Nieswandt, Katharina (2016) Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity. The Journal of Value Inquiry . ISSN 0022-5363
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9562-9
Abstract
Anscombe is usually seen as a critic of “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I attempt a systematic reconstruction and a defense of Anscombe’s positive theory. Anscombe’s metaethics is a hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian naturalism. Her three main claims are the following: (1) We cannot trace all duties back to one moral principle; there is more than one source of normativity. (2) Whether I have a certain duty will often be determined by the social practices of my community. For instance, duties imposed by other people’s rights are socially constructed. (3) Whether something constitutes a good, however, will often be determined by human nature—which is not socially constructed.
| Divisions: | Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy | 
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Article | 
| Refereed: | Yes | 
| Authors: | Nieswandt, Katharina | 
| Journal or Publication: | The Journal of Value Inquiry | 
| Date: | 2016 | 
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | 10.1007/s10790-016-9562-9 | 
| ID Code: | 982120 | 
| Deposited By: | KATHARINA NIESWANDT | 
| Deposited On: | 18 Jan 2017 17:47 | 
| Last Modified: | 18 Jan 2018 17:54 | 
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