Bazmohammadi, Saeid (2025) Corporate Strategic Leadership and Hedge Fund Activism. PhD thesis, Concordia University.
![]() |
Text (application/pdf)
3MBBazmohammadi_PhD_S2025.pdf - Accepted Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 1 April 2027. Available under License Spectrum Terms of Access. |
Abstract
Over the past decades, activist hedge funds have come to the forefront of shareholder activism. Often viewed as proactive defenders of shareholder primacy, activist hedge funds acquire ownership stakes in corporations they perceive as mismanaged and advocate for changes to enhance shareholder value. This dissertation examines underexplored aspects of hedge fund activism through three essays, using a longitudinal dataset of companies listed in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index between 2000 and 2020.
The first essay, grounded in corporate strategic leadership research, investigates whether social evaluations of CEOs—fame, celebrity, and infamy—affect the likelihood of their firms being targeted by activist hedge funds. Findings suggest that firms attract increased activist attention when their CEOs receive extensive media coverage, achieve celebrity status, or become infamous. I also find that this relationship is more substantial for firms led by female CEOs.
The second essay explores the impact of hedge fund activism on board gender diversity in both targeted and non-targeted firms. Results indicate that activism is associated with declines in board gender diversity in targeted firms, and that this negative effect is mitigated when a celebrity CEO leads the company. Contrary to expectations, no evidence of spillover effects on non-targeted firms was found, and potential explanations for this finding are discussed.
The third essay examines why some firms respond to hedge fund activism with hostile resistance by adopting defensive governance provisions, such as shareholder rights plans. Drawing on upper echelons theory, I argue that CEOs’ political ideologies and power shape corporate resistance strategies against hedge fund targeting. Empirical findings partially support this argument, revealing a strong positive relationship between CEO power and the likelihood of hostile resistance.
Together, these essays contribute to the literature on shareholder activism and corporate strategic leadership, offering new insights into how CEO characteristics and governance dynamics shape firms’ interactions with activist hedge funds.
Divisions: | Concordia University > John Molson School of Business > Management |
---|---|
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) |
Authors: | Bazmohammadi, Saeid |
Institution: | Concordia University |
Degree Name: | Ph. D. |
Program: | Business Administration (Management specialization) |
Date: | 4 February 2025 |
Thesis Supervisor(s): | Jeong, Young-Chul |
Keywords: | Shareholder activism; hedge fund activism; corporate governance; strategic leadership; chief executive officers; media; social evaluations; celebrity; infamy; media visibility; board gender diveristy; hostile resistance; power; political ideology; spillover effects |
ID Code: | 995171 |
Deposited By: | Saeid Bazmohammadi |
Deposited On: | 17 Jun 2025 14:03 |
Last Modified: | 17 Jun 2025 14:03 |
References:
Acharya, A. G., Gras, D., & Krause, R. 2022. Socially oriented shareholder activism targets: Explaining activists’ corporate target selection using corporate opportunity structures. Journal of Business Ethics, 178: 307–323.Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94: 291–309.
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. 2015. Connecting the dots: Bringing external corporate governance into the corporate governance puzzle. Academy of Management Annals, 9: 483–573.
Aguilera, R. V., Federo, R., & Ponomareva, Y. 2020. Gone global: The international diffusion of hedge fund activism. Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds, 317–367.
Ahn, A. M., & Wiersema, M. 2021. Activist Hedge Funds: Beware the New Titans. Academy of Management Perspectives, 35: 96–122.
Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A., & Keim, D. B. 2019. Standing on the shoulders of giants: The effect of passive investors on activism. Review of Financial Studies, 32: 2720–2774.
Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. 2016. The product market effects of hedge fund activism. Journal of Financial Economics, 119: 226–248.
Audia, P. G., Rousseau, H. E., & Brion, S. 2022. CEO power and nonconforming reference group selection. Organization Science, 33: 831–853.
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. 2013. The behavior of individual investors. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2: 1533–1570.
Bebchuk, L. A., Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Keusch, T. 2020. Dancing with activists. Journal of Financial Economics, 137: 1–41.
