundtable Discussions: Draft Regional Recommendation on the Future of the Treaty (October 2013 Public Discussions).”
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . 2017. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review: Public Comment Opportunities.” February 26, 2017. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226223132/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/CRTComments.aspx>.
- . 2022. “Columbia River Treaty 2014-2024 Review Main Site.” 2022.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170201224917/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Default.aspx>.
- . October 2-16. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Draft Regional Recommendation Discussion Roundtable.”
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Hydropower Generation and Capacity.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Lead Sovereign Technical Team Roster.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . July 16-July 23. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Learn and Discuss: Working Draft Recommendation Informational Webinars.”
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Treaty Review 101 - ‘The Basics.’” Washington WA. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- . n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Flood Risk Management: Iteration 1 Results.” Washington WA.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- Brideau, Isabelle. 2019. “The Duty to Consult Indigenous Peoples.” 2019-17-E. Library of Parliament.
- Broader Policy Research Institute. 2017. “Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty.” Washington, WA: Western Washington University Western CEDAR.
https://cedar.wvu.edu/bpri_publications/1.
- Brooks, Katy and Port of Vancouver. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Katy Brooks Port of Vancouver,” 2013.

- Brownlee Rollie. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Brownlee Letter Rollie," 2013.
- Bush, Larry. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Larry Bush," 2013.
- Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission. 2022. "Canadian Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission - Home." CCRIFC Online. 2022. <http://ccrifc.org/>.
- Canadian Entity, U.S. Entity. 2010a. "Columbia River Treaty: 2014/2024 Review - Phase 1 Report." British Columbia: United States of America, Province of British Columbia.
- . 2010b. "Columbia River Treaty: 2014/2024 Review - Phase 1 Report - Appendices." British Columbia: United States of America, Province of British Columbia.
- CBC News. 2018. "Lack of Indigenous Voices at Columbia River Treaty Talks 'Total Slap in the Face.'" *CBC*, May 28, 2018. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/columbia-river-treaty-1.4678999>.
- Center for Environmental Law & Policy. 2000. "Columbia River Vision: Strong and Sustainable Management of Washington's Waters."
- . 2022a. "Columbia River Roundtable." 2022. <https://celp.org/columbia-river-roundtable/>.
- . 2022b. "Media Library – Columbia River Treaty." 2022. <https://celp.org/crt-media-library/>.
- Center for Environmental Law & Policy, CELP. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - CELP US Entity Letter," 2013.
- Charlton, Guy. 2014. "The Law of Native American Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Outside of Reservation Boundaries in the United States and Canada." *Canada-United States Law Journal* 39: 103.
- Chelan County. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Chelan Co Columbia River Treaty Review," 2013.
- City of Portland. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - City of Portland Letter on CRT Process," 2013.
- Clark Public Utilities. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Clark Public Utilities Response to Entity Request," 2013.
- Cohen, Alice, and Emma S. Norman. 2018. "Renegotiating the Columbia River Treaty: Transboundary Governance and Indigenous Rights." *Global Environmental Politics* 18 (4): 4–24. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00477.
- Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority. 2008. "Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority Recommendations for Ammendments to the Northwest Power and Conservation Council 2000 Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program."
- Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee. 2016. "Columbia Basin Regional Advisory Committee." December 12, 2016. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/columbia-basin-regional-advisory-committee/>.
- Columbia Basin Tribes. 2010. "Columbia Basin Tribes: Common Views on the Future of the Columbia River Treaty."
- Columbia Basin Trust. 2020. *Columbia Basin Trust: A Story of People, Power and a Region United*. Canada: Helmcock Printers.
- Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission. 2022. "Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission - About Us." CRITFC. 2022. <https://critfc.org/about-us/>.
- Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, CRITFC. 2012. "Future of Our Salmon Conference: 2012, 2014, 2016." *CRITFC* (blog). 2016 2012. <https://critfc.org/future-of-our-salmon-conference-a-success/>.

- Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee, CRT LGC. 2022. "CRT LGC | Columbia River Treaty Local Governments' Committee." CRTLGC. 2022. <https://www.crtlgc.ca/the-committee>.
- Columbia River Treaty Tribes, Nez Perce Tribe, Cayuse-Walla Walla-Umatilla Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation of Oregon, and Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation. 2019. "Tribal Perspectives Report."
- Contributor. 2020. "Op/Ed: As Columbia River Treaty Negotiators Get Serious, Basin Residents Need to Speak Up." *The Nelson Daily*. July 8, 2020. <https://thenelsondaily.com/news/oped-columbia-river-treaty-negotiators-get-serious-basin-residents-need-speak>.
- Corbett, Jack. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Jack Corbett," 2013.
- Cosens, Barbara. 2017. "Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty: An Opportunity for Idaho." *Advocate* 60 (34): 6.
- Cosens, Barbara, Matthew McKinney, Richard Paisley, and Aaron T. Wolf. 2018. "Reconciliation of Development and Ecosystems: The Ecology of Governance in the International Columbia River Basin." *Regional Environmental Change* 18 (6): 1679–92. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1355-1>.
- CRT Stakeholder. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - CRT Stakeholder Comment Summary Chart."
- Denoon, Riley T. P., Richard K. Paisley, Marguerite de Chaisemartin, and Taylor W. Henshaw. 2020. "Engaging Non-State Actors in the Negotiation and Implementation of International Watercourse Agreements: Experiences and Lessons Learned from Canada." *Water International* 45 (4): 311–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2020.1734757>.
- Douglas County. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Douglas County Response Letter to US Entity Coordinators Regarding Columbia River Treaty," 2013.
- Duncan, Angus. 2013. "Review: The Columbia River Treaty Revisited: Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty by Barbara Cosens." *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 114 (3): 380–82. <https://doi.org/10.5403/oregonhistq.114.3.0380>.
- Earth Ministry. 2022. "Mission, Vision, and Values – Earth Ministry." 2022. <https://earthministry.org/about/>.
- East Columbia Basin Irrigation District. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - East Columbia Basin Irrigation District CRT Comment Letter," 2013.
- Eichenberger, Kathy. 2020. "Update on Covid-19 British Columbia Columbia River Treaty Consultations." Victoria, BC: Province of British Columbia.
- Ellis, Ray and Lincoln Electric. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Ray Ellis, Lincoln Electric Cooperative," 2013.
- EPA. 2016. "EPA Policy on Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribes: Guidance for Discussing Tribal Treaty Rights." https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-02/documents/tribal_treaty_rights_guidance_for_discussing_tribal_treaty_rights.pdf.
- Faith Communities USA, First Nations, and Indian Tribes. 2014. "First Nations and Tribes and Faith Communities Letter to President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Harper: Declaration on Ethics & Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty," September 23, 2014.
- Ginalias, Jeffrey L. 2008. "A Policy Analysis of the Columbia River Treaty Using Value-Focused Thinking and Integrative Bargaining to Create Value When Renegotiating the Treaty." MSc Thesis, Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia.

- Global Affairs Canada. 2018. “Canada and United States Launch Negotiations to Renew Columbia River Treaty.” News releases. Government of Canada: Global Affairs Canada. May 22, 2018. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/05/canada-and-united-states-launch-negotiations-to-renew-columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- Global Affairs Canada, Global Affairs. 2019. “Federal Government Announces Columbia River Basin Indigenous Nations to Participate as Observers in Columbia River Treaty Negotiations.” News releases. April 26, 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/04/federal-government-announces-columbia-river-basin-indigenous-nations-to-participate-as-observers-in-columbia-river-treaty-negotiations.html>.
- Government of Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. 2011. “Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult.” Ottawa: Minister of Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada.
- Government of Canada, Global Affairs. 2019. “Federal Government Announces Columbia River Basin Indigenous Nations to Participate as Observers in Columbia River Treaty Negotiations.” News releases. April 26, 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/04/federal-government-announces-columbia-river-basin-indigenous-nations-to-participate-as-observers-in-columbia-river-treaty-negotiations.html>.
- Government of Canada, United States of America. 1964. Columbia River Treaty Protocol and Documents: International Documents.
- Heffernan, Jim. 2019. “Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty.” October 3.
- Hoover, Katie. n.d. “PILT (Payments in Lieu of Taxes): Somewhat Simplified,” 27.
- Howard, Tim. 2021. “International Treaty Negotiations and Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples - A Case Study of the Columbia River Treaty Negotiations.” Paper 5.1. Aboriginal Law Conference 2021. British Columbia: The Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia.
- . 2022. “The Columbia River Treaty Negotiations Framework Agreement and The UN Declaration.” May.
- Hydropower Reform Coalition. 2022. “Federal Power Act (FPA).” 2022. <https://hydroreform.org/resource/federal-power-act-fpa/>.
- Idaho Rivers. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Idaho Rivers,” 2013.
- Ikakoula, Corrina. 2022. “DOE Tribal Energy Program Review.” Presented at the BPA Overview.
- Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. 2021. “INAN - Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 - Background - Jan 28, 2021.” May 13, 2021. <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/committees/inan-jan-28-2021/inan-section-35-constitution-act-1982-background-jan-28-2021.html>.
- Internet Archive. 2022. “Wayback Machine.” 2022. <https://web.archive.org/>.
- Jensen, Chad and Inland Power. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Chad Jensen, Inland Power,” 2013.
- Jost, Georg, and Frank Weber. 2013. “Potential Impacts of Climate Change on BC Hydro’s Water Resources.” BC Hydro. https://www.bchydro.com/content/dam/hydro/medialib/internet/documents/about/climate_change_report_2012.pdf.
- Keefer, Wanda and Port of Clarkston. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House -

