Abstract

We study the leader election in the presence of selfish nodes for intrusion detection systems (IDS) in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET). To balance the resource consumption among all nodes and prolong the lifetime of a MANET, nodes with the most remaining resources should be elected as the leaders. However, without incentives for serving others, a node may behave selfishly by lying about its remaining resource and avoiding being elected. We present a solution based on mechanism design theory. More specifically, we design a scheme for electing cluster leaders that have the following two advantages: First, the collection of elected leaders is the optimal in the sense that the overall resource consumption will be balanced among all nodes in the network overtime. Second, the scheme provides the leaders with incentives in the form of reputation so that nodes are encouraged to honestly participate in the election process. The design of such incentives is based on the Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG) model by which truth-telling is the dominant strategy for each node. Simulation results show that our scheme can effectively prolong the overall lifetime of IDS in MANET and balance the resource consumptions among all the nodes.