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Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peirceian Abduction: Toward a Relation Between Method, Sense and Nature

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Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peirceian Abduction: Toward a Relation Between Method, Sense and Nature

Morris, David (2005) Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peirceian Abduction: Toward a Relation Between Method, Sense and Nature. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 43 (2). pp. 267-298. ISSN 0038-4283

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Abstract

Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and Peirceian abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. Each method implies a correspondingly different view of the generation of the variations from which knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a distinction between extensive, intensive, and abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link between philosophical method and the generation of variation is used to illuminate different philosophical conceptions of nature and nature’s relation to meaning and sense.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy
Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Authors:Morris, David
Journal or Publication:The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Date:2005
ID Code:6461
Deposited By: David Morris
Deposited On:03 Dec 2009 21:50
Last Modified:18 Jan 2018 17:28
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