Collaboration and Diversity in Digital Platform Ecosystems: Insights from Streaming Platforms

Aaryan Pandya

A Thesis

In

The Department

Of

Supply Chain and Business Technology Management

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of Master of Science (Business Analytics & Technology Management) at

Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada

July 2025

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY

School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the thesis prepared

By: Aaryan Pandya

Entitled: Collaboration and Diversity in Digital Platform Ecosystems:
A quantitative investigation

And submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science (Business Analytics and Technology Management)

complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality

Signed by the final Examining Committee:

Dr. Xiaodan Pan Chair
Chair's name

Dr. Mahdi Mirhoseini Examiner
Examiner's name

Dr. Sumin Song Supervisor
Supervisor's name

Approved by _____
Dr. Suchit Ahuja, Graduate Program Director

July 2, 2025 _____
Dr. Anne-Marie Croteau, Dean of Faculty

Abstract

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Aaryan Pandya

Digital platforms have become the dominant architecture for delivering goods and services. Major firms have incorporated platform-based strategies to leverage network effects and modular innovation. Platform growth depends on diverse offerings, which requires collaboration between platform owners and complementors (third-party developers or service providers). Prior work has examined either economic coordination mechanisms (e.g., pricing and revenue sharing) or organizational governance structures (e.g., decision rights and contractual control), yet their joint effects on platform diversity remain unexplored. Some argue that tighter owner control expands diversity by reducing opportunism, while others warn it stifles partner innovation. Moreover, platform market power is an essential factor in this relationship, yet its impact has received little attention. To address these gaps, we adopt an integrative framework that maps collaboration from loosely coupled partnerships to full integration and incorporates market power as a moderating factor. We examine our model in the streaming industry using regression analysis on data from 188 platforms and 11,461 content–platform pairs drawn from Watchmode and TMDB, capturing production partnerships, availability patterns, and genre metadata. We find that collaboration increases the breadth of diversity (genre novelty) but reduces structural diversity (runtime novelty), and these effects are attenuated on platforms with greater market power. We contribute a unified theoretical lens for bridging economic and organizational perspectives, introduce a novel genre-novelty metric that captures both range and rarity, and offer practical guidance on governance and collaboration strategies to optimize platform performance.

Keywords: Digital platforms, complementors, platform owners, collaboration, competition, diversity, market power, streaming industry

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

1. Introduction

In recent years, firms have increasingly adopted platform-based business models, transforming how value is created and exchanged in digital markets. Successful companies such as Amazon leverage platform affordances to scale rapidly by facilitating interactions between users and third-party complementors without directly owning the products or services being sold (Constantinides et al., 2018). As of 2025, five of the world's top ten technology companies by market capitalization are platform-based businesses. These include Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, and Meta Platforms (Facebook) (Alsop, 2025). Compared to traditional firms, digital platforms offer distinct advantages, such as scalability beyond what a conventional firm can achieve and the ability to support a variety of functions that evolve over time (Tiwana et al., 2010). As a result, more businesses are incorporating platform-based models to capitalize on the strategic benefits offered by this approach.

Three fundamental aspects distinguish platform-based businesses from traditional firms. First, authority in a digital platform ecosystem comes from the ownership of the technical architecture at the center of the ecosystem (Kretschmer et al., 2022; Leong et al., 2024). Second, a platform participant's compensation is directly linked with its performance, unlike the fixed salary model typical of traditional firms (Kretschmer et al., 2022). Third, participants in a platform-based ecosystem are autonomous and make independent decisions within the rules and resources provided by the platform (Kretschmer et al., 2022). These characteristics create a business environment in which interdependent but legally autonomous participants must collaborate, in contrast to the traditional organizational structure (Leong et al., 2024).

Prior research has explored various types of relationships within digital platform ecosystems (Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022), highlighting their impact on platform outcomes such as innovation and user engagement. For example, the dynamics between platform owners and complementors influence the scope and quality of offerings, which in turn affect the overall business performance of the digital platform (Boudreau, 2010). In this context, product or service diversity has been an important area of interest in management and strategy research, particularly in relation to new product development (NPD) and existing product development (EPD), as it is an important factor affecting firm performance and survival (He Li et al., 2022; Cottrell & Nault, 2004).

While prior studies have examined how various relational dynamics influence different aspects of platform outcomes, such as complementors' innovation (De Reuver et al., 2018; Foerderer et al., 2018), less attention has been given to how collaboration between platform owners and complementors shapes broader structural characteristics of platform ecosystems. One such underexplored outcome is platform content diversity, defined as the range of distinct offerings made available within a digital platform. This construct captures the extent to which a platform provides novel or differentiated content relative to its existing portfolio and serves as a proxy for innovativeness (Boudreau, 2012). This study addresses this gap by examining the following research questions: *How does the nature of collaboration between platform owners and complementors impact product and service diversity on a digital platform? And how does platform market power moderate the effect of owner–complementor collaboration on platform diversity?*

To investigate this question, we conduct an empirical analysis in the streaming platform sector, where content diversity is both measurable and critical to platform competitiveness. Using content-platform pairs as the unit of analysis, we construct a dataset that combines content metadata with indicators of collaboration. We draw on Watchmode for detailed data on platform availability, production partnerships, and release characteristics, then match each title to *The Movie Database* from TMDB for standardized genre classifications, release dates, runtime, budget estimates, and other production details. We operationalize collaboration through production company involvement and cross-platform streaming availability of content. Content diversity is measured using two metrics: genre-novelty, calculated relative to each platform's existing content portfolio, and runtime novelty, based on the rarity of a title's duration category on the platform. To estimate the effects of collaboration on diversity, we employ OLS regression models with platform-clustered standard errors to account for within-platform heteroskedasticity. We also include control variables such as year of content release, original language,

and content type to adjust for temporal, cultural, and format-driven heterogeneity. To ensure robustness, we complement our main analysis with alternative specifications using both disaggregated indicators and aggregated indices.

Our study contributes to the digital platform ecosystems literature in three key ways. First, it provides one of the few empirical examinations of how collaborative relationships between platform owners and complementors influence content-level diversity, a structural outcome that has received limited attention compared to innovation or user growth. By introducing and operationalizing the construct of content-platform diversity, the study offers a novel metric that links collaboration to platform performance in terms of variety and differentiation. Second, the study advances theoretical integration by combining organizational perspectives, which emphasize governance, autonomy, and coordination, with economic perspectives that focus on value creation and incentive alignment. This combined approach contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of how collaboration affects not only innovation at the complementor level but also the structural composition of platform offerings. Finally, the findings provide practical insights for platform owners and complementors by demonstrating how different modes of collaboration, such as an exclusive partnership or broad distribution, are associated with content diversification, thereby informing governance design and partnership strategies in content-intensive digital markets.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Understanding Digital Platforms Ecosystem

Digital platforms function as ecosystems where platform owners establish governance structures while complementors contribute products and services that enhance the platform's value (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). Digital Platforms have been explored through various lenses over the years, which can be broadly categorized into three main perspectives: the engineering or technical perspective, the economic perspective, and the organizational perspective. Each offers a distinct view of the structure and functioning of platform ecosystems.

The engineering or technical perspective conceptualizes digital platforms as comprising a relatively stable functional core surrounded by modular components. These peripheral modules can be modified or replaced to enable innovation and expand capabilities on the platform. For instance, software-based platforms such as Apple's IOS and Mozilla's Firefox browser have been studied through this lens. In these cases, the central codebase is seen as an extensible system and the modules are treated as add-on subsystems that interoperate with the core through the standardized interfaces to expand the functionality (Tiwana et al, 2010). This modular structure enables third-party developers (complementors) to innovate independently while maintaining compatibility with the platform core, thus fostering scalability, specialization, and ecosystem growth.

The economic perspective views digital platforms primarily as multi-sided markets that facilitate interactions between supply- and demand-side participants. This approach emphasizes pricing structures, value creation mechanisms, and competitive strategies (Parker et al., 2016). For example, the video game industry has often been analyzed through this lens, illustrating how consoles such as PlayStation or Wii act as intermediaries. In this model, independent producers develop games on the supply side, while consumers engage with and play these games on the demand side (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013). This perspective highlights that value creation in digital platforms does not occur solely through technological infrastructure, but also through strategic coordination and incentive alignment between the platform owner and complementors, whose contributions determine the variety and appeal of the platform's offerings.

The organizational perspective considers platforms as organizational structures and focuses on how various actors interact to create value and foster innovation (Rolland et al., 2018). This view emphasizes the role of governance mechanisms, such as platform boundary resources (PBRs), which include tools, rules, or interfaces that enable and regulate interactions between platform participants and the platform owner. For instance, studies on mobile app developers on platforms such as Apple IOS have adopted this perspective by examining how the interaction between app developers and boundary resources offered by platform owners affects app performance (Soh & Grover, 2022). Beyond technical resources, platform owners also exert influence through strategic governance practices, including selective access, compliance enforcement, and co-development agreements, which shape how complementors contribute to and benefit from the platform ecosystem.

Our study builds on the organizational perspective by focusing on governance mechanisms that shape the collaborative relationship between platform owners and complementors. However, to fully understand how this relationship influences the diversity of platform offerings, it is also essential to incorporate the economic perspective, which addresses the mechanisms of value creation and innovation. Hence, we adopt the conceptualization of digital platform ecosystems as governed environments where platform owners coordinate interactions with autonomous complementors and consumers to facilitate value creation (Hein et al., 2020). This framing is particularly well suited to our study as it captures both the organizational and economic dimensions of platform ecosystems. It emphasizes the governance role of platform owners and the contribution of complementors to value generation, thereby integrating insights from both perspectives.

2.2 Participants in the Digital Platform Ecosystem

A digital platform ecosystem typically includes three key participant groups: platform owners, complementors, and end-users. These actors interact to create and exchange value, which is a

fundamental mechanism shared by all commercial ecosystems (Hagiu & Wright, 2015). Participants differ in their roles, functional responsibilities, ownership status, and the degree of control they exert over platform governance (Hagiu & Wright, 2015; Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022; Hein et al., 2020; Kapoor, 2018; De Reuver et al., 2018). Most studies on digital platform ecosystems, whether focused on platform strategy (Cennamo et al, 2013), societal development (Bonina et al, 2021) or platform boundary resources (PBRs) (Tiwana et al, 2010), implicitly or explicitly adopt this tripartite structure, illustrating how interdependent actors contribute uniquely to platform dynamics. Platform owners design and implement governance mechanisms to facilitate and support value creation activities involving autonomous complementors and consumers (Hein et al., 2020). Complementors, who operate on the supply side of the platform, co-create value by providing products or services that build upon or integrate with the platform's core functionality. In contrast, end-users represent the demand side, consuming the value generated through these interactions (Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022; Karhu et al., 2018; Schreieck et al., 2023).

