Abstract

This thesis addresses the multifaceted challenges of global climate cooperation through a comprehensive analysis of international environmental agreements. It examines three critical dimensions: the formation and stability of multiple international environmental agreements, the impact of ethical considerations on climate governance, and the role of leadership in fostering cooperation on net emissions. These themes provide fresh insights into the stability and effectiveness of environmental agreements.
The first essay explores the existence and stability of multiple international environmental agreements within a two-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game framework. Utilizing a partition function form, the model enables the formation of multiple coalitions. This approach captures inter-coalition externalities and allows for a refined analysis of coalition dynamics. Findings reveal a unique stable coalition structure characterized by multiple coalitions, achieving greater pollution reduction and welfare gains compared to a single coalition outcome.
The second essay investigates the role of ethical incentives in emissions reduction and the stability of climate agreements by incorporating into a classic model a cost-function that reflects the evaluation of a country's deviation from the global emissions norm to analyze the effects on emissions, cooperation, and welfare in simultaneous coalition formation and leadership game settings. The results indicate that uniform ethical motivations across all countries are more effective at curtailing emissions and improving welfare than partial commitments. Such broad ethical alignment within a leadership framework yields higher level of cooperation. The findings underscore the critical importance of promoting ethical alignment among all countries in fostering stricter environmental policies.
The third essay examines the role of leadership in fostering cooperation on net emissions through a non-cooperative leadership game, in which decisions on net emissions and abatement are strategically decoupled into two distinct stages. It explores how variations in abatement technology and environmental damage costs affect both the size of a stable coalition and the gains from cooperation. The findings suggest that the coalition's stability is robust to changes in these key parameters. Moreover, the results indicate that when abatement is costless, countries invest substantially in reducing environmental pollution while retaining economic benefits. In contrast, when abatement becomes costly, countries are incentivized to reduce emissions directly, which lowers total welfare gains.
Together, these essays contribute to the literature on international environmental agreements by offering novel perspectives on coalition formation, leadership dynamics, and the integration of ethical incentives in addressing climate change and promoting global cooperation on pollution reduction.