Abstract

In a dialogue about ostensibly about justice, Plato’s Republic has remarkably little to say about political justice: the justice between persons and within cities. The apparent discussions of politics in the main section of the dialogue (Books II to VII), I claim, serves as an analogue to show the proper ordering of the soul. Yet in this thesis, I argue that two other, disparate sections of The Republic, when read together, reveal a series of observations about political justice. In the introductory section of the text, Book I, we encounter three apparent definitions of political justice from Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus. Later, in the regression of the regimes, we encounter descriptions of cities, though these descriptions contain only passing references to justice.
I propose that the definitions of justice in Book I apply onto the three middle regimes of the Regression: the definition made for Cephalus is democratic, the definition presented Polemarchus is oligarchic, and Thrasymachus’ is timocratic. We know these sections are meant to be read together because Cephalus and Thrasymachus are representatives of the democratic and timocratic souls respectively. The synthesis of the two sections reveals a more complete description of three political justices, and offers a compelling account of the relationship between justice, politics, and desire. That being said, my approach does not conclude with a single cohesive understanding or satisfying account of political justice.