For example, Airbnb connects hosts (complementors), who provide accommodations, with guests (end-users), who consume these services. The platform owner facilitates this exchange by offering standardized listings, review systems, and transaction infrastructure. Similarly, Netflix connects content producers (complementors), including independent studios and contracted partners, with viewers (end-users). In this case, the platform owner not only licenses content but also engages in co-production, thereby actively shaping the type and diversity of offerings available on the platform. In both examples, complementors contribute directly to the platform's value proposition, and their collaboration with platform owners substantially influences the diversity and appeal of the ecosystem's offerings. Complementors may engage with the platform either directly or indirectly through resources such as APIs, development tools, or formalized guidelines provided by the platform owners (Eisenmann et al., 2008; Schreieck et al., 2016). Thus, platform owners and complementors both operate on the supply side of the ecosystem, and the nature of their collaboration significantly affects the variety and quality of the products and services offered on the platform (Tiwana et al., 2010; Schreieck et al., 2021; Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022).

Although all three participant groups are interdependent, this study specifically focuses on the supply side of digital platform ecosystems, where value creation is primarily driven by collaboration between platform owners and complementors. This emphasis is warranted because of the critical role these actors play in determining the diversity, innovation, and competitiveness of platform offerings. Understanding how governance mechanisms and collaborative structures shape this interaction is essential for explaining platform-level outcomes such as content diversity and ecosystem evolution.

2.3 Platform Owner and Complementors' Relationships

The relationship between platform owners and complementors is significantly more complex than traditional firm–supplier arrangements (Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022; Kapoor, 2018; Kretschmer et al., 2022; Leong et al., 2024). Whereas conventional firms rely on hierarchical structures for coordination, digital platforms operate as ecosystems characterized by decentralized governance, autonomous actors, and evolving interdependencies. These interactions are often conceptualized through a triadic framework comprising platform owners, complementors, and end-users, with multiple dyadic relationships among them, as shown in Figure 1 (Hein et al., 2020; Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022). In some cases, participants may occupy dual roles. For instance, an end-user may also act as a complementor (Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022). This structural embeddedness underscores the relational complexity inherent in platform ecosystems and establishes a foundation for examining how platform owners and complementors interact in diverse and dynamic ways.



Figure 1 - Dimensions of Interaction in Digital Platform Ecosystems (Adopted from Heimburg & Wiesche (2022))

As noted above, the relationship between platform owners and complementors is multifaceted, encompassing a spectrum of relational modes, including value co-creation, governance control, strategic alignment, and competition (Hein et al., 2020; Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022). In their review of literature published between 2018 and 2022, Heimburg and Wiesche (2022) identify formal mechanisms (control and rules), emergent dynamics (coopetition and motivational alignment), and resource supplementation as key dimensions. While contribution/supplementation, governance control and rules, and coordination/market orchestration have received extensive attention, reflecting strong scholarly emphasis on how complementors generate value, how governance is exercised, and how ecosystem-level coordination is achieved (Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022), long-term collaboration, direct competition, and their concurrency (i.e., coopetition) remain underexplored despite being essential to the strategic tensions that define platform ecosystems. To address this gap, this study focuses on three relational modes: collaboration, competition, and coopetition, recognizing that they coexist, evolve in parallel, and differentially influence structural outcomes such as content diversity. Table 1 outlines their key characteristics, illustrative cases, and relevant studies.

Table 1 - Plurality of Platform-Owner and Complementor Relationship

Relational Mode	**Key Characteristics**	**Typical Examples**	**Relevant Studies**
Collaboration	• Utilization of resources for mutual benefit. • Prioritizing balance in governance and overall growth of the platform. • Supporting autonomy and inspiring trust.	• Spotify enables third-party app developers to contribute to its ecosystem. • Apple provides Software Development Kits (SDKs) and APIs to app developers.	Tiwana (2015); Rodon Modol & Eaton (2021); Cennamo & Santaló (2019); Benlian et al. (2015)
Competition	• Prioritizing individual benefit over mutual benefits. • Preference for higher control and lower dependency.	• Amazon enters complementors' space and sells private-label products.	Zhu (2019); Cennamo & Santaló (2019); Hurni et al. (2021)

Relational Mode	Key Characteristics	Typical Examples	Relevant Studies
		• Platform owner launches its own products built using the complementors' data.	
Coopetition	• Collaborating for specific objectives while competing over conflicting interests. • Strategic balance between value creation and value capture.	• Netflix produces its own content while hosting and marketing third-party content. • Microsoft and Sony allow cross-platform cloud gaming while competing in the console market.	Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996); Zhu (2019); Tiwana et al. (2010)

As illustrated by the co-existence of these relational modes, any action by platform owners or complementors can be interpreted through both collaborative and competitive lenses (Kude & Huber, 2025). For example, when a platform owner increases openness by allowing complementors greater governance influence, this may be viewed as a redistribution of power. Simultaneously, it can signify a highly collaborative gesture. We therefore conceptualize platform owner–complementor ties as a collaboration-competition spectrum, with collaboration and competition representing opposite ends and coopetition occupying the middle. A position on this spectrum reflects the degree of integration and control in the relationship, which in turn shapes incentives for value co-creation and value capture.

Platform participants make independent decisions and differ from traditional firm participants, resulting in the coexistence of competition and collaboration (Kretschmer et al., 2022). Complementors depend on platform owners to reach end-users, while platform owners depend on complementors for their contributions to create value on the platform (Hurni et al., 2022). This mutual dependence reinforces the need to balance competitive and collaborative dynamics to sustain ecosystem growth and performance.

2.4 Impact of Collaboration on Product and Service Diversity

For a digital platform to thrive, it must maintain its existing user base to sustain revenue generation while expanding its user base to scale and grow the business (Tiwana et al, 2010; Karhu et al., 2018). Providing more open access to complementors typically leads to a significant increase in the development of new outputs by attracting more platform participants, and thereby increasing platform value (Kretschmer et al., 2022; Constantinides et al., 2018; Tiwana et al., 2010). However, the development rate depends on the complementors' intention to contribute. If there is no change in incentive to innovate for complementors, openness might have an adverse effect on the digital platform by increasing direct competition (Boudreau, 2010). There is a balance that needs to be maintained within the relationships that occur in a digital platform ecosystem and its growth (Cennamo & Santaló, 2019; Kretschmer et al., 2022; Staub et al., 2022). Therefore, for creating a successful platform ecosystem, a platform owner needs to simultaneously enable value co-creation and capture a sufficient share of the co-created value.

Complementors exhibit higher innovation incentives for more open platform ecosystems until the platform becomes overcrowded. This leads to financial constraints for complementors due to price competition, resulting in a loss of platform attractiveness (Boudreau, 2010; Warehamet al., 2014). On the other hand, a tighter control by a platform owner with the intention of extracting maximum profit may lead to complementors' unwillingness to innovate (Boudreau, 2010). Hence, platform owners and complementors need to have a proper balance of bargaining power to ensure mutual collaboration with each other for the creation of value and compete with each other on capturing the share of that value to ensure their individual success (Cennamo & Santaló, 2019).

Some studies have demonstrated the importance of the complementors and platform owners' relationship through the impact it has on the digital platform. One such study has discussed competitive bottlenecks in a digital platform (Armstrong & Wright, 2007). A competitive bottleneck in a digital platform ecosystem occurs when one side of the platform faces higher competition compared to the

other, causing an imbalance. For instance, if complementors have to compete more than the platform-owner, the ecosystem can become unstable (Armstrong & Wright, 2007). However, no research has explained how the variations in collaboration intensity between platform owners and complementors affect the products and service diversity on platforms. Although co-opetition (the concurrency of competition and collaboration) has been conceptualized (Heimburg & Wiesche, 2022), prior work has not linked collaboration modes to diversity metrics such as range or novelty (Foerderer et al., 2018; Zhu, 2019). This gap motivates our investigation of how collaboration mode and its interaction with market power shape platform diversity.

2.5 Hypotheses Development

Prior research has extensively examined platform governance, complementor strategies, and content diversity (Boudreau, 2010; Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). However, the relationship between platform owners and complementors and its impacts remains underexplored, with limited empirical insight into how varying degrees of collaboration impact content variety (Boudreau, 2010; Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). In this study, we integrate these perspectives into a comprehensive research model that examines not only the direct effects of collaboration but also the moderating role of platform market power on platform content diversity, as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2 - Research Model

We identified two contrasting perspectives on how owner-complementor collaboration affects platform diversity: a competition-driven view versus a collaboration-driven view (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022; Cennamo & Santaló, 2019). The competition-driven perspective argues that greater rivalry between platform owners and complementors results in more diverse offerings (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022), as complementors differentiate their contributions to gain greater bargaining power to capture a higher share of the created value. An increase in the number and variety of participants (reach) and in the heterogeneity of their interactions (range) drives both value creation and offering diversity on platforms (Grover and Lyytinen, 2022). Competition for control over complementor innovation results in more diverse offerings by forcing a platform to create new products and services beyond its ecosystem (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022). Google Maps embedded with Uber's delivery app is an example of this, where Google created value beyond its ecosystem by providing a service with an external platform. Competition across platforms also fosters diverse offerings. This competition arises when complementors participate in multiple digital platforms simultaneously (i.e., multi-homing), due to which a platform owner incentivizes the development of more diverse value offerings to distinguish itself from other platforms (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022). These competitive dynamics suggest that reduced collaboration and hence greater complementor independence may incentivize differentiation and innovation, increasing the diversity of platform offerings. Based on this logic, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1.1: A lower degree of collaboration between platform owners and complementors leads to a higher degree of differentiation in platform offerings.

On the other hand, the collaboration-driven perspective suggests that deeper ties between platform owners and complementors may enhance content diversity by leveraging platform generativity (Cennamo & Santalo, 2019). Generativity describes an ecosystem's ability to foster innovation from autonomous, heterogeneous participants. This means that platform owners, by collaborating with the complementors, create conditions that are necessary and motivational for the complementors to innovate. Thus, platform owners facilitate the creation of diverse products and services for the digital platform through a highly collaborative relationship with the complementors. Moreover, when a platform owner allows complementors to legally and technically access the core functioning of the platform, this leads to an increase in new product development (Boudreau, 2010). For example, Android operating system platform owners license their technology to hardware manufacturers to allow complementary innovation and expand their ecosystem. This granting of access demonstrates a more collaborative relationship for mutual benefit. Increasing the variety of complements available on a platform expands its capacity to innovate, which in turn enhances the final value for users, given that platform-owners have an effective governance strategy that ensures alignment of complementor interests and activities with the broader interest of the platform as a whole (Cennamo & Santaló, 2019). Platform governance research also suggests that a more open governance strategy requires that complementors and platform owners have a more collaborative relationship in order to align their interests for sustainable growth in the diversity of the platform's offerings (Cennamo & Santaló, 2019). Following this argument, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1.2: A higher degree of collaboration between platform owners and complementors leads to a higher degree of differentiation in platform offerings.

