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Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity


Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity

Nieswandt, Katharina (2016) Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity. The Journal of Value Inquiry . ISSN 0022-5363

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Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity_J Value Inquiry_HOMEPAGE Version 2016-05-02.pdf

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9562-9


Anscombe is usually seen as a critic of “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I attempt a systematic reconstruction and a defense of Anscombe’s positive theory. Anscombe’s metaethics is a hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian naturalism. Her three main claims are the following: (1) We cannot trace all duties back to one moral principle; there is more than one source of normativity. (2) Whether I have a certain duty will often be determined by the social practices of my community. For instance, duties imposed by other people’s rights are socially constructed. (3) Whether something constitutes a good, however, will often be determined by human nature—which is not socially constructed.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy
Item Type:Article
Authors:Nieswandt, Katharina
Journal or Publication:The Journal of Value Inquiry
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):10.1007/s10790-016-9562-9
ID Code:982120
Deposited On:18 Jan 2017 17:47
Last Modified:18 Jan 2018 17:54
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