References:

Abass A (2017) Historical and political background to the Malabo Protocol. In: Werle G and Vormbaum M (eds) The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 11–28.

Abbott KW and Snidal D (2001) Hard and soft law in international governance. In: Goldstein J, Kahler M, Keohane R, et al. (eds) Legalization and World Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 37–72.

Abbott KW and Snidal D (2013) Law, legalization, and politics: an agenda for the next genera- tion of IR-IL scholars. In: Dunoff JL and Pollack M (eds) Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. New York:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 33–57.

Abbott KW, Genschel P, Snidal D, et al. (2020) Competence-control theory: the challenge of gov- erning through intermediaries. In:

Abbott KW, Zangl B, Snidal D, et al. (eds) The Governor’s Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–38.

Alter KJ (2008) Agents or trustees? International courts in their political context. European Journal of International Relations 14(1): 33–63.

Barnett MN and Finnemore M (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Beach D and Pedersen RB (2016) Causal Case Study Methods: Foundations and Guidelines for Comparing, Matching, and Tracing. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.


Bexell M, Tallberg J and Uhlin A (2010) Democracy in global governance: the promises and pit- falls of transnational actors. Global Governance 16(1): 81–101.

Boyle A and Chinkin C (2007) The Making of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bradley CA and Kelley JG (2008) The concept of international delegation. Law and Contemporary Problems 71(1): 1–36.

Brunnée J and Toope SJ (2010) Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Büthe T and Mattli W (2011) The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carpenter RC (2007) Setting the advocacy agenda: theorizing issue emergence and non-emer- gence in transnational advocacy networks. International Studies Quarterly 51(1): 99–120.

Charnovitz S (2006) Nongovernmental organizations and international law. American Journal of International Law 100(2): 348–372.

Copelovitch MS and Putnam TL (2014) Design in context: existing international agreements and new cooperation. International Organization 68(2): 471–493.

Crawford J (1995) The ILC adopts a statute for an International Criminal Court. American Journal of International Law 89(2): 404–416.

Deitelhoff N (2009) The discursive process of legalization: charting islands of persuasion in the ICC case. International Organization 63(1): 33–65.

Deya D (2012a) Is the African Court worth the wait. Open Society Justice Initiative for Southern Africa, 22 March. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/201203221081.html (accessed 1 November 2023).

Deya D (2012b) Worth the wait: pushing for the African Court to exercise jurisdiction for interna- tional crimes. OpenSpace 2: 22–26.

Durkee MJ (2016) The business of treaties. UCLA Law Review 63(2): 264–321.

Elsig M and Pollack MA (2014) Agents, trustees, and international courts: the politics of judicial appointment at the World Trade Organization. European Journal of International Relations
20(2): 391–415.

Finnemore M and Sikkink K (1998) International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization 52(4): 325–347.

George AL and Bennett A (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Glasius M (2002) Expertise in the cause of justice: global civil society influence on the statute for an International Criminal Court. In: Glasius M, Kaldor M and Anheimer H (eds) Global Civil Society Yearbook 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–168.

Grant RW and Keohane RO (2005) Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. American Political Science Review 99(1): 29–43.

Green JF and Colgan J (2013) Protecting sovereignty, protecting the planet: state delegation to international organizations and private actors in environmental politics. Governance 26(3): 473–497.

Haas PM (1992) Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization 46(1): 1–35.

Hawkins DG and Jacoby W (2006) How agents matter. In: Hawkins DG, Lake D, Nielson DL, et al. (eds) Delegation and Agency in International Organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 199–228.

Hawkins DG, Lake D, Nielson DL, et al. (2006) Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. In: Hawkins DG, Lake D, Nielson DL, et al. (eds) Delegation and Agency in International Organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–38.

Helfer LR and Meyer T (2016) The evolution of codification: a principal-agent theory of the International Law Commission’s influence. In: Bradley CA (ed.) Custom’s Future: International Law in a Changing World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 305– 331.

Helfer LR and Slaughter AM (2005) Why states create international tribunals: a response to pro- fessors Posner and Yoo. California Law Review 93(3): 899–956.

Holthoefer A (2016) Constructing international crime: lawyers, states, and the origin of interna- tional criminal prosecution in the interwar period. Law and Social Inquiry 42(3): 711–743.

Johnson T (2014) Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control Over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johnson T and Urpelainen J (2014) International bureaucrats and the formation of international organizations: institutional discretion sweetens the pot. International Organization 68(1): 177–209.

Johnstone I (2013) Law-making by international organizations: perspectives from IL/IR theory. In: Dunoff JL and Pollack M (eds)

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 266–292.

Keck ME and Sikkink K (1998) Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.

Koremenos B (2005) Contracting around international uncertainty. American Political Science Review 99(4): 549–565.

Koremenos B (2008) When, what, and why do states choose to delegate? Law and Contemporary Problems 71(1): 151–192.

Koremenos B (2016) The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koremenos B, Lipson C and Snidal D (2001) The rational design of international institutions. International Organization 55(4): 761–799.

Lewis M (2014) The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919–1950. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Liese A, Herold J, Feil H, et al. (2021) The heart of bureaucratic power: explaining international bureaucracies’ expert authority. Review of International Studies 47(3): 353–376.

Lyne MM, Nielson DL and Tierney MJ (2006) Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In: Hawkins DG,

Lake D, Nielson DL, et al. (eds) Delegation and Agency in International Organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–76.

Morrow JD and Cope KL (2021) The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: a theory of treatymaking. Journal of Theoretical Politics 33(4): 399–429.

Morse JC and Keohane RO (2014) Contested multilateralism. Review of International Organizations 9(4): 385–412.

Murungu CB (2011) Towards a criminal chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Journal of International Criminal Justice 9: 1067–1088.

Pollack MA (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rietig K (2014) “Neutral” experts? How input of scientific expertise matters in international envi- ronmental negotiations. Policy Sciences 47(2): 141–160.

Schabas WA (2007) Origins of the genocide convention: from Nuremberg to Paris. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 40: 35–56.

Schabas WA (2011) International war crimes tribunals and the United States. Diplomatic History 35(5): 769–786.

Sell SK (2003) Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snidal D and Tamm H (2018) Rational choice: from principal-agent to orchestration theory. In: Weiss TG and Wilkinson R (eds) International Organization and Global Governance. New York: Routledge, pp. 135–145.

Stimmer A and Wisken L (2019) The dynamics of dissent: when actions are louder than words. International Affairs 95(3): 515–533.

Struett MJ (2008) The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and Agency. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tallberg J, Sommerer T, Squatrito T, et al. (2013) The Opening Up of International Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson A (2009) Rational design in motion: uncertainty and flexibility in the climate regime. European Journal of International Relations 20: 1–34.

Tieku TK (2021) Punching above weight: how the African Union Commission exercises agency in politics. Africa Spectrum 56(3): 254–273.

Voeten E (2019) Making sense of the design of international institutions. Annual Review of Political Science 22: 147–163.