Building on these two contrasting views, we conceptualize the relationship between platform-owners and complementors as a continuum ranging from high collaboration to high competition. One end of the spectrum represents a highly collaborative relationship, emphasizing mutual interdependence and coordinated innovation, while the other end represents a highly competitive relationship, characterized by strategic independence and differentiated value creation. Although theoretical arguments support both perspectives, the actual impact of varying degrees of collaboration and competition on platform diversity remains an empirical question. Accordingly, we test competing hypotheses (H1.1 and H1.2) to examine how different levels of collaboration influence the diversity of offerings within digital platform ecosystems.

A dominant platform characterized by significant market share and a concentration of resources can heavily invest in promotions and distribution of co-produced products and services, thereby reaching a wider and more diverse consumer base (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022). When a platform with significant market power collaborates with a complementor, the co-produced offerings are often perceived as having better quality by both the consumers and the complementors (Nian & Sundararajan, 2022). This indicates the important role that market power plays in determining the platform diversity. This reach enhances the visibility and uptake of offerings developed through collaborative efforts. The platform-driven quality signal incentivizes and motivates complementors to experiment and produce more novel platform offerings, leading to more diversity in platform offerings (Nian & Sundararajan, 2022). This suggests that platform market power may moderate the effect of collaboration on diversity on a platform, amplifying its positive outcomes. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Platform market power has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between collaboration (between platform owners and complementors) and diversity of products and services offered by the platform.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Context

Our empirical analysis focused on the streaming industry because it generated billions in digital entertainment revenue, depended critically on content diversity for subscriber growth, and produced rich, publicly available data on titles, licensing, and partner contributions. Digitization has transformed how streaming content is produced, distributed, and consumed. As competition among platforms has intensified, content diversity has become a crucial factor in platform performance, influencing both user engagement and market positioning. The industry also generated vast amounts of structured data, such as content categories, licensing agreements, and complementors' participation, making it a rich setting for analysis. This combination of economic scale, diversity reliance, and data availability makes streaming an excellent laboratory for examining our collaboration-competition framework using a cross-sectional snapshot of content-platform pairs.

Content diversity is inherently context-dependent. For example, if a platform catalog already has 100 action films, adding another action title will not increase its diversity. By contrast, that same action film would substantially enrich the diversity of a drama-focused catalog. Hence, the same content may have different implications on a platform's diversity depending on already existing content. Thus, content itself and its context both must be considered when observing diversity. To capture these context-specific effects, we use the content-platform pair as our unit of analysis.

3.2 Data Collection

We assembled a cross-sectional dataset in May 2025, covering all titles released between 1970 and 2025 on the leading streaming services tracked by Watchmode. Platforms were selected based on the API limitations in terms of available regions and global market share. We sourced streaming availability and production partnership data from the Watchmode API, a commercial service updated daily that covers more than 100 platforms. We then integrated this data with content metadata from TMDB, an industry-standard source for detailed information such as genre, release date, and runtime. Our dataset is structured at the content-platform pair level, with each row representing one title on one platform, resulting in a large cross-sectional sample. For each pair, we collected:

- Production companies involved in the content (proxy for collaboration intensity)
- Platform availability (number of platforms on which the title appears)
- Genre tags from TMDB (used to compute our genre-novelty diversity metric)
- Platform market share (proxy for market power, serving as a moderator)

Some content did not have listed production companies as they were created in-house by the platform owner. We kept these entries treating zero production companies as zero complementors. A small number of content-platform pairs had missing production-company counts. For content-platform pairs with high market power, we manually imputed the correct counts, whereas for the remaining pairs, we imputed them with the statistical mode. To control for catalog size, we restricted our sample to titles released in 1970 or later. Finally, we validated a random 50 content-platform pairs subsample of Watchmode availability against official platform catalogs to ensure data accuracy. By structuring our data around content–platform pairs and applying these proxies, we capture each title's context-specific contribution to diversity under varying degrees of collaboration and market power.

3.3 Variables

Dependent Variables: Diversity

The dependent variable in our study is the diversity of platform offerings. Given that our unit of analysis is a content-platform pair, we measure diversity based on the measure of genre novelty on a platform. Genre Novelty Score (GNS) is computed using the data collected on genre tags associated with each title. Similar novelty metrics have been used in music streaming research to operationalize diversity. For example, Park et al. (2021) measured a genre-based diversity score in the music industry. Moreover, genres associated with music artists have also been widely used to represent the diversity of music consumption (Hurley & Zhang, 2011; Farrahi et al., 2014). Following these precedents, we

operationalize GNS for content *i* on platform *p* in a way that accounts for both the genres associated with the content and the existing genre distribution on the host platform. This genre novelty score captures how the addition of content *i* affects the diversity of offerings on platform *p*. The genre novelty score for content *i* on platform *p* is calculated using the following formula:

$$Genre\ Novelty\ Score\ (GNS)_{ip} = 1 - \frac{1}{|G_i|} \sum_{g \in G_i} \left(\frac{n_{gp}}{N_p} \right)$$

Where,

- G_i *is the set of genre tags associated with content i*
- $|G_i|$ *is the number of genre tags associated with content i*
- n_{gp} *is the number of titles on platform p with genre g*
- N_p *is the total number of titles on platform p*

In addition to genre novelty and to capture different aspects of diversity in platform offerings, we incorporate runtime as a complementary diversity measure in streaming platforms.

Runtime has been used in other domains. In the context of the gaming industry, measures such as colour bandwidth and resolution capture the diversity of game scenarios (Li et al., 2025). In streaming, content duration often signals the intended viewing device and user context. For example, if the content is of shorter duration, it often targets consumers using mobile devices with smaller screens, and if the content is of longer duration, then the content is developed for audiences who use larger screens (Merikivi et al., 2019). Thus, runtime complements genre novelty by representing an alternative dimension of platform diversity. We classify each title into one of five runtime categories: very short (<30 min), short (30−59 min), medium (60−89 min), long (90−119 min), and very long (≥120 min) Then, we calculate a Runtime Novelty Score (RNS) for each content-platform pair by analogy to GNS as follows:

$$Runtime\ Novelty\ Score\ (RNS)_{ip} = 1 - \frac{n_{c_i p}}{N_p}$$

- *i* indexes for a specific content title
- *p* is the streaming platform
- c_i *is the runtime category of title i*
- $n_{c_i p}$ *is the number of titles on platform p with runtime category* c_i
- N_p*is the total number of titles on platform p*

An RNS close to 1 indicates that a title's runtime category is rare on that platform, while an RNS close to 0 indicates it is common. By combining GNS and RNS, we capture both genre and format diversity in platform offerings.

Independent Variables: Collaboration

The independent variable in our analysis is the degree of collaboration between platform owners and complementors. We conceptualize this variable as a spectrum, with one extreme representing highly collaborative relationships and the other extreme reflecting highly competitive interactions. In our context, complementors are content producers, and platform owners are content hosts or co-producers. Collaboration is reflected in the activities undertaken by both parties. We use two proxies measured at the content-platform pair level to capture the degree of collaboration as follows:

- Production companies: the number of distinct production companies associated with content *i* as listed on TMDB. This captures the depth of integration, since co-production involves formal alliances and shared governance.
- Streaming availability (multi-homing): the number of distinct streaming platforms on which content *i* appears, derived from Watchmode availability data. This reflects the breadth of reach. Titles distributed across more platforms indicate looser, arm's-length collaboration but may also signal competitive positioning by complementors.

Prior research has measured collaboration as the total number of formal alliances or initiatives in which a company participates (Wassmer, 2010). Formal alliance includes strategic alliances of all types (Wassmer, 2010). Through this logic, we argue that a content producer (complementor) has a strategic alliance with the streaming platform (platform owner). This warrants the streaming availability of content to be used as a proxy for the degree of collaboration. In this context, if a content producer has a high number of strategic alliances (multi-homing), it forces platform owners to differentiate their offerings from other competing platforms (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022). To achieve this, platform owners incentivize the creation of more diverse offerings on their platforms. However, complementors may host their content on multiple platforms (multi-home) to capture more value for their innovation. This leads to platform owners' increasing control to prevent complementors from multi-homing, thereby making this relationship less collaborative and more competitive. Hence, a smaller number of platforms hosting content indicates a higher degree of collaboration between content producers and platform owners. To reflect this inverse relationship, we take the negative of platform count as a proxy for collaboration in the regression equation.

Similarly, in supply chain management, collaboration between stakeholders is partly measured by the total number of organisations a company is involved with (Garcia-Torres et al., 2024). We argue that a high number of stakeholder collaboration in the form of production companies indicate a higher degree of collaboration between platform-owners and complementors. These arguments justify using the production-company count and streaming availability as proxies for the degree of collaboration between platform owners and complementors. In our regressions, we include these proxies as separate variables to test whether deep integration (multiple co-producers) or broad distribution (multi-homing) more strongly drives platform diversity.

Moderator: Platform Market Power

We include platform market power as a moderator because a platform's dominance can alter how collaboration affects diversity. Market power captures a platform's centrality in the streaming ecosystem and can change the interpretation of collaborative relationships (Charlet, 2024). For example, consider exclusive contracts. If the market power of a platform is high, an exclusive contract can be interpreted as less collaborative since the platform owner has more bargaining power due to its market share. Similarly, if the market power of the platform is low, this same relationship can be interpreted as collaborative. In this case, instead of complementors participating in multiple platforms, they may choose to have an exclusive contract with the platform, which demonstrates collaboration. Thus, a high market power implies greater platform owner leverage and stronger demand from complementors to participate in the platform (Zhang & Chung, 2020). We use the market share of each platform as a proxy for the market power of the platform. Dominant platform use their market power to exert tighter ecosystem control and extract disproportionate profits (Charlet, 2024). Market share is widely recognized as an important indicator for estimating the overall market dominance (Kim & Sawada, 2024), making it an appropriate moderator in our analysis. We classify the market power of each platform in our dataset as significant or insignificant based on publicly available market-share data (see Appendix A for details).

Control Variables

To account for confounding factors, we include control variables that help isolate the causal relationship between collaboration and diversity in platform offerings. We include the following control variables:

- Year of content release: Business strategies, governance policies, and platform visions may evolve over time. This factor may confound our estimates owing to the year when the content was released. Including the year of release ensures that the causal relationship between collaboration and diversity is isolated from other broader technological, social, and industry trends. Controlling for release year ensures that the effect of collaboration on diversity is not driven by period effects.
- Original language: The language in which the content was made originally strongly relates to some structural differences in content markets. The production size of the content might vary significantly depending on the original language of the content. For example, if the content is

made in English, it will have a wider global audience, whereas if the content is made in a regional language, the reach may be limited. Moreover, language controls for production resource disparity since content targeting a global reach will have greater resources. Language also influences the genres and duration preferences rooted in cultural context. Controlling for original language accounts for these structural differences across content markets.

- Content type: The type of content also has a direct impact on novelty scores, representing diversity in a platform. Some formats of content, such as documentaries, short films, and special content, are by definition more novel than movies and TV series. Hence, it is necessary to include content type as a control variable to prevent biases in our diversity measures.