- Wanda Keefer, Port of Clarkston,” 2013.
- Ktunaxa Nation, Secwepemc Nation, Syilx Nation, Department of Foreign Affairs Government of Canada Trade and Development, Ministry of Children and Family Development British Columbia, and British Columbia, Ministry Responsible for the Columbia River Treaty. 2019. “Canada - British Columbia - Columbia Basin Indigenous Nations Columbia River Treaty Negotiations Framework Agreement.”
- League of Women - Idaho. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - League of Women Voters-Idaho,” 2013.
- League of Women - Oregon. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - League of Women Voters-Oregon,” 2013.
- “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Columbia River Treaty Review - Ecosystem -- FOR PRINT.” 2013.
- “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Columbia River Treaty Review - Fact Sheet - Canadian Entitlement--FOR PRINT.” 2013.
- “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Columbia River Treaty Review - Fact Sheet - Current Operations- FOR PRINT.” 2013.
- “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Columbia River Treaty Review - Flood Risk - FOR PRINT.” 2013.
- “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Columbia River Treaty Review - Purpose and Future Fact Sheet-FOR PRINT.” 2013.
- “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - ColumbiaRiverTreaty-Oppose.” 2013, 2013.
- Lirette, Dominika. 2019. “Indigenous Leaders Observing Columbia River Treaty Talks.” *CBC News*, April 30, 2019. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/indigenous-leaders-invited-columbia-river-treaty-1.5116162>.
- Local Governments Committee. 2012. “Columbia River Treaty: Local Governments Collaborate on Community Engagement and Education.” <https://akblg.ca/src/documents/Columbia%20River%20Treaty/Local%20Governments%20Form%20Columbia%20River%20Treaty%20Committee%20Jan2012.pdf>.
- Local Governments’ Committee. 2013. “Columbia River Treaty: Recommendations - December 2013.” Local Governments’ Committee.
- . 2021. “Columbia River Treaty: Local Governments’ Committee Recommendations Update - January 2021.”
- Mainzer, Elliot E., John S. Kem, and U.S. Entity. 2013. “Communication to Canadian Entity,” December 13, 2013.
- Marbach, Peter. 2022. “Healing the Big River: Salmon Dreams and the Columbia River Treaty.” Peter Marbach Photography. 2022. <https://www.petermarbach.com/purchase/p/healing-the-big-river>.
- Marts, Marion. 1974. Columbia River Treaty Lectures (SFU 1974) Transcript.
- Matthews, Heather. 2016. “BC Hydro - Kootenay System Overview.” British Columbia, March.
- Michel, D.R. 2018. “Columbia River Treaty Negotiations Must Include Tribes, First Nations.” *The Seattle Times*, May 13, 2018, sec. Opinion. <https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/columbia-river-treaty-negotiations-must-include-tribes-first-nations/>.
- Multnomah County Drainage District, MCDD. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - MCDD,” 2013.
- Noland, Joe and City of Cheney. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Joe

- Noland, City of Cheney,” 2013.
- Northwest Indian College and Western Washington University (WWU). 2017. “Columbia River Treaty Symposium: The Changing Environment & The Columbia River Treaty.” February 22, 2017. <https://wp.wwu.edu/crt/>.
- Northwest Power and Conservation Council. 2022. “Bibliography of the Columbia River Basin.” 2022. <https://www.nwcouncil.org/reports/columbia-river-history/bibliography/>.
- . n.d. “Northwest Power and Conservation Council - About.” Accessed July 23, 2022. <https://www.nwcouncil.org/about/>.
- Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust. 2014. “The Columbia River Basin: Learning From Our Past to Shape Our Future: 2014 Conference Summary.”
- . 2019. “The 6th International Columbia River Transboundary Conference | Columbia River Treaty.” February 14, 2019. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/event/the-6th-international-columbia-river-transboundary-conference/>.
- Northwest Requirements Utilities, NRU. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - NRU Comments on CRT Review,” 2013.
- One River Ethics Matter. 2014. “2014 Spokane – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2014. <https://riverethics.org/2014-spokane/>.
- . 2015. “2015 Portland – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2015. <https://riverethics.org/2015-portland/>.
- . 2016. “2016 Ethics Boise – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2016. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-boise/>.
- . 2017. “2017 Ethics Revelstoke – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2017. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-revelstoke/>.
- . 2018. “2018 Ethics Montana – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2018. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-montana/>.
- . 2019. “2019 Castlegar – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2019. <https://riverethics.org/2019-castlegar/>.
- . 2020. “2020 Ethics Estuary – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2020. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-estuary/>.
- . 2021. “2021 Ethics Okanagan – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2021. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-okanagan/>.
- . 2022a. “2022 Ethics Spokane – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/ethics-spokane-river/>.
- . 2022b. “About Roundtable – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/about-roundtable/>.
- . 2022c. “Document Library – Columbia River Treaty – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/document-library-columbia-river-treaty/>.
- . 2022d. “Media Library – Columbia River Treaty – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/media-library-columbia-river-treaty/>.
- . 2022e. “One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/>.
- . 2022f. “Project History – One River, Ethics Matter.” 2022. <https://riverethics.org/project-history/>.
- Pacific NorthWest Economic Region. Wednesday August 18. “Water Infrastructure and Policy.”
- Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER). 2022. “Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) - About Us.” PNWER. 2022. <https://www.pnwer.org/about-us.html>.

- Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee, PNUCC. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - PNUCC Letter," 2013.
- Pacific Northwest Waterways Association, PNWA. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - PNWA Comment on Columbia River Treaty Preparations," 2013.
- Pacific Rivers. n.d. "Pacific Rivers - Columbia River Treaty." Pacific Rivers. Accessed July 24, 2022. <https://www.pacificrivers.org/columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- Pearkes, Eileen Delehanty. 2015. "Keynote Address – The Columbia River Treaty: Is It Sustainable? | UBCO World Water Day." March 19, 2015. <https://worldwaterday.ok.ubc.ca/ubco/eileendelehantypearkes/>.
- . 2016. *A River Captured: The Columbia River Treaty and Catastrophic Change*: Pearkes, Eileen Delehanty. Victoria, BC: Rocky Mountain Books. <https://www.amazon.ca/River-Captured-Columbia-Treaty-Catastrophic/dp/1771601787>.
- Pearkes, Eileen Delehanty, and Graeme Lee Rowlands. 2020. "Eileen Delehanty Pearkes and Graeme Lee Rowlands: River Treaty Still Crucial to Columbia's Health | The Spokesman-Review." *The Spokesman-Review*, April 3, 2020. <https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2020/apr/03/eileen-delehanty-pearkes-and-graeme-lee-rowlands-r/>.
- Pearson, L.B., Paul Martin, W.A.C. Bennett, and R.G. Williston. 1963. Canada - B.C. Agreement on CRT.
- Penfold, George E. 2012. "A Review of the Range of Impacts and Benefits of the Columbia River Treaty on Basin Communities, the Region and the Province." Columbia River Treaty Review. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- Petrusha, Tony. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Tony Petrusha," 2013.
- PNGC Power, PNGC. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - PNGC Power Response to US Entity Request for Input," 2013.
- Port of Pdx Marine. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Port of Pdx Marine," 2013.
- Port of Vancouver. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Port of Vancouver," 2013.
- Powder Basin Watershed Council, PBWC. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - PBWC Comment," 2013.
- Power Group. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Power Group Response," 2013.
- Price, Pat. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Pat Price," 2013.
- Price, Richard T. 2009. "The British Columbia Treaty Process: An Evolving Institution." *Native Studies Review* 18 (1): 30.
- Province of British Columbia. 2012a. "Columbia River Treaty Review Technical Conference | Columbia River Treaty." 2012. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/columbia-river-treaty-review-technical-conference/>.
- . 2012b. "Kinbasket Reservoir Dam: Feasibility Overview." Province of British Columbia. https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/CRT_KinbasketReservoir_ver01.pdf.
- . 2012c. "Libby VARQ Flood Control Impacts on Kootenay River Dikes: Summary." Province of British Columbia.

- https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/CRT_Factsheet_LibbyFlood_v02.pdf.
- . 2012d. “May and June 2012 Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty.” 2012. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/may-and-june-2012-community-sessions/>.
- . 2012e. “November 2012 Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty.” 2012. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/november-2012-community-sessions/>.
- . 2012f. “Phase 1 Community Consultation Summary Spring 2012: Appendix 1: Notes from Community Sessions.” Province of British Columbia. https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Community-session-summary_Appendix-1-notes_Oct-30.pdf.
- . 2012g. “Session Handout (2012): Columbia River Treaty Review Overview.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/crt-review.pdf>.
- . 2012h. “Session Handout (2012): How Do You Want to Be Consulted?” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/how-do-you-want-to-be-consulted.pdf>.
- . 2012i. “Columbia River Treaty Review - B.C. Decision.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2012j. “About the Columbia River Treaty.” Columbia River Treaty. March 28, 2012. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/about/>.
- . 2012k. “Summary of Interests and Values Shared by Columbia Basin Residents.” Province of British Columbia. https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Community-session-summary_final_Oct-30.pdf.
- . 2012l. “Summary Report (November 2012): November 2012 Community Consultations.” Province of British Columbia. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Treaty-Review-November-2012-Public-Consultation-Summary-Report1.pdf>.
- . 2012m. “Session Handout (November 2012): Table of Scenarios and Benefits and Impacts.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/BCH-handout-scenarios-Nov-2012.pdf>.
- . 2013a. “June 2013 Fauquier Community Session | Columbia River Treaty.” 2013. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/june-2013-fauquier-community-session/>.
- . 2013b. “March 2013 Golden and Nelson Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty.” 2013. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/march-2013-golden-and-nelson-community-sessions/>.
- . 2013c. “November 2013 Community Sessions | Columbia River Treaty.” 2013. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2016/12/16/november-2013-community-sessions/>.
- . 2013d. “Panel Discussion Feedback Form (2013).” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Panel-Feedback-Form-2.pdf>.
- . 2013e. “Sounding Board - Member List.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2013/04/Sounding-Board-List-May-21-public.pdf>.

