Robillard, Chantale 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2346-8103
(2018)
Network and System Management using IEC 62351-7 in IEC 61850 Substations: Design and Implementation.
Masters thesis, Concordia University.
![[thumbnail of Robillard_MASc_Spring2019.pdf]](https://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text (application/pdf)
2MBRobillard_MASc_Spring2019.pdf - Accepted Version Available under License Spectrum Terms of Access. |
Abstract
Substations are a prime target for threat agents aiming to disrupt the power grid’s operation. With the advent of the smart grid, the power infrastructure is increasingly being coupled with an Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) infrastructure needed to manage it, exposing it to potential cyberattacks. In order to secure the smart grid, the IEC 62351 specifies how to provide cybersecurity to such an environment. Among its specifications, IEC 62351-7 states to use Network and System Management (NSM) to monitor and manage the operation of power systems. In this research, we aim to design, implement, and study NSM in a digital substation as per the specifications of IEC 62351-7. The substation is one that conforms to the IEC 61850 standard, which defines how to design a substation leveraging ICT. Our contributions are as follows. We contribute to the design and implementation of NSM in a smart grid security co-simulation testbed. We design a methodology to elaborate cyberattacks targeting IEC 61850 substations specifically. We elaborate detection algorithms that leverage the NSM Data Objects (NSM DOs) of IEC 62351- 7 to detect the attacks designed using our method. We validate these experimentally using our testbed. From this work, we can provide an initial assessment of NSM within the context of digital substations.
| Divisions: | Concordia University > Gina Cody School of Engineering and Computer Science > Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
| Authors: | Robillard, Chantale |
| Institution: | Concordia University |
| Degree Name: | M.A. Sc. |
| Program: | Information Systems Security |
| Date: | December 2018 |
| Thesis Supervisor(s): | Debbabi, Mourad and Hanna, Aiman |
| Keywords: | Cybersecurity, power systems, substations, IEC 61850, IEC 62351, network and system management, security monitoring |
| ID Code: | 984880 |
| Deposited By: | CHANTALE ROBILLARD |
| Deposited On: | 08 Jul 2019 12:50 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Jul 2019 00:00 |
References:
[1] F. Cleveland, “IEC 62351 security standards for the power system information infrastructure”, IEC, 2012.[2] (2017). NERC, [Online]. Available: https://www.nerc.com/Pages/default.aspx.
[3] S.W. Blume, Electric Power Systems Basics for the Nonelectrical Professional. Piscataway: IEEE Press, 2007.
[4] IEC 61850-1, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 1: Introduction and overview”, 2013.
[5] A. R. Metke and R. L. Ekl, “Smart grid security technology”, in 2010 Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 2010, pp. 1–7. DOI: 10.1109/ISGT.2010.5434760.
[6] T. Jansen, “Technical considerations for building secure substation automation systems”, Electra, D2/B3/C2.01 Joint Working Group Report, Nov. 29, 2006.
[7] IEC 62351-1, “Communication network and system security - introduction to security issues”, 2007.
[8] IEC/TS 62351-7, “Power systems management and associated information exchange - data and communications security - part 7: Network and system management (NSM) data object models”, 2017.
[9] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography. 1996. 137
[10] (Apr. 15, 2014). Fingerprint lock in Samsung Galaxy 5 easily defeated by whitehat hackers,
[Online]. Available: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/04/fingerprint-lock-in-samsung-galaxy-5-easily-defeatedby-whitehat-hackers/.
[11] E. Barker and Q. Dang, “NIST special publication 800-57 part 3 revision 1”, NIST.
[12] (Mar. 2, 2015). Denial of service, [Online]. Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Denial_of_Service.
[13] (Nov. 28, 2016). DDoS attack types: The 12 types of DDoS attacks used by hackers, [Online]. Available: https://www.rivalhost.com/12-types-of-ddos-attacks-used-by-hackers.
[14] D. Ince, Degradation of service attack. [Online]. Available: http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571444.001.0001/acref-9780199571444-e-858.