Bebchuk, L.A., Brav, A., & Jiang, W. 2015. The long-term effects of hedge fund activism. Columbia Law Review, 115: 1085–1155.
Becht, M., Franks, J., Grant, J., & Wagner, H. F. 2017. Returns to hedge fund activism: An international study. Review of Financial Studies, 30: 2933–2971.
Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. 2009. Returns to shareholder activism: Evidence from a clinical study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund. Review of Financial Studies, 22: 3093–3129.
Bednar, M. K. 2012. Watchdog or lapdog? A behavioral view of the media as a corporate governance mechanism. Academy of Management Journal, 55: 131–150.
Belenzon, S., Shamshur, A., & Zarutskie, R. 2019. CEO’s age and the performance of closely held firms. Strategic Management Journal, 40: 917–944.
Benoit, D. 2014, November 25. CEOs’ test: Contending with activist investors; executives devise strategies to deal with shareholders, who are more assertive since financial crisis. Wall Street Journal.
Black, B. S., 1990. Shareholder passivity reexamined. Michigan Law Review, 89: 520–608.
Blank, S. 2017, October 30. Why GE’s Jeff Immelt lost his job: Disruption and activist investors. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from: https://hbr.org/2017/10/why-ges-jeff-immelt-lost-his-job-disruption-and-activist-investors.
Blau, P. M. 1977. Inequality and heterogeneity: A primitive theory of social structure. New York: Free Press.
Boivie, S., Bednar, M. K., Aguilera, R. V., & Andrus, J. L. 2016. Are boards designed to fail? The implausibility of effective board monitoring. Academy of Management Annals, 10: 319–407.
Bowen, H. P., Wiersema, M. F. 2004. Modeling limited dependent variables: Guidelines for researchers of strategic management. In D. J. Ketchen Jr., & D. Bergh (Eds.), Research methodology in strategy and management: 87–134. JAI/Elsevier Press: Oxford, UK.
Boyson, N. M., & Mooradian, R. M. 2011. Corporate governance and hedge fund activism. Review of Derivatives Research, 14: 169–204.
Boyson, N. M., & Pichler, P. 2019. Hostile resistance to hedge fund activism. Review of Financial Studies, 32: 771–817.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. 2010. Hedge fund activism: A review. Foundations and Trends in Finance, 4: 185–246.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. 2015a. The real effects of hedge fund activism: Productivity, asset allocation, and labor outcomes. Review of Financial Studies, 28: 2723–2769.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. 2015b. Recent advances in research on hedge fund activism: Value creation and identification. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 7: 579–595.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Ma, S., & Tian, X. 2018. How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation? Journal of Financial Economics, 130: 237–264.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F., & Thomas, R. 2008. Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance. Journal of Finance, 63: 1729–1775.
Brescoll, V. L. 2012. Who takes the floor and why: Gender, power, and volubility in organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 56: 622–641.
Brescoll, V. L., & Uhlmann, E. L. 2008. Can an angry woman get ahead?: Status conferral, gender, and expression of emotion in the workplace. Psychological Science, 19: 268–275.
Brescoll, V. L., Dawson, E., & Uhlmann, E. L. 2010. Hard won and easily lost: The fragile status of leaders in gender-stereotype-incongruent occupations. Psychological Science, 21: 1640–1642.
Briscoe, F., & Gupta, A. 2016. Social activism in and around organizations. Academy of Management Annals, 10: 671–727.
Briscoe, F., Chin, M. K., & Hambrick, D. C. 2014. CEO ideology as an element of the corporate opportunity structure for social activists. Academy of Management Journal, 57: 1786–1809.
Byron, K., & Post, C. 2016. Women on boards of directors and corporate social performance: A meta-analysis. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24: 428–442.
Certo, S. T., Busenbark, J. R., Woo, H., & Semadeni, M. 2016. Sample selection bias and Heckman models in strategic management research. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 2639–2657.
Chang, E. H., Milkman, K. L., Chugh, D., & Akinola, M. 2019. Diversity thresholds: How social norms, visibility, and scrutiny relate to group composition. Academy of Management Journal, 62: 144–171.
