Abstract

According to the view of epistemic partiality, friendship provides the believer with a reason to adopt partial beliefs about friends, even when such beliefs are sometimes epistemically irrational. Partial beliefs seem to enhance friendship by strengthening the believer’s esteem for their friends and by contributing to the friends’ well-being. Moreover, this view applies with the intuitive force in explaining why we act partially towards friends.
In this thesis, I argue that these alleged advantages do not stand up to a closer scrutiny: the unclarity of the valence of many beliefs brings some troubling consequences for the view of epistemic partiality. Moreover, partial beliefs are not necessary for sincere partial actions to be characteristic of friendship. Along the way, I argue that we can sidestep those troubling consequences of epistemic partiality if we hold truth-aimed belief about friends. The fundamental goal when we form beliefs about friends is to form the epistemically rational ones.