[15] S. E. Collier, “Ten steps to a smarter grid”, in 2009 IEEE Rural Electric Power Conference, 2009, B2–B2–7. DOI: 10.1109/REPCON.2009.4919420.
[16] (Jun. 13, 2017). CrashOverride - analysis of the threat to electric grid operations, [Online]. Available: https://www.dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf.
[17] N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien, “W32. stuxnet dossier”, White paper, Symantec Corp., Security Response, vol. 5, no. 6, 2011.
[18] (Feb. 25, 2016). Cyber-attack against Ukrainian critical infrastructure, [Online]. Available: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01.
[19] (Jul. 12, 2017). CrashOverride malware, [Online]. Available: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A.
[20] IEC 61850-5, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 5: Communication requirements for functions and device models”, 2013.
[21] Z. Zhang, X. Huang, et al., “Modeling and simulation of data flow for VLAN-based communicationin substations”, IEEE Systems Journal, vol. PP, pp. 1–12, 99 2015.
[22] IEC/TR 61850-90-4, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 90-4: Network engineering guidelines”, 2013.
[23] IEC 61850-7-1, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 7-1: Basic communication structure - principles and models”, 2011.
[24] IEC 61850-7-2, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 7-2: Basic information and communication structure - abstract communication service interface (ACSI)”, 2010.
[25] IEC 61850-7-4, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 7-4: Basic communication structure - compatible logical node classes and data object classes”, 2010.
[26] IEC 61850-9-2, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 9-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) - sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3”, 2011.
[27] IEC/TS 61850-8-1, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 8-1: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) - mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC 8802-3”, 2011.
[28] IEC/TS 62351-6, “Power systems management and associated information exchange - data and communications security - part 6: Security for IEC 61850”, 2007.
[29] (Nov. 18, 2016). What does time synchronisation mean for Sampled Values?, [Online]. Available: https://ideology.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/AP/pages/50069508/What+does+time+synchronisation+mean+for+Sampled+Values.
[30] ISO, “ISO 9506-1:2003”, ISO, Aug. 2003.
[31] SISCO, “Overview and introduction to the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS - revision 2)”, SISCO, 1995.
[32] J. T. Sørensen and M. G. Jaatun, “An analysis of the Manufacturing Messaging Specification protocol”, in Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing, F. E. Sandnes, Y. Zhang, et al., Eds., Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 602–615, ISBN: 978-3-540-69293-5.
[33] R. L. O’Fallon, D. A. Klas, et al., “IEC 61850 MMS SCADA network optimization forIEDs”, in DistribuTECH Conference, February 2011, Feb. 2011.
[34] D. R. Mauro and K. J. Schmidt, Essential SNMP, Second Edition. O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2005, ISBN: 0596008406.
[35] W. Stallings, “SNMP and SNMPv2: The infrastructure for network management”, IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 37–43, 1998, ISSN: 0163-6804. DOI: 10.1109/35.663326.
[36] (2018). Object identifier (OID) repository, [Online]. Available: http://oid-info.com/index.htm.
[37] M. Stump, Securing SNMP: A look at Net-SNMP (SNMPv3), 2003.
[38] (Aug. 2012). SNMP reflected amplification DDoS attack mitigation, [Online]. Available: https://www.bitag.org/documents/SNMP-Reflected-Amplification-DDoS-Attack-Mitigation.pdf.
[39] N. Lawrence and P. Traynor, “Under new management: Practical attacks on SNMPv3”, in Presented as part of the 6th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, Bellevue, WA:USENIX, 2012. [Online]. Available: https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot12/workshop-program/presentation/Lawrence.
[40] IEC 62351-3, “Power systems management and associated information exchange - data and communications security - part 3: Communication network and system security - profiles including TCP/IP”, 2014.
[41] IEC/TS 62351-4, “Power systems management and associated information exchange - data and communications security - part 4: Profiles including MMS”, 2007.
[42] M. Strobel, N. Wiedermann, and C. Eckert, “Novel weaknesses in IEC 62351 protected smart grid control systems”, in 2016 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), pp. 266–270.
