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Haphazard Reform: The Effects of Party Finance Regulations on Perceptions of Political Corruption and Confidence in Electoral Processes

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Haphazard Reform: The Effects of Party Finance Regulations on Perceptions of Political Corruption and Confidence in Electoral Processes

Campbell, Michael (2018) Haphazard Reform: The Effects of Party Finance Regulations on Perceptions of Political Corruption and Confidence in Electoral Processes. Masters thesis, Concordia University.

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Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to systematically analyze what causes variation in levels of perceived political corruption and confidence in electoral processes across countries, to better understand how the functionality of democracy can be improved. A quantitative analysis of 35 parliamentary and semi-presidential countries considers the potential effects of three mainstream explanations: the economic status of citizens; the education level of citizens; and the electoral systems under which a country operates. A fourth and original explanation for variation is also examined: party finance regulations. Arguably, these regulations can incentivize parties to participate in corrupt acts, which might have far-reaching consequences. This concerns the need for money in modern democratic elections, as well as the desire of political parties to win office. This thesis treats perceptions of political corruption and confidence in electoral processes as dependent variables, while the four explanations are treated as independent variables. Compiling data from multiple relevant sources, an entirely original dataset has been created for this project. I conclude that socio-economic development is among the most important determinants for variation, while installing a system of direct public funding alongside bans that purge all special interest money from the political sphere is the most advantageous party finance regulatory strategy.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Political Science
Item Type:Thesis (Masters)
Authors:Campbell, Michael
Institution:Concordia University
Degree Name:M.A.
Program:Political Science
Date:2018
Thesis Supervisor(s):Kanji, Mebs and Poteete, Amy
ID Code:983783
Deposited By: MICHAEL CAMPBELL
Deposited On:11 Jun 2018 01:50
Last Modified:11 Jun 2018 01:50
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