Abstract

This paper examines the effect of in-state and out-of-state liberalization of interstate banking regulation on U.S. bank stock returns and risk during the period 1982-92. The empirical findings suggest that shareholders have a positive attitude towards laws with national provisions and a negative attitude to laws, allowing for only regional reciprocity. The bank portfolios produce positive abnormal returns around the dates when the interstate banking bill, allowing some form of reciprocity is first introduced by either the Bankers Association or state bankers, demonstrating a market enthusiasm about news of coming changes. The banks' exposure to market related risk is directly related to the degree of reciprocity granted by the home state. According to Gross State Product (GSP) figures and the number of failing banks in each state, the poorest states with the weakest banking sector tend to choose the most liberal form of interstate banking legislation. The results also reveal a drop in the actual number of banking institutions for the majority of states and an increase in the number of branches and publicly traded banks after the deregulation becomes effective.