[43] S. Fuloria, R. Anderson, et al., “The protection of substation communications”, Cambridge University, 2010.
[44] F. Hohlbaum, M. Braendle, and F. Alvarez, “Cyber security: Practical considerations for implementing IEC 62351”, ABB, 2009.
[45] IEC/TS 62351-7, “Power systems management and associated information exchange - data and communications security - part 7: Network and system management (NSM) data object models”, 2010.
[46] (2017). IEC TS 62351-7:2010 — IEC Webstore — cyber security, smart city, [Online]. Available: https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/6910.
[47] (2017). IEC TS 62351-7:2017 — IEC Webstore — cyber security, smart city, [Online]. Available: https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/30593.
[48] E. R. Raghunarayan, “Management information base for the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)”, The Internet Society, Mar. 2005.
[49] M. Mathis and J. Heffner, “TCP extended statistics MIB”, The IETF Trust, May 2007.
[50] W. Hardaker, “Transport Layer Security (TLS) transport model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)”, IETF, Aug. 2010.
[51] B. Fenner and J. Flick, “Management information base for the User Datagram Protocol (UDP)”, The Internet Society, Jun. 2005.
[52] B. Haberman, “IP forwarding table MIB”, The Internet Society, Apr. 2006.
[53] E. S. Routhier, “Management information base for the Internet Protocol (IP)”, The Internet Society, Apr. 2006.
[54] D. McWalter, D. Thaler, and A. Kessler, “IP multicast MIB”, The IETF Trust, Dec. 2007.
[55] NESCOR, “Electric sector failure scenarios and impact analyses - version 3.0”, EPRI, 2015.
[56] ——, “Analysis of selected electric sector high risk failure scenarios”, EPRI, 2015.
[57] M. T. A. Rashid, S. Yussof, et al., “A review of security attacks on IEC61850 substation automation system network”, in 2014 International Conference on Information Technology and Multimedia (ICIMU), 2014.
[58] J. Wright and S. Wolthusen, “Access control and availability vulnerabilities in the ISO/IEC 61850 substation automation protocol”, in Critical Information Infrastructures Security. Nov. 2017, p. 239.
[59] B. Kang, P. Maynard, et al., “Investigating cyber-physical attacks against IEC 61850 photovoltaic inverter installations”, in 2015 IEEE 20th Conference on Emerging Technologies Factory Automation (ETFA), 2015, pp. 1–8.
[60] A. Valdes, C. Hang, et al., “Design and simulation of fast substation protection in IEC 61850 environments”, in 2015 Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (MSCPES), 2015, pp. 1–6.
[61] J. Hoyos, M. Dehus, and T. X. Brown, “Exploiting the GOOSE protocol: A practical attack on cyber-infrastructure”, in 2012 IEEE Globecom Workshops, 2012, pp. 1508–1513.
[62] N. Kush, E. Ahmed, et al., “Poisoned GOOSE: Exploiting the GOOSE protocol”, in Proceedings of the Twelfth Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2014), Auckland, New Zealand, 2014.
[63] O. Khaled, A. Marin, et al., “Analysis of secure TCP/IP profile in 61850 based substation automation system for smart grids”, Int. J. Distrib. Sen. Netw., vol. 2016, Apr. 2016, ISSN: 1550-1329. DOI: 10.1155/2016/5793183.
[64] J. G. Wright and S. D. Wolthusen, “Limitations of IEC62351-3’s public key management”, in 2016 IEEE 24th International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), 2016.
[65] M. M. R. Chowdhury, H. Raddatz, and J. E. Y. Rosseb, “Challenges when securing manufacturing message service in legacy industrial control systems”, in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Emerging Technology and Factory Automation (ETFA), 2014, pp. 1–6. DOI: 10.1109/ETFA.2014.7005355.
[66] S. Fries, H. J. Hof, and M. Seewald, “Enhancing IEC 62351 to improve security for energy automation in smart grid environments”, in 2010 Fifth International Conference on Internet and Web Applications and Services (ICIW), 2010, pp. 135–142.
