Hlobil, Ulf (2015) Anti-Normativism Evaluated. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 23 (3). pp. 376-395.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2015.1042398
Abstract
I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false.
| Divisions: | Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Article |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Authors: | Hlobil, Ulf |
| Journal or Publication: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies |
| Date: | 15 June 2015 |
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | 10.1080/09672559.2015.1042398 |
| Keywords: | meaning, content, normativity, normativism, theory of content, semantics |
| ID Code: | 983496 |
| Deposited By: | ULF HLOBIL |
| Deposited On: | 08 Feb 2018 14:51 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2018 14:51 |
| Related URLs: |
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