Li, Yi Lun (2026) Strategic Interactions in Corporate Finance: A Game-Theoretic Model of the Principal-Agent Problem. Masters thesis, Concordia University.
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Abstract
This study explores the principal-agent problem in corporate finance through a game-theoretic framework, analyzing strategic interactions among shareholders, creditors, and managers. I used a sequential game to model the problem by incorporating asymmetric information and economic environment factors. The model examines managerial incentives, risk-taking behavior, and compensation structures. The findings highlight the impact of incentive misalignment on corporate decision-making and propose an optimized hybrid compensation model. The results offer insights for corporate governance, suggesting strategies to balance the manager, the shareholder and the creditor’s interests, ultimately enhancing firm performance and financial stability.
| Divisions: | Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Economics |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
| Authors: | Li, Yi Lun |
| Institution: | Concordia University |
| Degree Name: | M.A. |
| Program: | Economics |
| Date: | March 2026 |
| Thesis Supervisor(s): | Li, Ming |
| ID Code: | 997105 |
| Deposited By: | Yilun Li |
| Deposited On: | 29 Jun 2026 14:23 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Jun 2026 14:23 |
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