- . 2013f. “Sounding Board - Terms of Reference.”
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2013/04/Sounding-Board-TOR-April-2.pdf>.
- . 2013g. “Summary Report (March 2013): Community Consultations: Golden and Nelson.” Province of British Columbia.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Golden-and-Nelson-Community-Consultations-Summary-Report-March-2013-rev1.pdf>.
- . 2013h. “Appendix A: Project Team and Committees – Members and Roles.” Columbia River Treaty Review – Technical Studies. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013i. “Summary Report (2013 - Castlegar): Technical Conference.” Castlegar, BC: Province of British Columbia.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Summary-Report-CRT-Review-Technical-Conference-March-22-2013.pdf>.
- . 2013j. “Summary Report (2013 - Fauquier): Fauquier Community Workshop.” Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013k. “Columbia River Treaty Review: Environmental Discussion Paper.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013l. “Appendix 4: Provincial Government Response to Issues Raised by the CRT Local Governments’ Committee.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/APPENDIX-4-CRT-Issue-Table-BC-Response2.pdf>.
- . 2013m. “Community Feedback Form - November 2013.”
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2012/07/Nov-Community-Feedback-Form.pdf>.
- . 2013n. “Appendix B: Operations on the Columbia River - Relationship between Columbia River Treaty, Non Treaty Storage Agreement, and Water Use Plans.” Columbia River Treaty Review – Technical Studies. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013o. “Appendix C: Kootenay System Operations.” Columbia River Treaty Review – Technical Studies. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013p. “Appendix D: System Model & Assumptions.” Columbia River Treaty Review – Technical Studies. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013q. “Appendix E: Potential Lower Columbia River Flow Regimes for Fisheries Benefits.” Columbia River Treaty Review – Technical Studies. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013r. “Appendix F: Columbia Performance Measure Information Sheets.” Columbia River Treaty Review – Technical Studies. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2013s. “Appendix H: Development of Kootenay Performance Measures.” Columbia River Treaty Review – Technical Studies. British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . 2014. “Columbia River Treaty Review: Public Consultation Report.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2017/01/Columbia-River-Treaty-Review-Public-Consultation-Report-_March-2014-1.pdf.
- . 2016a. “Columbia River Treaty News.” Columbia River Treaty. September 6, 2016.

- <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/>.
- . 2016b. “Public Engagement.” September 6, 2016. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/engagement-process/>.
- . 2016c. “Sounding Board Meetings.” December 12, 2016. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/sounding-board-meetings/>.
- . 2019a. “Edition: February 2019 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. February 2019. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/february-2019>.
- . 2019b. “Edition: May 2019 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. May 2019. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/may-2019>.
- . 2019c. “Historic Agreement Reached between Columbia River Basin Indigenous Nations, Canada and British Columbia to Collaborate on Salmon Re-Introduction.” July 29, 2019. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/stories/historic-agreement-reached-between-columbia-river-basin-indigenous-nations-canada-and-british-columb>.
- . 2019d. “Edition: September 2019 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. September 2019. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/september-2019>.
- . 2019e. “Edition: September 2019 (Updated) | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. September 2019. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/september-2019-updated>.
- . 2020a. “Edition: February 2020 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. February 2020. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/february-2020>.
- . 2020b. “Edition: May 2020 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. May 2020. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/may-2020>.
- . 2020c. “Edition: December 2020 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. December 2020. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/december-2020>.
- . 2021a. “Socio-Economic Integration in Columbia River Treaty Scenario Modelling Backgrounder - Sept 2021.” Province of British Columbia.
- . 2021b. “Edition: April 2021 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. April 2021. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/april-2021>.
- . 2021c. “Edition: Updated April 2021 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. April 2021. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/updated-april-2021>.
- . 2021d. “CBRAC - Terms of Reference.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2021/05/CBRAC-Terms-of-Reference-and-Code-of-Conduct-UPDATED-May-18-2021.pdf>.
- . 2021e. “Koochanusa Weir Feasibility Study | Columbia River Treaty.” Columbia River Treaty. May 20, 2021. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/koochanusa-weir-feasibility-study/>.
- . 2021f. “Edition: September 2021 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. September 2021. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/september-2021>.
- . 2022a. “Columbia River Treaty | Facebook.” 2022. <https://www.facebook.com/ColumbiaRiverTreaty>.
- . 2022b. “CR Treaty Review (@CRTreaty) / Twitter.” Twitter. 2022. <https://twitter.com/CRTreaty>.
- . 2022c. “ProvinceofBC Youtube Channel - Columbia River Treaty Playlist.” Video Channel. ProvinceofBC Youtube Channel. 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLbER4Sxdn0R786RyWJohqgAEgYD7yF12X>.
- . 2022d. “Public Engagement | Columbia River Treaty.” 2022.

