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Diabetes, Chronic Illness and the Bodily Roots of Ecstatic Temporality

Title:

Diabetes, Chronic Illness and the Bodily Roots of Ecstatic Temporality

Morris, David (2008) Diabetes, Chronic Illness and the Bodily Roots of Ecstatic Temporality. Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 31 (4). pp. 399-421. ISSN 0163-8548

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Abstract

This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time, shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic illness, especially in children.

Divisions:Concordia University > Faculty of Arts and Science > Philosophy
Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Authors:Morris, David
Journal or Publication:Human Studies: A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences
Date:December 2008
Keywords:adherence; body; chronic illness; compliance; diabetes; ecstatic temporality; Merleau-Ponty; Heidegger; Being and Time; phenomenology
ID Code:6402
Deposited By:ANDREA MURRAY
Deposited On:23 Oct 2009 15:11
Last Modified:08 Dec 2010 18:54
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