Abstract

Similar tendencies in the work of philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida appear in their thoughts on language and lead to similarities in their respective ethical thought. Their views are such that the way in which they conceive the operation of meaning lead to a stance that rejects the possibility of total knowledge or command of concepts, and therefore refuses the idea of a "correct" account of meaning, morality, history, knowledge, and so on. This thesis is an attempt to identify and elaborate the overlap between Wittgenstein and Derrida's work in light of the role that proper names play in their philosophies of language and ethics. The philosophical account of proper names is important because it clarifies the view of subjectivity and also serves as a model for understanding the general operation of language. The fact that we are revealed to be inextricably dependent on the "otherness" of other people in order for each of us to be "selves" implies we are indebted to others and therefore must initiate any ethical project based on that indebtedness. Furthermore, the instability of language insures that we cannot have the "correct" interpretation of all concepts and must therefore maintain a certain charity in our dialogical engagement with others. This thesis argues in favour of the ethical stance that results from Wittgenstein and Derrida's perspectives