- <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/engagement-process/>.
- . 2022e. “Edition: February 2022 | BC Gov News.” BC Gov News. February 2022. <https://news.gov.bc.ca/newsletters/columbia-river-treaty/february-2022>.
- . 2022f. “CBRAC - Member List.” <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2022/08/CBRAC-Member-List.pdf>.
- . n.d. “Columbia River Treaty Review: Objectives and Performance Measures - Kootenay System Status Summaries.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . n.d. “Executive Summary: A Review of the Range of Impacts and Benefits of the Columbia River Treaty on Basin Communities, the Region and the Province.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- . n.d. “Treaty Highlights.”
- Province of British Columbia, BC Ministry of Energy and Mines. 2013. “U.S. Benefits from the Columbia River Treaty – Past, Present and Future: A Province of British Columbia Perspective.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia.
- Province of British Columbia, Columbia River Treaty Team. 2021. “Exploring the Feasibility of Building a Proposed Weir/Dam on Koochanusa Reservoir: Summary of a Preliminary Assessment and Public Feedback.” British Columbia: Province of British Columbia. <https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/6/2021/05/Koochanusa-Weir-Feasibility-Summary-Report-FINAL.pdf>.
- Province of British Columbia, Government of Canada, Ktunaxa Nation, Secwepemc Nation, and Syilx Nation. 2019. “CRT Negotiation Framework Agreement: Confidentiality Agreement.” Victoria, BC: Province of British Columbia.
- Public Power Council. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Public Power Council,” 2013.
- Rea, Leann. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Commissioner Leann Rea, Morrow County,” 2013.
- Rea, Matthew. 2013. “2014/2024 Review: Columbia River Treaty - Overview of Treaty Review Process.” Bonneville Power Administration: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
- Rowlands, Graeme Lee. 2018a. “Exclusion of Indigenous Voices in U.S.-Canada Water Agreement – Evidence Network.” *Evidencenetwork.ca*, October 2018. <http://evidencenetwork.ca/exclusion-of-indigenous-voices-in-u-s-canada-water-agreement/>.
- . 2018b. “Graeme Lee Rowlands: Exclusion of Indigenous Voices in U.S.-Canada Water Agreement Puts Salmon Restoration in Columbia River at Risk.” *The Province*, November 3, 2018. <https://theprovince.com/opinion/op-ed/graeme-lee-rowlands-exclusion-of-indigenous-voices-in-u-s-canada-water-agreement-puts-salmon-restoration-in-columbia-river-at-risk>.
- . 2019. “B.C. Should Give up Case of ‘extinct’ Sinixt First Nations.” *Macleans.ca*, November 6, 2019. <https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/b-c-should-give-up-case-of-extinct-sinixt-first-nations/>.
- . 2020. “Graeme Lee Rowlands: Americans Should Moderate Expectations and Broaden Perspective on Modernized Columbia River Treaty.” *The Spokesman-Review*, January 7, 2020. <https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2020/jan/07/graeme-lee-rowlands-americans-should-moderate-expe/>.
- Ruskin, Vern. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Vern Ruskin,” 2013.
- Sandvig, Nathan. 2013a. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Nathan Sandvig-1,”