Chen, G., Crossland, C., & Huang, S. 2016. Female board representation and corporate acquisition intensity. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 303–313.
Chen, G., Meyer-Doyle, P., & Shi, W. 2021. Hedge fund investor activism and human capital loss. Strategic Management Journal, 42: 2328–2354.
Chen, J., & Jung, M. J. 2016. Activist hedge funds and firm disclosure. Review of Financial Economics, 29: 52–63.
Chen, S., & Feldman, E. R. 2018. Activist-impelled divestitures and shareholder value. Strategic Management Journal, 39: 2726–2744.
Cheng, C. A., Huang, H. H., & Li, Y. 2015. Hedge fund intervention and accounting conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research, 32: 392–421.
Cheng, C. A., Huang, H. H., Li, Y., & Stanfield, J. 2012. The effect of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance. Accounting Review, 87: 1493–1526.
Chin, M. K., & Semadeni, M. 2017. CEO political ideologies and pay egalitarianism within top management teams. Strategic Management Journal, 38: 1608–1625.
Chin, M. K., Hambrick, D. C., & Treviño, L. K. 2013. Political ideologies of CEOs: The influence of executives’ values on corporate social responsibility. Administrative Science Quarterly, 58: 197–232.
Cho, S. Y., Arthurs, J. D., Townsend, D. M., Miller, D. R., & Barden, J. Q. 2016. Performance deviations and acquisition premiums: The impact of CEO celebrity on managerial risk‐taking. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 2677–2694.
Christensen, D. M., Dhaliwal, D. S., Boivie, S., & Graffin, S. D. 2015. Top management conservatism and corporate risk strategies: Evidence from managers’ personal political orientation and corporate tax avoidance. Strategic Management Journal, 36: 1918–1938.
Clifford, C. P. 2008. Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14: 323–336.
Cohen, J., Cohen, P.,West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. 2003. Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Cook, A., & Glass, C. 2018. Women on corporate boards: Do they advance corporate social responsibility? Human Relations, 71: 897–924.
Core, J. E., Guay, W., & Larcker, D. F. 2008. The power of the pen and executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 88: 1–25.
Cronbach, L. J. 1951. Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16: 297–334.
Crooks, E. 2017, June 12. Immelt reshaped GE but failed to enthuse investors. Financial Times.
Daily, C. M., & Johnson, J. L. 1997. Sources of CEO power and firm financial performance: A longitudinal assessment. Journal of Management, 23: 97–117.
Dalziel, T., Gentry, R. J., & Bowerman, M. 2011. An integrated agency–resource dependence view of the influence of directors’ human and relational capital on firms’ R&D spending. Journal of Management Studies, 48: 1217–1242.
Datta, D. K., Musteen, M., & Herrmann, P. 2009. Board characteristics, managerial incentives, and the choice between foreign acquisitions and international joint ventures. Journal of Management, 35: 928–953.
David, T., Di Giuli, A., & Romec, A. 2023. CEO reputation and shareholder voting. Journal of Corporate Finance, 83: 1–23.
Davis, G. F., & Kim, E. H. 2007. Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds. Journal of Financial Economics, 85: 552–570.
de la Merced, M. J. 2017, December 8. Activist hedge fund will push for changes at Alexion pharmaceuticals. New York Times.
de la Merced, M. J., & Stevenson, A. 2014, May 6. Sotheby’s yields to hedge fund mogul and allies. New York Times.
de Villiers, C., Naiker, V., & van Staden, C. J. 2011. The effect of board characteristics on firm environmental performance. Journal of Management, 37: 1636–1663.
deHaan, E., Larcker, D., & McClure, C. 2019. Long-term economic consequences of hedge fund activist interventions. Review of Accounting Studies, 24: 536–569.
Denes, M. R., Karpoff, J. M., & McWilliams, V. B. 2017. Thirty years of shareholder activism: A survey of empirical research. Journal of Corporate Finance, 44: 405–424.
