Abstract

It is the contention of this thesis that the ongoing problems Searle has encountered trying to establish a theory of mental and linguistic meaning come from a failure to properly interpret the relation between his notion of 'Background' and his theory of Intentionality. The present thesis interprets Searle's theory of meaning as naturally following from this relation, the articulation of which relies on the use of transcendental arguments. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a line of defense for Searle's theory of meaning by demonstrating the applicability of transcendental arguments. This will be accomplished by appealing to a transcendental understanding made intelligible by concentrating on Searle's notion of Background. Once this is done, much of the existing criticisms of Searle's project can be more successfully addressed. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is threefold: (1) to provide an overview of Searle's key concepts used in articulating his theory of intentional meaning (i.e. Intentionality, Background, and mental causation), (2) to look at some of the major opposition to Searle's theory and to point out the theory's major shortcomings, (3) to make explicit the transcendental arguments implicit in Searle's project and to apply them to existing criticisms of Searle's theory of meaning. It is not the goal of this thesis to defend the use of transcendental arguments within philosophy of mind, but to demonstrate that the use of transcendental arguments could greatly benefit Searle if such arguments were found to be reliable