Li, Xingming (2026) Shanghai Mechanism with Minority Allotments. Masters thesis, Concordia University.
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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the properties of affirmative action policies (AAPs) under the Shanghai Mechanism, a parallel admission system intermediate between Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Immediate Acceptance (IA). We employ a formal model to evaluate the Shanghai Mechanism under stylized quota-based and reserve-based AAPs. The analysis reveals several shortcomings. The mechanism fails to satisfy minimal responsiveness under both implementations, meaning stronger AAPs can harm minority students. It violates Affirmative Action fairness and within-minority fairness due to irreversible, round-based assignments, allowing lower-priority students to preempt higher-priority peers based on the choice band of their application. Consequently, the mechanism is manipulable by all students. Furthermore, we identify a trade-off: the reserve implementation is non-wasteful but fails to respect the AAP, while the quota implementation respects the AAP but is wasteful. These results indicate that parallel mechanisms introduce new structural trade-offs related to the multi-round structure rather than resolving the inherent tensions in affirmative action design.
| Divisions: | Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Economics |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
| Authors: | Li, Xingming |
| Institution: | Concordia University |
| Degree Name: | M.A. |
| Program: | Economics |
| Date: | February 2026 |
| Thesis Supervisor(s): | Pápai, Szilvia |
| Keywords: | Shanghai Mechanism, affirmative action, school choice, mechanism design, minority reserves, majority quotas, market design, Deferred Acceptance, Immediate Acceptance, matching theory |
| ID Code: | 996787 |
| Deposited By: | Xingming Li |
| Deposited On: | 29 Jun 2026 13:58 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Jun 2026 13:58 |
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