Login | Register

Shareholder Litigation and Anti-Takeover Provisions

Title:

Shareholder Litigation and Anti-Takeover Provisions

BERBERIAN, GARABED (2021) Shareholder Litigation and Anti-Takeover Provisions. Masters thesis, Concordia University.

[thumbnail of Berberian_MSc_F2021.pdf]
Text (application/pdf)
Berberian_MSc_F2021.pdf - Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 31 December 2022.
1MB

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the impact of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) on shareholder litigation. In theory, ATPs could result in an increased propensity for litigation if they block the market for corporate control and leave aggrieved shareholders looking for an alternative for redress in the form of litigation, or in a decreased propensity for litigation if they directly block the ability to litigate. Our results indicate that the net effect of an index of ATPs on litigation is unclear. However, individual ATPs have an impact on litigation. Some that directly block specific avenues of litigation appear to reduce the probability of litigation, while others that do not do so increase the probability of litigation. Our results indicate that the overall lack of a relationship between an ATP index and litigation is driven by these two opposing forces. We conclude that the relationship between ATPs and takeovers and the concomitant effect on firm governance is not limited to a simple reduction in the probability of takeovers but is more complex, including litigation and possibly other aspects of corporate governance.

Divisions:Concordia University > John Molson School of Business > Finance
Item Type:Thesis (Masters)
Authors:BERBERIAN, GARABED
Institution:Concordia University
Degree Name:M. Sc.
Program:Finance
Date:25 May 2021
Thesis Supervisor(s):Basu, Nilanjan
ID Code:988615
Deposited By: Garabed Berberian
Deposited On:29 Nov 2021 16:28
Last Modified:29 Nov 2021 16:28

References:

Aharony, J., Liu, C., & Yawson, A. (2015). Corporate litigation and executive turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 34, 268-292.


Barabanov, S. S., Ozocak, O., Turtle, H. J., & Walker, T. J. (2008). Institutional investors and shareholder litigation. Financial Management, 37(2), 227-250.


Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2008). What matters in corporate governance?.The Review of financial studies, 22(2), 783-827.


Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of corporate finance, 14(3), 257-273.


Coates IV, J. C. (2000). Takeover defenses in the shadow of the pill: A critique of the scientific evidence. Tex. L. Rev., 79, 271.


Core, J. E. (1997). On the corporate demand for directors' and officers' insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 63-87.


Core, J. E. (2000). The directors' and officers' insurance premium: An outside assessment of the quality of corporate governance. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16(2), 449-477.


Daines, R., & Klausner, M. (2001). Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 17(1), 83-120.


Eckbo, B. E. (1990). Valuation effects of greenmail prohibitions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 491-505.


Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The quarterly journal of economics, 118(1), 107-156.


Karpoff, J. M., Schonlau, R. J., & Wehrly, E. W. (2020). Which antitakeover provisions matter?. Available at SSRN 3142195.


Kim, I., & Skinner, D. J. (2012). Measuring securities litigation risk. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(1-2), 290-310.


Kole, S. R. (1996). Managerial ownership and firm performance: incentives or rewards? Advances in financial economics, 2.

Lambert, R. A., & Larcker, D. F. (1985). Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 179-203.

Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Greenmail, white knights, and shareholders' interest. The Rand Journal of Economics, 293-309.


McTier, B. C., & Wald, J. K. (2011). The causes and consequences of securities class action litigation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(3), 649-665.


Peng, L., & Röell, A. (2008). Executive pay and shareholder litigation. Review of Finance, 12(1), 141-184.


Straska, M., & Waller, H. G. (2014). Antitakeover provisions and shareholder wealth: A survey of the literature. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 933-956.
All items in Spectrum are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved. The use of items is governed by Spectrum's terms of access.

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Downloads per month over past year

Research related to the current document (at the CORE website)
- Research related to the current document (at the CORE website)
Back to top Back to top