Abstract

In his work The Law of Peoples , John Rawls is commonly criticized by his cosmopolitan opponents for leaving out an international difference principle. Much concern has been voiced in regards to Rawls's rejection of a global principle of distributive justice despite his argumentation for a distributive principle in his domestic theory. Instead, the only principle that bears any resemblance to an international difference principle and relates directly to economic redistribution between peoples is what Rawls calls a duty of assistance. In this Thesis, I will argue that many critiques of Rawls are not sufficiently charitable toward Rawls's international duty of assistance and do not fully appreciate the potential demands that this duty, if actualized, may require. I argue that once one evaluates the demands that the duty of assistance places upon members in Rawls's Society of Peoples , one can reasonably conclude that the duty of assistance is robust and furthermore reasonably sufficient. Given that the cut-off point of the duty of assistance demands that members in the Society of Peoples must aid a burdened people until (a) the basic needs of the individuals within the burdened society are met; and (b) the once burdened people can be considered a reasonably well-ordered and equal standing member in the Society of Peoples that is politically autonomous, self-sufficient, and self-determining, I will argue that the duty of assistance is a demand that is not to be underestimated and has the potential to be both robust and sufficient.