These control variables are explicitly included in all regression models to account for external factors influencing content diversity. Standard errors are clustered at the platform level to account for within-platform correlation.

3.4 Data Analysis

To examine the impact of collaboration between platform owners and complementors on platform content diversity, we estimate linear regression models with an interaction effect between collaboration intensity and market power, as well as the control variables described above. This specification allows us to estimate how collaboration on a given platform influences the diversity of content it offers, accounting for the fact that the same content may contribute differently to diversity across different platforms. Our full model is specified as follows:

$$Diversity_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 Collaboration_{ip} + \beta_2 MarketPower_p + \beta_3 \left(Collaboration_{ip} \times Market\ Power_p\right) + \gamma' X_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip}$$

where

- $Diversity_{ip}$ is either the genre-novelty score (GNS) or runtime-novelty score (RNS) for content *i* on platform *p,*
- $Collaboration_{ip}$ measures the degree of collaboration between the platform owners and the complementors for content *i* on platform *p,* measured by production companies and multi-homing (entered as separate standardized, log-transformed variables),
- $MarketShare_p$ represents the market share of the platform *p,*
- $Collaboration_{ip} \times MarketShare_p$ represents the interaction effect of the market power,
- X_{ip} is a vector of control variables (years of content release, original language, and content type), and
- ε_{ip} is the error term.

To ensure statistical robustness, we cluster standard errors at the platform level to account for within-platform correlations and heteroskedasticity in our content diversity measures. We estimated several variations of the base model to examine the main and interaction effects. Table 2 presents these model specifications.

Prior to estimation, we assessed multicollinearity via a correlation matrix and variance inflation factors (VIF). Most categorical dummies showed low correlation, but the English and Japanese language dummies were highly correlated (VIF > 5), reflecting that the vast majority of content in our sample is produced in one of these two languages. To avoid multicollinearity, we retain one of these dummies and omit the other from our models.

Table 2 - Model Variations

Model Variations	Model Description	Regression Equation
A	Regressing GNS and RNS on the number of production companies and the count of hosting platforms only.	$Diversity_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 Collaboration_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip}$
B	Regressing GNS and RNS on the number of production companies, the count of hosting platforms, and the market power of the platform **without interactions**.	$Diversity_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 Collaboration_{ip} + \beta_2 Market\ Power_p + \varepsilon_{ip}$
C	Regressing GNS and RNS on the number of production companies, the count of hosting platforms, and the market power of the platform **with interactions**.	$Diversity_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 Collaboration_{ip} + \beta_2 Market\ Power_p + \beta_3 (Collaboration_{ip} \times Market\ Power_p) + \varepsilon_{ip}$
D	Regressing GNS and RNS on the number of production companies, the count of hosting platforms, and control variables only.	$Diversity_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 Collaboration_{ip} + \gamma' X_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip}$
E	Regressing GNS and RNS on the number of production companies, the count of hosting platforms, the market power of the platform, and control variables **without interactions.**	$Diversity_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 Collaboration_{ip} + \beta_2 Market\ Power_p + \gamma' X_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip}$
F	Regressing GNS and RNS on the number of production companies, the count of hosting platforms, the market power of the platform, and control variables **with interactions.**	$Diversity_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_1 Collaboration_{ip} + \beta_2 Market\ Power_p + \beta_3 (Collaboration_{ip} \times Market\ Power_p) + \gamma' X_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip}$

Marginal Effects and Visualization

To interpret the interaction between collaboration and market power, we compute and plot the marginal effects of collaboration on diversity at two distinct levels of market power. These simple bar plots illustrate how the effect of collaboration (β_1) varies with the interaction term (β_3), and help clarify whether collaboration is more strongly associated with breadth (GNS) or structural novelty (RNS) depending on platform dominance. This visual approach allows readers to see directly how collaboration's impact on platform diversity changes with platform dominance.

4. Results

In this section, we first summarize our data (Section 4.1), including descriptive statistics and distribution diagnostics for the primary variables. In Section 4.2, we then report the results of our hierarchical regression analyses examining the direct effects of collaboration on two facets of content diversity, GNS and RNS. Next, we explore how market power moderates these relationships by presenting marginal effects plots (Section 4.3). Finally, we assess the robustness of our findings under alternative specifications and operationalizations (Section 4.4).

4.1 Data Overview and Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all primary variables (N=11,558), including dependent (GNS, RNS) and independent variables (production company count, platform count). For each variable, we report the count, mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and maximum.

The Genre Novelty Score (GNS) has a high central tendency (mean = 0.854; SD = 0.098), indicating that most content exhibits substantial novelty in its genre combinations. RNS is more evenly spread and does not show increased popularity of a certain score (mean=0.593; SD=0.232). This means there is no content that has a drastic contribution to RNS on a platform, and content on a platform is highly varied in terms of its RNS.

One key independent variable is the number of production companies involved in content creation. Based on its mean (2.935) and standard deviation (2.183), the majority of content is produced by fewer than five companies, resulting in a positively skewed distribution. The other independent variable, platform count (the number of platforms on which content is hosted), has a mean of 1.676 (SD = 1.132), meaning most content appears on one or two platforms. However, some titles appear on as many as eight platforms, suggesting an intriguing dynamic in platform–complementor relationships.

For the moderator, platform market power, we identified 2,515 content-platform pairs with high market power and 9,043 with low market power, based on the market share. We classified each platform as having high market power if its market share exceeded roughly 50 million subscribers in terms of consumer market share or $1 billion in quarterly revenue. Moreover, there are some outliers which don't follow this threshold, but they are still labelled having high market power due to the larger umbrella company it comes under (e.g. – Netflix Free comes under Netflix); otherwise, it was coded as low market power (see Appendix A for the detailed threshold and source). This distribution indicates that the majority of content–platform relationships in the sample occur on platforms with relatively low market power, reflecting the fragmented nature of the streaming market where many smaller platforms coexist alongside a few dominant players. This imbalance underscores the value of testing whether the effects of collaboration differ between dominant and less dominant platforms.

Regarding the control variable for original language of content, we found that English (count = 9,482) and Japanese (count = 669) are the most common amongst a total of 51 languages. Only these two languages have counts more than 500, while the majority of languages have fewer than 100 titles. To avoid overfitting and improve model stability, we grouped languages with fewer than 15 titles as rare languages. This implies that most content is likely to be produced in English or Japanese. For content type, another control variable, there are a total of six types in the dataset: Movie (count = 6,287), TV series (count = 3,857), TV movie (count = 732), TV mini-series (count = 649), short film (count = 27) and TV special (count = 6). This suggests that short films and TV specials are relatively rare, contributing to greater content novelty on a platform, whereas movies and TV series are the most common types of content found. Content release years range from 1916 to 2025, with the majority of content released after 2013. This indicates the momentum gained by OTT platforms during this period, with an increase in content volume. More detailed descriptive statistics for the control variables are provided in Appendix A.

Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	Diversity		Collaboration	
	Genre Novelty Score (GNS)	**Runtime Novelty Score (RNS)**	**Number of Production Companies**	**Platform Count**
Count	11,558	11,558	11,558	11,558
Mean	0.854	0.593	2.935	1.676
Standard Deviation	0.098	0.232	2.183	1.132
Min	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
25th Percentile	0.818	0.403	1.000	1.000
Median	0.875	0.612	2.000	1.000
75th Percentile	0.912	0.796	4.000	2.000
Max	0.999	0.996	27.000	8.000

Overall, both Genre Novelty Score (GNS) and Runtime Novelty Score (RNS) exhibit substantial variation but depart notably from normality, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. GNS is negatively skewed with the tail extending to the left (Figure 3), and most of the values lie on the right side of the graph, showing that the majority of content substantially increases genre diversity on their platform.



Figure 3 - Distribution of Genre Novelty Score (GNS)

However, RNS (Figure 4) demonstrates a more spread-out and even bimodal distribution. This suggests that there is a mix of content with a wide range of runtimes across platforms. This shows that in terms of duration of content, the platforms in our dataset are not biased for a certain duration. Instead, all formats of content with varying durations are available on these platforms. There is a mix of content which are novel and experimental in terms of duration, as well as those that are fairly common.



Figure 4 - Distribution of Runtime Novelty Score (RNS)

To satisfy OLS assumptions, we applied a logarithmic transformation to both dependent variables and then standardized them to a common scale. We also filtered out rows with GNS above 0.5 to remove extreme outliers. Although these outliers were few, they exerted disproportionate influence on the model, making it less stable.

As additional preprocessing, we performed the following:

- Production-Company Imputation: Some content-platform pairs show a null value for the number of production companies, which is not possible. Upon further examination, we found that a few such cases with zero production companies involved titles on platforms with large market power. For these, since there were few, we retrieved correct counts from another trustworthy secondary data source – the International Movie Database (IMDB) - and updated our data. For the remaining cases with zero production companies and little market power, we randomly imputed values of 1 or 2, reflecting the most likely counts to avoid biasing the data and to ensure a balanced dataset.
- Original-Language Coding: For the control variable *original languages*, if the number of contents associated with a language was fewer than 10, we categorized them under the *rare_language* category to avoid overfitting and make our model more stable.
- Multicollinear Checks: We also inspected the correlation matrix and computed variable inflation factors (VIFs) for all predictors (details in Appendix B). We found English and Japanese language dummies exhibited high multicollinearity (VIF>10), driven by their dominance in the sample. This reflects the near-mutual exclusivity of these two categories rather than a modeling flaw (see Appendix A for distributions).

After preprocessing, our final regression dataset had a large sample size of 11,461, which ensures strong statistical power and enhances the generalizability of our results.

4.2 Hierarchical Regression Analysis

In this section, we present the results of our OLS regression models testing our hypotheses. We estimate two models corresponding to two distinct dependent variables. Model 1 predicts Genre Novelty Score (GNS) and Model 2 predicts Runtime Novelty Score (RNS). For each dependent variable, we estimate six nested specifications (A-F):

- Model A: Collaboration variables only (number of production companies and platform count)
- Model B: Model A + market power
- Model C: Model B + collaboration x market power interaction
- Model D: Model A + control variables
- Model E: Model B + control variables

- Model F: Model C + control variables

These specifications allow us to isolate the direct effects of collaboration, assess the role of market power, and then test our interaction hypotheses while controlling for covariates. The regression results for Model 1 and Model 2 are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. Coefficients on the number of production companies and platform count test Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2, whereas coefficients on the interactions of market power with collaboration test Hypothesis 2.

Regression Results of Model 1

Table 4 reports six nested OLS models predicting GNS. Models A - C include only collaboration variables and market power, while Models D - F re-estimate the same specifications with additional controls. Overall, model fit improves steadily from Model A ($R^2 = 0.042$) to Model F ($R^2 = 0.171$), indicating that adding market power, interaction terms, and controls meaningfully increases the variances explained in GNS (the complete coefficient table can be found in Appendix J).