DesJardine, M. R., & Durand, R. 2020. Disentangling the effects of hedge fund activism on firm financial and social performance. Strategic Management Journal, 41: 1054–1082.
DesJardine, M. R., & Shi, W. 2023. The downside of displaying agentic values: Evidence from shareholder activism. Organization Science, 34: 1577–1601.
DesJardine, M. R., Marti, E., & Durand, R. 2021. Why activist hedge funds target socially responsible firms: The reaction costs of signaling corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management Journal, 64: 851–872.
DesJardine, M. R., Shi, W., & Marti, E. 2024. The corporate opportunity structure for shareholder activism: How activist hedge funds exploit board demographic diversity. Organization Science, 35: 644–666.
DesJardine, M. R., Shi, W., & Sun, Z. 2022. Different horizons: The effects of hedge fund activism versus corporate shareholder activism on strategic actions. Journal of Management, 48: 1858–1887.
DesJardine, M. R., Zhang, M., & Shi, W. 2023. How shareholders impact stakeholder interests: A review and map for future research. Journal of Management, 49: 400–429.
Devers, C. E., Wuorinen, S., McNamara, G., Haleblian, J. (John), Gee, I. H., et al. 2020. An integrative review of the emerging behavioral acquisition literature: Charting the next decade of research. Academy of Management Annals, 14: 869–907.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147–160.
Dobbin, F., & Jung, J. 2010. Corporate board gender diversity and stock performance: The competence gap or institutional investor bias. North Carolina Law Review, 89: 809–840.
Dwivedi, P., Misangyi, V. F., & Joshi, A. 2021. “Burnt by the spotlight”: How leadership endorsements impact the longevity of female leaders. Journal of Applied Psychology, 106: 1885–1906.
Dyck, A., Volchkova, N., & Zingales, L. 2008. The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia. Journal of Finance, 63: 1093–1135.
Eagly, A. H. 1987. Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. 2002. Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. Psychological Review, 109: 573–598.
Eagly, A. H., & Wood, W. 2012. Social role theory. Handbook of theories of social psychology, 2: 458–476.
Economist. 2015a, February 5. An investor calls; activist funds. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2015/02/05/an-investor-calls
Economist. 2015b, February 5. Capitalism’s unlikely heroes: Why activist investors are good for the public company. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/02/05/capitalisms-unlikely-heroes
Edmans, A., Fang, V. W., & Zur, E. 2013. The effect of liquidity on governance. Review of Financial Studies, 26: 1443–1482.
Engelberg, J. E., & Parsons, C. A. 2011. The causal impact of media in financial markets. Journal of Finance, 66: 67–97.
England, G. W. 1967. Personal value systems of american managers. Academy of Management Journal, 10: 53–68.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301–325.
Fang, L. H., Peress, J., & Zheng, L. 2014. Does media coverage of stocks affect mutual funds' trading and performance?. Review of Financial Studies, 27: 3441–3466.
Fang, L., & Peress, J. 2009. Media coverage and the cross‐section of stock returns. Journal of Finance, 64: 2023–2052.
Feldman, E. R., Amit, R. (Raffi), & Chen, S. 2024. Hedge fund activism in family firms. Strategic Management Journal, 45: 1273–1299.
Finkelstein, S. 1992. Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 505–538.
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. 2009. Strategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams, and boards. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fischhoff, M. 2020, June 17. Activist hedge funds hurt sustainability. Retrieved from: https://www.nbs.net/articles/activist-hedge-funds-hurt-sustainability
Fortado, L. 2017, December 26. Why activists are cheerleaders for corporate social responsibility. Financial Times.
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., Shen, Y., & Wu, Q. 2021. Do activist hedge funds target female CEOs? The role of CEO gender in hedge fund activism. Journal of Financial Economics, 141: 372–393.
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. 2008. Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95: 1450–1466.
Gantchev, N. 2013. The costs of shareholder activism: Evidence from a sequential decision model. Journal of Financial Economics, 107: 610–631.
Gantchev, N., Gredil, O. R., & Jotikasthira, C. 2019. Governance under the gun: Spillover effects of hedge fund activism. Review of Finance, 23: 1031–1068.