[67] K. C. Ruland and J. Sassmannshausen, “Non-repudiation services for the MMS protocol of IEC 61850”, in Security Standardisation Research: Second International Conference, SSR 2015, Tokyo, Japan, December 15-16, 2015, Proceedings, L. Chen and S. Matsuo, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015, pp. 70–85.
[68] P.Weerathunga, “Security aspects of smart grid communication”,Western University, 2012.
[69] R. Schlegel, S. Obermeier, and J. Schneider, “Assessing the security of IEC 62351”, in Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015, 2015.
[70] M. El Hariri, T. A. Youssef, and O. A. Mohammed, “On the implementation of the IEC 61850 standard: Will different manufacturer devices behave similarly under identical conditions?”, Electronics, vol. 5, no. 4, 2016.
[71] (May 9, 2018). Fuzzing, [Online]. Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Fuzzing.
[72] (2017). State of fuzzing 2017, [Online]. Available: https://www.synopsys.com/content/dam/synopsys/sig-assets/reports/state-of-fuzzing-2017.pdf.
[73] Y. Yang, H. T. Jiang, et al., “Cybersecurity test-bed for IEC 61850 based smart substations”, in 2015 IEEE Power Energy Society General Meeting, 2015, pp. 1–5. DOI: 10.1109/PESGM.2015.7286357.
[74] R. Amoah, S. Suriadi, et al., “Security analysis of the non-aggressive challenge response of the DNP3 protocol using a CPN model”, in 2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2014, pp. 827–833.
[75] IEC/TS 62351-5, “Power systems management and associated information exchange - data and communications security - part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives”, 2013.
[76] R. Amoah, S. Camtepe, and E. Foo, “Formal modelling and analysis of DNP3 secure authentication”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 2016.
[77] C. J. F. Cremers, M. Dehnel-Wild, and K. Milner, “Secure authentication in the grid: A formal analysis of DNP3: SAv5”, in ESORICS, 2017.
[78] A. Hall, “Realising the benefits of formal methods”, in Formal Methods and Software Engineering, K.-K. Lau and R. Banach, Eds., Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 1–4, ISBN: 978-3-540-32250-4.
[79] J. L. P. de Sa and R. Cartaxo, “Implementing substations automatic control functions designed with Petri Nets on IEC 61850”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 1119–1127, 2011, ISSN: 0885-8977. DOI: 10.1109/TPWRD.2010.2090952.
[80] G. Kunz, J. Machado, et al., “A formal methodology for accomplishing IEC 61850 realtime communication requirements”, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 6582–6590, 2017, ISSN: 0278-0046. DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2017.2682042.
[81] L. Obregon, “Infrastructure security architecture for effective security monitoring”, SANS Institute, Dec. 2, 2015.
[82] R. King, “Network system management: Implementations and applications of the IEC 62351-7 standard”, EPRI, Technical Update.
[83] Y. Kwon, M.-S. Kim, et al., “Network and system management object modeling for smart grid infrastructure”, in Network Operations and Management Symposium (APNOMS), 2015 17th Asia-Pacific, 2015.
[84] C.-H. Kim, M.-S. Choi, et al., “Security data extraction from IEC 61850 ACSI models for network and system management”, in WISA 2011 International Workshop on Information Security Applications, 2011.
[85] S. Ju, Y. Lim, et al., “Anomaly detection mechanism based on common NSM data objects for advanced metering infrastructure”, Advances in Computer Science : an International Journal, 2014.
[86] K. Choi, X. Chen, et al., “Intrusion detection of NSM based DoS attacks using data mining in smart grid”, Energies, 2012.
[87] IEC/TR 61850-90-5, “Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - part 90-5: Use of IEC 61850 to transmit synchrophasor information according to IEEE C37.118”, 2012.
[88] (2018). SteelCentral Riverbed Modeler, [Online]. Available: https://www.riverbed.com/products/steelcentral/steelcentral-riverbed-modeler.html.
