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Questions for Uniqueness


Questions for Uniqueness

Lota, Kenji (2019) Questions for Uniqueness. [Graduate Projects (Non-thesis)] (Unpublished)

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In this paper, I argue that the so-called Uniqueness Thesis, or Uniqueness, is untenable because we cannot conceive of epistemic rationality as free of any practical components. Uniqueness states that given the same body of evidence, there is at most one rational doxastic attitude taken towards any proposition. Some authors, on the other hand, argue that it is rationally permissible to hold differing doxastic attitudes; call that view Permissivism. First, I provide a precise formulation for Uniqueness and evaluate some of the arguments for and against it. I show that many extant arguments against Uniqueness are question-begging and why these arguments fail. Finally, I offer a better argument against Uniqueness. My argument brings out that rational belief is not determined solely by evidence but also by the questions that guide one’s inquiry.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy
Item Type:Graduate Projects (Non-thesis)
Authors:Lota, Kenji
Institution:Concordia University
Degree Name:M.A.
Date:25 April 2019
Keywords:Uniqueness Thesis; Permissivism; Inquiry; Epistemic Rationality
ID Code:985499
Deposited By: Kenji Lota
Deposited On:06 Jun 2019 17:26
Last Modified:06 Jun 2019 17:26
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