Gantchev, N., Sevilir, M., & Shivdasani, A. 2020. Activism and empire building. Journal of Financial Economics, 138: 526–548.
Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. 2007. The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19: 55–73.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118: 107–156.
Goranova, M., & Ryan, L. V. 2014. Shareholder activism: A multidisciplinary review. Journal of Management, 40: 1230–1268.
Graffin, S. D., Hubbard, T. D., Christensen, D. M., & Lee, E. Y. 2020. The influence of CEO risk tolerance on initial pay packages. Strategic Management Journal, 41: 788–811.
Graffin, S. D., Wade, J. B., Porac, J. F., & McNamee, R. C. 2008. The impact of CEO status diffusion on the economic outcomes of other senior managers. Organization Science, 19: 457–474.
Graf-Vlachy, L., Oliver, A. G., Banfield, R., König, A., & Bundy, J. 2020. Media coverage of firms: Background, integration, and directions for future research. Journal of Management, 46: 36–69.
Greenwood, R., & Schor, M. 2009. Investor activism and takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics, 92: 362–375.
Gupta, A. H., & Fisher, L. 2021, June 7. Surprise: Women and minorities are still underrepresented in corporate boardrooms. New York Times.
Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., & Hambrick, D. C. 2018. Evenhandedness in resource allocation: Its relationship with CEO ideology, organizational discretion, and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 61: 1848–1868.
Gupta, A., Nadkarni, S., & Mariam, M. 2019. Dispositional sources of managerial discretion: CEO ideology, CEO personality, and firm strategies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 64: 855–893.
Gupta, V. K., Han, S., Mortal, S. C., Silveri, S. (Dino), & Turban, D. B. 2018. Do women CEOs face greater threat of shareholder activism compared to male CEOs? A role congruity perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology, 103: 228–236.
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9: 193–206.
Harrison, D. A., & Klein, K. J. 2007. What’s the difference? Diversity constructs as separation, variety, or disparity in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 32: 1199–1228.
Haslam, S. A., Ryan, M. K., Kulich, C., Trojanowski, G., & Atkins, C. 2010. Investing with prejudice: The relationship between women’s presence on company boards and objective and subjective measures of company performance. British Journal of Management, 21: 484–497.
Haynes, K. T., & Hillman, A. 2010. The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1145–1163.
Hayward, M. L., Rindova, V. P., & Pollock, T. G. 2004. Believing one's own press: The causes and consequences of CEO celebrity. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 637–653.
Heckman, J. J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47: 153–161.
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Harris, I. C. 2002. Women and racial minorities in the boardroom: How do directors differ? Journal of Management, 28: 747–763.
Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., & Cannella, A. A. 2007. Organizational predictors of women on corporate boards. Academy of Management Journal, 50: 941–952.
Hoetker, G. 2007. The use of logit and probit models in strategic management research: Critical issues. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 331–343.
Hofstede, G. 1980. Culture’s consequences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hsu, T. 2017, December 15. Nelson Peltz appointed to P.&G. board, after all. New York Times.
Hubbard, T. D., Pollock, T. G., Pfarrer, M. D., & Rindova, V. P. 2018. Safe bets or hot hands? How status and celebrity influence strategic alliance formations by newly public firms. Academy of Management Journal, 61: 1976–1999.
Hymowitz, C., Kochkodin, B., & Ruhle, S. 2016, March 8. Icahn, Loeb, and other activists overlook women for board seats. Bloomberg.
Ingersoll, A. R., Glass, C., Cook, A., & Olsen, K. J. 2019. Power, status and expectations: How narcissism manifests among women CEOs. Journal of Business Ethics, 158: 893–907.
Insightia. 2023. Shareholder activism in 2022: The definitive statistical analysis of shareholder activism with data compiled, analyzed. New York: Insightia.
