In this paper, we analyze the impact of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) on shareholder litigation. In theory, ATPs could result in an increased propensity for litigation if they block the market for corporate control and leave aggrieved shareholders looking for an alternative for redress in the form of litigation, or in a decreased propensity for litigation if they directly block the ability to litigate. Our results indicate that the net effect of an index of ATPs on litigation is unclear. However, individual ATPs have an impact on litigation. Some that directly block specific avenues of litigation appear to reduce the probability of litigation, while others that do not do so increase the probability of litigation. Our results indicate that the overall lack of a relationship between an ATP index and litigation is driven by these two opposing forces. We conclude that the relationship between ATPs and takeovers and the concomitant effect on firm governance is not limited to a simple reduction in the probability of takeovers but is more complex, including litigation and possibly other aspects of corporate governance.