Our first independent variable, the number of production companies, has a significant positive effect on GNS (e.g., Model A: $\beta = 0.176$, $p < .01$; Model F: $\beta = 0.148$, $p < .01$). Although the coefficient value varies, the difference is minimal and the effect remains significantly positive across all model specifications. This means that more collaborating production companies lead to greater genre novelty, supporting Hypothesis 1.2.

Our second independent variable, platform count, shows a significant positive effect on GNS in Models A through D (e.g., Model A $\beta = 0.107$, $p < .05$), indicating that content available on fewer platforms (i.e., more collaboration) tends to be associated with more genre novelty. However, this positive effect attenuates to non-significance in Models E and F, suggesting that once market power and controls are accounted for, platform count alone no longer explains additional variance in GNS. The initial positive effect aligns with Hypothesis 1.2, while its attenuation underscores the importance of market power and other covariates.

The main effect of market power of a platform is large and positive in Models B and E ($\beta \approx 0.52$, $p < .01$), and remains robust after adding interaction terms in Models C and F. This means that high market power platforms generally host more genre-novel content, consistent with our theoretical expectation.

When we include the interactions between collaboration and market power (Models C and F), the Production-Company Count × Market Power interaction is negative and significant (Model C: $\beta = -0.214$, $p < .01$; Model F: $\beta = -0.202$, $p < .01$). This indicates that the positive effect of additional co-producers on genre novelty weakens on high-power platforms, providing contrary evidence for Hypothesis 2. Similarly, The Platform Count × Market Power interaction is negative and significant in Model C ($\beta = -0.140$, $p < .01$) but attenuates to marginal significance in Model F ($\beta = -0.072$, $p < .10$), suggesting that the positive effect of limited platform availability on genre novelty is partly offset when platforms hold dominant market power.

In sum, collaboration and platform characteristics interact in complex ways: more co-producers generally boost genre novelty, but this benefit diminishes on dominant platforms, and while limited platform availability also increases novelty, that effect is lessened when market power is high. These findings suggest the direct effects of collaboration measures provide clear support for Hypothesis 1.2, but the moderation effect does not align with Hypothesis 2. Although market power shows a consistently significant positive main effect, its impact on the relationship between collaboration and diversity is negative, highlighting its nuanced role. We examine the marginal-effects plots in Section 4.3 to visualize and investigate these conditional relationships further.

Table 4 - Regression Results of Model 1

Variables	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 1C	Model 1D	Model 1E	Model 1F
Collaboration: Number of Production Companies (SE)	0.176*** (0.032)	0.144*** (0.031)	0.182*** (0.035)	0.128*** (0.034)	0.106*** (0.031)	0.148*** (0.036)
Collaboration: Platform Count (SE)	0.107** (0.048)	0.081** (0.041)	0.102** (0.048)	0.086** (0.045)	0.050 (0.036)	0.061 (0.043)
Market Power (SE)	–	0.521*** (0.093)	0.592*** (0.088)	–	0.529*** (0.099)	0.585*** (0.096)
Prod. Companies × Market Power (SE)	–	–	–0.214*** (0.043)	–	–	–0.202*** (0.043)
Platform Count × Market Power (SE)	–	–	–0.140*** (0.052)	–	–	–0.072 (0.047)
Controls	-	-	-	included	included	included
N	11,461	11,461	11,461	11,461	11,461	11,461
R-squared	0.042	0.086	0.095	0.123	0.165	0.171
Adjusted R-squared	0.041	0.086	0.095	0.121	0.163	0.169

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Standard errors (SE) are included in parentheses.
Dashes (-) indicate that a variable is not included in the model.
The Market Power variable is coded 1 = high, 0 = low.
Control variables (content release year, original language, and content type) are omitted for brevity.

Regression Results of Model 2

To ensure robustness and capture a different facet of platform diversity, we use the Runtime Novelty Score (RNS) as our second dependent variable. Table 5 reports six nested OLS models predicting RNS. As before, Models A-C include only collaboration variables and market power, while Models D-F add control variables (the complete coefficient table can be found in Appendix K). The addition of interaction terms and control variables steadily increases the explanatory strength of Model 2 from Model A ($R^2 = 0.018$) to Model F ($R^2 = 0.058$), indicating that although the total variance explained in RNS is lower than for GNS, adding market power, interaction terms, and controls still contributes meaningfully to model performance. However, Model 2's key effect patterns diverge from those observed in Model 1.

In Model 2, for all model variations except Model E, the number of production companies involved in content creation is not statistically significant, offering no support for either Hypothesis 1.1 or 1.2 in the RNS context. In Model E, in which it approaches significance, the coefficient is negative (β = -0.037, p < .10). This means a higher number of collaborating production companies is linked to lower RNS, an effect opposite to that observed with GNS, and supports Hypothesis 1.1.

Moreover, platform count is significant and negative whenever market power is included: Model B (β = - 0.079, p < .05), Model C (β = -0.101, p < .01), Model E (β = -0.055, p < .05) and Model F (β = -0.074, p < .10). This pattern suggests that more collaboration (i.e., lower availability of content across

multiple platforms) predicts lower diversity in relation to runtime novelty, providing support for Hypothesis 1.1.

The main effect of market power of the platform remains large, positive, and highly significant across all specifications: Model B ($\beta = 0.731$, $p < .01$), Model C ($\beta = 0.721$, $p < .01$), Model E ($\beta = 0.708$, $p < .01$), and Model F ($\beta = 0.697$, $p < .01$). This strongly supports the independent role of market power in determining platform diversity.

However, the interactions between collaboration and market power are largely insignificant in Model 2 except for the Platform Count × Market Power term in Model C. In that model, the moderation effect of market power on the relation between platform count and RNS is positive. This means the negative relationship between collaboration and diversity weakens if a platform has greater market power, which implies that dominant platforms mitigate the limiting effect of collaboration on runtime novelty. This aligns with Hypothesis 2's prediction of uniformly positive moderation.

In sum, unlike genre novelty, runtime novelty shows only weak links to co-production intensity (no support for H1.2) and a reverse effect (partial support for H1.1), while market-power moderation (H2) is partially supported. We visualize these moderation patterns in Section 4.3 (Figure 6).

Table 5 - Regression Results of Model 2

Variable	**Model 2A**	**Model 2B**	**Model 2C**	**Model 2D**	**Model 2E**	**Model 2F**
Collaboration: Number of Production Companies (SE)	0.038 (0.052)	–0.007 (0.043)	0.006 (0.052)	0.001 (0.030)	–0.037* (0.021)	–0.032 (0.026)
Collaboration: Platform Count (SE)	–0.042 (0.049)	–0.079* (0.040)	–0.101** (0.047)	–0.005 (0.042)	–0.055** (0.028)	–0.074** (0.031)
Market Power (SE)	–	0.731*** (0.144)	0.721*** (0.133)	–	0.708*** (0.145)	0.697*** (0.135)
Prod. Companies × Market Power (SE)	–	–	–0.058 (0.058)	–	–	–0.017 (0.036)
Platform Count × Market Power (SE)	–	–	0.124* (0.072)	–	–	0.101 (0.065)
Controls	-	-	-	Included	Included	Included
N	11,461	11,461	11,461	11,461	11,461	11,461
R-squared	0.003	0.091	0.094	0.091	0.168	0.169
Adjusted R-squared	0.003	0.091	0.094	0.089	0.166	0.167

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Standard errors (SE) are included in parentheses.
Dashes (-) indicate that a variable is not included in the model.
The Market Power variable is coded 1 = high, 0 = low.
Control variables (content release year, original language, and content type) are omitted for brevity.

To summarize, Model 1 supports Hypothesis 1.2, which posits that if the relationship between complementor and platform owner is more collaborative, then the diversity in the platform offerings increases. However, Models 1C to 1F show that the market power of a platform has a negative interaction effect, contradicting Hypothesis 2's expectation of positive moderation and demonstrating that high market power weakens the impact of collaboration on genre diversity. Model 2 explains a meaningful but smaller share of variance in runtime novelty. In this model, collaboration, especially the dimension of platform count, has a negative impact on RNS in Models B, C, E, and F. This indicates that lower collaboration (i.e., higher competition) actually increases runtime novelty, which supports H1.1 rather than H1.2. The interaction effects in Model 2 are largely insignificant except for Model C, providing partial support for H2. In short, while higher collaboration consistently promotes genre diversity (H1.2), it reduces runtime novelty (H1.1), and market power shows mixed moderation effects. Specifically, H2 is not supported, and even contradicted in Model 1 (genre diversity), but receives partial support in Model 2 (runtime diversity), suggesting a more nuanced interplay between platform dominance and collaboration.

4.3 Moderation by Market Power: Marginal Effects

To unpack the significant interactions observed in Model 1 and the lone significant interaction in Model 2, we plot marginal effects of each collaboration measure at low (Market Power = 0) and high (Market Power = 1) levels of market power and conduct simple-slope tests. Figures 5 and 6 for GNS and Figures 7 and 8 for RNS display marginal bar plots. Table 6 summarizes the corresponding slopes and p-values. We included plots from Models 1C and 2C, along with the complete models including control variables (Models 1F and 2F), to demonstrate the marginal effects of interaction in isolation and with controls. This helps ensure internal robustness by showing how interactions change when confounding factors are accounted for. Inclusion of both the baseline interaction models (1C and 2C) and the full models (1F and 2F) allows us to observe how much variation is explained by key interactions and variables alone, compared to when additional variables are included. Thus, presenting both specifications provides greater confidence and a clearer understanding of the marginal effects of the interactions.

Although the interaction terms in our regression models indicate whether the difference in collaboration slopes between low- and high-power platforms is significant, marginal-effects plots translate those coefficients into more intuitive visuals. Specifically, while an interaction coefficient tells us how much to adjust the baseline collaboration effect when Market Power = 1 (vs. 0), the marginal-effects plot shows the total estimated effect of collaboration at each level. Because Market Power is binary (0 = low-power platforms; 1 = high-power platforms), each plot displays two points where the X-axis shows the Market Power (0 or 1) and the Y-axis shows the marginal effect of the collaboration variable (the number of production companies or platform count) on the diversity outcome (GNS or RNS).

For the Genre Novelty Score (GNS), the marginal effect of the number of production companies (Figure 5) is strong and positive at low market power (Market Power = 0) for Model 1C (≈ 0.18, $p < .001$) and Model 1F(≈ 0.15, $p < .001$), but turns negative at high market power (Market Power = 1) for both Model 1C ($\approx - 0.03$, $p < .001$) and Model 1F ($\approx - 0.05$, $p < .001$). Similarly, the effect of platform counts (Figure 6) flips from positive at low power for Model 1C (≈ 0.10, $p < .05$) and Model 1F (≈ 0.061, $p = 0.121$) to negative at high power for Model 1C (≈ -0.038, $p < .05$) and Model 1F (≈ -0.011, $p = 0.124$). These results illustrate that platform dominance suppresses the genre-boosting benefit of co-production and may also suppress the novelty gains from limited platform distribution, although the latter effect is less robust in Model 1F.