ISS. 2017. The impact of shareholder activism on board refreshment trends at S&P 1500 firms. Retrieved from: https://www.issgovernance.com/activism-public-companies-erodes-gender-racial-ethnic-diversity/
J.P. Morgan. 2015. The activist revolution: Understanding and navigating a new world of heightened investor scrutiny. New York: J.P. Morgan.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360.
Johnson, S. G., Schnatterly, K., & Hill, A. D. 2013. Board composition beyond independence: Social capital, human capital, and demographics. Journal of Management, 39: 232–262.
Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. A., & Gosling, S. D. 2008. Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality, and political psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3: 126–136.
Jung, H., Lee, Y. G., & Park, S. H. 2023. Just diverse among themselves: How does negative performance feedback affect boards’ expertise vs. ascriptive diversity? Organization Science, 34: 657–679.
Kahan, M., & Rock, E. B. 2007. Hedge funds in corporate governance and corporate control. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155: 1021–1093.
Kang, J., & Han Kim, A. Y. 2017. The relationship between CEO media appearances and compensation. Organization Science, 28: 379–394.
Kaniel, R., & Parham, R. 2017. WSJ category kings – The impact of media attention on consumer and mutual fund investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 123: 337–356.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. 2003. Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychological Review, 110: 265–284.
Keusch, T., 2020. Activist involvement in CEO recruiting. Working paper.
Khurana, I. K., Li, Y., & Wang, W. 2018. The effects of hedge fund interventions on strategic firm behavior. Management Science, 64: 4094–4117.
Khurana, R. 2002. Searching for a corporate savior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
King, B. G. 2008. A political mediation model of corporate response to social movement activism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 53: 395–421.
Kirca, A. H., Hult, G. T. M., Roth, K., Cavusgil, S. T., Perryy, M. Z., et al. 2011. Firm-specific assets, multinationality, and financial performance: A meta-analytic review and theoretical integration. Academy of Management Journal, 54: 47–72.
Kirsch, A. 2018. The gender composition of corporate boards: A review and research agenda. The Leadership Quarterly, 29: 346–364.
Klein, A., & Zur, E. 2009. Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other private investors. Journal of Finance, 64: 187–229.
Klein, A., & Zur, E. 2011. The impact of hedge fund activism on the target firm's existing bondholders. Review of Financial Studies, 24: 1735–1771.
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. 2013. The supply of corporate directors and board independence. Review of Financial Studies, 26: 1561–1605.
Koenig, A. M., Eagly, A. H., Mitchell, A. A., & Ristikari, T. 2011. Are leader stereotypes masculine? A meta-analysis of three research paradigms. Psychological Bulletin, 137: 616–642.
Lazard. 2020. 2019 review of shareholder activism. Retrieved from: https://www.lazard.com/media/451141/lazards-2019-review-of-shareholder-activism-vf.pdf
Lazard. 2021, January 12. Annual review of shareholder activism 2020. Retrieved from: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/25/annual-review-of-shareholder-activism/
Liekefett, K. H. 2018, June 4. The hypocrisy of hedge fund activists. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Finanical Regulation. Retrieved from: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/04/the-hypocrisy-of-hedge-fund-activists/
Lippmann, W. 1922. Public opinion. New York: Macmillan.
Lipton, M. 2013, February 26. Bite the apple; poison the apple; paralyze the company; wreck the economy. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Retrieved from: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/
Lorsch, J., & MacIver, E. 1989. Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate boards. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Love, E. G., Lim, J., & Bednar, M. K. 2017. The face of the firm: The influence of CEOs on corporate reputation. Academy of Management Journal, 60: 1462–1481.
Lovelace, J. B., Bundy, J., Hambrick, D. C., & Pollock, T. G. 2018. The shackles of CEO celebrity: Sociocognitive and behavioral role constraints on “star” leaders. Academy of Management Review, 43: 419–444.
Lovelace, J. B., Bundy, J., Pollock, T. G., & Hambrick, D. C. 2022. The push and pull of attaining CEO celebrity: A media routines perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 65: 1169–1191.
Mah, J., Kolev, K., McNamara, G., Pan, L., & Devers, C. E. 2023. Women in the c-suite: A review of predictors, experiences, and outcomes. Academy of Management Annals, 17: 586–625.
