Abstract

Political decision-making in Nigeria is often influenced by a system of patron-client relationships, commonly referred to as Godfatherism. This study examines how political Godfathers shape the policy choices of politicians and, in turn, affect democratic accountability. By extending the Maskin and Tirole (2004) model, this paper introduces the role of campaign contributions from Godfathers as a critical
factor in affecting political choices.
The theoretical framework considers a two-period model where elected politicians choose between policies that align with public welfare or the preferences of their Godfathers. The model accounts for re-election incentives, voter awareness, and institutional strength, revealing that politicians are likelier to prioritize the Godfather’s interests over public needs when electoral accountability is weak. The study also compares three governance structures which are Direct Democracy, Judicial Power, and Representative Democracy, to evaluate which system minimizes the distortive effects of this elite influence.