Figure 5 - Marginal Plot of Interaction for Model 1C



Figure 6 - Marginal Plot of Interaction for Model 1F

For the Runtime Novelty Score (RNS), the collaboration measure of the number of production companies shows largely insignificant marginal effects, while the collaboration measure of the number of streaming platforms shows mostly significant effects. The effect of the number of production companies remains close to zero regardless of market power ($p > .10$). The effect of platform counts is negative at low market power for both Model 2C (≈ -0.101, $p < .05$) and Model 2F (≈ -0.074, $p < .05$), but shifts to a small, marginally significant positive effect at high market power for Model 2C (≈ 0.023, $p < .10$) and Model 2F (≈ 0.026, $p = .121$). This pattern underscores the limited evidence of moderation by market power, yet provides partial support for H2 when platform counts is considered as a proxy for collaboration.



Figure 7 - Marginal Plot of Interaction for Model 2C



Figure 8 - Marginal Plot of Interaction for Model 2F

By separating interaction coefficients from their graphical marginal effects and conducting simple-slope tests at each market power level, these plots clarify not only whether market power moderates the collaboration–diversity link (via significance tests) but also how the strength and direction of that relationship differ between low- and high-power platforms. Table 6 summarizes the simple-slope estimates and their significance levels for each collaboration measure at low (Market Power = 0) and high (Market Power = 1) platform dominance.

Table 6 - Simple Slopes for Collaboration Measures

Dependent Variable	Model	Collaboration Measure	Low Power Effect (coef, p-value)	High Power Effect (coef, p-value)
GNS	1C	Number of Production Companies	0.183 (<.001)	-0.032 (<.001)
		Platform Count	0.102 (<.05)	-0.038 (<.05)
GNS	1F	Number of Production Companies	0.149 (<.001)	-0.055 (<.001)
		Platform Count	0.061 (0.121)	-0.011 (0.124)
RNS	2C	Number of Production Companies	0.007 (0.895)	-0.052 (0.895)
		Platform Count	-0.101 (<.05)	0.023 (<.10)
RNS	2F	Number of Production Companies	-0.032 (0.215)	-0.049 (0.632)
		Platform Count	-0.074 (<.05)	0.026 (0.121)

4.4 Robustness Checks

We conducted several robustness analyses to verify that our main findings are not driven by specific modelling choices, transformations, outlier observations, or changes in the industry context.

First, to examine whether our results hold in the post-COVID streaming landscape, we restricted the sample to titles released after 2020. Re-running all six nested models on this post-COVID subsample shows that the positive effect of co-production on genre novelty, its attenuation under high market power, and the conditional effects of platform count all replicate. Moreover, for post-COVID data the platform count was observed to be significant in this robustness check, showing the same effect on genre diversity as in our primary model specifications. For runtime novelty, collaboration effects remain weak and mostly insignificant, with limited evidence of moderation, consistent with our main results. We observed that for post-COVID data, collaboration between platform owners and complementors was at large insignificant. Moreover, similar to specifications of model 2, the interaction between moderator and complementor were also observed to be statistically insignificant. While smaller sample sizes of 2588 in the post-COVID subsample led to wider confidence intervals and some shifts in significance, the core effect patterns remain intact, suggesting that our findings are robust to major industry disruptions.

Second, to rule out historical biases, we restricted the dataset to titles released in the last 10 years. This check ensures that our results are not driven by older titles with different production or distribution contexts. In this subsample, the positive effect of co-production on genre novelty, its attenuation under high market power, and the conditional platform-count effects all persist. Runtime novelty again shows only weak and largely insignificant collaboration effects and no robust moderation, underscoring the generalizability of our results across content cohorts.

These analyses strengthen confidence that the relationships among collaboration intensity, platform dominance, and content diversity reflect genuine underlying dynamics rather than quirks of outliers, cut-points, or sample composition.

5. Discussion

From the results, we can draw some key implications regarding our hypotheses. Due to mixed arguments found in the literature, we developed two competing hypotheses and tested them empirically using the context of streaming services. Hypothesis 1.1 posits that a lower degree of collaboration increases the degree of diversity among the products and services offered by a digital platform. Models 2A to 2F, which use the runtime novelty score as a proxy for diversity in platform offerings, partially support this hypothesis. These models show that broader availability of content, which indicates a lower degree of collaboration, is linked to greater experimentation with the runtime of content. In contrast, Hypothesis 1.2 posits that when platform owners and complementors have a more collaborative relationship, this leads to higher diversity in platform offerings. We found strong empirical support for this hypothesis in Models 1A to 1F. These models demonstrate that limited availability of content across different platforms and a higher number of production companies involved in creating the content increase the genre novelty score. As for H2, while market power shows a consistent positive independent effect in all models, its moderation effect reverses the impact of the independent variables on the novelty scores. This provides only limited support for Hypothesis 2, which posits that increasing market power should strengthen the positive impact of collaboration on diversity.

The contradictory implications of Models 1 and 2 indicate that the relationship between participants in a digital platform and their impact on the platform outcomes is not straightforward. This means the genre of content and runtime of content hosted on streaming platforms capture distinct aspects of diversity. This implies that both theories – one supporting the idea of competition leading to more diversity and the other stating increased collaboration improves diversity - may be reasonable and justifiable at the same time (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022; Cennamo & Santalo, 2019). These studies considered platform offerings from different perspectives and discussed diversity indirectly as "platform output" or as a consequence of varied interactions between platform participants, without directly defining platform offerings. Our study proposes novel ways to think about platform diversity by measuring content genre and runtime in digital platforms. We suggest that runtime captures more of the structural aspect of the content, while genre captures more of a qualitative aspect of the content's nature.

Our study suggests that diversity in platform offerings may be a complex construct, with the same causal factors having varying effects on its different aspects. As demonstrated by the result of our analysis, the impact of collaboration on the qualitative aspect (genre novelty score) of diversity in platform offerings was not the same as observed on the structural aspect (runtime novelty score). This shows that the causal factor may have different or even opposing impacts on different aspects of diversity. Additional evidence for these differences can also be seen in our descriptive analysis, where genre novelty was observed to follow a significantly different distribution from that of runtime novelty scores. These reasons warrant breaking the complex construct of diversity down into its fundamental aspects to better study its causal relationships in the platform ecosystem.

We measured our moderator, the market power of the platform, based on the market share of the platform in terms of user base and revenue. This means that if a platform has a comparatively larger number of consumers, it translates to having greater market power. Through this rationale, we operationalize our moderator in a way that indirectly includes end-users in our study. The market power of the digital platform had a significant positive effect on the diversity of platform offerings. Model variations B, C, E, and F for both Models 1 and 2 consistently showed that the market power plays a significant role in determining diversity. These results confirm the idea that if a platform has a larger consumer base, it will offer more diverse content to satisfy its varied customers. Thus, content hosted on a higher market power platform would increase the diversity of that platform more than it would for a platform with lower market power (Grover & Lyytinen, 2022). Moreover, the negative interaction effect of the moderator adds nuance to this relationship. As a moderator, market power changes the interpretation of the relationship between the platform owners and the complementors. Market power had a reversing moderation effect, meaning any activity between the platform owners and complementors must be interpreted in the context of the market power of the platform. Such activities can be viewed as either collaborative or competitive (Kude & Huber, 2025). For example, an exclusive

content deal may indicate a collaborative relationship if the platform does not dominate its complementor. However, the same deal may be seen as less collaborative if the platform's market power is high, and it dominates the relationship.

5.1 Contributions

Through this study, we advance the academic knowledge on the organization and functioning of digital platform ecosystems. Our work makes important theoretical and practical contributions. By integrating organizational and economic perspectives, we offer a more holistic view of digital platforms and help bridge gaps between existing studies that often focus on one perspective. Because relationships in digital platforms are plural and complex, their interpretation may change drastically depending on the lens applied. Therefore, to support a more standardized and objective understanding, this study incorporates organizational and economic perspectives and proposes examining the interactions between two participants on a spectrum of collaboration, offering a standardized and coherent way of accommodating different interpretations and continuing to study this research area.

Our findings also clarify a key contradiction in prior research regarding the relationship between collaboration and diversity in platform offerings. Previous studies have offered opposing views on the causal relationships between collaboration and diversity, specifically concerning the effect of collaboration between platform owners and complementors. Our analysis demonstrates that this relationship and its underlying constructs are more complex than previously assumed. Moreover, we offer empirical evidence that the same causal factors can affect different aspects of diversity in different ways. To support this, we introduce two novelty metrics that capture both range and rarity by developing the Genre Novelty Score (GNS) and the Runtime Novelty Score (RNS). Our study also draws attention to the essential role of market power in understanding the platform relationships, as it not only directly influences diversity but can also alter the interpretation of collaborative activities in the platform ecosystem. This advancement helps clarify many inconsistencies in earlier findings and provide an explanation for the varying effects of the relationship between participants in the platform ecosystem.

Our study also provides practical implications for digital platform strategy and governance. By empirically testing the causal relationship between the nature of collaboration and diversity in platform offerings, we enable platform owners to understand how a governance policy would impact the offerings on their platform and their relationship with complementors. Moreover, through the insight that this study offers, complementors and platform owners can understand the implications of their respective strategic decisions on the platform offerings and align their objectives for mutual benefits. Through this study, platform owners gain insights into the optimum strategy to meet their scaling objectives while ensuring a proper balance in collaborative relationships to ensure sustainable growth of the platform. Based on the platform's position in the market, platform owners can control the product diversity to meet their specific user engagement goals, and it reduces the risk for platform owners of unintended governance policy effects on their platform. Overall, it helps both platform owners and complementors gain a better understanding of the consequences of their actions and helps them optimize platforms for better performance and relational harmony.

5.2 Limitations and Future Research

While our study provides important insights into the impact of collaboration on diversity in digital platform ecosystems, future research can extend and refine our findings in several ways. First, by excluding end-users as direct subjects in our study, we may overlook important drivers of platform diversity. We have constrained this study to the relationship between only two participant groups - platform owners and complementors. However, one major participant that can dictate the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of platform offerings is the end-users or consumers. We partially addressed this through our moderator (market power), which reflects the role that end-users play in changing diversity on platforms. However, we did not examine end-users as a primary subject alongside platform owners and complementors. Future research could address this gap by explicitly incorporating end-user behaviours and preferences to better capture their role in determining the diversity of platform offerings.

Second, this study incorporates organizational and economic perspectives by analysing the relationship between complementors and platform owners and their effect on platform diversity. However, one of the main perspectives – the technical or engineering perspective - is not included in this study. We demonstrate the importance of governance of digital platforms pertaining to this relationship and its impact. When discussing governance structure, it becomes essential to discuss the access provided by platform owners to complementors, and to view the digital platform through a technical perspective. Future research could expand governance of digital platforms in their studies by including the technical or engineering perspective when studying this relationship.

Third, our empirical context is limited to the streaming industry, which is appropriate given its rapid growth and adoption. However, this focus may introduce industry-specific biases. Future work could extend our framework to other sectors, such as e-commerce, where genre might map onto product categories and structural diversity onto features like the length of product descriptions or feature sets on the platform.