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance, 60: 2661–2700.
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. 2009. Superstar CEOs. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124: 1593–1638.
Mariconda, S., & Lurati, F. 2014. Being known: A literature review on media visibility, public prominence and familiarity with implications for reputation research and management. Corporate Reputation Review, 17: 219–236.
Marquardt, C., & Wiedman, C. 2016. Can shareholder activism improve gender diversity on corporate boards? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24: 443–461.
McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. 1972. The agenda setting function of the mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36: 176–187.
McDonnell, M.-H., & King, B. 2013. Keeping up appearances: Reputational threat and impression management after social movement boycotts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 58: 387–419.
McKinsey & Company. 2021, October 21. Closing the gender and race gaps in North American financial services. Retrieved from: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/closing-the-gender-and-race-gaps-in-north-american-financial-services#/
Merton, R. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance, 42: 483–510.
Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. C. 2004. Conceptualizing political opportunity. Social Forces, 82: 1457–1492.
Mitra, A., Post, C., & Sauerwald, S. 2021. Evaluating board candidates: A threat-contingency model of shareholder dissent against female director candidates. Organization Science, 32: 86–110.
Murray, A. 2005, December 14. Hedge funds are the new sheriffs of boardroom. Wall Street Journal.
Nielsen, S., & Huse, M. 2010. The contribution of women on boards of directors: Going beyond the surface. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18: 136–148.
Papadopoulos, K., Kalb, R., Valderrama, A., Balog, T. 2018, April 11. U.S. board study: Board diversity review. Institutional Shareholder Services. Retrieved from: https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/us-board-diversity-study.pdf.
Partnoy, F. S., & Thomas, R. S. 2007. Gap filling, hedge funds, and financial innovation. New financial instruments and institutions. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press.
Pennebaker, J. W., Booth, R. J., & Francis, M. E. 2007. LIWC 2007: Linguistic inquiry and word count. Austin, TX: liwc.net.
Peress, J. 2014. The media and the diffusion of information in financial markets: Evidence from newspaper strikes. Journal of Finance, 69: 2007–2043.
Perrault, E. 2015. Why does board gender diversity matter and how do we get there? The role of shareholder activism in deinstitutionalizing old boys’ networks. Journal of Business Ethics, 128: 149–165.
Petersen, M. A. 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22: 435–480.
Pfarrer, M. D., Pollock, T. G., & Rindova, V. P. 2010. A tale of two assets: The effects of firm reputation and celebrity on earnings surprises and investors’ reactions. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1131–1152.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource-dependence perspective. New York: Harper and Row.
Picker, L. 2016, October 4. Hedge fund targets companies’ weakness: The gender gap. New York Times.
Pollock, T. G., & Rindova, V. P. 2003. Media legitimation effects in the market for initial public offerings. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 631–642.
Pollock, T. G., Lashley, K., Rindova, V. P., & Han, J.-H. 2019. Which of these things are not like the others? Comparing the rational, emotional, and moral aspects of reputation, status, celebrity, and stigma. Academy of Management Annals, 13: 444–478.
Pollock, T. G., Mishina, Y., & Seo, Y. 2016. Falling stars: Celebrity, infamy, and the fall from (and return to) grace. In D. Palmer, K. Smith-Crowe, & R. Greenwood (Eds.), Organizational wrongdoing: Key perspectives and new directions: 235–269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pollock, T. G., Ragozzino, R., & Blevins, D. P. 2024. Not like the rest of us? How CEO celebrity affects quarterly earnings call language. Journal of Management, 50: 1198–1229.
Post, C., Rahman, N., & Rubow, E. 2011. Green governance: Boards of directors’ composition and environmental corporate social responsibility. Business & Society, 50: 189–223.
Quigley, T. J., & Hambrick, D. C. 2015. Has the “CEO effect” increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great rise in America's attention to corporate leaders. Strategic Management Journal, 36: 821–830.
