Abstract

I perform a critique Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of sexuality in Phenomenology of Perception by arguing that his reification of misogynistic sexual objectification and heteronormativity is contrary to the very core of his own thought. Namely, it contradicts his conception of intersubjectivity and “encroachment” as fundamental pre-existing structures of existence. For Merleau-Ponty, every so-called individual subject emerges from a pre-existing social dimension. Sexuality uniquely highlights this intersubjective phenomenon and the ambiguity between what other thinkers might call the “subject” and “object.” By promoting a disembodied account of “normal” sexuality as sexist objectification, Merleau-Ponty undermines his very argument by failing to do his own definition of sexuality justice. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to an “essence” of femininity reinforces biological essentialism that justifies gender-based oppression. I first offer a critical analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s key structural features of the lived body in Phenomenology of Perception such as the body schema and habit body, the intentional arc, and sexuality. Next, I follow critical phenomenology and psychoanalytic feminist methodologies to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s thought, particularly his conception of sexuality, can and should be amended to properly account for sexual difference, sexual variation, and difference in general. I explore a survey of more recent contributions to phenomenological thought to show the possibilities for re-appropriation of his work, including Iris Marion Young’s essay “Throwing Like a Girl,” as an early feminist intervention highlighting the limits of the intentional arc in accounting for gender differences. However, I argue that Young’s article nevertheless remains trapped in patriarchal norms. I then argue that Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology acts as a positive contribution towards appropriating Merleau-Ponty’s thought in new directions, considering how his thought can be applied to queer orientations.