[89] I. Ali, M. S. Thomas, et al., “IEC 61850 substation communication network architecture for efficient energy system automation”, Energy Technology & Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 82–91, 2015. DOI: 10.1080/23317000.2015.1043475.
[90] M. Golshani, G. A. Taylor, and I. Pisica, “Simulation of power system substation communications architecture based on IEC 61850 standard”, in 2014 49th International Universities Power Engineering Conference (UPEC), 2014, pp. 1–6. DOI: 10.1109/UPEC.2014.6934745.
[91] (2018). OMNeT++ discrete event simulatior - home, [Online]. Available: https://www.omnetpp.org/.
[92] A. Hahn, A. Ashok, et al., “Cyber-physical security testbeds: Architecture, application, and evaluation for smart grid”, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 847–855, 2013, ISSN: 1949-3053.
[93] (2018). PowerFactory, [Online]. Available: https://www.digsilent.de/en/powerfactory.html.
[94] (2018). REAL TIME POWER SYSTEM SIMULATION, [Online]. Available: https://www.rtds.com/real-time-power-system-simulation/.
[95] (2018). Simulator overview, [Online]. Available: https://www.powerworld.com/products/simulator/overview.
[96] T. B. Lo, M. F. Mendes, et al., “Cloud IEC 61850: Architecture and integration of electrical automation systems”, in 2014 Brazilian Symposium on Computing Systems Engineering, 2014, pp. 13–18. DOI: 10.1109/SBESC.2014.30.
[97] R. Wjtowicz, R. Kowalik, and D. D. Rasolomampionona, “Next generation of power system protection automation - virtualization of protection systems”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 2002–2010, 2018, ISSN: 0885-8977. DOI: 10.1109/TPWRD.2017.2786339.
[98] J. Yu, H. Lee, et al., “Traffic flooding attack detection with SNMP MIB using SVM”, Computer Communications, vol. 31, no. 17, pp. 4212 –4219, 2008, ISSN: 0140-3664. DOI: 10.1016/j.comcom.2008.09.018.
[99] J. Yu, H. Kang, et al., “An in-depth analysis on traffic flooding attacks detection and system using data mining techniques”, Journal of Systems Architecture, vol. 59, no. 10, Part B, pp. 1005 –1012, 2013, Advanced Smart Vehicular Communication System and Applications, ISSN: 1383-7621. DOI: 10.1016/j.sysarc.2013.08.008.
[100] P. M. Priya, V. Akilandeswari, et al., “The Protocol Independent Detection and Classification (PIDC) system for DRDoS attack”, in 2014 International Conference on Recent Trends in Information Technology, 2014, pp. 1–7. DOI: 10.1109/ICRTIT.2014.6996154.
[101] W. Cerroni, G. Moro, et al., “Decentralized detection of network attacks through P2P data clustering of SNMP data”, Computers & Security, vol. 52, pp. 1 –16, 2015, ISSN: 0167-4048. DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2015.03.006.
[102] K. McLaughlin, “Contract no 608224 deliverable D4.1 high-level design documentation and deployment architecture for multi-attribute SCADA intrusion detection system”, 2015.
[103] Y. Yang, H. Q. Xu, et al., “Multidimensional intrusion detection system for IEC 61850-based SCADA networks”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 1068–1078, 2017, ISSN: 0885-8977. DOI: 10.1109/TPWRD.2016.2603339.
[104] U. K. Premaratne, J. Samarabandu, et al., “An intrusion detection system for IEC61850 automated substations”, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 2010.
[105] J. Hong, C.-C. Liu, and M. Govindarasu, “Integrated anomaly detection for cyber security of the substations”, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1643–1653, 2014.
[106] H. Yoo and T. Shon, “Novel approach for detecting network anomalies for substation automation based on IEC 61850”, Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 303–318, 2015, ISSN: 1573-7721. DOI: 10.1007/s11042-014-1870-0.
[107] C. Feng, T. Li, and D. Chana, “Multi-level anomaly detection in industrial control systems via package signatures and LSTM networks”, in 2017 47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), 2017, pp. 261–272. DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2017.34.
