Abstract

In this paper I build upon the capacitarian account of moral responsibility, whose main tenet is that in order to hold someone blameworthy for a wrong they commit, it must be the case that the agent could and should have known better and done otherwise. I first suggest, on grounds of fairness, that the capacitarian account is more plausible than its strongest competitors, notably the attributionist and volitionist account. Proceeding this, I argue that many of the most prominent capacitarians accounts fall short of encompassing all wrongs an agent can fairly avoid, and so proceed to offer my own amended capacitarian account that formulates an expanded conception of reasonable expectations that I argue is vital to our understanding of moral responsibility. This new formulation of reasonable expectations considers four variables specific to the agent in question: Capabilities, Environmental Influences, Access to Information, and Professionally and Socially Assumed Roles. I use these variables, in conjunction with a focus on effort and risk to define the condition for moral responsibility of a wrong. I conclude by considering some of the practical consequences of assenting to this theory of moral responsibility, and argue that despite certain uncertainties in practice, this account nonetheless leads to the humanization of those around us, even those who have wronged.