Fourth, we relied on secondary data covering the USA, Canada, Australia, England, India, Spain & Brazil. While these regions account for the majority of the global streaming market, they are not exhaustive. Thus, future research should seek broader data from additional geographies or industries and could use primary data collection methods such as stakeholder surveys or interviews to complement secondary sources, reduce potential biases, and enhance generalizability.

Fifth, our results from RNS models demonstrated that the nature of collaboration between platform owners and complementors was observed to have a significant impact on the qualitative aspect of content in our study, but the structural aspect of content showed different and largely insignificant results than this. We suggest that future research further explore the structural dimension of platform diversity and its factors. We introduced novelty scores for genres and runtime to indicate diversity on a digital platform. These measurements represent our construct appropriately, yet they do not account for all the fundamental components of diversity. The implication from our study is that diversity in platform offerings is a complex construct, which warrants a deeper understanding of the fundamental components that form this construct together. Our study demonstrates the importance of understanding diversity to clarify the factors impacting it. The future research could advance by decomposing these constructs further and identifying and measuring the underlying elements more holistically by utilizing other ways to measure diversity than the genre novelty score (GNS) or the runtime novelty score (RNS).

Finally, in our regression specifications, we observed that the market power has a strong positive direct effect on diversity in platform offerings for both qualitative and structural aspects. The market power of a platform was a moderator in our study, but the regression models represent its importance in understanding diversity in a digital platform. This indicates a possible arena for further exploration.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, our primary objective was to understand how the degree of collaboration affects the diversity of offerings in a digital platform ecosystem. We found two seemingly contradictory arguments in the literature. One side argued that when the nature of the relationship between platform owners and complementors is more collaborative, this increases diversity in platform offerings. On the other hand, the other argument is that when the nature of the relationship between platform owners and complementors is less collaborative, it results in increased diversity in platform offerings.

We found that these relationships are complex, and their interpretations change based on the market power of the platform. We conclude that any activity in the relationship between platform owners and complementors can be placed on a spectrum of collaboration. Market power has an independent impact as well as a moderating role to play in changing the diversity of platform offerings. Market power of the platform may even reverse the placement of an activity on the spectrum of collaboration, rendering a collaborative activity into a competitive activity and vice versa.

From the observation of our results, we also conclude that diversity in platform offerings is a complex construct involving multiple distinct dimensions. Our findings suggest that there are structural and qualitative dimensions involved in the construct of diversity. Based on our research, we suggest that it is important to study the effects of collaboration on these dimensions individually to fully understand how platform relationships shape ecosystem diversity.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Streaming Platform Market Power Determination

The table below is about the preparation of the data and its distribution before using it for our regression model. The table includes a list of all the streaming platforms in our dataset, along with the type of platform and references based on which we determine market power significance.

Table 7 - Market Power of Streaming Platforms

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
203	Netflix	sub	High	Statista. (2024). Number of Netflix subscribers worldwide from the 1st quarter of 2013 to the 1st quarter of 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/250934/quarterly-number-of-netflix-streaming-subscribers-worldwide/
157	Hulu	sub	High	The Walt Disney Company. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.
387	Max	sub	High	Warner Bros. Discovery. (2023). Q4 2023 Earnings Report.
26	Prime Video	sub	High	Statista. (2024). Video streaming market revenue worldwide from 2017 to 2028. https://www.statista.com/outlook/dmo/digital-media/video-on-demand/video-streaming/worldwide
372	Disney+	sub	High	The Walt Disney Company. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.
371	AppleTV+	sub	High	Statista. (2024). Apple TV+ global subscribers and ARPU estimates. https://www.statista.com/
409	BBC iPlayer	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
392	Hayu	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
444	Paramount+	sub	High	Paramount Global. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.
455	Paramount+ with Showtime	sub	High	Paramount Global. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.
248	Showtime	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
393	Crave	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
388	Peacock	free	High	Comcast. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.
389	Peacock Premium	sub	High	Comcast. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.
250	Showtime Anytime	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
365	Amazon Freevee	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
440	Netflix Free	free	High	Statista. (2024). Number of Netflix subscribers worldwide from the 1st quarter of 2013 to the 1st quarter of 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/250934/quarte

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
				rly-number-of-netflix-streaming-subscribers-worldwide/
395	Crave Starz	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
425	Stan	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
232	STARZ	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
402	CBC Gem	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
424	Foxtel Now	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
408	Sky Go	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
77	Crackle	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
454	MAX Free	free	High	Warner Bros. Discovery. (2023). Q4 2023 Earnings Report.
108	MGM+	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
406	Now TV	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
407	All 4	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
423	BINGE	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
419	Britbox UK	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
296	Tubi TV	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
10	ABC	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
13	AMC	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
462	Fawesome	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
122	FX	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
458	JioCinema	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
367	Kanopy	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
192	NBC	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
299	USA	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
369	Youtube Premium	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
159	Hulu with Showtime	sub	High	The Walt Disney Company. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
368	Youtube Premium	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
80	Crunchyroll Premium	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
456	Movistar+	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
439	Plex	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
451	Topic	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
366	The Criterion Channel	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
457	FILMIN	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
125	Fandor	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
252	Shudder	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
318	WWE Network	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
349	AppleTV	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
215	PBS	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
140	Google Play	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
24	Amazon	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
307	Fandango at Home	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
344	YouTube	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
452	The Roku Channel	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
270	Syfy	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
271	Syfy	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
18	Acorn TV (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
68	Cinemax (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	High	Warner Bros. Discovery. (2023). Q4 2023 Earnings Report.
73	Comedy Central Stand-Up Plus (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
81	Curiosity Stream (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
126	Fandor (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
358	Hallmark Movies Now (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
247	Shout! Factory TV (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
249	Showtime (via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
253	Shudder (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
234	STARZ (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
269	SundanceNow Doc Club (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
443	Spectrum On Demand	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
442	DirecTV On Demand	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
404	FX Now Canada	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
427	7plus	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
426	9Now	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
7	A&E	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
8	A&E	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
9	ABC	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
428	ABC iview	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
17	Acorn TV	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
19	Adult Swim	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
20	Adult Swim	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
12	AHC GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
378	AMC+	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
30	Animal Planet GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
32	BBC America	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
437	Beamafilm	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
34	BET	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
382	BET+	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
410	BFI Player	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
46	Bravo	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
376	Britbox	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
377	Britbox (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
62	Cartoon Network	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
63	Cartoon Network	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
50	CBS	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
53	CBS News	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
441	Chili	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
384	Cinemax (Via Hulu)	sub	High	Warner Bros. Discovery. (2023). Q4 2023 Earnings Report.
397	Cineplex	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
449	Clarovideo	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
71	Comedy Central	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
72	Comedy Central	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
79	Crunchyroll	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
403	CTV	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
421	Curiosity Stream	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
412	Curzon Home Cinema	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
284	The CW	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
61	CW Seed	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
405	Darkmatter TV	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
86	Destination America GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
91	Discovery GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
93	Discovery Life GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
445	Discovery+	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
355	DisneyNOW	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
356	DisneyNOW	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
436	Fetch TV	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
422	Flix Premiere	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
399	FlixFling	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
131	Food Network	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
114	FOX	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
115	FOX	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
361	Freeform	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
132	Freeform	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
373	fuboTV	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
381	Funimation	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
347	fyi	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
348	fyi	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
448	Globoplay	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
401	GuideDoc	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
151	Hallmark Channel Everywhere	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
152	Hallmark Movies Now	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
385	HBO (Via Hulu)	sub	High	The Walt Disney Company. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.
147	HGTV	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
420	HiDive	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
287	The History Channel	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
288	The History Channel	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
400	Hollywood Suite	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
390	Hoopla	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
447	Hotstar	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
460	Hungama Play	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
396	ICI TOU.TV	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
160	IFC	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
165	Investigation Discovery	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
166	Investigation Discovery GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
413	ITV Player	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
170	Lifetime	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
171	Lifetime	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
169	LOGO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
375	MGM+ (Via Amazon Prime)	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
178	MTV	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
179	MTV	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
181	MUBI	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
461	MX Player	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
418	My5	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
198	National Geographic	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
199	National Geographic	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
191	NBC	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
194	NBC News	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
214	Oxygen	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
435	OzFlix	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
414	Pantaflix	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
221	Paramount Network	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
217	PBS Kids	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
463	Plex	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
391	Pluto TV	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
225	Popcornflix	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
431	Quickflix	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
432	Quickflix Store	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
417	Rakuten TV	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
429	SBS On Demand	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
237	Science GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
246	Shout! Factory TV	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
251	Showtime FREEview	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
411	Sky Store	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
459	Sony LIV	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
259	South Park Studios	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
453	Star+		Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
386	STARZ (Via Hulu)	sub	High	The Walt Disney Company. (2023). Q4 Earnings Report.

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
433	Sun Nxt	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
267	Sundance	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
268	SundanceNow Doc Club	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
415	Talk Talk TV	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
272	TBS	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
434	Telstra TV	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
430	tenplay	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
274	TLC GO	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
276	TNT	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
292	Travel Channel	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
353	truTV	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
277	TV Land	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
278	TV Land	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
416	UKTV Play	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
298	USA	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
302	VH1	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
303	VH1	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
305	VICELAND	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
313	Vimeo	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
446	Virgin TV GO	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
308	Fandango at Home Free	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
330	Watch Food Network	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
331	Watch HGTV	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
332	Watch TCM	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
333	Watch Travel Channel	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/

id	name	type	Platform market power	References
315	WE tv	tve	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
398	Windows Store	purchase	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
345	YouTube	free	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/
450	Zee5	sub	Low	Digital TV Research. (2023). Global SVOD Forecasts. https://www.digitaltvresearch.com/

Appendix B: Streaming Platform Market Power Distribution



Figure 9 - Distribution of Market Power

Appendix C: Distribution of Language

The following table shows the ten most common languages in which the content was originally created.



Figure 10 - Distribution of Original Language of Content

Among this, as expected, the English language has a substantially higher amount of content, followed by Japanese and French.

Appendix D: Distribution of Type of Content

The following histogram depicts the distribution of the content type in our dataset.



Figure 11 - Distribution of Type of Content

Understandably, content types such as movies and TV series are highest in our dataset. Content type tv_movies are the movies that were created to be broadcast primarily on a television, unlike movies that are screened in a cinema.

Appendix E: Streaming Platform Distribution

The histogram below depicts the ten most occurring streaming platforms in our dataset.



Figure 12 - Distribution of Streaming Platforms

Appendix F: Distribution of Year of Content Release

We include the year of content release as one of our control variables, and its distribution was as follows.



Figure 13 - Distribution of Release Year of Content

Appendix G: Correlation Matrix

This section presents the correlation matrix for each variable. This analysis was performed before regression to check for any issues relating to collinearity.