[108] N. Mohan, K. P. Soman, and R. Vinayakumar, “Deep power: Deep learning architectures for power quality disturbances classification”, in 2017 International Conference on Technological Advancements in Power and Energy (TAP Energy), 2017, pp. 1–6. DOI: 10.1109/TAPENERGY.2017.8397249.
[109] (2018). Weka 3: Data mining software in Java, [Online]. Available: https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/.
[110] (2018). Snort, [Online]. Available: https://www.snort.org/.
[111] (Aug. 8, 2018). TensorFlow, [Online]. Available: https://www.tensorflow.org/.
[112] (Jul. 23, 2018). Keras documentation, [Online]. Available: https://keras.io/.
[113] (2018). HYPERSIM, [Online]. Available: https://www.opal-rt.com/systemshypersim/.
[114] (May 26, 2011). Net-SNMP tutorial – MIB module, [Online]. Available: http://netsnmp.sourceforge.net/tutorial/tutorial-5/toolkit/mib_module/index.html.
[115] (2018). Python, [Online]. Available: https://www.python.org/.
[116] (Dec. 15, 2017). GNU Bash, [Online]. Available: https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/.
[117] (2018). SQLite, [Online]. Available: https://www.sqlite.org/index.html.
[118] (2017). SNMP library for Python, [Online]. Available: http://pysnmp.sourceforge.net/.
[119] (2018). Elasticsearch, [Online]. Available: https://www.elastic.co/products/elasticsearch.
[120] (Jan. 15, 2004). SNMPTRAPD, [Online]. Available: http://net-snmp.sourceforge.net/docs/man/snmptrapd.html.
[121] (2018). Kibana, [Online]. Available: https://www.elastic.co/products/kibana.
[122] (Oct. 10, 2006). SNMP: Frequently asked questions about MIBs, [Online]. Available: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ip/simple-networkmanagement-protocol-snmp/9226-mibs-9226.html#q20b.
[123] (2017). OWASP top 10 - 2017, [Online]. Available: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf.
[124] W. M. Eddy, “SYN flood attack”, in Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, H. C. A. van Tilborg and S. Jajodia, Eds. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011, pp. 1273–1274, ISBN:978-1-4419-5906-5. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_276.
[125] R. Shirey, “RFC 2828: Internet security glossary”, The Internet Society, May 2000.
[126] (Mar. 17, 2017). Vulnerability note VU#867968 - Microsoft Windows SMB tree connect response denial of service vulnerability, [Online]. Available: https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/867968.
[127] US v. Morris, No. 774, Docket 90-1336. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, 1991, vol. 928, p. 504.
[128] (May 4, 2017). BrickerBot results in PDoS attack, [Online]. Available: https://security.radware.com/ddos-threats-attacks/brickerbot-pdos-permanentdenial-of-service.
[129] A. Bohra, I. Neamtiu, et al., “Remote repair of operating system state using backdoors”, in International Conference on Autonomic Computing, 2004. Proceedings., 2004, pp. 256–263. DOI: 10.1109/ICAC.2004.1301371.
[130] S. Hariri, G. Qu, et al., “Impact analysis of faults and attacks in large-scale networks”, IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 49–54, 2003, ISSN: 1540-7993. DOI: 10.1109/MSECP.2003.1236235.
[131] (Apr. 11, 2016). Decrypting the Petya ransomware, [Online]. Available: https://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/04/11/decrypting-the-petya-ransomware/.
[132] Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and U.S. Department of Energy, “Large power transformers and the U.S. electric grid”, U.S. Department of Energy, Apr. 2014.
[133] “IEEE standard for synchrophasor measurements for power systems”, IEEE Std C37.118.1-2011 (Revision of IEEE Std C37.118-2005), pp. 1–61, 2011. DOI: 10.1109/IEEESTD.2011.6111219.
All items in Spectrum are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved. The use of items is governed by Spectrum's terms of access.
Repository Staff Only: item control page
Download Statistics
Download Statistics