Abstract

Friendship as a virtue has been an integral part of ethical discussions in philosophy. However, friendships between men and women have received little philosophical attention, and women were often denied this form of friendship on the basis of their sex. It is the intrinsic value placed on the friend, the direct concern for the other's good and a shared pursuit of goods that defines friendship as a virtue and gives it ethical value. This thesis defends the argument that friendship between men and women can be a virtue. This defense is achieved through the critical analysis of classical theories about friendship, and the practical application of these theories to selected examples of friendship between men and women philosophers. In contrast, philosophical theories that argued friendship between men and women were not possible were also evaluated, and the philosophical basis of these theories was questioned. The examination of particular contemporary ethical theories disclosed specific insights into a philosophical conception of friendship. These theories provided a defense of a virtue-based ethics, and the relevance of friendship within such an ethic. The importance of this topic for contemporary ethics is evident. Our current social problems easily attest to a distorted understanding of the relationship between men and women and the re-examination of this relationship has taken on a vital urgency. The conception of friendship as a virtue provides a different perspective from which to view our relations with others, and specifically between men and women