Abstract

Between 1979 and 1982 the US supported the Khmer Rouge in the refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border, in the Security Council of the United Nations, and in behind-closed-doors discussions seeking to ensure a place for the Khmer Rouge (as an armed force) in a coalition government. The US supported the Khmer Rouge as a result of a confluence of strategic, trade, and oil interests in and around the South China Sea. In sharp contrast to the diplomatic, financial, and political support the US gave the Khmer Rouge between 1979 and 1982, Washington had made remarkable and promising strides towards providing aid, and establishing trade and diplomatic relations with Vietnam between 1975 and 1978. During this time, a constellation of pro-Vietnam American business interests, Christian and Jewish-based organizations, and peace advocates backed liberal Congressional proponents of US-Vietnamese rapprochement. Success appeared imminent on two important occasions between 1975 and 1978, but prospects for US-Vietnamese rapprochement were quashed by January 1979 when Vietnamese forced invaded and occupied Cambodia, and the US normalized relations with China. Washington had before it two compelling geopolitical poles--Peking and Hanoi. In choosing Peking, Washington sidelined Peking's enemy, Hanoi, and to this end, supported Hanoi's other enemy, the Khmer Rouge.