Abstract

According to Bernard Lonergan being is connatural with intelligibility; the universe is ultimately systematic and intelligible right down to the smallest detail. But what does this mean for freedom, and what does this mean for moral responsibility? In this thesis we will examine the grounds of moral responsibility in Lonergan's early works on Thomas Aquinas' theory of operative grace. This issue is of fundamental importance to ethics, as it will determine the nature of our ability to act morally, and our limitations. Therefore through this thesis we will see that Lonergan's early works on operative grace are also of fundamental importance to ethics. We will begin with the Pelagian controversy, where the question first emerged. Then we will examine Lonergan's philosophical and methodological assumptions as he began his "apprenticeship" to Aquinas. And finally, we will examine the actual content of Lonergan's presentation. What will become evident is that this is a complex question; in fact, it pushes human reason to its limits. Ultimately, it may only be able to be resolved by taking a stand on the nature of the universe, a stand similar to the one in physics, in which one accepts the worldview of classical or quantum physics.