Figure 14 - Correlation Matrix

Appendix H: Correlation Table

Table 8 - Correlation Table for Key Variables

	num_production_companies_log_std	platform_count_log_std	market_power_significance_Significant
num_production_companies_log_std	1.00	-0.02	0.14
platform_count_log_std	-0.02	1.00	0.12
market_power_significance_Significant	0.14	0.12	1.00

Appendix I: Variable Inflation Factor (VIF)

Table 9 - Variable Inflation Factor

Feature	VIF
const	263.240916
original_language_en	39.144513
original_language_ja	15.549152
original_language_fr	6.990476
original_language_es	4.124769
original_language_rare_language	3.877925
original_language_ta	3.745889
original_language_ko	3.326040
original_language_it	3.161450
original_language_de	3.065294
original_language_zh	2.859840
original_language_te	2.654575
original_language_sv	2.167378
original_language_da	1.935461
original_language_no	1.852939
original_language_ml	1.808151
market_power_significance_Significant	1.648514
original_language_tr	1.598640
num_production_companies_log_std	1.563644
original_language_ru	1.524652
platform_count_2_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.484485
platform_count_2	1.461840
num_production_companies_log_std_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.373167
original_language_th	1.366420
type_tv_series	1.349241
platform_count_7	1.314473
platform_count_7_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.310820
original_language_pl	1.297491

Feature	VIF
original_language_pt	1.297253
platform_count_3	1.274801
release_year_std	1.237574
type_tv_movie	1.237288
platform_count_3_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.237112
platform_count_8	1.231645
platform_count_5	1.223419
platform_count_6	1.217035
platform_count_5_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.216799
platform_count_8_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.213363
platform_count_6_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.207015
platform_count_4	1.176404
platform_count_4_x_market_power_significance_Significant	1.153130
type_tv_miniseries	1.127876
type_short_film	1.012153
type_tv_special	1.003526

Appendix J: Coefficient Table for Model 1

Table 10 - Coefficient Table for Model 1 (GNS)

Variable (SE)	**1A**	**1B**	**1C**	**1D**	**1E**	**1F**
num_production_companies_log_std (SE)	0.176*** (0.032)	0.144*** (0.030)	0.182*** (0.035)	0.127*** (0.025)	0.105*** (0.023)	0.147*** (0.029)
platform_count_log_std (SE)	0.107** (0.048)	0.081** (0.041)	0.102** (0.048)	0.086** (0.040)	0.050 (0.033)	0.061 (0.039)
market_power_significance_Significant (SE)	–	0.521*** (0.093)	0.592*** (0.088)	–	0.529*** (0.096)	0.585*** (0.094)
num_production_companies_log_std × market_power_significance_Significant (SE)	–	–	-0.214*** (0.043)	–	–	-0.201*** (0.039)
platform_count_log_std × market_power_significance_Significant (SE)	–	–	-0.140*** (0.052)	–	–	-0.072 (0.047)
original_language_pt (SE)	–	–	–	-0.696 (0.424)	-0.625 (0.417)	-0.642 (0.416)
original_language_rare_language (SE)	–	–	–	-0.651*** (0.179)	-0.622*** (0.172)	-0.614*** (0.176)
type_tv_series (SE)	–	–	–	-0.291*** (0.101)	-0.274*** (0.094)	-0.257*** (0.094)
type_tv_movie (SE)	–	–	–	-0.885*** (0.169)	-0.745*** (0.168)	-0.724*** (0.166)
type_tv_miniseries (SE)	–	–	–	-0.424*** (0.139)	-0.406*** (0.128)	-0.393*** (0.124)
type_short_film (SE)	–	–	–	0.775*** (0.176)	0.670*** (0.190)	0.637*** (0.199)
release_year_std (SE)	–	–	–	-0.053 (0.033)	-0.096*** (0.033)	-0.102*** (0.033)
original_language_zh (SE)	–	–	–	-0.162 (0.132)	-0.124 (0.129)	-0.123 (0.130)

Variable (SE)	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E	1F
original_language_tr (SE)	–	–	–	-0.665 (0.407)	-0.667* (0.401)	-0.671* (0.405)
original_language_th (SE)	–	–	–	-0.140 (0.231)	-0.092 (0.215)	-0.071 (0.223)
original_language_te (SE)	–	–	–	-0.456*** (0.089)	-0.414*** (0.094)	-0.367*** (0.097)
original_language_ta (SE)	–	–	–	-0.353*** (0.088)	-0.313*** (0.093)	-0.269*** (0.096)
original_language_sv (SE)	–	–	–	-1.008*** (0.196)	-1.006*** (0.197)	-1.019*** (0.197)
original_language_ru (SE)	–	–	–	-0.041 (0.225)	-0.054 (0.248)	-0.051 (0.249)
type_tv_special (SE)	–	–	–	0.721** (0.308)	0.481 (0.329)	0.442 (0.366)
original_language_es (SE)	–	–	–	-0.439 (0.342)	-0.466 (0.343)	-0.481 (0.354)
const (SE)	-0.000 (0.068)	-0.114 (0.079)	-0.110 (0.078)	0.317*** (0.079)	0.282*** (0.083)	0.274*** (0.083)
original_language_no (SE)	–	–	–	-0.001 (0.167)	-0.026 (0.157)	-0.034 (0.163)
original_language_ml (SE)	–	–	–	-0.253*** (0.089)	-0.209** (0.094)	-0.161* (0.097)
original_language_ko (SE)	–	–	–	-0.064 (0.160)	-0.145 (0.143)	-0.158 (0.146)
original_language_ja (SE)	–	–	–	0.218** (0.108)	0.232** (0.111)	0.205* (0.109)
original_language_it (SE)	–	–	–	-0.858*** (0.305)	-0.895*** (0.306)	-0.899*** (0.305)
original_language_fr (SE)	–	–	–	-0.683*** (0.137)	-0.660*** (0.129)	-0.671*** (0.130)
original_language_pl (SE)	–	–	–	-0.614*** (0.141)	-0.577*** (0.145)	-0.576*** (0.147)

Variable (SE)	**1A**	**1B**	**1C**	**1D**	**1E**	**1F**
original_language_en (SE)	–	–	–	-0.119 (0.082)	- 0.237*** (0.090)	-0.231** (0.091)
original_language_de (SE)	–	–	–	-0.345** (0.155)	- 0.393*** (0.145)	- 0.407*** (0.147)
original_language_da (SE)	–	–	–	-0.811*** (0.170)	- 0.809*** (0.161)	- 0.810*** (0.166)
R-squared (SE)	0.042	0.086	0.095	0.123	0.165	0.171
R-squared Adj. (SE)	0.041	0.086	0.095	0.121	0.163	0.169
N (SE)	11461	11461	11461	11461	11461	11461

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Standard errors (SE) are included in parentheses.
Dashes (-) indicate that a variable is not included in the model.
The Market Power variable is coded 1 = high, 0 = low.

Appendix K: Coefficient Table for Model 2 (RNS)

Table 11 - Coefficient Table for Model 2 (RNS)

Variable (SE)	**2A**	**2B**	**2C**	**2D**	**2E**	**2F**
num_production_companies_log_std (SE)	0.039 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.043)	0.007 (0.053)	0.002 (0.031)	-0.036* (0.021)	-0.031 (0.026)
platform_count_log_std (SE)	-0.042 (0.049)	-0.079* (0.040)	-0.101** (0.047)	-0.005 (0.042)	-0.055** (0.028)	-0.074** (0.031)
market_power_significance_Significant (SE)	–	0.731*** (0.144)	0.721*** (0.133)	–	0.708*** (0.145)	0.697*** (0.135)
num_production_companies_log_std × market_power_significance_Significant (SE)	–	–	-0.059 (0.059)	–	–	-0.018 (0.037)
platform_count_log_std × market_power_significance_Significant (SE)	–	–	0.124* (0.072)	–	–	0.101 (0.065)
original_language_ml (SE)	–	–	–	-1.100*** (0.108)	-1.055*** (0.124)	-1.050*** (0.125)
original_language_no (SE)	–	–	–	0.362 (0.236)	0.328 (0.246)	0.303 (0.235)
original_language_zh (SE)	–	–	–	0.520*** (0.202)	0.569*** (0.213)	0.562*** (0.211)
original_language_tr (SE)	–	–	–	0.978*** (0.292)	0.973*** (0.303)	0.980*** (0.301)
original_language_th (SE)	–	–	–	0.176 (0.163)	0.231 (0.182)	0.229 (0.180)
original_language_te (SE)	–	–	–	-1.518*** (0.107)	-1.476*** (0.123)	-1.472*** (0.124)
original_language_ta (SE)	–	–	–	-1.468*** (0.106)	-1.428*** (0.123)	-1.424*** (0.124)
original_language_sv (SE)	–	–	–	0.886*** (0.136)	0.894*** (0.151)	0.873*** (0.149)

Variable (SE)	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E	2F
original_language_ru (SE)	–	–	–	0.537*** (0.178)	0.521*** (0.192)	0.511*** (0.194)
original_language_rare_language (SE)	–	–	–	0.276 (0.266)	0.310 (0.275)	0.301 (0.274)
original_language_pt (SE)	–	–	–	0.501** (0.231)	0.596** (0.238)	0.590** (0.239)
original_language_pl (SE)	–	–	–	1.201*** (0.222)	1.251*** (0.235)	1.240*** (0.231)
release_year_std (SE)	–	–	–	0.003 (0.034)	-0.046 (0.030)	-0.050* (0.030)
original_language_ko (SE)	–	–	–	0.938*** (0.120)	0.828*** (0.092)	0.818*** (0.093)
original_language_ja (SE)	–	–	–	0.430** (0.202)	0.464** (0.209)	0.458** (0.209)
original_language_it (SE)	–	–	–	0.535*** (0.129)	0.494*** (0.143)	0.478*** (0.142)
original_language_fr (SE)	–	–	–	0.569*** (0.106)	0.604*** (0.128)	0.589*** (0.126)
original_language_es (SE)	–	–	–	0.712*** (0.140)	0.681*** (0.161)	0.667*** (0.163)
original_language_en (SE)	–	–	–	0.648*** (0.113)	0.507*** (0.123)	0.489*** (0.122)
original_language_de (SE)	–	–	–	0.641*** (0.147)	0.584*** (0.150)	0.566*** (0.150)
original_language_da (SE)	–	–	–	0.554*** (0.129)	0.560*** (0.134)	0.550*** (0.132)
const (SE)	0.000 (0.078)	-0.160** (0.073)	-0.161** (0.072)	- 0.587*** (0.101)	- 0.629*** (0.119)	- 0.615*** (0.119)
R-squared (SE)	0.003	0.091	0.094	0.091	0.168	0.169
R-squared Adj. (SE)	0.003	0.091	0.094	0.089	0.166	0.167
N (SE)	11461	11461	11461	11461	11461	11461

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Standard errors (SE) are included in parentheses.
Dashes (-) indicate that a variable is not included in the model.

Variable (SE)	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E	2F
The Market Power variable is coded 1 = high, 0 = low.						