Rindova, V. P., Pollock, T. G., & Hayward, M. L. 2006. Celebrity firms: The social construction of market popularity. Academy of Management Review, 31: 50–71.
Rudman, L. A., & Fairchild, K. 2004. Reactions to counterstereotypic behavior: The role of backlash in cultural stereotype maintenance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87: 157–176.
Schurman, R. 2004. Fighting “Frankenfoods”: Industry opportunity structures and the efficacy of the anti-biotech movement in Western Europe. Social Problems, 51: 243–268.
Serfling, M. A. 2014. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 25: 251–273.
Shi, W., Connelly, B. L., Hoskisson, R. E., & Ketchen, D. J. 2020. Portfolio spillover of institutional investor activism: An awareness–motivation–capability perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 63: 1865–1892.
Shi, W., Wajda, D., & Aguilera, R. V. 2022. Interorganizational spillover: A review and a proposal for future research. Journal of Management, 48: 185–210.
Shi, W., Zhang, Y., & Hoskisson, R. E. 2017. Ripple effects of CEO awards: Investigating the acquisition activities of superstar CEOs’ competitors. Strategic Management Journal, 38: 2080–2102.
Sidhu, J. S., Feng, Y., Volberda, H. W., & Van Den Bosch, F. A. J. 2021. In the shadow of social stereotypes: Gender diversity on corporate boards, board chair’s gender and strategic change. Organization Studies, 42: 1677–1698.
Singh, S. J. 2021, August 31. Boards need real diversity, not tokenism. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2021/08/boards-need-real-diversity-not-tokenism
Solal, I., & Snellman, K. 2019. Women don’t mean business? Gender penalty in board composition. Organization Science, 30: 1270–1288.
Sorkin, A. R. 2015, February 9. Do activist investors target female C.E.O.s? New York Times.
Soule, S. A. 2009. Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Swigart, K. L., Anantharaman, A., Williamson, J. A., & Grandey, A. A. 2020. Working while liberal/conservative: A review of political ideology in organizations. Journal of Management, 46: 1063–1091.
Tang, J., Crossan, M., & Rowe, W. G. 2011. Dominant CEO, deviant strategy, and extreme performance: The moderating role of a powerful board. Journal of Management Studies, 48: 1479–1503.
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. 2009. Women directors on corporate boards: A review and research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 320–337.
Tilly, C. 1978. From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Wade, J. B., Porac, J. F., Pollock, T. G., & Graffin, S. D. 2006. The burden of celebrity: The impact of CEO certification contests on CEO pay and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 49: 643–660.
Wang, M., & Kelan, E. 2013. The gender quota and female leadership: Effects of the Norwegian gender quota on board chairs and CEOs. Journal of Business Ethics, 117: 449–466.
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 2013. A behavioral theory of corporate governance: Explicating the mechanisms of socially situated and socially constituted agency. Academy of Management Annals, 7: 607–661.
Wiersema, M. F., & Bowen, H. P. 2009. The use of limited dependent variable techniques in strategy research: Issues and methods. Strategic Management Journal, 30: 679-692.
Wiersema, M., Ahn, A., & Zhang, Y. 2020. Activist hedge fund success: The role of reputation. Strategic Management Journal, 41: 2493–2517.
Wong, Y. T. F. 2020. Wolves at the door: A closer look at hedge fund activism. Management Science, 66: 2347–2371.
Wu, S. Y., & Chung, K. H. 2022. Hedge fund activism and corporate M&A decisions. Management Science, 68: 1378–1403.
Yim, S. 2013. The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior. Journal of Financial Economics, 108: 250–273.
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. 1996. Who shall succeed? How CEO/board preferences and power affect the choice of new CEOs. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 64–90.
Zavyalova, A., Pfarrer, M. D., & Reger, R. K. 2017. Celebrity and infamy? The consequences of media narratives about organizational identity. Academy of Management Review, 42: 461–480.
Zhang, J., & Luo, X. R. 2013. Dared to care: Organizational vulnerability, institutional logics, and MNCs’ social responsiveness in emerging markets. Organization Science, 24: 1742–1764.
Repository Staff Only: item control page