- 2013.
- . 2013b. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Nathan Sandvig-2,” 2013.
- . 2013c. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Nathan Sandvig-3,” 2013.
- Save Our Wild Salmon. 2022a. “Save Our Wild Salmon - About Save Our Wild Salmon.” 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/about/about-us.html>.
- . 2022b. “Save Our Wild Salmon - Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty.” 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/projects/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- . 2022c. “Save Our Wild Salmon - Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty - About.” 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/projects/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty/about-modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty.html>.
- . 2022d. “Save Our Wild Salmon - News - News and Media.” 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/news-and-media/news/>.
- . 2022e. “Save Our Wild Salmon - Save Our Wild Salmon Coalition.” 2022. <https://www.wildsalmon.org/about/save-our-wild-salmon-coalition.html>.
- Scruggs, Gregory. 2019. “Tribes That Rely on Columbia River Being Left out of Talks between U.S. and Canada. Why?” *Crosscut.Com*, June 27, 2019. <https://crosscut.com/2019/06/tribes-rely-columbia-river-being-left-out-talks-between-us-and-canada-why>.
- Seattle City Light. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Seattle City Light,” 2013.
- Seirra Club, Columbia River Team. 2020. “A New Deal for the Columbia River.”
- Semanko, Norm and IWUA. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Norm Semanko, IWUA,” 2013.
- SFU Adaptation to Climate Change Team, and Canadian Water Resources Association. 2015. “The Columbia River Treaty: Past, Present and Future Workshop: Proceedings and Outcomes.” Osoyoos, B.C.
- Sierra Club. 2022. “Sierra Club Home Page: Explore, Enjoy and Protect the Planet.” Sierra Club. 2022. <https://www.sierraclub.org>.
- Soeldner, W. Thomas. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - W. Thomas Soeldner,” 2013.
- Sovereign Review Team. n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Columbia River Treaty Review: Summary Analysis of Revised Iteration #1: Ecosystem-Based Function.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- Spencer, Megan, Rosie Simms, and Oliver M. Brances. 2018. “Columbia River Treaty Symposium Edited Proceedings.” In , 35. Victoria, BC: POLIS Project on Ecological Governance.
- State of Washington Department of Ecology, and US Department of the Interior: Bureau of Reclamation. n.d. “Columbia River Treaty 2014/2024 Review: Yakima River Basin Integrated Water Resource Management Plan.” <https://web.archive.org/web/20170226222331/https://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/UsEntity.aspx>.
- Stern, Charles V. 2020. “Columbia River Treaty Review.” CRS Report R43287-Version 23. Congressional Research Service.
- Sweeney, CG. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - C G Sweeney,” 2013.

- The Columbia-Snake River Irrigators Association, CSRIA. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - CSRIA," 2013.
- "The Future of the US-Canada Columbia River Treaty: Building on 60 Years of Coordinated Power Generation and Flood Control." 2013.
- The President of the USA. 2000. "Executive Order 13175 of November 6, 2000: Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments." *Presidential Documents - Federal Register*, Presidential Documents, 65 (218).
- Thomson, Alan. 2013. "High Level Description and Evaluation of Three Post 2024 Duncam Dam and Reservoir Operation Scenarios and A Constant Mid-Elevation Pool Scenario for the Arrow Reservoir." Nelson, BC: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum:
- Thomson, Alan, Greg Utzig, Bill Green, and Nicole Kapell. 2018. "Arrow Lakes Reservoir Mid-Elevation Scenarios: Scoping Evaluation." Nelson, BC; Cranbrook, BC: Mountain Station Consultants Inc.; Kutenai Nature Investigations Ltd.; Canadian Columbia River Inter-tribal Fisheries Commission; Ktunaxa Nation Council.
- Troy, Sebastian. 2018. "'A Special Place in Hell' and the Columbia River Treaty." *Canada's National Observer*, October 18, 2018, sec. Opinion.
<https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/10/18/opinion/special-place-hell-and-columbia-river-treaty>.
- Umatilla County Board of Commissioners. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Umatilla County Board of Commissioners," 2013.
- United Nations for Indigenous Peoples. 2022. "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." United Nations. 2022.
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html>.
- Universities Consortium. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Universities Consortium," 2013.
- Universities Consortium on Columbia Basin Governance, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, and Columbia Basin Trust. 2012. "Annual Symposia on Columbia River Governance | Columbia River Treaty: 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014." July 19, 2012.
<https://engage.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/2012/07/19/%e2%80%a24th-annual-symposium-on-columbia-river-governance/>.
- Universities Consortium on Columbia River Governance, Richard K. Paisley, Matthew McKinney, and Molly Smith Stenovec. 2015. "A Sacred Responsibility: Governing the Use of Water and Related Resources in the International Columbia Basin Through the Prism of Tribes and First Nations."
- Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative. 2018a. "Improving Ecosystem Function in the Canadian (Upper) Columbia Basin." Ecosystem Function Discussion Paper. British Columbia: Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative.
- . 2018b. "Improving Ecosystem Function in the Canadian (Upper) Columbia Basin - Discussion Paper Summary." Ecosystem Function Discussion Paper. British Columbia: Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative.
- . 2022a. "Columbia River Treaty." 2022. <https://www.kootenayresilience.org/columbia-river-treaty>.
- Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative, UCBEC. 2022b. "UCBEC - The Future of the Columbia River Basin Hangs in the Balance."
- . 2022c. "Upper Columbia Basin Environmental Collaborative - UCBEC." 2022.

