Layouni, Mohamed, Hooman, Jozef and Tahar, Sofiène (2007) Formal Specification and Verification of the Intrusion-Tolerant Enclaves Protocol. International Journal of Network Security, 5 (3). pp. 288-298. ISSN 1816-3548
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Abstract
We demonstrate the application of formal methods to the verification of intrusion-tolerant agreement protocols that have a distributed leadership and can tolerate Byzantine faults. As an interesting case study, the Enclaves group-membership protocol has been verified using two techniques: model checking and theorem proving. We use the model checker Murphi to prove the correctness of authentication, and the interactive theorem prover PVS to formally specify and verify Byzantine agreement, termination of agreement, and integrity.
| Divisions: | Concordia University > Gina Cody School of Engineering and Computer Science > Electrical and Computer Engineering |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Article |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Authors: | Layouni, Mohamed and Hooman, Jozef and Tahar, Sofiène |
| Journal or Publication: | International Journal of Network Security |
| Date: | 1 November 2007 |
| ID Code: | 977374 |
| Deposited By: | Danielle Dennie |
| Deposited On: | 14 Jun 2013 15:05 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Jan 2018 17:44 |
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