Abstract

In this paper I examine N ̄ag ̄arjuna’s famous no-thesis view, which finds its locus classicus in verse 29 of the Vigraha-vy ̄avartan ̄ı (VV). I discuss three interpretations of the verse occurring in the literature, which I deem the dialetheist, ineffable, and semantic readings. I show that these interpretations fail to either (1) provide a convincing exegesis that is compatible with the historical background of VV 29 or (2) lend a greater cohesion to N ̄ag ̄arjuna’s overall philosophical project. I show that we must understand the verse in relation to Ny ̄aya epistemology, which the dominant interpretations have failed to fully take into consideration. I deem this approach the epistemic reading and show that it fulfills (1) and (2). Finally, drawing on Bh ̄avaviveka’s commentary on N ̄ag ̄arjuna, I argue for a positive account of Madhyamaka epistemology. The account of Madhya-maka epistemology avoids the ontological posits of Ny ̄aya epistemology while allowing for the possibility of argumentation and the use of inference.