- <https://www.kootenayresilience.org/columbia-river-treaty>.
- U.S. Columbia NGOs. 2021a. “NGO Letter to Canadian Negotiating Teams,” June 30, 2021.
- . 2021b. “NGO Letter to Secretary Antony Blinken,” June 30, 2021.
- . Appeal. 2018. “NGO Letter to Jill Smail - Chief Negotiator Columbia River Treaty,” August 31, 2018.
- U.S. Department of State. 2018a. “The Columbia River Treaty: Past, Present, and Future.” U.S. Government. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-Columbia-River-Treaty-Past-Present-and-Future.pdf>.
- . n.d. “Columbia River Treaty U.S. Government Front Page.” United States Department of State. Accessed June 16, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/columbia-river-treaty/>.
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson. 2017. “Modernizing the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). December 7, 2017. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/modernizing-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2018b. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 1.” *United States Department of State* (blog). April 10, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime-3/>.
- . 2018c. “Acting Assistant Secretary Palmieri To Deliver Keynote Speech at the Lake Roosevelt Forum.” *United States Department of State* (blog). April 24, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/acting-assistant-secretary-palmieri-to-deliver-keynote-speech-at-the-lake-roosevelt-forum/>.
- . 2018d. “Launching Negotiations to Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). May 22, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/launching-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2018e. “On the Opening of Negotiations To Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). May 30, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-opening-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2018f. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 2.” *United States Department of State* (blog). July 18, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2018g. “Chief Negotiator Jill Smail’s Remarks at the Second Columbia River Treaty Town Hall.” *United States Department of State* (blog). September 6, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/chief-negotiator-jill-smails-remarks-at-the-second-columbia-river-treaty-town-hall/>.
- . 2018h. “Conclusion of the Third Round of Negotiations To Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). October 19, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-third-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2018i. “Conclusion of the Fourth Round of Negotiations To Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). December 14, 2018. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-fourth-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2019a. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 3.” *United States Department of State* (blog). February 27, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime-3/>.

- 2/.
- . 2019b. “Conclusion of the Fifth Round of Negotiations To Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). March 1, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-fifth-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2019c. “Conclusion of the Sixth Round of Negotiations To Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). April 12, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-sixth-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2019d. “Conclusion of the Seventh Round of Negotiations to Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). June 24, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-seventh-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2019e. “Town Hall To Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 4.” *United States Department of State* (blog). July 3, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime-3/>.
- . 2019f. “Conclusion of the Eighth Round of Negotiations to Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). September 12, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-eighth-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2019g. “Postponement of the Ninth Round of Negotiations to Modernize the Columbia River Treaty Regime.” *United States Department of State* (blog). November 13, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/postponement-of-the-ninth-round-of-negotiations-to-modernize-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime/>.
- . 2019h. “Town Hall to Discuss Modernization of the Columbia River Treaty Regime 5.” *United States Department of State* (blog). November 22, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/town-hall-to-discuss-modernization-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-regime-4/>.
- . 2020a. “Conclusion of the Ninth Round of the Columbia River Treaty Negotiations.” *United States Department of State* (blog). March 12, 2020. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-ninth-round-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-negotiations/>.
- . 2020b. “Conclusion of the Tenth Round of the Columbia River Treaty Negotiations.” *United States Department of State* (blog). June 30, 2020. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/conclusion-of-the-tenth-round-of-the-columbia-river-treaty-negotiations/>.
- US Entity. 2013. “Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - US Entity Letter,” 2013.
- U.S. Entity. 2013. “U.S. Entity Regional Recommendation for the Future of the Columbia River Treaty after 2024.” U.S. Government.
- U.S. Entity, U.S. Department of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division, and Bonneville Power Administration. 1999. “Delivery of the Canadian Entitlement Final Environmental Impact Statement: Supplement to Record of Decision.”
- U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. 2016. “Executive Order 11177.” National Archives: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11177.html>.
- USDA, Forestry Service. 1992. “Indian Tribal Treaty Rights and Consultation.” In *Management Plan for the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area*, IV-25-IV-31.

- https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5212938.pdf.
- USDS. 2022. "Pacific Northwest Reservoir System."
- USGS, NOAA, and ESRI. 2022. "Columbia River Basin."
- Valemount and Area Recreation Development Area, VARDA. 2022. "Welcome - VARDA." Home. 2022. <https://ridevalemount.com/>.
- Waterwatch of Oregon. 2022. "Waterwatch of Oregon." WaterWatch. 2022. <https://waterwatch.org/>.
- Watson, Julie. 2012. "A River Loved: Facilitating Cooperative Negotiation of Transboundary Water Resource Management in the Columbia River Basin through Documentary Film." MSc Thesis, Eugene, OR: Oregon State University.
- Weatherly, Hamish. 2012. "Ministry of Energy, Mines and Natural Gas: Libby VARQ Flood Control Impacts on Kootenay River Dikes." 0640-002. British Columbia: BGC Engineering Inc.
- Weatherly, Hamish, and Ministry of Energy Province of British Columbia Mines and Petroleum. 2020. "Lake Koochanusa - High Level Assessment of a Proposed Dam." 0466001. Vancouver, BC: BGC Engineering Inc.
- Western Montana G&T. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Western Montana G&T," 2013.
- Wildsight. 2022. "Know Your Watershed." Wildsight. 2022. <https://wildsight.ca/programs/knowyourwatershed/>.
- Wilson, Gloria. 2013. "Letter in Response to Spring 2013 Open House - Mayor Gloria Wilson," 2013.